

STUDIA PATRISTICA

VOL. LXXXVII

Papers presented at the Seventeenth International Conference
on Patristic Studies held
in Oxford 2015

Edited by
MARKUS VINZENT

Volume 13:
Augustine in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology

Edited by
JOHN T. SLOTEMAKER and JEFFREY C. WITT



PEETERS

LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT

2017

STUDIA PATRISTICA

VOL. LXXXVII

STUDIA PATRISTICA

Editor:

Markus Vinzent, King's College London and Max Weber Centre,
University of Erfurt

Board of Directors (2015):

Professor Emerita Gillian Clark, University of Bristol (Chair)

Dame Averil Cameron, University of Oxford

Professor Mark Edwards, University of Oxford

Dr Thomas Graumann, University of Cambridge

Professor Carol Harrison, University of Oxford

Dr Neil McLynn, University of Oxford

Professor Josef Lössl, Cardiff University

Professor Morwenna Ludlow, University of Exeter

Dr Yannis Papadogiannakis, King's College London

Dr David Taylor, University of Oxford

Professor Markus Vinzent, King's College London and Max Weber Centre,
University of Erfurt

Professor Theodore de Bruyn, University of Ottawa (AIEP)

Professor Susanna Elm, University of California, Berkeley (NAPS)

STUDIA PATRISTICA


VOL. LXXXVII

Papers presented at the Seventeenth International Conference
on Patristic Studies held
in Oxford 2015

Edited by
MARKUS VINZENT

Volume 13:
Augustine in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology

Edited by
JOHN T. SLOTEMAKER and JEFFREY C. WITT



PEETERS

LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT

2017

© Peeters Publishers — Louvain — Belgium 2017
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form.

D/2017/0602/148
ISBN: 978-90-429-3583-9
eISBN: 978-90-429-5642-1

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Printed in Belgium by Peeters, Leuven

Table of Contents

David C. FINK & John T. SLOTEMAKER <i>In Memoriam</i> David C. Steinmetz	1
John T. SLOTEMAKER & Jeffrey C. WITT Introduction	3
John T. SLOTEMAKER The Reception of Augustine's Thought in the Later Middle Ages: A Historiographical Introduction	5
Peter EARDLEY Augustinian Science or Aristotelian Rhetoric? The Nature of Theology According to Giles of Rome	23
Bernd GOEHRING Giles of Rome on Human Cognition: Aristotelian and Augustinian Principles	35
Christopher M. WOJTULEWICZ The Reception of Augustine in the Theology of Alexander de Sancto Elpidio	47
Graham McALEER 1277 and the Sensations of the Damned: Peter John Olivi and the Augustinian Origins of Early Modern Angelism	59
Florian WÖLLER The Bible as Argument: Augustine in the Literal Exegesis of Peter Auriol (c. 1280-1322) and Nicholas of Lyra (c. 1270-1349).....	67
Severin V. KITANOV Richard FitzRalph on Whether Cognition and Volition are Really the Same: Solving an Augustinian Puzzle.....	81
Simon NOLAN Augustine in Richard FitzRalph (c. 1300-1360)	95
Jack HARDING BELL Loving Justice: Cicero, Augustine, and the Nature of Politics in Robert Holcot's <i>Wisdom of Solomon</i> Commentary.....	109

John T. SLOTEMAKER	
Peter Lombard's Inheritance: The Use of Augustine's <i>De Trinitate</i> in Gregory of Rimini's Discussion of the Divine Processions	123
John W. PECK	
Gregory of Rimini's Augustinian Defense of a World <i>ab aeterno</i>	135
Jeffrey C. WITT	
Tradition, Authority, and the Grounds for Belief in Late Fourteenth- Century Theology	147
Pekka KÄRKKÄINEN	
Augustinian, Humanist or What? Martin Luther's Marginal Notes on Augustine.....	161
David C. FINK	
Bullshitting Augustine: Patristic Rhetoric and Theological Dialectic in Philipp Melanchthon's <i>Apologia</i> for the Augsburg Confession	167
Ueli ZAHND	
The Early John Calvin and Augustine: Some Reconsiderations	181

Abbreviations

AA.SS	see ASS.
AAWG.PH	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen Philologisch-historische Klasse, Göttingen.
AB	Analecta Bollandiana, Brussels.
AC	Antike und Christentum, ed. F.J. Dölger, Münster.
ACL	Antiquité classique, Louvain.
ACO	Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum, ed. E. Schwartz, Berlin.
ACW	Ancient Christian Writers, ed. J. Quasten and J.C. Plumpe, Westminster (Md.)/London.
AHDLMA	Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, Paris.
AJAH	American Journal of Ancient History, Cambridge, Mass.
AJP	American Journal of Philology, Baltimore.
AKK	Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht, Mainz.
AKPAW	Abhandlungen der königlichen Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin.
ALMA	Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Bulletin du Cange), Paris/Brussels.
ALW	Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft, Regensburg.
AnalBoll	Analecta Bollandiana, Brussels.
ANCL	Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Edinburgh.
ANF	Ante-Nicene Fathers, Buffalo/New York.
ANRW	Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, ed H. Temporini <i>et al.</i> , Berlin.
AnSt	Anatolian Studies, London.
AnThA	Année théologique augustinienne, Paris.
APOT	Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English, ed. R.E. Charles, Oxford.
AR	Archivum Romanicum, Florence.
ARW	Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, Berlin/Leipzig.
ASS	Acta Sanctorum, ed. the Bollandists, Brussels.
AThANT	Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Zürich.
Aug	Augustinianum, Rome.
AugSt	Augustinian Studies, Villanova (USA).
AW	Athanasius Werke, ed. H.-G. Opitz <i>et al.</i> , Berlin.
AZ	Archäologische Zeitung, Berlin.
BA	Bibliothèque augustinienne, Paris.
BAC	Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid.
BASOR	Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, New Haven, Conn.
BDAG	A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd edn F.W. Danker, Chicago.
BEHE	Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Paris.
BETL	Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, Louvain.
BGL	Benedictinisches Geistesleben, St. Ottilien.
BHG	Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca, Brussels.
BHL	Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina Antiquae et Mediae Aetatis, Brussels.

BHO	Bibliotheca Hagiographica Orientalis, Brussels.
BHTh	Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, Tübingen.
BJ	Bursians Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertums- wissenschaft, Leipzig.
BJRULM	Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester.
BKV	Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, ed. F.X. Reithmayr and V. Thalhofer, Kempten.
BKV2	Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, ed. O. Bardenhewer, Th. Schermann, and C. Weyman, Kempten/Munich.
BKV3	Bibliothek der Kirchenväter. Zweite Reihe, ed. O. Bardenhewer, J. Zel- linger, and J. Martin, Munich.
BLE	Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique, Toulouse.
BoJ	Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn.
BS	Bibliotheca sacra, London.
BSL	Bolletino di studi latini, Naples.
BWAT	Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament, Leipzig/Stuttgart.
Byz	Byzantion, Leuven.
BZ	Byzantinische Zeitschrift, Leipzig.
BZNW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, Berlin.
CAr	Cahiers Archéologique, Paris.
CBQ	Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Washington.
CChr.CM	Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis, Turnhout/Paris.
CChr.SA	Corpus Christianorum, Series Apocryphorum, Turnhout/Paris.
CChr.SG	Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, Turnhout/Paris.
CChr.SL	Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Turnhout/Paris.
CH	Church History, Chicago.
CIL	Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, Berlin.
CP(h)	Classical Philology, Chicago.
CPG	Clavis Patrum Graecorum, ed. M. Geerard, vols. I-VI, Turnhout.
CPL	Clavis Patrum Latinorum (SE 3), ed. E. Dekkers and A. Gaar, Turnhout.
CQ	Classical Quarterly, London/Oxford.
CR	The Classical Review, London/Oxford.
CSCO	Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Louvain. Aeth = Scriptores Aethiopici Ar = Scriptores Arabici Arm = Scriptores Armeniaci Copt = Scriptores Coptici Iber = Scriptores Iberici Syr = Scriptores Syri Subs = Subsidia
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Vienna.
CSHB	Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, Bonn.
CTh	Collectanea Theologica, Lvov.
CUF	Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Asso- ciation Guillaume Budé, Paris.
CW	Catholic World, New York.
DAC	Dictionary of the Apostolic Church, ed. J. Hastings, Edinburgh.

DACL	see DAL
DAL	Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie, ed. F. Cabrol, H. Leclercq, Paris.
DB	Dictionnaire de la Bible, Paris.
DBS	Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément, Paris.
DCB	Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines, ed. W. Smith and H. Wace, 4 vols, London.
DHGE	Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique, ed. A. Baudrillart, Paris.
Did	Didaskalia, Lisbon.
DOP	Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Cambridge, Mass., subsequently Washington, D.C.
DOS	Dumbarton Oaks Studies, Cambridge, Mass., subsequently Washington, D.C.
DR	Downside Review, Stratton on the Fosse, Bath.
DS	H.J. Denzinger and A. Schönmetzer, ed., Enchiridion Symbolorum, Barcelona/Freiburg i.B./Rome.
DSp	Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, ed. M. Viller, S.J., and others, Paris.
DTC	Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and E. Amann, Paris.
EA	Études augustinienes, Paris.
ECatt	Enciclopedia Cattolica, Rome.
ECQ	Eastern Churches Quarterly, Ramsgate.
EE	Estudios eclesiasticos, Madrid.
EECh	Encyclopedia of the Early Church, ed. A. Di Berardino, Cambridge.
EKK	Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, Neukirchen.
EH	Enchiridion Fontium Historiae Ecclesiasticae Antiquae, ed. Ueding-Kirch, 6th ed., Barcelona.
EO	Échos d'Orient, Paris.
EtByz	Études Byzantines, Paris.
ETL	Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, Louvain.
EWNT	Exegetisches Wörterbuch zum NT, ed. H.R. Balz <i>et al.</i> , Stuttgart.
ExpT	The Expository Times, Edinburgh.
FC	The Fathers of the Church, New York.
FGH	Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin.
FKDG	Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Göttingen.
FRL	Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Göttingen.
FS	Festschrift.
FThSt	Freiburger theologische Studien, Freiburg i.B.
FTS	Frankfurter theologische Studien, Frankfurt a.M.
FZThPh	Freiburger Zeitschrift für Theologie und Philosophie, Freiburg/Switzerland.
GCS	Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller, Leipzig/Berlin.
GDV	Geschichtsschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit, Stuttgart.
GLNT	Grande Lessico del Nuovo Testamento, Genoa.
GNO	Gregorii Nysseni Opera, Leiden.

GRBS	Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
GWV	Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, Offenburg.
HbNT	Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. Tübingen.
HDR	Harvard Dissertations in Religion, Missoula.
HJG	Historisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft, successively Munich, Cologne and Munich/Freiburg i.B.
HKG	Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, Tübingen.
HNT	Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, Tübingen.
HO	Handbuch der Orientalistik, Leiden.
HSCP	Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Cambridge, Mass.
HTR	Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, Mass.
HTS	Harvard Theological Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
HZ	Historische Zeitschrift, Munich/Berlin.
ICC	The International Critical Commentary of the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, Edinburgh.
ILCV	Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres, ed. E. Diehl, Berlin.
ILS	Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, ed. H. Dessau, Berlin.
J(b)AC	Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Münster.
JBL	Journal of Biblical Literature, Philadelphia, Pa., then various places.
JdI	Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Berlin.
JECS	Journal of Early Christian Studies, Baltimore.
JEH	The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, London.
JJS	Journal of Jewish Studies, London.
JLH	Jahrbuch für Liturgik und Hymnologie, Kassel.
JPTh	Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie, Leipzig/Freiburg i.B.
JQR	Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia.
JRS	Journal of Roman Studies, London.
JSJ	Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Period, Leiden.
JSOR	Journal of the Society of Oriental Research, Chicago.
JTS	Journal of Theological Studies, Oxford.
KAV	Kommentar zu den apostolischen Vätern, Göttingen.
KēTh	Kerk en Theologie, 's Gravenhage.
KJ(b)	Kirchliches Jahrbuch für die evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Gütersloh.
LCL	The Loeb Classical Library, London/Cambridge, Mass.
LNPF	A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. P. Schaff and H. Wace, Buffalo/New York.
L(O)F	Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, Oxford.
LSJ	H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, new (9th) edn H.S. Jones, Oxford.
LThK	Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, Freiburg i.B.
MA	Moyen-Âge, Brussels.
MAMA	Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua, London.
Mansi	J.D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, Florence, 1759-1798. Reprint and continuation: Paris/Leipzig, 1901-1927.
MBTh	Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie, Münster.

MCom	Miscelanea Comillas, Comillas/Santander.
MGH	Monumenta germaniae historica. Hanover/Berlin.
ML	Mediaevalia Lovaniensia, Louvain.
MPG	See PG.
MSR	Mélanges de science religieuse, Lille.
MThZ	Münchener theologische Zeitschrift, Munich.
Mus	Le Muséon, Louvain.
NGWG	Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen.
NH(M)S	Nag Hammadi (and Manichaean) Studies, Leiden.
NovTest	Novum Testamentum, Leiden.
NPNF	See LNPF.
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version.
NRTh	Nouvelle Revue Théologique, Tournai/Louvain/Paris.
NTA	Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen, Münster.
NT.S	Novum Testamentum Supplements, Leiden.
NTS	New Testament Studies, Cambridge/Washington.
OBO	Orbis biblicus et orientalis, Freiburg, Switz.
OCA	Orientalia Christiana Analecta, Rome.
OCP	Orientalia Christiana Periodica, Rome.
OECS	Oxford Early Christian Studies, Oxford.
OLA	Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, Louvain.
OLP	Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica, Louvain.
Or	Orientalia. Commentarii editi a Pontificio Instituto Biblico, Rome.
OrChr	Oriens Christianus, Leipzig, then Wiesbaden.
OrSyri	L'Orient Syrien, Paris.
PG	Migne, Patrologia, series graeca.
PGL	A Patristic Greek Lexicon, ed. G.L. Lampe, Oxford.
PL	Migne, Patrologia, series latina.
PLRE	The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, ed. A.H.M. Jones <i>et al.</i> , Cambridge.
PLS	Migne, Patrologia, series latina. Supplementum ed. A. Hamman.
PO	Patrologia Orientalis, Paris.
PRE	Paulys Realenzyklopädie der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft, Stuttgart.
PS	Patrologia Syriaca, Paris.
PTA	Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen, Bonn.
PTHr	Princeton Theological Review, Princeton.
PTS	Patristische Texte und Studien, Berlin.
PW	Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. G. Wissowa, Stuttgart.
QLP	Questions liturgiques et paroissiales, Louvain.
QuLi	Questions liturgiques, Louvain
RAC	Rivista di Archeologia Cristiana, Rome.
RACH	Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, Stuttgart.
RAM	Revue d'ascétique et de mystique, Paris.
RAug	Recherches Augustiniennes, Paris.
RBen	Revue Bénédictine, Maredsous.
RB(ibl)	Revue biblique, Paris.

RE	Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, founded by J.J. Herzog, 3e ed. A. Hauck, Leipzig.
REA(ug)	Revue des études Augustiniennes, Paris.
REB	Revue des études byzantines, Paris.
RED	Rerum ecclesiasticarum documenta, Rome.
RÉL	Revue des études latines, Paris.
REG	Revue des études grecques, Paris.
RevSR	Revue des sciences religieuses, Strasbourg.
RevThom	Revue thomiste, Toulouse.
RFIC	Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica, Turin.
RGG	Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. Gunkel-Zscharnack, Tübingen
RHE	Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, Louvain.
RhMus	Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Bonn.
RHR	Revue de l'histoire des religions, Paris.
RHT	Revue d'Histoire des Textes, Paris.
RMAL	Revue du Moyen-Âge Latin, Paris.
ROC	Revue de l'Orient chrétien, Paris.
RPh	Revue de philologie, Paris.
RQ	Römische Quartalschrift, Freiburg i.B.
RQH	Revue des questions historiques, Paris.
RSLR	Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa, Florence.
RSPT, RSPH	Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, Paris.
RSR	Recherches de science religieuse, Paris.
RTAM	Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, Louvain.
RthL	Revue théologique de Louvain, Louvain.
RTM	Rivista di teologia morale, Bologna.
Sal	Salesianum, Roma.
SBA	Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, Basel.
SBS	Stuttgarter Bibelstudien, Stuttgart.
ScEc	Sciences ecclésiastiques, Bruges.
SCh, SC	Sources chrétiennes, Paris.
SD	Studies and Documents, ed. K. Lake and S. Lake. London/Philadelphia.
SE	Sacris Erudiri, Bruges.
SDHI	Studia et documenta historiae et iuris, Roma.
SH	Subsidia Hagiographica, Brussels.
SHA	Scriptores Historiae Augustae.
SJMS	Speculum. Journal of Mediaeval Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
SM	Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktinerordens und seiner Zweige, Munich.
SO	Symbolae Osloenses, Oslo.
SP	Studia Patristica, successively Berlin, Kalamazoo, Leuven.
SPM	Stromata Patristica et Mediaevalia, ed. C. Mohrman and J. Quasten, Utrecht.
SQ	Sammlung ausgewählter Quellenschriften zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Tübingen.
SQAW	Schriften und Quellen der Alten Welt, Berlin.
SSL	Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Louvain.

StudMed	Studi Medievali, Turin.
SVigChr	Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, Leiden.
SVF	Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. J. von Arnim, Leipzig.
TDNT	Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Mich.
TE	Teologia espiritual, Valencia.
ThGl	Theologie und Glaube, Paderborn.
ThJ	Theologische Jahrbücher, Leipzig.
ThLZ	Theologische Literaturzeitung, Leipzig.
ThPh	Theologie und Philosophie, Freiburg i.B.
ThQ	Theologische Quartalschrift, Tübingen.
ThR	Theologische Rundschau, Tübingen.
ThWAT	Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament, Stuttgart.
ThWNT	Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Stuttgart.
ThZ	Theologische Zeitschrift, Basel.
TLG	Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
TP	Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Lancaster, Pa.
TRE	Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Berlin.
TS	Theological Studies, New York and various places; now Washington, D.C.
TThZ	Trierer theologische Zeitschrift, Trier.
TU	Texte und Untersuchungen, Leipzig/Berlin.
USQR	Union Seminary Quarterly Review, New York.
VC	Vigiliae Christianae, Amsterdam.
VetChr	Vetera Christianorum, Bari (Italy).
VT	Vetus Testamentum, Leiden.
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary, Waco.
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, Tübingen.
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vienna.
YUP	Yale University Press, New Haven.
ZAC	Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum, Berlin.
ZAM	Zeitschrift für Aszese und Mystik, Innsbruck, then Würzburg.
ZAW	Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, Giessen, then Berlin.
ZDPV	Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins, Leipzig.
ZKG	Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, Gotha, then Stuttgart.
ZKTh	Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Vienna.
ZNW	Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche, Giessen, then Berlin.
ZRG	Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, Weimar.
ZThK	Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen.

In Memoriam David C. Steinmetz

David C. FINK, Greenville, USA
John T. SLOTEMAKER, Fairfield, USA

David Curtis Steinmetz (1936-2015) is best known as an intellectual historian of the Reformation era, but anyone who ever studied with him or read much of his scholarship can attest to his insistence that the theological debates of the sixteenth century were only intelligible in light of the Western Church's protracted struggle to come to terms with the legacy of St. Augustine. A master of fine-grained textual analysis, Steinmetz had no patience for the sort of sweeping generalizations that so often tempt historians, in his words, 'to soar above the sources'. He would probably have scowled, for example, at any attempt to characterize (in the manner of Alfred North Whitehead) the Latin theological tradition as a series of footnotes to Augustine. Yet, his work contains much that testifies to the abiding significance of the bishop of Hippo's ideas for theological developments in the later Middle Ages. In his book on *Luther and Staupitz*, for example, Steinmetz set out a typology of late medieval Augustinianism, listing five different ways in which the term is used by historians of the period: first, as a description of the theology of the Latin West in general; second, as the theology of the Augustinian Order; third, with reference to a group of theologians within the Augustinian Order who purportedly were more faithful to Augustine's teaching than other, merely nominal, Augustinians of their Order; fourth, a tendency to embrace the more controversial aspects of Augustine's teaching, especially on predestination and concupiscence, with little or no concession to popular scruples; and fifth, the embodiment, in contrast with Pelagianism, of a theological tendency within Christian thought which transcended the original thought of either figure. The debates of later eras in the Latin West cannot be reduced to the reception history of Augustine's writings, but neither can they be understood apart from it.

In this regard, Steinmetz carried forward the legacy of his own *Doktorvater*, Heiko Augustinus Oberman, the Dutch scholar who firmly re-anchored the intellectual history of the Reformation in the later Middle Ages. Despite a disagreement over the existence of a purported *schola moderna Augustiniana*, which (according to Oberman) mediated an Augustinian theology of grace to the young Luther through his mentor, Johannes von Staupitz, both men agreed on the fundamental importance of late medieval Augustinianism as the theological matrix for the *initia Lutheri*. But, as his divergence from Oberman indicates, Steinmetz insisted both on the pervasiveness of Augustine's influence, and on

the diffuse ways in which Augustine's ideas were transformed by appropriation. In that sense, to describe Latin theology as 'Augustinian' is both as true and as imprecise as describing it as 'Pauline'. Augustine's authority was so well established as to be beyond direct challenge, but only careful attention to the specific ways in which his texts were read and reinterpreted in different contexts can make sense of the bewildering breadth of late medieval 'Augustinianisms' – a neologism which would certainly have drawn a scowl!

It is therefore fitting that the editors of this volume on the reception history of Augustine's thought dedicate the essays herein to the memory of David Steinmetz. A careful reader of late medieval texts, a probing critic of confessionally-driven historiography, and a scholar committed to situating texts in their wider intellectual contexts, he would have read these essays with interest. Several of the contributors in this volume studied with David Steinmetz during his long career at Duke University, and many more knew him personally. All were influenced, in one way or another, by his labors to reinvigorate the intellectual history of Christian theology. These essays are dedicated in loving memory to a judicious scholar, a dedicated teacher, and a generous friend.

Introduction

John T. SLOTEMAKER, Fairfield, USA

Jeffrey C. WITT, Baltimore, USA

In the second week of August 2015, a group of scholars came together in the idyllic setting of Merton College at Oxford University. The group met as a workshop within the *XVIIth International Conference on Patristics Studies* and its goal was to engage in research and reflection on how the works and ideas of Augustine of Hippo (†430) impacted the development of philosophy and theology in the late Middle Ages.

Founded in 1264 by Walter de Merton (†1277), Merton College is one of the constituent colleges of Oxford University and was the academic home of numerous medieval intellectuals, including Thomas Wilton, Walter Burley, the Mertonian Calculators (*i.e.*, Thomas Bradwardine, William Heytesbury, Richard Swineshead, and John Dumbleton), John Wyclif, and the great librarian, Sir Thomas Bodley. While not all of these thinkers are known for their Augustinianism, Thomas Bradwardine's massive *De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum* is perhaps the most famous appeal for a 'return' to Augustine in the late Middle Ages. Likewise, the theological, scriptural, and political treatises of John Wyclif are clearly influenced by a deep appreciation for Augustine, leading his followers to call him 'John, son of Augustine'.¹ It was fitting, therefore, that Merton College was the location for a discussion of the reception of Augustine's thought in the late Middle Ages.

Augustine's obvious ubiquity in the Middle Ages makes it easy to think we know and can adequately describe his impact. The truth, however, is quite the opposite. While it is known that Augustine was wildly influential in the late medieval period, our knowledge of how this impact was made remains meager. The fourteenth century, in particular, still remains understudied both generally and with respect to the reception of Augustine. However, as J.A. Robson wrote, 'it is hard to think of any century ... more soaked in Augustine than the fourteenth'.² Thus, at present, there is still much we don't know about the availability of sources and the use and re-use of key passages or quotations. Nor do we have a very clear picture of how these sources were interpreted or how these interpretations were received and developed. In an effort to expand

¹ J.A. Robson, *Wyclif and the Oxford Schools. The Relation of the 'Summa de ente' to Scholastic Debates at Oxford in the Later Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1961), 25.

² *Ibid.*

our knowledge of this reception, we asked participants to develop short papers exploring how a particular idea, theme, or passage from Augustine's corpus influenced late medieval thought. This volume is the result of that conversation.

We are grateful to Gillian Clark and Markus Vinzent for including our workshop in the *XVIIth International Conference on Patristic Studies*. Thanks also to Merton College, Oxford for hosting the workshop. Finally, thanks are due to the presenters for their contributions and efforts on behalf of this volume.

Note on Citations and Practices

The present volume follows the practice of providing a full citation for both primary and secondary sources the first time a work is referenced (as there is no comprehensive bibliography for individual articles or the volume as a whole). With respect to Latin citations it should be noted that individual authors have maintained their own standards with respect to orthography (some authors retaining the late medieval and renaissance spelling and punctuation, while others have standardized throughout).

The names of medieval scholars presents a challenge and individual authors have addressed it in various ways. In brief, when a name has a commonly accepted English equivalent, authors have been encouraged to follow such usage (e.g., Peter Lombard and Adam Wodeham, not Petrus Lombardus and Adamus Goddamus, etc.). However, for more obscure figures (e.g., Petrus Gracilis or Alexander de Sancto Elpidio) authors have tended to follow the Latin spellings. Finally, individual authors have also abbreviated the titles of medieval works in various ways, thus one can find Gregory of Rimini's *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum* abbreviated differently (e.g., *Lect.* or *Super Primum*, etc.). In the footnotes to primary sources we have recorded the textual divisions introduced by the author, followed by the modern pagination and line numbers in parentheses: e.g., Gregory of Rimini, *Lect.* I, d.13, q.1 (198, ll. 21-3). If there are no textual divisions in a given work, the modern pagination and line numbers are provided without parentheses.

The Reception of Augustine's Thought in the Later Middle Ages: A Historiographical Introduction

John T. SLOTEMAKER, Fairfield, USA

ABSTRACT

This essay presents a historiographical introduction to the reception of Augustine's thought in the late medieval and early modern periods. First, the article considers three historiographical approaches developed by Damasus Trapp, Adolar Zumkeller, and Heiko Augustinus Oberman. Building on this general background, it is argued that the search for Augustine's influence in the late medieval period has often been overshadowed by the search for Martin Luther's Reformation breakthrough, such that the historiography of Augustine's reception has been 'confessionalized' in the literature (a confessionalization that begins in the sixteenth century and extends into the modern period). Second, the article concludes by making two suggestions for how modern scholars can move beyond the 'confessionalization' that has dominated the historiography on 'Augustinianism' since the sixteenth century.

*All medieval theologians are, in some measure at least, Augustinian theologians.
The question is not whether a theologian is indebted to Augustine but rather
what is the degree and nature of his indebtedness.¹*

The reception of Augustine in Western thought has been an active field of research in the past few decades, as witnessed by the continuous stream of companions, encyclopedias, and handbooks dedicated to the subject. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to catalog the reception of Augustine is *The Oxford*

¹ David C. Steinmetz, *Misericordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes von Staupitz in its Late Medieval Setting* (Leiden, 1968), 33. In *Luther and Staupitz. An Essay in the Intellectual Origins of the Protestant Reformation* (Durham, 1980), 13-5, David Steinmetz articulates five meanings of the term 'Augustinian'. This essay remains a useful point of departure for a discussion of the term 'Augustinian' understood in a theological sense. Eric L. Saak, *Creating Augustine. Interpreting Augustine and Augustinianism in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 2012), 9, unfairly claims that 'Steinmetz has been too narrow minded' in his categories because he has emphasized the theological reception of Augustine to the exclusion of the philosophical, political, etc. Steinmetz is clear, however, that he is not discussing all possible uses of the term, but limiting himself to 'five different senses in which this term is used by historians' (13). Further, it ought to be clear to the reader of Steinmetz that his focus is on the theological uses of the term.

Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine.² This three volume work examines Augustine's influence in the fields of political theory, ethics, music, education, semiotics, literature, philosophy, psychology, religion, and popular culture and demonstrates both the significant achievements that have been made in recent decades, as well as the complexity of the subject and the limitations that scholars confront. Modern research on the reception of Augustine in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has focused primarily on the development of certain lines of philosophical and theological influence.³ This is evidenced by the fact that the majority of the articles dedicated to thirteenth-, fourteenth-, and fifteenth-century thinkers in *The Oxford Guide* treat a few central philosophical and theological positions and the degree to which they are either in agreement or disagreement with the teachings of Augustine. However, this is a particular methodological choice. In the end, the search for Augustine's influence, or 'Augustinianism', or an Augustinian school of thought, is the product of modern historiography.⁴

² Volker H. Drecoll (ed.), *Augustin Handbuch* (Tübingen, 2007); Allan D. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids, 1999); David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine* (Cambridge, 2nd ed. 2014); C.C. Pecknold and Tarmo Toom (eds), *The T&T Clark Companion to Augustine and Modern Theology* (London, 2013); Karla Pollmann and Willemien Otten (eds), *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 2013); Mark Vessey (ed.), *A Companion to Augustine* (Oxford, 2012). On the reception of the patristic Fathers more generally, see Irena Backus (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1997). See also, Heiko A. Oberman and Frank A. James III (eds), *Via Augustini: Augustine in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation. Essays in Honor of Damasus Trapp*, O.S.A. (Leiden, 1991); Kenneth Hagen (ed.), *Augustine, The Harvest, and Theology (1300-1650): Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of His Sixtieth Birthday* (Leiden, 1990); Edward B. King (ed.), *Saint Augustine and His Influence in the Middle Ages* (Sewanee, TN, 1988); Cornelius Petrus Mayer and Willigis Eckermann (eds), *Scientia Augustiniana: Studien über Augustinus, den Augustinismus und den Augustinerorden* (Würzburg, 1975).

³ E.L. Saak has argued for an alternative methodological approach (see the works referenced in fn. 4 below). For a discussion focusing on theological influence, see Christopher Ocker, 'Augustinianism in Fourteenth-Century Theology', *Augustinian Studies* 18 (1987), 81-106. A more historical approach can be found in Irena Backus, *Historical Method and Confessional Identity in the Era of the Reformation (1378-1615)* (Leiden, 2003), 7-15; William J. Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England* (Princeton, 1987), 307-24; *id.*, 'Augustinianism at Oxford in the Fourteenth Century', *Augustiniana* 30 (1980), 58-70; Irena Backus, *Historical Method and Confessional Identity in the Era of the Reformation (1378-1615)* (Leiden, 2003), 7-15.

⁴ The best historiographical essays remain Manfred Schulze, 'Via Gregorii in Forschung und Quellen', in Heiko A. Oberman (ed.), *Gregor von Rimini: Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation* (Berlin 1981), 1-126; and D.C. Steinmetz, *Luther and Staupitz* (1980). See also Eric L. Saak's historiographical approach as developed in *High Way to Heaven. The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation, 1292-1524* (Leiden, 2002), 683-735; *id.*, 'The Reception of Augustine in the Later Middle Ages', in *The Reception of the Church Fathers* (1997), I 367-404; *id.*, *Creating Augustine* (2012), 1-21; and *id.*, 'Augustin(ian)ism', in *The Oxford Guide* (2013), II 596-8.

The present essay is primarily historiographical and develops a two pronged argument: first, I argue that the historiography dedicated to the reception of Augustine's thought in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has been narrowly focused on the reception of his doctrine of grace and redemption (to the exclusion of other philosophical or theological topics); and, second, I argue that this emphasis on certain topics, to the exclusion of others, should be balanced with a broader textual approach that attends more closely to the practices of citation in the late medieval period. I develop this argument by considering several historiographical trends within the study of the reception of Augustine's thought; however, I limit the discussion to historiographical developments that have studied or attempted to describe explicitly philosophical and theological debates often located in the *Sentences* commentary tradition.⁵ This approach is adopted because the essays that comprise the present volume are focused on the reception of Augustine's philosophical theology.

1. Three models

The reception of Augustine and 'Augustinianism' in the late medieval period is often discussed along historiographical models developed by Damasus Trapp (OSA, †1996), Adolar Zumkeller (OSA, †2011), and Heiko Augustinus Oberman (†2001).⁶ These models have been influential on modern scholarship and continue to shape the present debates. Among these models one can observe a progressive development, such that Zumkeller builds on the earlier developments of Trapp, and Oberman builds on the previous models of both Trapp and

⁵ E.L. Saak is correct that a comprehensive study of the influence of Augustine must expand beyond the *Sentences* commentary tradition. However, since this is the primary focus of the essays in the present volume, I am limiting the present discussion to this material. See E.L. Saak, *High Way* (2002), 698-9. On the *Sentences* commentary tradition see Philipp W. Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's Sentences*, Rethinking the Middle Ages 2 (Ontario, 2007); Gillian Evans (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Volume 1, Current Research* (Leiden, 2002); Philipp W. Rosemann (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Volume 2* (Leiden, 2010); *id.* (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Volume 3* (Leiden, 2015).

⁶ Here I follow E.L. Saak, 'The Augustinian Renaissance', *The Oxford Guide* (2013), I 63. Of course, prior to these three models one should note Alphons Victor Müller, *Luthers theologische Quellen: Seine Verteidigung gegen Denifle und Grisar* (Giessen, 1912). The work of Müller followed, in many ways, the work of Karl Werner (see the following fn.). Related to Müller and Werner, one should also see: Eduard Stakemeier, *Der Kampf um Augustin. Augustinus und die Augustiner auf dem Tridentinum* (Paderborn, 1937); Carl Stange, 'Über Luthers Beziehungen zur Theologie seines Ordens', *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift* 11 (1900), 574-85; *id.*, 'Luther über Gregor von Rimini', *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift* 13 (1902), 721-7. Much of this older scholarship has been strongly criticized and thus will not be discussed here. For a critique of this literature, see Denis R. Janz, *Luther and Late Medieval Thomism: A Study in Theological Anthropology* (Waterloo, 1983), 158-65, and the sources therein.

Zumkeller. Oberman's model, for better or worse, has been the most influential narrative (in English language scholarship) that attempts to bridge the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries (over and against Trapp, who limited his discussion to the fourteenth century).

Damasus Trapp argued that there is a clear distinction between a traditional (*i.e.* older) Augustinian school and a modern Augustinian school (*schola Augustiniana moderna*).⁷ The historical point of departure, according to Trapp, is Thomas of Strasbourg who he refers to as the 'last Augustinian of Aegidius' and Gregory of Rimini who he refers to as the 'first Augustinian of Augustine'.⁸ The first school persisted from the time of Giles of Rome (*i.e.* Aegidius Romanus) (†1316) until Thomas of Strasbourg (†1357) and was characterized by the *cognitio universalis*. Conversely, the *Schola Augustiniana moderna* persisted from the time of Gregory of Rimini (†1358) until the close of the fourteenth century and was characterized by the *cognitio rei particularis* and a historico-critical attitude (as opposed to a logico-critical attitude).⁹ Trapp argued that the distinctive feature of the modern school was an 'astounding mastery over the sources of theology both ancient and contemporary'¹⁰ and a profound engagement with the texts of Augustine.¹¹

In his recent historiographical studies Eric Saak has observed that Trapp's analysis of the *Schola Augustiniana moderna* is often confused in the literature with the theories of Adolar Zumkeller and Heiko Oberman. Zumkeller, building on Trapp, argued that there was a distinct Augustinian School (*Augustiner-schule*) in the late Middle Ages.¹² Here he attempts to describe the distinct

⁷ The Catholic Austrian theologian Karl Werner (†1888) is given credit for writing the first monograph on 'Augustinianism' (*Der Augustinismus*) in the late Middle Ages. Werner distinguished between two distinct traditions within the Augustinian Order. He argued that the first tradition began with Giles of Rome and was characterized by a particular affective approach to theology that was wedded to a strong Aristotelianism. The second tradition was founded by Gregory of Rimini (following William of Ockham) and was characterized by a reaction to Giles' Aristotelianism and the claim that theology is a practical science. Thus, Werner distinguishes between two movements within the Order (what Saak calls Order-specific Augustinianism) as well as between these two movements and the rise of anti-Pelagianism in Thomas Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini. As such, there is a link between the approaches of Trapp and Werner. See Karl Werner, *Der Augustinismus in der Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters* (Vienna, 1883). See also E.L. Saak, *High Way* (2002), 684, fn. 1. For an extensive discussion of the Augustinian Order see, Rudolf Arbesmann, *Der Augustiner-Eremitenorden und der Beginn der humanistischen Bewegung* (Würzburg, 1965).

⁸ Damasus Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Booklore', *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), 146-274.

⁹ D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology' (1956), 181-4.

¹⁰ D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology' (1956), 185.

¹¹ See also, Damasus Trapp, 'Hiltalinger's Augustinian Quotations', *Augustiniana* 4 (1954), 412-49; *id.*, 'Gregory of Rimini's Manuscripts, Editions and Additions', *Augustiniana* 8 (1958), 425-43; *id.*, 'Harvest of Medieval Theology', *Augustinianum* 5 (1965), 147-51.

¹² Adolar Zumkeller, 'Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters. Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre', *Analecta Augustiniana* 27 (1964), 167-262. The essay is translated in John

theological, philosophical, and spiritual aspects characteristic of the *Ordo eremitarum sancti Augustini* (OESA). While Zumkeller agrees with Trapp that there is an important shift in the mid-fourteenth century – beginning with Gregory of Rimini – he sees this not ‘as a break with the theological direction of doctrine traditional in the Order’ but as a re-emphasis on anti-Pelagianism and Augustine’s doctrine of grace in the face of new semi-Pelagian challenges.¹³ Thus, Zumkeller presents a broader and more unitive view than Trapp by emphasizing similar theological themes that one can find throughout the members of the OESA from Giles of Rome until the end of the fifteenth century.

As David Steinmetz has argued, Heiko Oberman built on the research of Trapp and Zumkeller to examine the influence of ‘late medieval Augustinianism’ on the development of Martin Luther’s (†1546) early theology and his relationship to Johann von Staupitz (†1524).¹⁴ Oberman argued that beginning with Gregory of Rimini one could identify the origins of a *schola moderna Augustiniana* (modern Augustinian school). According to Oberman, the unique combination of nominalism, humanism, and Augustinianism within the *schola moderna Augustiniana* had a significant influence on Luther’s theological development: ‘both nominalism and humanism [were] domesticated and put into the service of a new Augustinian theology’.¹⁵ On this view nominalism was the ‘prolegomena’ to the tradition with its emphasis on the world of the senses and its relation to scientific investigation; similarly, humanist methodology contributed to the emergence of a new Augustinian theology through the search for the *mens Augustini* and a return to Augustine as the source (*fons*). Therefore, the development of an authentic *schola moderna Augustiniana* – here defined theologically as an emphasis on justification by faith alone – was combined with nominalism and humanism to form a unique theological tradition

E. Rotelle (ed.), *Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages* (Villanova, Pa., 1996), 11-79. I cite the English translation. See also, Adolar Zumkeller, *Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremitenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken* (1966).

¹³ A. Zumkeller, *Theology and History* (1996), 40.

¹⁴ D.C. Steinmetz, *Luther and Staupitz* (1980), 23-7, 23. Steinmetz developed an important critique of Oberman’s method that has been accepted by subsequent scholarship and is relevant to the present discussion. Steinmetz focuses his critique on Heiko A. Oberman, ‘Headwaters of the Reformation: *Initia Lutheri* – *Initia Reformationis*’, in Heiko A. Oberman (ed.), *The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought* (Leiden, 1986), 39-83, and my account is informed by Steinmetz’ reading. Oberman developed his thesis further in *Werden und Wertung der Reformation. Vom Wegestreit zum Glaubenskampf* (Tübingen, 1977); translated by Dennis Martin as *Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence of a New Intellectual Climate in Europe* (Cambridge, 1981). While Oberman is sometimes critical of Alphons V. Müller’s, *Luthers theologische Quellen. Seine Verteidigung gegen Denifle und Grisar* (Giessen, 1912), the work of Müller seems to have influenced his own reading of the period. For a critique of A.V. Müller, see Dennis Janz, ‘Towards a Definition of Late Medieval Augustinianism’, *The Thomist* 44 (1980), 117-27; *id.*, *Luther and Late Medieval Thomism* (1983), 158-65, here 159-60.

¹⁵ For this paragraph, see H.A. Oberman, ‘Headwaters’ (1986), 79-80; and D.C. Steinmetz, *Luther and Staupitz* (1980), 23-4.

that extended from Gregory of Rimini to Martin Luther (alternatively referred to by Oberman as the *via Gregorii*). Oberman concludes by arguing that one ‘can point to the *schola Augustiniana moderna*, initiated by Gregory of Rimini, reflected by Hugolino of Orvieto, apparently spiritually alive in the Erfurt Augustinian monastery, and transformed into a pastoral reform-theology by Staupitz ... for the inception of the *theologia vera* at Wittenberg’.¹⁶

The work of Oberman extends chronologically the previous work of Trapp and Zumkeller who were more modest in their claims and did not attempt, primarily, to link the ‘Augustinian school’ with the Protestant Reformation and Martin Luther’s early theology of grace and human redemption. That said, these three accounts of late medieval ‘Augustinianism’ agree that beginning with Gregory of Rimini one can trace a distinct Augustinian school associated with the Augustinian Order. However, Trapp, Zumkeller, and Oberman disagree about the historical parameters of the *schola* (Trapp limiting it to the fourteenth century, while Zumkeller extends it into the fifteenth and Oberman into the sixteenth) as well as its distinctive philosophical and theological positions (Trapp emphasizing philosophical positions, Zumkeller and Oberman emphasizing specific theological doctrines). While these narratives have been substantively challenged by subsequent scholarship, they continue to exert influence on scholarly approaches to the reception of Augustine in the late medieval period.¹⁷ In particular, the attempt to understand the relationship between the theology of Gregory of Rimini, Johann von Staupitz, and Martin Luther has had a considerable influence on what aspects of Augustine’s theology modern researchers have focused on in terms of defining an authentic ‘Augustinianism’.

2. Martin Luther, his sources, and the confessionalization of Augustine

In discussions of the influence of Augustine’s thought in the medieval Christian West, well-intentioned authors often quote the late Jaroslav Pelikan as stating that ‘the history of the West is but “a series of footnotes” to Augustine’.¹⁸ The late Pelikan, however, was neither so imprecise nor ahistorical in his approach. Pelikan wrote that the Latin-Western debate about Augustine’s doctrine of grace and Pelagianism/semi-Pelagianism, ‘since Orange has oscillated

¹⁶ H.A. Oberman, ‘Headwaters’ (1986), 77.

¹⁷ While the general consensus in secondary scholarship has been that a search for a late medieval *schola Augustiniana moderna* is, in fact, not a helpful approach to the material (or in fact, that it is probable that an identifiable *schola Augustiniana moderna* – understood in a narrowly theological sense – never existed in the fifteenth century), it has continued to be supported by Alister E. McGrath, *The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2004), 82-8, 99-102, and 107-12.

¹⁸ E.g., C.C. Pecknold and Tarmo Toom in the introduction to *The T&T Clark Companion to Augustine* (2013), xii.

between ... two poles, and we shall have to write its history ... as a "series of footnotes" to Augustine'.¹⁹ What he argued, therefore, is that the long history of the predestinarian controversy in the Latin West following the Council of Orange (529) could be narrated as a set of footnotes to Augustine, but Pelikan was not arguing that *all* of Western theology is a set of footnotes to Augustine. This anecdote is illustrative because what Pelikan recognized – and is usually passed over by his commentators – is that Augustine's reception, and its historiography, are often focused acutely on specific theological topics.

The study of the reception of Augustine's thought in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has been partially fueled, in the past century, by the search for the sources of Martin Luther's theology and the Protestant Reformation broadly conceived.²⁰ This is perhaps clearest in the extensive treatment that Johann von Staupitz has received by scholars who have attempted to trace the origins of Luther's Reformation breakthrough: *i.e.*, the Wittenberg reformer's doctrine of justification by faith alone (*sola fide*).²¹ There is a virtual cottage industry focused on analyzing the origins of Martin Luther's early theology, and this scholarly endeavor has influenced the historiography treating the reception of Augustine in the late medieval period.

The 'center' or 'heart' of Luther's theology is understood – in textbooks on Luther or introductions to the Reformation – to be his radical re-thinking of the righteousness of God and the nature of justification.²² Protestant historiography has been quick to argue that Luther rejected the semi-Pelagian tendencies of late medieval theologians such as William of Ockham and Pierre d'Ailly in favor of Augustine's doctrine of grace. Thus, Bernhard Lohse writes that

¹⁹ Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, vol. 1: *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600)* (Chicago, 1971), 330.

²⁰ A similar historiographical development can be found in Calvin scholarship. This claim is grounded in Calvin's own narrative about the relationship between Reformation theology and the early Church Fathers. See, John Calvin, *Responsio ad Sadoleti epistolam*, eds G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss, in *Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia* 5, Corpus Reformatorum 33 (Braunschweig, 1866), 385-416. See also Anthony N.S. Lane, *John Calvin: Student of the Church Fathers* (Edinburgh, 1999); and Johannes van Oort, 'John Calvin and the Church Fathers', in *The Reception of the Church Fathers* (2001), II 661-700.

²¹ The German Lutheran theologian Theodor Kolde published an extensive monograph on Staupitz and late medieval German Augustinians (*id.*, *Die deutsche Augustiner-Congregation und Johann von Staupitz. Ein Beitrag zur Ordens und Reformationsgeschichte* [Gotha, 1879]). This was followed by the German Lutheran Pastor and Assyriologist Alfred Jeremias' study, *Johannes von Staupitz, Luthers Vater und Schüler: sein Leben, sein Verhältnis zu Luther und eine Auswahl aus seinen Schriften* (Berlin, 1926). More recently see D.C. Steinmetz, *Misericordia Dei* (1968); *id.*, *Luther and Staupitz* (1980); Markus Wriedt, *Gnade und Erwählung: Eine Untersuchung zu Johann von Staupitz und Martin Luther* (Mainz, 1991); and Adolar Zumkeller, *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters* (Würzburg, 1984).

²² See Bernhard Lohse, *Martin Luther's Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Development*, trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis, 1999), 85-95.

‘Augustine gained significance precisely through his radical doctrine of grace ... [such that] Augustine became all but the antipode to Occam’.²³ Our interest here is not in the veracity of such narrations of medieval intellectual history, but in precisely how this historiographical trajectory has shaped the field of Augustine reception.

The centrality of particular theological questions regarding the origin of Luther’s theology is evident, for example, in the numerous works by Heiko Oberman. Oberman defended the thesis throughout his career that Martin Luther was, in essence, a late medieval theologian and that his thought should be understood in dialogue with the late medieval period. This thesis is developed most eloquently in Oberman’s *Luther: Mensch zwischen Gott und Teufel*.²⁴ Oberman’s thesis involved the notion that certain late medieval thinkers (close followers of Augustine) should be understood as ‘forerunners’ to the Reformation,²⁵ and his earlier studies of Thomas Bradwardine and Gabriel Biel developed this approach.²⁶

In his monograph on Bradwardine’s *De causa Dei*, Oberman argued that Bradwardine was a conservative Augustinian theologian who sought to counter the semi-Pelagianism of theologians such as William of Ockham, Robert Holcot, and Adam Wodeham. As Saak has observed, Oberman is careful in this work to refute the thesis of Adolf von Harnack that Bradwardine influenced Luther’s theology by means of Wycliffe, Hus, and Gregory of Rimini.²⁷ However, in subsequent publications Oberman would return to the question – *Thomas Bradwardine: un précurseur de Luther?*²⁸ – and develop the theory, discussed above, which argued that the *schola moderna Augustiniana* was the proximate cause of Luther’s theology. While Oberman’s approach to Bradwardine’s thought remains a defensible methodology within the field of late medieval theology, it had un-intended historiographical consequences. Saak writes:

Although Oberman recognized the broader scope of the ‘historical Augustine’, his emphasis on Bradwardine’s anti-Pelagian Augustinianism became the defining characteristic

²³ B. Lohse, *Martin Luther’s Theology* (1999), 23.

²⁴ Heiko A. Oberman, *Luther: Mensch zwischen Gott und Teufel* (Berlin, 1983).

²⁵ See also Heiko A. Oberman, *Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought*, trans. Paul L. Nyhus (New York, 1966), 123–41, where he defends the claim that theologians such as Gregory of Rimini and Johannes Staupitz should be considered forerunners of Luther’s doctrine of justification. For a criticism of this approach see Alister E. McGrath, ‘Forerunners of the Reformation? A Critical Examination of the Evidence for Precursors of the Reformation Doctrines of Justification’, *HTR* 75 (1982), 219–42.

²⁶ Heiko A. Oberman, *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine: A Fourteenth Century Augustinian. A Study of His Theology in its Historical Context* (Utrecht, 1958); *id.*, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Cambridge, 1963).

²⁷ E.L. Saak, *Creating Augustine* (2012), 40–2.

²⁸ Heiko A. Oberman, ‘Thomas Bradwardine: un précurseur de Luther?’, *Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuse* 40 (1960), 146–51.

of a 'late medieval Augustinianism' to the extent that Manfred Schulze ... claimed the anti-Pelagian Augustine as the only authentic 'historical' Augustine.²⁹

This approach, as Saak observes, has its roots in earlier narratives that extend as far back as Adolph von Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte*.³⁰

The search for Martin Luther's 'reformation breakthrough' has been acutely focused on the theology of Augustine. Thus, one reads that 'Augustine was the figure who became of utmost importance to Luther. Having studied his works most diligently, Luther preferred him over all other scholastics, turning him King's evidence for his reformational renewal'.³¹ This emphasis on tracing the relationship between Augustine's doctrine of grace and Martin Luther's theology of *sola fide* and *sola gratia* has engendered extensive studies of late medieval soteriology.³² This emphasis on soteriology is evident in bibliographic studies on the Augustinian Hermits and the reception of Augustine in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and early sixteenth centuries. Consider, for instance, Egon Gindele's bibliography (extending up through the mid-1970s) examining the history and theology of the Augustinian Hermits.³³ What is evident in his catalog is that modern research dedicated to late medieval 'Augustinianism' – and the reception of Augustine broadly understood – has focused on certain theological themes to the exclusion of others. The focus of modern research, as Gindele observes, has been doctrinal topics that have been debated between Catholics and Protestants and have been the focus of understanding Luther's break with Rome: e.g., *Mariologie* (Mariology), *Ekklesiologie* (ecclesiology), *Gnadenlehre* (the doctrine of grace), and *Rechtfertigungslehre* (the doctrine of

²⁹ E.L. Saak, *Creating Augustine* (2012), 42. See also M. Schulze, 'Via Gregorii' (1981), 1-126.

³⁰ E.L. Saak, *Creating Augustine* (2012), 42, fn. 74. Adolf von Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vols. 6 & 7, trans. Neil Buchanan (New York, 1961), 307-8, argues – in a chapter on the 'Revision of Augustinianism' – that 'Bradwardine was the first to take again a strong stand [against Pelagianism], and after his time, the reaction never again disappeared, but slowly gathered strength in the fifteenth century, till the time of Wesel and Wessel, Cajetan and Contarini, till the time of Luther and the Decrees of Trent'. Bradwardine, according to Harnack, defends the 'genuine Augustinianism'.

³¹ Albrecht Beutel, 'Luther's Life', in Donald K. McKim (ed.), *A Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther* (Cambridge, 2003), 5.

³² There are numerous studies one could list here, but in particular see Berndt Hamm, *Pro-missio, Pactum, Ordinatio: Freiheit und Selbstbindung Gottes in der scholastischen Gnadenlehre*, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 54 (Tübingen, 1977); id., *The Reformation of Faith in the Context of Late Medieval Theology and Piety: Essays by Berndt Hamm* (Leiden, 2004). Of course, this is not to say I disagree with Hamm's approach; the point here is that the emphasis on finding the sources of Luther's Reformation breakthrough has fueled extensive research into the study of late medieval soteriology (much of this literature, though not all, considers the relationship between Augustine and late medieval theology).

³³ Egon Gindele, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte und Theologie des Augustiner-Eremitenordens bis zum Beginn der Reformation* (Berlin, 1977), 294-302, catalogues 75 entries (2527-2602) that deal with the influence of the Augustinian tradition or Augustine on the young Luther.

justification). Of these theological themes, Gindele notes that Mariology is treated in 30 studies, ecclesiology 50 studies, the doctrine of grace 28 studies, and the doctrine of justification 16 studies.³⁴ By contrast, the subjects of *Gotteslehre* (doctrine of God) and *Trinitätslehre* (doctrine of the Trinity) account for only 5 and 2 studies respectively.³⁵ What this demonstrates is that the modern studies recorded in Gindele's bibliography often limit their analysis of Augustine's influence to specific theological topics that were disputed between the Reformers and Rome.³⁶ The cumulative impact of this body of literature is such that it gives the impression that Augustine's reception in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries is limited to select theological themes (in this sense, the *anti-Pelagian Augustine* is understood as the only authentic *historical Augustine*).

The 'Confessionalization' of Augustine

The search for the sources of Luther's reformation breakthrough has had a significant influence on the historiography of Augustine's reception; however, it belies a broader historiographical trend that has its origins in the sixteenth century: the 'confessionalization' of Augustine. Here it is instructive to observe not only the confessionalization of Augustine that occurred in the sixteenth century, but, in particular, the confessionalization of modern historiography.

Irena Backus has argued that the:

fragmentation of the Church into 'Papists' and 'Antipapists' during the sixteenth century inevitably entailed a 'conessionalization' of [Augustine] in the sense that each side in the religious conflict wanted to claim him as their doctor, and so to claim the status of the universal Church by an appropriation of him.³⁷

However, as Backus argues, one must be cautious in overemphasizing and simplifying the nature of this reception. For example, in his study of *Calvin*

³⁴ E. Gindele, *Bibliographie* (1977), 108-11 (1042-1071), 111-9 (1072-1121), 119-22 (1122-1149), and 122-4 (1150-1165).

³⁵ E. Gindele, *Bibliographie* (1977), 104-5 (1011-1017).

³⁶ I. Backus, *Historical* (2003), 6, argues that in her analysis of the church between 1378 and 1580 she will develop an approach – 'a counter point to the work of Trapp, Zumkeller and especially Oberman' – that goes beyond the search for Luther's sources. However, one could argue that by choosing to focus on ecclesiology she is, in fact, remaining more faithful to the precedent set by Oberman than it might first appear.

³⁷ Irena Backus, 'The "Confessionalization" of Augustine in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation', *The Oxford Guide* (2013), I 74-82, 74-5. While not focused on Augustine *per se*, also see *ead.*, *Historical Method* (2003). See also Richard A. Muller, 'Augustinianism in the Reformation', *Augustine Through the Ages* (1999), 705-7; and Arnoud S.Q. Visser, *Reading Augustine in the Reformation: The Flexibility of Intellectual Authority in Europe, 1500-1620* (Oxford, 2011). The argument here is that this 'Confessionalization' of Augustine has profoundly influenced the historiography.

and Augustine the Presbyterian theologian Benjamin B. Warfield argued in a problematically simplified way that the 'Reformation, inwardly considered, was just the ultimate triumph of Augustine's doctrine of grace over Augustine's doctrine of the Church'³⁸ – a triumphalist claim that, in the end, grounds the 'Reformation discovery' in the work of Augustine of Hippo. Warfield, it must be recognized, is not an outlier here, as some modern historians of the Reformation still give credence to this basic theory.³⁹ Further, there is good precedence for such arguments in the sixteenth century, as John Calvin himself argued in his letter to Bishop Sadoletto that 'all we [*i.e.*, the Reformers] have attempted has been to renew that ancient form of the church'.⁴⁰ More explicitly, in the third book of the *Institutes*, Calvin stated that *plane nobiscum est Augustinus* ('clearly Augustine is with us [*i.e.*, the Reformers]').⁴¹ What is important for our immediate purposes is, again, not the veracity of such claims, but the historiographical fact that the search for the influence of Augustine's thought has been debated along confessional lines and has led to a confessionalization of both early modern and modern research. Here it is perhaps instructive to consider a couple of specific examples.

Backus argues that up until the present the received view has been that 'the Reformation adopted the late anti-Pelagian [Augustine] to defend its doctrines of the bondage of the will and predestination, while Catholics defended [Augustine's] early view of free will as genuine'.⁴² While such narratives find grounding in the fact, for example, that Philip Melancthon mandated that the theological curriculum at Wittenberg include some of Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings (*e.g.*, *De spiritu et littera*), they problematically simplify the complexity of the Reformation debates.⁴³ However, as Backus notes, this narrative has been generally accepted throughout much modern scholarship and has focused

³⁸ Benjamin B. Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine* (Philadelphia, 1956), 332. A proponent of a Calvinism grounded in the *Westminster Confession*, Warfield defended a theological 'Augustinianism' that argued for a strong doctrine of grace and double predestination, linking, in the end, Augustine's theology of grace with Calvin's.

³⁹ See Diarmid MacCulloch, *The Reformation* (New York, 2003), 108, and his positive use of Warfield's quotation and his subsequent claim that the debate during the Reformation was 'a debate in the mind of long-dead Augustine'.

⁴⁰ John Calvin, *Responsio ad Sadoleti epistolam*, eds G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss, in *Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia* 5, Corpus Reformatorum 33 (Braunschweig, 1866), 385–416, 394. Strong claims for the relationship between Calvin and Augustine can be found in Jan Marius J. Lange van Ravenswaay, *Augustinus totus noster: das Augustinverständnis bei Johannes Calvin* (Göttingen, 1990); and Luchsius Smits, *Saint Augustin dans l'œuvre de Jean Calvin*, 2 vols. (Assen, 1957–1958).

⁴¹ See, John Calvin, *Institutio Christianae Religionis*, eds G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss, in *Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia* 2, Corpus Reformatorum 30 (Braunschweig, 1864), 3.4.33 (485).

⁴² I. Backus, 'The "Confessionalization" of Augustine' (2013), I 75. For her critique – which I agree with but cannot discuss here – see I 76–7.

⁴³ I. Backus, 'The "Confessionalization" of Augustine' (2013), I 76.

a considerable amount of scholarly energy on analyzing both Augustine's soteriology as well as its reception in the late medieval and early modern periods. Here the confessionalization of the historiography is transparent as the history of the debate demonstrates considerable scholarly energy invested in defending particular readings of Augustine.

The historical confessionalization of Augustine persisted throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Augustine's doctrine of grace was a topic of heated dispute both between ecclesial traditions and within them.⁴⁴ For example, the seventeenth century saw numerous controversies over the correct interpretation of Augustine's soteriology.⁴⁵ Within the Catholic Church the Jesuits and Dominicans debated the theology of the Jesuit Luis de Molina (†1600) for over a century and, at the heart of the debate, was a disagreement about Augustine's theology of grace.⁴⁶ Similarly, the Louvain professor Cornelius Jansen (†1638) sparked controversy and debate by defending what – according to his detractors within the Catholic Church – amounted to a 'Calvinist' reading of Augustine.⁴⁷ Jansenists remained a distinct group within the Catholic Church throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such that within the Catholic tradition the theology of Augustine remained a point of intra-ecclesial conflict. Simultaneously, a similar internal debate threatened to tear asunder the Reformed churches. The Dutch professor Jacobus Arminius (†1609) sparked controversy when he argued that John Calvin's interpretation of Augustine was not consistent with the teachings of Augustine himself (in particular, his early writings). At the Synod of Dordt (1618-1619) the Reformed Churches rejected the theology of Arminius and argued that it was a version of Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism. However, the specter of Arminianism would linger on the Continent, England, and North America up through the eighteenth century.

The disagreements about Augustine's theology of grace, however, have not been limited to intra-ecclesial debates. The Syncretistic Controversy (*Synkretistischer Streit*) that originated with the German Lutheran Georg Calixtus (†1656) involved a heated debate about how, precisely, to interpret Augustine's doctrine of predestination. While the Syncretistic Controversy was certainly an intra-ecclesial debate, it also generated ongoing disagreements between Lutherans and the Reformed over how to interpret Augustine's theology of grace.

⁴⁴ See Jean-Louis Quantin and Scott Mandelbrote, 'Augustine in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *The Oxford Guide* (2013), I 83-96.

⁴⁵ See J.-L. Quantin and S. Mandelbrote, 'Augustine' (2013), I 84-8, for further examples of the debates over Augustine's theology of grace.

⁴⁶ For a recent introduction to Molina, see Kirk R. MacGregor, *Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge* (Grand Rapids, 2015).

⁴⁷ At the heart of the debate was the work by Cornelius Jansen, *Augustinus. Seu doctrina S. Augustini de humanae naturae sanitate, aegritudine, medicina adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses* (Louvain, 1640).

In short, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the debate about Augustine's theology of grace continued to divide Anglicans, Lutherans, the Reformed, and Catholics.⁴⁸

This ongoing 'confessionalization' of Augustine throughout the early modern and modern periods has had a continued influence on late medieval historiography as it relates to a search for 'Augustinianism' (however that term is defined). As argued above, the search for Luther's sources (or those of Calvin, the English Church, or the doctrinal statements at the Council of Trent) in the late medieval period has often been focused on certain theological themes that were, and continue to be, the source of theological disagreement between the various confessional identities.

3. Looking beyond the historiography

It is not possible to provide here a comprehensive roadmap to guide subsequent studies in the late medieval reception of Augustine's philosophy and theology. Instead, I want to suggest two approaches that could open up the field to new areas of research and contribute to a more balanced account of Augustine's reception in the late Middle Ages.

Beyond the sources of the Reformation

The first approach modern scholars should adopt is to allow the late medieval sources to *speak for themselves*: that is, scholars should be guided by what is found in the text, and not by the preoccupations and trends of past and present historiography. While this, one could argue, ought to be the method of any historian, here we can examine the doctrine of the Trinity as an interesting test case. Martin Luther famously stated in the *Smalcald Articles* that his disagreement with Rome was not about the Trinity or Incarnation. Luther was correct in this regard and this simple fact has had an impact on the study of Augustine's reception – *i.e.*, there is no extensive historiographical debate that seeks to distinguish between various late medieval trinitarian theologies on the grounds that one is perhaps more Augustinian than another. In short, because there was not a confessionally contested intra-Western debate focused on trinitarian doctrine, there has been no corresponding body of research defending a given position as the *truly* Augustinian inheritance. And this is what one finds in the literature in two ways: (1) because late medieval trinitarian theology was not disputed in the early modern debates along ecclesial/confessional divides,

⁴⁸ For a clear delineation of the various theological positions, see Eugene Teselle, 'Grace', *The Oxford Guide* (2013), II 1061-75, 1067-72.

there has been little research on the topic;⁴⁹ and (2) the research on late medieval trinitarian theology that does exist is not focused on the reception of Augustine (*i.e.*, whether a given author is in line with Augustine's trinitarian theology, or not).⁵⁰

Yet, the fact that there is almost no research on the influence of Augustine's *De Trinitate* in the late medieval period is a bit odd. If one focuses on the theological influence of Augustine in late medieval scholastic theology one must begin with Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Peter Lombard's *Sentences* was the textbook for teaching theology within the medieval universities and the source of numerous quotations from Augustine. The Lombard quotes Augustine 680 times in the *Sentences* [compare against Ambrose (66 citations), Hilary (63 citations), Jerome (48 citations), Gregory the Great (41 citations), *et al.*],⁵¹ of which almost half, 310 to be precise, are from Augustine's *De Trinitate*.⁵² The closest work,

⁴⁹ When compared to studies of grace, ecclesiology, etc., the study of the doctrine of God and the Trinity in the late medieval and early modern periods is remarkably underdeveloped.

⁵⁰ On the development of late medieval trinitarian theology, see Russell L. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology Among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 2013); *id.*, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge, 2010); and Michael Schmaus, *Der 'Liber propugnatorius' des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, II Teil: Die trinitarischen Lehرداریfferenzen* (Münster, 1930). It is also worth considering the more focused studies of David Albertson, *Mathematical Theologies: Nicholas of Cusa and the Legacy of Thierry of Chartres* (Oxford, 2014); Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (Aldershot, 2005); J.T. Paasch, *Divine Production in Late Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham* (Oxford, 2012); and Martijn Schrama, *Gabriel Biel en zijn leer over de allerheiligste drievuldigheid volgens het eerste boek van zijn Collectorium* (Munich, 1981). What these books attest to (largely by omission) is that there is relatively little direct scholarship on the reception of Augustine in late medieval trinitarian theology. Of course this is not intended as a criticism of the above scholars and their work, it is simply that the story of late medieval trinitarian theology has not been told through the lens of Augustine reception (for better or worse).

Further, it must be noted that a generally negative view of late medieval theology continues to muddy the waters. See, *e.g.*, the comments of Roland Kany regarding Ockham's trinitarian theology and the fourteenth century in general. He writes, '[f]or William of Ockham any teaching on the Trinity was impossible; the *similitudines* between divine and human spheres on which some of the central arguments in [*De Trinitate*] are built are in Ockham only imaginable as relations between symbols. At this time theology and philosophy had developed into two separate disciplines; as a consequence [*De Trinitate*] did not seem to be understandable any more'; *id.*, 'De Trinitate', *The Oxford Guide* (2013), I 387-99, 91. See *id.*, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken. Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu 'De Trinitate'* (Tübingen, 2007), 361 and 405-8, for a discussion of Ockham and Gabriel Biel.

⁵¹ Jacques-Guy Bougerol, 'The Fathers and the *Sentences*', in *The Reception of the Church Fathers* (1997), I 113-64, 115.

⁵² J.-G. Bougerol, 'The Fathers and the *Sentences*' (1997) I 122-4. This, despite the fact that Peter Lombard did not have direct access to *De Trinitate* and compiled his quotations from the *Expositio* of Florus of Lyons. Peter Lombard had access to the complete texts of: *De doctrina Christiana*, *Enchiridion*, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, and *Retractationes*. For all other citations

in terms of citations, is from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* (129 citations).⁵³ Stated differently, there are more citations from Augustine's *De Trinitate* in the *Sentences* than there are from the combined works of Ambrose, Hilary, Jerome, and Gregory the Great. A similar pattern is found in the *Sentences* commentary tradition. For example, Willigis Eckermann notes that for Gregory of Rimini (†1358) '*De Trinitate* ranks first [in the number of citations], followed by *De libero arbitrio*, *De Genesi ad litteram*, *Contra Iulianum*, [and] *De Civitate Dei*...'.⁵⁴ Gregory cites Augustine 1942 times in his commentary on the *Sentences* (books 1 and 2), including 511 citations from *De Trinitate*. This is a pattern that holds true for the majority of fourteenth-century commentaries on the *Sentences* that have been edited in modern critical editions.⁵⁵

Thus, despite the fact that Augustine's *De Trinitate* was one of the most important theological sources for late medieval scholastics,⁵⁶ there is almost no literature on the reception of Augustine's *De Trinitate* – or the influence of Augustine's trinitarian theology – in the late medieval period.⁵⁷ There are undoubtedly numerous reasons for this lack of scholarship, but first and foremost are the dominant trends in historiography noted above: confessionally driven scholarship has had no need to ferret out the relationship between

of Augustine, Peter Lombard used the *Glossa ordinaria* and the *Expositio* of Florus of Lyons. See *ibid.*, 115 and 122.

⁵³ J.-G. Bougerol, 'The Fathers and the *Sentences*' (1997), I 117-22.

⁵⁴ See Willigis Eckermann, 'Gregory of Rimini', *The Oxford Guide* (2013), II 1075; E.L. Saak, 'The Augustinian Renaissance', 63; and *id.*, 'The Reception of Augustine' (1997), I 384-97.

⁵⁵ I cannot definitively make this claim at present, however, a few observations are in order. In Adam Wodeham's *Lectura secunda* there are more citations to Augustine's *De Trinitate* than to all other works of Augustine combined. Similar patterns are found in Ockham's commentary on the *Sentences* and *Quodlibeta Septem* and John Duns Scotus' *Lectura*, *Ordinatio*, and *Reportatio*.

⁵⁶ Pace R. Kany who seems to imply that between Ockham (†1347) and Biel (†1495) there is no authentic reception of Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Following his disparaging comments of Ockham noted above (fn. 44), Kany proceeds to argue that Biel takes all of his references to *De Trinitate* from other sources and seems to mistrust the work as a whole. For a particularly problematic reading of Ockham and Biel see *id.*, 'De Trinitate', *The Oxford Guide* (2013), I 391; and *id.*, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 405-8. Here, however, the issue is not necessarily Kany's reading of Biel, but the fact that he ignores the retrieval of Augustine's theology by scholastics such as Gregory of Rimini. For a reading of Gregory's trinitarian theology in relation to Augustine, see John T. Slotemaker, 'Reading Augustine in the Fourteenth Century: Gregory of Rimini and Pierre d'Ailly on the *Imago Trinitatis*', *SP* 69 (2013), 345-57.

⁵⁷ For example, in the magisterial studies of Michael Schmaus or Russell Friedman, the question of Augustinian heritage is not central to the methodological distinctions that are employed to discuss the development of the doctrine in the late thirteenth or fourteenth centuries. Roland Kany's *Augustins Trinitätsdenken* (2007), 344-64, attempts a brief overview of the reception of Augustine's *De Trinitate* in the entire medieval and Reformation/early modern periods. The results confirm the present argument: *i.e.*, that given the centrality of Augustine's *De Trinitate* in medieval and Reformation theology, there is a disproportionate lack of scholarship on its reception.

Augustine's *De Trinitate* and the trinitarian theology of the early sixteenth century.⁵⁸

The proposal here is modest and uncontroversial: modern scholars must return *ad fontes* of medieval scholasticism unencumbered by the confessional limitations of past historiography. This means that a study of Augustine's influence in late medieval philosophy and theology must not begin with certain preconceptions of what accounts for a true 'Augustinianism' nor with a preconceived notion of which doctrinal themes should be the focus of study. Instead, scholars must begin with the late medieval texts and study what influence Augustine had.

Damasus Trapp and the historico-critical approach

Damasus Trapp argued that one central characteristic of the *schola Augustiniana moderna* was a particular focus on the *historico-critical* over and against the *logico-critical* approach.⁵⁹ The *historico-critical* approach, he argued, developed among the Augustinian theologians and was focused on a retrieval of original and accurate citations from Augustine. In short, Trapp argued that these scholars 'put a profound stress on better quoting';⁶⁰ primarily this meant that late medieval theologians who adopted the *historico-critical* approach attempted to access more reliable quotations and to return to the texts of Augustine themselves, instead of relying on the stock quotations that were so readily available in Gratian's *Decretum*,⁶¹ Lombard's *Sentences*, or *Florilegia* collections. However, was Trapp correct in this judgement?

Eric Saak, I think correctly, agrees with Trapp's basic argument, however he observes that the 'call *ad fontes*' that characterized the Augustinian school has not been the focus of modern research. Saak writes,

the detailed research into the actual knowledge and use of Augustine in the later Middle Ages epitomized by Trapp has not been pursued. Meanwhile the debates have continued over the influence of Augustinian themes. Yet if we are to delineate the historical contours of Augustine's reception, it is precisely to the lines of research set forth by Trapp that we must return.⁶²

⁵⁸ For example, if we return to Luther briefly we can observe that it is hardly discussed in the literature that in 1510 Martin Luther read and richly annotated the 1489 edition of Augustine's *De Trinitate* published in Basel by Johannes Amerbach. See the edition of Jun Matsuura, *Martin Luther Erfurter Annotationen, 1509-1510/11* (Cologne, 2009), 561-614. The search for Luther's 'Augustinianism' has been focused elsewhere.

⁵⁹ E.L. Saak, 'The Reception of Augustine' (1997), 379. D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology' (1956), 147.

⁶⁰ D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology' (1956), 184.

⁶¹ See Jean Werckmeister, 'The Reception of the Church Fathers in Canon Law', in *The Reception of the Church Fathers* (1997), I 51-81.

⁶² E.L. Saak, 'The Reception of Augustine' (1997), I 380.

In short, Saak is correct that Trapp's genuine search for the 'use of Augustine' has not been pursued, and the second proposal I want to suggest here is that this must become the focus of modern research if the field is to achieve substantive results.

The focused studies on Gregory of Rimini have often been the point of departure for arguments that claim a new historico-critical approach developed among certain members of the Augustinian Order. Damasus Trapp and Christopher Burger have both argued that the works of Gregory of Rimini demonstrate that he re-read various texts of Augustine and introduced new quotations into the debate.⁶³ However, it is not enough to focus only on Gregory of Rimini and a few other members of the Augustinian Order. Further, in order to make definitive claims about patterns of citation, one must develop a more systematic approach.

What I am suggesting here is that an adequate historical understanding of Augustine's place in the philosophy and theology of the late medieval period can only be grounded in a comprehensive and systematic survey of quotations (and their use) from Augustine's corpus (*i.e.*, how these quotations were used, referenced, and cited). First, the focus on 'better quoting' – argued by Trapp – can only be defended if one has a general sense of how accurately a given quotation from Augustine had been referenced in the preceding scholastic literature. This requires detailed information about what sources were being used by scholars and what practices of citation were adopted within the Universities.⁶⁴ Second, while the precision of citations is important, it is also vital to establish a database of quotations of Augustine (*e.g.*, those preserved in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Gratian's *Decretum*, Florilegia collections, *et al.*) as a baseline to establish what was known, and what was not known, through these sources.⁶⁵ This is necessary because prior to claiming Gregory of Rimini or

⁶³ See D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology' (1956); Cristopher P. Burger, 'Der Augustinschüler gegen die modernen Pelagianer: Das *auxilium speciale dei* in der Gnadenlehre Gregors von Rimini', in *Gregor von Rimini* (1981), 195-240. More broadly, see Willigis Eckermann, *Wort und Wirklichkeit. Das Sprachverständnis in der Theologie Gregors von Rimini und sein Weiterwirken in der Augustinerschule* (Würzburg, 1978).

⁶⁴ This first suggestion is not as simple as it first appears. The critical edition of Augustine's *De Trinitate*, ed. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CChr.SL 50, 50A (Turnhout, 1968), to take one example, is itself grounded in the medieval manuscript tradition. In the introduction, Mountain and Glorie list 52 manuscripts (xlvi-ii) used in their edition of *De Trinitate*. These manuscripts date from the eighth through the fourteenth centuries, distributed as follows: eighth, 3 mss.; ninth, 9 mss.; tenth, 7 mss.; eleventh, 17 mss.; twelfth, 11 mss., thirteenth, 3 mss.; and fourteenth, 2 mss. Over half of the manuscripts, therefore, belong to the eleventh and twelfth centuries (28 mss.). Thus, when one compares a quotation in Gregory of Rimini to the critical edition of *De Trinitate*, one has to recognize that what is preserved in the edition of Mountain and Glorie is itself a 'medieval' artifact.

⁶⁵ For an introduction to the methodology I am suggesting here, see Jeffrey C. Witt, 'Texts, Media, and Re-Mediation: The Digital Future of the *Sentences* Commentary Tradition', *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences*, vol. 3 (2015), 504-15; and Andrew Dunning, 'Rethinking the

Hugolino or Orvieto ‘recovered’ or ‘retrieved’ a citation from Augustine that one does not find in the standard sources, one must be able to definitively claim that the quotation in question was not commonly found in such reference works. In short, the claims made by Damasus Trapp (*et al.*) regarding ‘better quoting’ or use of ‘original citations’ – while illuminating and, in the end, perhaps correct – remain premature until a more systematic approach to the problem has been adopted. These types of studies remain valuable and instructive, however in the future the field must enhance such methodologies with modern research tools.

Thankfully, the development of modern research methods – *e.g.*, databases, digital editions, and powerful search engines – hold the potential for a more systematic approach to the study of Augustine’s reception in the late Middle Ages. The key, however, remains a commitment to semantic encoding of sources texts (which can be furthered manipulated into print or digital editions) that can support the type of searches necessary for such research.

publication of premodern sources: Petrus Plaoul on the Sentences’, *RIDE* 3 (2015), at <http://ride.i-d-e.de/issues/issue-3/petrus_plaoul/> (accessed on January 1, 2016). See also Jeffrey C. Witt, ‘The Sentences Commentary Text Archive: Laying the Foundation for the Analysis, Use, and Reuse of a Tradition’, *Digital Humanities Quarterly* 10.1 (2016).

Augustinian Science or Aristotelian Rhetoric? The Nature of Theology According to Giles of Rome

Peter EARDLEY, Guelph, Canada

ABSTRACT

This article addresses the question of whether Giles of Rome (1243/47-1316), the first Augustinian Hermit to hold a chair of theology at Paris, changed his mind on the nature of theology, from regarding it as a form of rhetoric in the early works to an ‘affective science’ in the later ones. In the process of addressing this question, this article considers Giles’ indebtedness to both Augustine and Aristotle. It concludes by arguing that Giles’ change in language merely represents a shift in emphasis, and that, despite his indebtedness to Aristotle’s account of rhetoric for understanding Christian theology, his conception of theology remains fundamentally Augustinian.

1. Introduction

From its inception until well into the later Middle Ages, the Christian theological tradition held what can perhaps suitably be characterized as an ambivalent attitude towards rhetoric.¹ Long a hallmark of the publicly-oriented cultures of Greek and Roman antiquity, the ability to persuade large numbers of people, usually through the deliberate manipulation of their emotions, was widely regarded as an important tool for achieving personal success, whether in the courts, the forum, or the assembly.² Of the Church Fathers, Augustine was perhaps the most famous, not to mention the most articulate, in his ambivalence towards rhetoric. On the one hand, he regarded the single-minded pursuit of worldly success that the discipline was designed to achieve as a manifestation of human vanity and pride. More than anything, however, he deplored its casual acceptance, and indeed encouragement of deception and manipulation to achieve advantage over others.³ Indeed, when he finally resigned from his

¹ The best known general histories of rhetoric are undoubtedly James J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance* (Berkeley, 1974) and George Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill, 1980).

² For an overview of the art of rhetoric in the ancient world, see Laurent Pernot, *Rhetoric in Antiquity*, trans. W.E. Higgins (Washington, D.C., 2005).

³ Augustine, *Confessionum libri XIII*, ed. Luc Verheijen, CChr.SL 27 (Turnhout, 1981), 4.2.2 (40): *Docebam in illis annis artem rhetoricam, et victoriosam loquacitatem victus cupiditate*

position as professor of rhetoric in Milan – just prior to his conversion to Christianity in 386 – he famously characterized his resignation in the *Confessions* as a liberation from his *cathedra mendacii*: his ‘chair of lies’.⁴ To this extent, Augustine was following in the footsteps of Plato, who had also been deeply suspicious of the art of rhetoric.⁵ On the other hand, Augustine recognized the importance of effective communication in defense of the Christian faith. Indeed, in book 4 of his *De doctrina christiana*, for example, he argued – with no little degree of rhetorical flourish – that:

[T]he art of rhetoric being available for the enforcing either of truth or falsehood, who will dare to say that truth in the person of its defenders is to take its stand unarmed against falsehood? For example, that those who are trying to persuade men of what is false are to know how to introduce their subject, so as to put the hearer into a friendly, or attentive, or teachable frame of mind, while the defenders of the truth shall be ignorant of that art? That the former are to tell their falsehoods briefly, clearly, and plausibly, while the latter shall tell the truth in such a way that it is tedious to listen to, hard to understand, and, in fine, not easy to believe it?⁶

For Augustine, then, the ‘interpreter and teacher of Sacred Scripture’ (*divinarum scripturarum tractator et doctor*) has something of a duty to oppose error and, in general, to defend the faith against those who are ignorant of, or indeed hostile to it. Naturally it is best if he can do this without alienating such opponents, which is where the art of rhetoric, or eloquent persuasion, becomes useful.⁷

vendebam. Malebam tamen, domine, tu scis, bonos habere discipulos, sicut appellantur boni, et eos sine dolo docebam dolos, non quibus contra caput innocentis agerent, sed aliquando pro capite nocentis. Et, deus, vidisti de longinquo lapsantem in lubrico et in multo fumo scintillantem fidem meam, quam exhibebam in illo magisterio diligentibus vanitatem et quaerentibus mendacium, socius eorum. For Augustine’s approach to rhetoric in the *Confessions*, see Calvin L. Toupe, *Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine’s Confessions* (Columbia, 1999) and James J. Murphy, ‘Saint Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric’, *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 46 (1960), 400–10.

⁴ Augustine, *Confessionum* 9.2.4 (135) and 9.47 (136). See also D. Tell, ‘Augustine and the “Chair of Lies”: Rhetoric in the *Confessions*’, *Rhetorica* 28 (2010), 384–407.

⁵ According to Plato, rhetoric is closely linked to poetry since both arts move their listeners on the basis of emotion rather than truth, which is antithetical to the goal of philosophy. On rhetoric’s relationship to poetry see, for example, *Gorgias* 502e–503b. As is clear from this dialogue, rhetoric is also, for Plato, linked to sophistry: it is the tool by which the weaker argument can be made to appear stronger which, of course, Plato regarded as repugnant.

⁶ Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, ed. R.P.H. Green (Oxford, 1995) 4.2 (196): *Nam cum per artem rhetoricam et vera suadeantur et falsa, quis audeat dicere, adversus mendacium in defensoribus suis inermem debere consistere veritatem, ut videlicet illi, qui res falsas persuadere conantur, noverint auditorem vel benevolum vel intentum vel docilem prooemio facere, isti autem non noverint? Illi falsa breviter aperte verisimiliter et isti vera sic narrent, ut audire taedeat, intellegere non pateat, credere postremo non libeat?* Translation by J.F. Shaw in J.D. Williams (ed.), *An Introduction to Classical Rhetoric: Essential Readings* (Oxford, 2009), 496.

⁷ Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* 4.6 (200): *Debet igitur divinarum scripturarum tractator et doctor, defensor rectae fidei ac debellator erroris, et bona docere et mala dedocere atque in*

How, on the other hand, should this ‘teacher of Sacred Scripture’ relate to a friendly, as opposed to a hostile audience? It depends on whether such fellow believers require further instruction in the faith. If so, then less eloquence is required and more rational demonstration.⁸ Sometimes, however, such believers do not need more instruction in the faith since ignorance is not the problem. Rather, it is a complacency from which they need to be roused. What these fellow believers require, in other words, is assistance in deepening their commitment to the faith. And this is where the *doctor divinarum scripturarum* ought to employ rhetoric:

If, however, the hearers require to be roused rather than instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they admit, greater vigor of speech is needed. Here entreaties and reproaches, exhortations and upbraidings, and all the other means of rousing the emotions, are necessary.⁹

Now unlike Aristotle, who thought it necessary to draw a sharp distinction between science and rhetoric due to their different modes of assent, Augustine had comparatively less interest in the taxonomy of cognitive states. For Augustine, science (*scientia*) involved knowledge of the profane, in contrast to wisdom (*sapientia*), which involved knowledge of the divine.¹⁰ What was the relationship of science to rhetoric for Augustine? In contrast to Aristotle, both science and rhetoric were subordinate to faith, and both had equal pragmatic value, at least to the extent that they might be useful in reinforcing the faith for those who already believe, and in defending it from the attacks of those who do not. For Augustine, then, in contrast to Aristotle, there need be no conflict – or hierarchical relationship – between rhetoric, which generates or reinforces (from Aristotle’s perspective, mere) belief, and science, which generates (from Aristotle’s perspective, the cognitively superior habit of) knowledge.¹¹

hoc opera sermonis conciliare aversos, remissos erigere, nescientibus quod agitur quid expectare debeant intimare.

⁸ Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* 4.6 (200-2).

⁹ Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* 4.6 (202; Shaw 497): *Si vero qui audiunt movendi sunt potius quam docendi, ut in eo quod iam sciunt agendo non torpeant et rebus assensum quas veras esse fatentur accommodent, maioribus dicendi viribus opus est. Ibi obsecrationes et increpationes, concitationes et coercitationes et quaecumque alia valent ad commovendos animos sunt necessaria.*

¹⁰ Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ed. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CChr.SL 50, 50A (Turnhout, 1968), 14.1.3 (423, l. 48-424, l. 56): *Disputantes autem de sapientia definierunt eam dicentes: Sapientia est rerum humanarum diuinarumque scientia. Vnde ego quoque in libro superiore utrarumque rerum cognitionem, id est diuinarum atque humanarum, et sapientiam et scientiam dici posse non tacui. Verum secundum hanc distinctionem qua dixit apostolus: Alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae, ista definitio diuidenda est ut rerum diuinarum scientia sapientia proprie nuncupetur, humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obtineat...*

¹¹ We discuss Aristotle’s distinction between science, dialectic and rhetoric in section 2 below.

As Augustine famously writes of the sort of *scientia* that is relevant to the Christian faith in book 14 of *De Trinitate*:

I discussed this knowledge (*scientia*) in the thirteenth volume, where I did not of course ascribe to it any and every thing a man can know about things human, because this includes a great deal of superfluous frivolity and pernicious curiosity; all I ascribed to it was anything that breeds, feeds, defends, and strengthens the saving faith which leads to true happiness. Very many of the faithful do not excel in such knowledge, though they excel very much in faith itself. It is one thing to know only what a man should believe in order to gain the happy life which is nothing if it is not eternal; quite another to know how the godly are to be assisted in this and how the attacks of the ungodly upon it are to be met, and it is this that the apostle seems to call by the proper name of knowledge (*scientia*).¹²

As Stephen Brown and Jeffrey Witt have demonstrated, the foregoing passage from *De Trinitate* 14.1 had a profound impact on later medieval debates over the question of whether theology is a science.¹³ But if I am correct that Augustine's view of the proper aim of science dovetails with his view of the proper aim of rhetoric, then it is worth asking: what was the role of rhetoric, if any, in later medieval debates over the controversial question of whether theology is a science? Moreover, this question, at least in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries – as Brown himself has done so much to show – was not merely over how much influence Augustine's notion of *scientia* as articulated in the *De Trinitate* had on this debate, but also over the question of whether theology was a science as Aristotle had understood it in the *Posterior Analytics*, that is, in a demonstrative or deductive sense.¹⁴

¹² Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.1.3 (424, ll. 56-67): *De qua uolumine tertio decimo disputaui, non utique quidquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis ubi plurimum superuacaneae uanitatis et noxae curiositatis est huic scientiae tribuens, sed illud tantummodo quo fides saluberrima quae ad ueram beatitudinem ducit gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur. Qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamuis polleant ipsa fide plurimum. Aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam uitam beatam quae non nisi aeterna est, aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur, quam proprio appellare uocabulo scientiam uidetur apostolus.* Translated by Edmund Hill in John E. Rotelle (ed.), *The Trinity* (New York, 1991), 371.

¹³ Stephen F. Brown, 'Late Thirteenth Century Theology: "Scientia" Pushed to the Limits', in Rainer Berndt, Matthias Lutz-Bachmann and Ralf M.W. Stammberger (eds), '*Scientia*' und '*Disciplina*': *Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2002), 229; and Jeffrey C. Witt, 'Interpreting Augustine: On the Nature of "Theological Knowledge" in the Fourteenth Century', *SP* 69 (2013), 359-71.

¹⁴ There is a robust literature on this topic. See Stephen F. Brown, 'The Intellectual Context of Later Medieval Philosophy: Universities, Aristotle, Arts, Theology', in John Marenbon (ed.), *The Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume 3. Medieval Philosophy* (London and New York, 1998), 188-203. For a useful recent overview of the topic, see Ulrich G. Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington, D.C., 2010). See also M.-D. Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1975).

One of the most important scholastic theologians to wrestle with these issues – and who has arguably received far less attention in the literature than he deserves – is Giles of Rome (1243/47–1316), the first member of the Augustinian Hermits to hold a chair at Paris and later official spokesman of his order.¹⁵ As a thirteenth-century theologian, Giles was unique in having had an abiding interest in rhetoric, having himself written the first and most influential scholastic commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and having made extensive use of it in his widely-read political manual or 'mirror of princes': the *De regimine principum*. All of this is relatively well-known.¹⁶ A seldom recognized feature of Giles' thought, however, is his early association of theology with rhetoric (as Aristotle had understood it), a matter that has come to light with the relatively recent critical edition of Giles' early *Reportatio* to his lectures on the *Sentences*.¹⁷ He would later cease to refer explicitly to theology as a type of rhetoric and instead come to think of it as an 'affective science'. In this article I will argue that this change in terminology amounts not so much to a repudiation of his earlier views on the relationship of theology to rhetoric as to a mere shift in emphasis; that, despite appearances, Giles did not in fact change his mind about the nature of theology. I also argue that, despite Giles' reliance on Aristotle for understanding revealed theology, Giles' fundamental attitude toward the nature and function of theology remains Augustinian through and through.

2. Theology as rhetoric

Unique amongst thirteenth century theologians, in the early *Reportatio* to his lectures on the *Sentences*, Giles likened theology to rhetoric on the grounds that they share an identical habit: that of faith or belief (*fides*).¹⁸ As Giles puts it 'belief (*fides*) as it pertains to the rhetorician possesses a similarity with belief (*fides*) in theology'.¹⁹ How so? Consider how rhetoric, for example, compares

¹⁵ On Giles' life and career, see Francesco Del Punta, Silvia Donati and Concetta Luna, 'Egidio Romano', in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 42 (Rome, 1993), 319–41.

¹⁶ On this, see Matthew Kempshall, 'The Rhetoric of Giles of Rome's *De Regimine Principum*', in F. Lachaud (ed.), *Le Prince au miroir de la littérature politique de l'Antiquité aux Lumières* (Rouen, 2007), 161–90; and Ubaldo Staico, 'Rhetorica e politica in Egidio Romano', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 3 (1992), 1–75. On Giles' important commentary on the *Rhetoric*, see Reginald O'Donnell, 'The Commentary of Giles of Rome on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle', in T. Sandquist and M. Powicke (eds), *Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson* (Toronto, 1969), 139–56.

¹⁷ See Giles of Rome, *Reportatio lectionum super libros I–IV Sententiarum* (*Reportatio Monacensis. Excerpta Godefridi de Fontibus Reportatio*), ed. Concetta Luna, in *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia* 3.2 (Florence, 2003).

¹⁸ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (439–41).

¹⁹ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (439): *Dicendum quod fides, secundum quod pertinet ad rethorem, similitudinem habet cum fide in theologia.*

to dialectic. Both are similar in one respect, but different in another. They are similar in that neither, in contrast to demonstrative science, necessitates assent; different in that one of them – dialectic – moves the intellect according to its proper mode, while the other – rhetoric – moves the intellect through a command of the will (*imperium voluntatis*).²⁰ More specifically dialectic and rhetoric differ insofar as the former relies on probable reasoning, which moves the intellect to assent through its own accord. The successful dialectician (or philosopher) ‘proves’ his case using rational arguments that are geared towards appealing exclusively to reason. The habit associated with such assent is called ‘opinion’ (*opinio*).²¹ The rhetorician, by contrast, while he also seeks to induce intellectual assent on the part of his listeners, cannot do so, given the nature of his claims, through rational argument alone. Rather, he must move them in other ways so as to persuade them to accept his propositions. The habit he generates is not therefore opinion, but rather ‘belief’ (*credulitas*).

[T]he rhetorician [in contrast to the philosopher] determines the intellect by means of a command of the will to assent; consequently, it is not his business to prove a proposition, but to persuade a judge and to generate belief (*credulitas*).²²

Now, according to Giles, as mentioned a moment ago, both rhetoric and theology share the same cognitive habit: that of faith or belief, the assent associated with which must also, unlike dialectic (and indeed demonstrative science), be voluntary. The assent of faith, in short, also comes about through a command of the will. Where theological premises are concerned, as is equally true of the premises of rhetoric, one’s acceptance is never necessitated. Rather, in the act of religious belief, one’s assent is a matter of free choice. This is because ‘the opposite of *fides* (i.e. opinion or demonstrative science) has stronger rational arguments (*rationes efficaciores*) than those that are associated with *fides*’.²³ It is therefore necessary, according to Giles, that the will seize (*captivare*) the intellect in order to elicit its assent. What is the basis of the intellect’s consent to be thus ‘captivated’ by the will? According to Giles, it is the divine word (*divinum dictum*). Giles’ authorities for this claim are Paul’s

²⁰ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (439): [*U*]terque determinat intellectum per medium non necessarium, licet diversimode, quia intellectus quandoque determinatur secundum modum proprium, scilicet rationis, quandoque secundum imperium voluntatis.

²¹ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (440): *Dialecticus vero determinat intellectum ad assentiendum secundum modum proprium intellectus, scilicet per rationem probabilem. Et ideo ipse est probare et adgenerare opinionem.*

²² Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (440): *Sed rethor determinat intellectum per imperium voluntatis ad assentiendum, et ideo ipse non est probare, sed persuadere iudici et adgenerare credulitatem.* Note that, for Giles, *credulitas* is interchangeable with *fides* and refers to the same doxastic habit, that of faith or belief.

²³ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (440): *Fides autem determinat intellectum ad assentiendum per modum voluntatis, non secundum rationem propriam intellectus, immo contrarium fidei habet rationes efficaciores quam ea que sunt fidei.*

Letter to the Corinthians, as well as Augustine, who claimed that ‘there are some things that I can do unwillingly, but I cannot believe except willingly’.²⁴

In addition to Paul and Augustine, Giles invokes Aristotle’s account of rhetoric to further elaborate on the similarities between theological assent and rhetorical assent. Specifically, he compares religious belief – with which he associates three acts – with the threefold way that the rhetorician persuades a judge.²⁵ One way comes from the side of the speaker, whose audience must regard him as credible, another from the side of the hearer, who must be emotionally receptive to the rhetorician’s speech, and the third from the ornateness of the speech itself.²⁶ Giles is obviously drawing here on Aristotle’s three modes of persuasion or *pisteis* in the *Rhetoric* (1356a1-5): through the character or *ēthos* of the speaker, through the emotional receptivity (*pathos*) of his audience, and through the speech or *logos* itself.

How do Aristotle’s three modes of persuasion relate to the three acts of (religious) belief? First, there is an act on the part of the believer (presumably an act of faith that is prompted by the will or affect); second, there is an act on the part of the speaker (whose act presumably involves *inducing* belief in the listener), and finally there is an act that has to do with the object of belief (presumably, given the analogy, some article of faith). Giles refers to these respectively as: *credere in Deum* (to believe in God), *credere Deum* (to believe that God), and finally *credere Deo* (to believe God).²⁷ Although Giles does not explicitly mention it here, one is reminded yet again of book 4 of Augustine’s *De doctrina christiana*:

The eloquent divine, then, when he is urging a practical truth, must not only teach so as to give instruction, and please so as to keep up the attention, but he must also sway the mind so as to subdue the will. For if a man be not moved by the force of truth, though it is demonstrated to his own confession, and clothed in beauty of style, nothing remains but to subdue him by the power of eloquence.²⁸

If theology is closer to being a form of rhetoric in the Aristotelian (and indeed Augustinian) sense, then it is clearly not a demonstrative science, a point

²⁴ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (440): *Ideo oportet captivare intellectum. Unde Apostolus: captivantem intellectum in obsequium Christi etc. Sed consentit intellectus, hoc est ex imperio voluntatis, quia tamen ostenditur ei ex aliquo auditu vel ratione quia hoc est dictum divinum etc. Et ideo dicit Augustinus: aliqua possum facere nolens, credere non nisi volens.*

²⁵ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (441): *Et notandum quod tres sunt actus fidei, sicut rethor triplici via persuadet iudici: uno modo, ex parte dicentis, dicendo se esse talem cui credendum et esse scientem; alio modo, ex parte audientis, adgenerando passionem in animo per quam inclinetur ad ipsum...; tertia via, ex parte sermonum ornatorum.*

²⁶ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (441).

²⁷ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 3, q.38, d.23 (441): *Sic triplex actus fidei: unus ex parte credentis, secundum quod procedit ex affect suo, et hoc est credere in Deum; alio modo, ex parte dicentis, et hoc est credere Deum; tertio, ex parte rerum, et hoc est credere Deo.*

²⁸ Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* 4.13 (232; Shaw 503).

that Giles makes abundantly clear.²⁹ This has to do with the premises on which theology is based, which are derived from authority, and therefore rooted in faith, rather than graspable by the natural light of the intellect. Like the premises of rhetoric, those of theology will have to be freely chosen if they are to be granted assent at all.

3. Theology as an affective science

If theology cannot generate evidentiary knowledge or science, as Giles suggests in the *Reportatio*, then what is its point? Giles provides an answer in his slightly later *Ordinatio* to his commentary on the *Sentences*. In this work he no longer links rhetoric to theology. Rather he emphasizes theology as an ‘affective science’ (*scientia affective*), that is, a cognitive habit whose goal is the love of God and neighbor.³⁰ He defended this view as early as in his commentary on book 1 of the *Sentences* when he was still a young bachelor at Paris, and as late as in his *Ordinatio* to book 2 of his commentary on the *Sentences*, his last work.³¹ In this respect Giles was in something of a minority position, although he did have some illustrious company, such as Albert the Great and Bonaventure. Still, the majority of theologians in the late thirteenth century, by contrast, tended not to define theology as an affective science, something they regarded as un-Aristotelian at best, and incoherent at worst. Rather they tended either to emphasize the speculative aspect, as Thomas Aquinas did, or the practical aspect, as Franciscan theologians generally did.³²

According to Giles, theology (*sacra pagina*) has several ends. One of its goals is moral action, and in that sense it might be considered a practical science. Another of its goals has to do with contemplation of divine matters and in this sense might be considered a speculative science. Finally, since

²⁹ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1, q.3.5 (495) (*excerpta Godfridi de Fontibus*): *Theologia etiam proprie loquendo non est scientia, quia non est simpliciter speculative, immo est sapientia, non a sapiendo id est cognoscendo, dicta, sed a sapore.*

³⁰ For Giles’ views on theology as an affective science, see Johannes Beumer, ‘Augustinismus und Thomismus in der theologischen Prinzipienlehre des Aegidius Romanus’, *Scholastik* 32 (1957), 542-60; Peter Nash, ‘Giles of Rome on the Subject of Theology’, *Mediaeval Studies* 18 (1956), 61-92; Peter Prassel, *Das Theologieverständnis des Ägidius Romanus O.E.S.A. (1243/7-1316)* (Frankfurt, 1983); and Martijn Schrama, ‘The Inseparable Connection of Knowledge and Love: Giles of Rome and the Practice of Theology’, *Augustiniana* 53 (2003), 265-93.

³¹ On the dating of Giles works, see F. Del Punta, S. Donati and C. Luna, ‘Egidio Romano’ (1993), 319-41.

³² See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Leonina, *Opera Omnia* IV (Rome, 1888) I, q.1, a.4, co. (14-15). For a review of the Franciscan positions on theology as a practical science, see P. Amorós, ‘La teología como ciencia practica en la escuela franciscana en los tiempos que preceden a Escoto’, *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 9 (1934), 261-303.

theology is concerned with divine commands whose end is the love of God, theology may also be considered an affective science. Now of these diverse ends, only love of God is intended for its own sake and is accordingly the end to which both speculation and moral action are ordered. That is, although revealed theology can spur rational agents to both perform good works and to speculate about the divine, the love of God and neighbor that emerges from practicing the science of theology is always an end in itself and therefore that to which the others are subordinate. According to Giles, then, theology should principally be considered an affective science, since love is its ‘ultimate end’ (*finis ultimus*), and indeed the end in virtue of which the two other ends are moved.³³ If, however, it is asked whether theology is more a practical science than speculative one, ‘it should be said that it is more speculative than practical’.³⁴

In his commentary on book 2 of the *Sentences* – dated to 1309 and therefore his most mature work – Giles finally responded to the charge that if theology is an affective science then it should ultimately be considered practical rather than speculative. In this work, he reiterates his earlier view that theology is affective, and further explains why such a description cannot be reduced to the level of the practical. Giles’ critics had argued that if the end of theology is love, and love is an act, then it follows that theology ought to be considered a practical science. What these critics fail to appreciate, according to Giles, is that it is necessary to draw a distinction between internal and external action otherwise we will have to concede the absurd claim that speculation belongs to practical science since it too is ordered toward an operation: the act of knowing. In order to be able to call a science ‘practical’, then, it is necessary that such a science be ordered to *external* action. Since the act of love is internal to the agent, and moreover relates specifically to the will as opposed to the

³³ Giles of Rome, *In primum librum Sententiarum* (Venice, 1521), prol., d.4, q.1 (7vP-Q): ... non est inconueniens eiusdem rei diversos esse fines si unus ad alium ordinatur, sicut si bellum ordinatur ad victoriam, potest homo intendere ad bellum et victoriam. Quando autem ita est quod in una re diversos fines aspicimus, oportet unum illorum ad alium ordinari et ille ad quem alii ordinantur dicitur ‘finis ultimus’ qui ab aliis sic distinguitur quia omnia alia moventur in virtute eius et in omnibus aliis ipse intenditur. Ipse autem non movet in virtute aliorum nec alia intenduntur in ipso ... Et quia videmus sacra pagina plura intendere, oportet diversos esse fines scripture sacre. Intenditur enim per eam bonam operatio, nam finis moralis ut dicebatur est actio. Ipsa autem potissime de moribus determinat. Rursum, in ea intenditur speculatio quia de summe speculabilibus tractat. Intendit in ea dilectio quia finis precepti charitas. Igitur cum diversi fines in ea intenduntur, oportet unum istorum ad alium ordinari et unum illorum principales esse finis principalis ut dicebatur ab aliis distinguitur quia ipse ubique intenditur, alii autem non. Et quia dilectio et charitas in tota sacra pagina intenditur quia in ea pendet lex et propheti. Principalis enim finis in sacra pagina intentus est inducere homines ad dei et proximi dilectionem.

³⁴ Giles of Rome, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, prol., d.4, q.1 (8rB): Si tamen quereretur utrum sit magis practica quam speculativa vel econverso, responderi debet quod magis speculativa quam practica.

intellect, theology must be considered an ‘affective’ (*affectiva*) or ‘loving’ (*dilectiva*) cognitive habit.³⁵

In the final analysis, theology is an affective habit because it generates the sort of *scientia* that – although not rooted in the natural light of reason and therefore incapable of counting as an Aristotelian science – can nonetheless move the will to a deepening of faith where it already exists, with the aim of generating love of God and neighbor.³⁶ As Giles says, ‘for according to the Apostle, the fullness of the divine law concerning which the whole science of theology strives is not evident knowledge (*scientia*) but love (*dilectio*)’.³⁷ Indeed, such charity prefigures our final end. In a sense, then, as Giles puts it in his *Quodlibet* 3, question 2, disputed when he was regent master at Paris in the 1280s, theology is an ‘instrument’ (*organum*) for achieving human happiness (*felicitas*) and thereafter salvation (*beatitudo*). Here Giles explicitly appeals to book 14, chapter 1 of Augustine’s *De Trinitate*, cited above, where Augustine refers to a science that serves the ends of the Christian faith.³⁸ Theology, in short, is not a demonstrative science in Aristotle’s sense, but an (Augustinian) affective or sapiential one.³⁹

4. Conclusion

Did Giles change his mind on the fundamental nature of theology? Giles’ theory that theology is an ‘affective science’ is in no way inconsistent – and arguably highly consistent – with the view that it is also closer to rhetoric than

³⁵ Giles of Rome, *In secundum librum Sententiarum* (Venice, 1581), d.21, q.1, a.1 (172b): *Sed dices ipsum diligere est aliqua actio et aliqua operatio, ut ex hoc theologia debeat dici ‘practica’. Dicemus quod si sic vellemus appellare scientiam practicam, cum ipsa speculatio sit aliqua actio, scientia speculativa dicetur ‘practica’. Propter quod oportet nos dicere quod est actio exterior et interior ex actione autem exteriori potest vocari scientia practica ... sed sicut est actio exterior ita actio interior, et hic est duplex: quia vel respicit intellectum et hic est speculator et scientia hoc intendens ut finem est speculativa, vel respicit effectum et voluntatem et haec actio est dilectio et scientia hoc intendens ut finem debet dici dilectiva vel affectiva.*

³⁶ Giles of Rome, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, pt.2, d.21, q.1, a.1 (172a): *Fides enim per quam credimus ad caritatem et ad dilectionem Dei debet ordinari.*

³⁷ Giles of Rome, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, pt.2, d.21, q.1, a.1 (172b): *Plenitudo ergo legis divinae secundum Apostolum circa quam insudat tota scientia Theologiae, non est scientia, sed dilectio.*

³⁸ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3, q.2 (128-9): *... est enim haec scientia quasi organum ad felicitatem et ad hunc finem data est homini propter beatitudinem adipiscendam, ut satis innuit Augustinus [De Trinitate, Book 14, chapter 1], ubi fidem et hanc scientiam vult propter adipiscendam beatitudinem esse datam...* (in Aegidii Columnae Romani *Quodlibeta* [Louvain, 1646, repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1966]). See also J.C. Witt, ‘Interpreting Augustine’ (2013), 360-2.

³⁹ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1, q.3.5 (495) (*excerpta Godfridi de Fontibus*): *Theologia etiam proprie loquendo non est scientia, quia non est simpliciter speculativa, immo est sapientia, non a sapiendo id est cognoscendo, dicta, sed a sapore. Unde cognitio intellectiva que habetur per theologiam, ordinatur ad amorem Dei.*

to demonstrative science.⁴⁰ The former description simply picks out its final cause, while the latter points to its formal one. Indeed, the distinguished medieval literary critic A.J. Minnis noticed this connection between Giles' account of rhetoric in his commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and Giles' understanding of theology as a science in the 1980s, well before the scholarly community was aware of Giles' explicit association of rhetoric as the formal cause of theology in the *Reportatio*, the edition of which was not published by Concetta Luna until 2003. With impressive foresight Minnis stated:

In the first Latin commentary [on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*], written in the late thirteenth century by the theologian, Giles of Rome (†1316), the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic is explained as follows. Scientific assent and dialectical assent are purely intellectual acts, while the assent of faith can be called intellectual only in so far as the intellect is open to being moved by an appetite, a desire of the will. The rhetorician generates belief by moving the will, by arousing appetites; his persuasive arguments employ enthymemes and *exempla*. In his commentary on the *Sentences* and elsewhere, Giles argued that theology is basically affective. Clearly, this is of a piece with his attitude to rhetoric. Scriptural texts obtain the assent of faith by moving the reader's will and appealing to his *affectus*. The *modus sacrae Scripturae* is essentially a rhetorical mode.⁴¹

In articulating his account of theology, Giles changed his terms without changing the essence of his theory. Theology is not an Aristotelian demonstrative science but something closer to Aristotle's understanding of rhetoric. To the extent that theology is a 'science' at all, it is one that appeals to Augustine's understanding of *scientia* as the latter applied it to the faith in the *De Trinitate*: knowledge that arouses the will for the purposes of strengthening the faith amongst those who already believe, with the eventual goal of achieving happiness.

⁴⁰ Indeed, as early as in the *Reportatio*, the work in which Giles had argued for theology as a kind of rhetoric, he also, to the extent that theology aims for the love of God, implies that it is affective. See previous note.

⁴¹ Alastair J. Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages* (2nd ed.; Philadelphia, 1988), 125-6.

Giles of Rome on Human Cognition: Aristotelian and Augustinian Principles

Bernd GOEHRING, New York, USA

ABSTRACT

In this essay I examine how the medieval thinker Giles of Rome employs fundamental Aristotelian and Augustinian principles in his theory of human cognition. Giles of Rome (d. 1316) was the first member of the Augustinian order to become a master in theology at the University of Paris, and he played a crucial role in building the Augustinian identity. My analysis has two parts: First I analyze the notion of cognitive presence, *i.e.* the notion that ideally a cognitive object is immediately present to a cognizer in the right format. Giles develops this conception of cognitive presence in his discussion of the beatific vision. He reads Augustine's analysis of the mind's self-presence and self-knowledge in *De Trinitate* as support for the general principle that the mind knows nothing better than what is present to it. I argue that Giles uses the ideal case of the beatific vision to explain the role of representations as functional intermediaries in cognition. Then I examine specifically the role of sensory representations in our cognition. Giles conceives of our intellect as a capacity for universal thought and assumes with Aristotle that all our cognition originates from sense-experience. Yet Giles also holds on to an Augustinian hierarchy of capacities as explicated in Augustine's *De libero arbitrio*, which allows the higher controlling powers of soul or mind to operate on lower, bodily capacities and their contents, but not vice versa. Finally I show why, according to Giles, sensory representations of particular, sensible objects are not only required for our initial concept-formation via abstraction, but also for any subsequent actualization of our intellective capacity and its contents in thought.

1. Introduction

In this essay I examine how the medieval thinker Giles of Rome employs fundamental Aristotelian and Augustinian principles in his theory of human cognition. I focus on Giles' views in representative passages from his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* and related writings that deal with the human intellect and its functions.¹ Giles of Rome, who was born around 1243 and died at the papal court in Avignon in 1316, was 'the first member of the Augustinian

¹ For a first overview see the dissertation by Richard Egenter, *Die Erkenntnispsychologie des Aegidius Romanus* (Regensburg, 1925).

order to become a master in theology at the University of Paris'.² Giles was probably a student of Thomas Aquinas during Thomas' second regency in Paris between 1269 and 1272. After the death of Thomas in 1274 Giles was one of the three great lights at Paris, often disagreeing with his other two prolific colleagues, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. His academic career was interrupted between 1277 and 1285 when he was the target of a doctrinal inquiry, in the wake of the Condemnations of 1277 initiated by the Parisian bishop Stephen Tempier. The Parisian faculty of theology attacked Giles for holding 51 suspect theses in his commentary on the first book of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. As Robert Wielockx has shown, the ultimate target of this doctrinal inquiry was probably Thomas Aquinas himself.³ Giles played a crucial role in building the Augustinian identity.

My analysis has two parts: First I analyze the notion of cognitive presence, *i.e.* the notion that ideally a cognitive object is immediately present to a cognizer in the right format. Giles develops this conception of cognitive presence in his discussion of the beatific vision. He reads Augustine's analysis of the mind's self-presence and self-knowledge in *De Trinitate* as support for the general principle that the mind knows nothing better than what is present to it. I argue that Giles uses the ideal case of the beatific vision to explain the role of representations as functional intermediaries in cognition.

Then I examine specifically the role of sensory representations in our cognition. Giles conceives of our intellect as a capacity for universal thought and assumes with Aristotle that all our cognition originates from sense-experience. Yet Giles also holds on to an Augustinian hierarchy of capacities as explicated in Augustine's *De libero arbitrio*, which allows the higher controlling powers of soul or mind to operate on lower, bodily capacities and their contents, but not vice versa. Finally I show why, according to Giles, sensory representations of particular, sensible objects are not only required for our initial concept-formation via abstraction, but also for any subsequent actualization of our intellectual capacity and its contents in thought.

2. Cognitive presence

In his *Quodlibet III*, q.14, Giles explicates the nature and role of mental representations. He discusses the case of the beatific vision, in which the blessed human mind sees God face to face and is thus directly presented with its perfect object: the divine essence. Giles asks whether the intellect can

² See Silvia Donati, 'Giles of Rome', in Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (eds), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 2003), 266-71, 266.

³ Giles of Rome, *Apologia*, ed. Robert Wielockx, *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia* III/1 (Florence, 1985).

understand the divine essence through some form, some *species*. Drawing, among others, on Augustinian and Aristotelian insights, Giles seeks to explain how the mind's intellective grasp of an object is caused by the object's cognitive presence to the mind (*ex praesentia rei ad intellectum causatur intellectio rei in ipso intellectu*). Giles argues that the cases of the beatific vision, and by extension of the mind's self-presence, do not involve representations as functional intermediaries. The object does not have to be re-presented. Giles offers a general principle: 'Where we posit the presence of something intelligible we do not posit any mediating form'.⁴ He reads Augustine's analysis of the mind's self-presence and self-knowledge in *De Trinitate* as support for this general principle: 'For the mind knows nothing better than what is present to it'.⁵

By contrast, in other cases we generate mental representations in order to emulate an object's direct cognitive presence to the mind. Giles argues that any mind-created and mind-dependent representation remains deficient compared to the object and its (hypothetical) presence. For instance, if a concrete material object such as a stone could itself be directly cognitively present to the mind, then it would bring about the relevant intellective act more clearly and completely than any representation could:

Thus a form is posited to take the place of the object's complete presence, so that, since the stone cannot itself be in the soul, it is there through its form; and the act of understanding, or the understanding in intellect, is caused by this form; however, if the stone's substance could be in the soul itself, then the stone's substance would bring about what the stone's form does; rather [more precisely], not only would it bring this about, but it would do so more effectively; for the understanding of the stone would be caused more clearly and better by the stone's substance if it could be present in the soul than it would be caused by its form.⁶

⁴ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet III*, ed. P. De Coninck (Leuven, 1646; reprint Frankfurt/Main, 1966), q.14 (172b): *Ubi enim ponimus praesentiam rei intelligibilis non ponimus ibi aliquam speciem mediam*. Unless otherwise indicated all translations are mine.

⁵ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet III*, q.14 (172b): *Nihil enim tam novit mens quam id quod sibi praesto est*. See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ed. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CChr.SL 50, 50A (Turnhout, 1968), 14.4.7 (429, ll. 36-9): *Inter cetera ergo in libro decimo diximus hominis mentem nosse semetipsam. Nihil enim tam novit mens quam id quod sibi praesto est, nec menti magis quidquam praesto est quam ipsa sibi* ('We said, therefore, among other things in the tenth book that the human mind knows itself. For the mind knows nothing so well as what is present to itself, and nothing is more present to the mind than the mind is present to itself'). See also Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 10.7.10 (323-4). On self-knowledge in Giles, see Reginald Friedeman, 'Het "intellectus noster est potentia pura in genere intelligibilium" van Averroës en de "ratio intelligendi" en de zelfkennis volgens Aegidius Romanus', *Augustiniana* 8 (1958), 48-111.

⁶ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet III*, q.14 (172b): *Ergo ponitur species ad supplendam omnem praesentiam obiecti, ut, quia lapis non potest esse in anima per seipsum, est ibi per suam speciem, et ab illa specie causatur actus intelligendi, vel intellectio in intellectu; sed substantia lapidis si per seipsam posset esse in anima, hoc faceret substantia lapidis, quod facit species lapidis; immo non solum faceret hoc, sed amplius; multo enim clarius et melius causaretur intellectio lapidis a substantia lapidis, si posset esse praesens in anima, quam causaretur a specie eius*.

If concrete material objects could be present to the soul, Giles argues, then they would cause in the intellect a more complete understanding through themselves,⁷ compared to what they would bring about through some mental representation. Giles holds that theologians, and principally among the Fathers Augustine, and philosophers, especially Aristotle in book 3 of *De anima*, agree on the principle that a representation is required only because its function is to emulate the object's direct presence. Thus, a concrete, material lion for instance is a formal structure or configuration realized in matter, and as such it cannot be a direct object of our understanding. Giles adds that 'if the lion were separated from matter [*i.e.* from material, individuating conditions], and a completely immaterial form, then it could be understood through itself'.⁸ In other words, it would be an intelligible object immediately present to the human mind in the right format. Giles refers once again to Aristotle's famous dictum in *De anima* III 8 (431b29), that it is not the stone that is in the soul but its form,⁹ and he explicates Aristotle's position as follows: 'The sole reason why the stone is not in the soul is the fact that it is [something] "here and now", and that it is something material'¹⁰ – a concrete material thing in space and time. In cognizing these things we need mediating mental representations because we fall short of the ideal case, in which we would be in a position to grasp an intelligible object that is immediately, directly present to our mind in the right format.

Indeed in his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* (which shows the influence of Averroës' long commentary), Giles discusses the need for an active-constructive principle in our mind, so that we might actively generate conceptual content on the basis of sensory input. Giles points out that Plato did not need to posit such an 'agent' intellect since Plato assumed that the immaterial, unchanging Ideas or Forms, namely 'the proper objects of our intellect were

⁷ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet III*, q.14 (173a): *Causarent in intellectu perfectiorem intellectiōnem per seipsas*.

⁸ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet III*, q.14 (173a): *Sed si leo esset separatus a materia, et esset forma penitus immaterialis, posset per seipsum esse in anima, et tunc intelligeretur per seipsum*.

⁹ Compare Giles' contemporary Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta*, ed. Gordon Wilson and Girard Etzkorn, *Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia VIII* (Leuven, 2010), IV, q.7 (33, ll. 108-10): *Ipsae quidem res non sunt in anima ut lapis; unde necesse est quod species rerum sint in anima; sed hoc intellige de specie impressiva quoad sensitivam partem, et de [scil. specie] repraesentativa quoad intellectivam*. See Aristotle, *De anima*, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford, 1956), III 8 (431b29): οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος. Note that Aristotle does not explicitly say that it is the form (εἶδος) of the stone, although this is implicitly understood. This passage also appears prominently in the very first article of Henry's *Quaestiones ordinariae*, his theological *Summa*. See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, ed. Gordon Wilson, *Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia XXI* (Leuven, 2005), art.1, q.1 (8, ll. 54-5): *Lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis*.

¹⁰ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet III*, q.14 (173b): *Signanter ergo Philosophus loquitur, cum dicit quod lapis non sit in anima sed species eius, nam tota causa, quare lapis non sit in anima, est quia est hic et nunc, et quia est quid materiale; si autem esset penitus separatus a materia, esset penitus immaterialis, et posset per seipsum esse*.

actually intelligible'.¹¹ Against this position Giles stresses that in this life our embodied human intellect is directed towards the essences or natures of concrete, sensible, material things. We encounter these things via our senses and process the sensory input further by the *phantasia*, a physiologically realized capacity that combines and synthesizes incoming sensory information and generates complex sensory representations of a given object, so-called phantasms. As Giles points out, stressing his disagreement with Plato:

The essences of material things – of which we have phantasms –, are the proper objects of our intellect yet they are not abstract nor actually intelligible as Plato posited. Therefore we need an active intellect, which makes what is potentially intelligible actually intelligible, through whose power and illuminating function what is potentially intelligible can change the possible intellect.¹²

Thus, to generate concepts in our mind two factors are required: *content* available in sensory representations and an *active intellectual principle* that operates on this semantic content in order to produce concepts that can be received, stored, and activated by our mind.¹³ Human cognition, according to this picture, is not a simple one-way street of passively receiving impressions

¹¹ Giles of Rome, *Super libros de anima* (Venice, 1500; reprint Frankfurt/Main, 1982), III (fol. 69^{rb}): *Dicendum quod, ut Commentator tangit, Plato non indiguit ponere intellectum agentem, sed Aristoteles. Posuit enim Plato quod propria obiecta intellectus nostri erant actu intelligibilia. Posuit enim quidditates rerum separatae, quas vocabat ideas, et quia quod quid est est proprium obiectum intellectus nostri dicebat illas ideas et illas quidditates abstractas esse proprium obiectum intellectus nostri.* See Averroës, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima Libros*, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, 1953), III 5 (409): *Plato dixit quod universalis sunt neque generabilia neque corruptibilia, et quod sunt existentia extra mentem* ('Plato said that the universals are neither subject to generation nor subject to corruption, and that they exist outside of the mind'). See also Averroës, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima Libros* III 18 (440): *Et omnia dicta ab Aristotele in hoc sunt ita quod universalis nullum habent esse extra animam, quod intendit Plato. Quoniam, si ita esset, non indigeret ponere intellectum agentem* ('All the things said by Aristotle about this are such that the universals have no being outside the soul, which [separate being] is what Plato intended. For, if it were so, there would be no need to posit an active intellect'). On Averroës' understanding of Plato see Richard Taylor, 'Introduction', in Averroës (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, *Long Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle*, translated with introduction and notes by Richard C. Taylor with Thérèse-Anne Druart, subeditor (New Haven, 2009), XCIII.

¹² Giles of Rome, *Super libros de anima*, III (69^{rb}): *Nam quia quidditates rerum materialium quarum est habere fantasmata quae sunt proprium obiectum intellectus nostri non sunt actu abstractae nec actu intelligibilia ut ponebat Plato indigemus ponere intellectum agentem qui faciat haec potentia intelligibilia actu intelligibilia, per cuius virtute et irradiationem haec potentia intelligibilia immutare possint intellectum potentialem.* See Carey J. Leonard, 'A Thirteenth Century Notion of the Agent Intellect: Giles of Rome', *The New Scholasticism* 37 (1963), 327-58, 334.

¹³ On intellect's active function of abstraction from sensory representations in Giles, see Valeria Sorge, 'L'astrazione nella Gnoseologia di Egidio Romano', *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 72 (1980), 670-80, especially 678. Sorge argues persuasively against an earlier, narrow interpretation by Edgar Hocedez in his critical edition of Giles' *Theoremata de esse et essentia* (Louvain, 1930), 78: 'Ce qui donne à l'espèce intelligible son caractère immatériel et abstrait ce n'est pas l'activité

from extramental sensible reality, but rather a constructive, dynamic process of abstracting from available sensory information. It is a gradual process relying on the support of sensory and mental representations because in this life the concrete material objects are not immediately, in their natures, cognitively present to our mind. Rather, our cognitive processes employ representations in their stead, which fall short of the ideal case, as the discussion of the beatific vision has shown.

3. The role of sensory representations in human cognition

At this point we may ask how the human mind or intellect can access the content, the sensory representations, namely the phantasms, that are available in a physiologically realized capacity, the *phantasia*, given that, according to Giles, the intellect itself is not material or realized in an organ such as the brain. It seems that sensory information received from extramental sensible objects can be transferred from one capacity to another as long as they are all physiologically realized and somehow bodily connected. Thus, information gathered by sight and touch can be transferred to the common root of all sensory capacities, so that it may be combined to a more complete picture, and passed on to the synthesizing *phantasia*, which can produce ‘images’, or representations, even if the sensible object is no longer present to sight or touch. But how can there be a further cognitive transfer of information beyond this capacity for sensory representations, given that the human mind or intellect is considered non-physiological and thus altogether different in kind? In his *Quodlibet V*, q.21, Giles addresses this difficulty by asking specifically ‘how the *phantasia*, once changed by the overall sense capacity and the particular senses, may effect a change in the possible intellect’.¹⁴

In his answer Giles again uses a certain notion of what we may call cognitive or intentional presence, which is meant to overcome the strict limits of material, extended, organic constitution. First he states the problem:

The form which is in the *phantasia* acts beyond its nature because it causes a form in the possible intellect. The *phantasia*, which is something bodily, acts beyond its nature, since it acts on the possible intellect, which is not an organic power because it is not a body nor a power-in-a-body, as can be seen from [Aristotle’s exposition in] the third book of *De anima*.¹⁵

propre de l’intellect agent, mais précisément la nature même de l’intellect possible, selon l’axiome bien connu: “quidquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis”.”

¹⁴ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet*, ed. P. De Coninck (Leuven, 1646; reprint Frankfurt/Main, 1966), V, q.21 (329b): *His itaque declaratis, restat declarare difficultatem tertiam: quomodo phantasia immutata a sensu communi, et a sensibus particularibus, possit immutare intellectum possibilem?*

¹⁵ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet V*, q.21 (329b): *Species existens in fantasia agit ultra suam naturam, quia causat speciem in intellectu possibili. Phantasia igitur, quae est quid corporale, agit ultra suam naturam, quia agit in intellectum possibilem, qui non est virtus organica, quia nec est corpus nec est virtus in corpore, ut ex [libro] tertio De anima haberi potest.*

In short, Giles' solution is to stress the higher, *active*, intellectual function as operating on and manipulating the content that is available in the lower, subordinated *phantasia*. Yet Giles still needs to explain how the incorporeal mind or intellect can access any sensory representation located in a bodily power. He claims that:

Since the active and the receptive intellect are not organic powers in some subject they are grounded in the soul's essence. The soul's essence however, since it is not localized, is all at once in the entire body, and all at once in every part, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* VI 7.¹⁶ In this way the active and possible intellect will be present to the *phantasia*, for there the soul's essence is present, in which these kinds of powers are grounded. In this way, then, there is a certain kind of contact between the *phantasia* and these powers, but on account of this contact alone the *phantasia* cannot impress anything on the possible intellect because the spirit is more excellent than any [kind of] body, as Augustine says in *De libero arbitrio*.¹⁷

Giles considers the soul's essence as not specifically located but rather as extending throughout the entire human body, which helps him explain how the mind may access the contents of bodily cognitive capacities. He also holds on

¹⁶ See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ed. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CCh.SL 50, 50A (Turnhout, 1968), 6.6.8 (237, ll. 20-7): *Creatura quoque spiritalis sicut est anima est quidem in corporis comparatione simplicior; sine comparatione autem corporis multiplex est, etiam ipsa non simplex. Nam ideo simplicior est corpore quia non mole diffunditur per spatium loci sed in unoquoque corpore, et in toto tota est et in qualibet parte eius tota est; et ideo cum fit aliquid in quamvis exigua particula corporis quod sentiat anima, quamvis non fiat in toto corpore, illa tamen tota sentit quia totam non latet.*

¹⁷ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* V, q.21 (329b-30a): *Intellectus autem agens, et possibilis, quia non sunt virtutes organicae tamquam in subiecto fundantur in essentia animae. Essentia autem animae, quia non est situata, est tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet parte; ut vult Augustinus [libro] 6^o De trinitate, capitulo 7^o. Hoc ergo modo intellectus agens, et possibilis erunt praesentes ipsi fantasiae, quia est ibi praesens essentia animae, in qua huiusmodi potentiae radican- tur: propter [p. 330a] quod est aliquis modus contactus fantasiae ad huiusmodi potentias, sed propter talem contactum non posset fantasia aliquid imprimere in intellectum possibilem, quia spiritus est praestantior omni corpore, ut vult Augustinus in libro de arbitrio. See Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, ed. W. Green, CCh.SL 29 (Turnhout, 1970), 2.6.13 (245, l. 76-246, l. 10): *A[ugustinus]. Adtende iam, utrum etiam ratio de hoc interiore sensu iudicet. Iam enim non quaero utrum eam meliorem illo esse dubites, quia non dubito id te iudicare; quamquam ne id quidem iam quaerendum putem, utrum de isto sensu iudicet ratio. Namque in his ipsis quae infra eam sunt, id est in corporibus et in sensibus corporis et isto interiore sensu, quo modo sit aliud alio melius et quam sit illis ipsa praestantior, quae tandem nisi ipsa renuntiat? Quod profecto nullo modo posset, nisi de his ipsa iudicaret. E[vodius]. Manifestum est ('A[ugustinus]. Turn now to the question whether reason judges the inner sense. Now, I will not even ask whether reason is better than the inner sense because I do not doubt that you think it is; indeed I think we do not even have to ask whether reason judges the inner sense. For with respect to the things that are below reason, namely bodily things, the bodily senses and the inner sense, how could one be [considered] better than another, and reason more excellent than any one of them, unless reason itself announced this? Which would be in no way possible unless reason judged about these things. E[vodius]. This is clear').**

to an Augustinian hierarchy of capacities which allows the higher controlling powers of soul or mind to operate on lower, bodily capacities and their contents, but not vice versa. Giles argues that in our intellective activity the *phantasia* plays a crucial, instrumental role: 'The *phantasia* thus serves as an organ/instrument for the active intellect as it acts on the possible intellect'.¹⁸ The point of contact between this capacity for sensory representations and the intellect insofar as it receives or generates conceptual content is unique, Giles claims.¹⁹ For

the possible intellect is certainly present to other organic powers because it is in the soul's essence, which is in every part of body, and present to every organ. However, the possible intellect can only be changed by the *phantasia*, since we must posit degrees even among the sensory powers.²⁰

The *phantasia* with its contents appears ranked above all other sensory capacities, either because its representations are more actualized than those in memory, or because they have a higher level of intentionality, of separation from material conditions.²¹ Perhaps by these short remarks Giles means that compared to memory-contents the sensory representations furnished by the *phantasia* are more readily accessible to our attending, conscious mind, and that their format allows us to abstract general concepts more easily. Giles' view that the *phantasia* serves as our intellect's *instrument*, capable of effecting change in the receptive intellect, stands in contrast to the mature conception of his contemporary Henry of Ghent, who holds that the universalized content in the *phantasia* is merely a necessary condition for intellect's self-actualization.²²

¹⁸ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet V*, q.21 (330a): *Phantasia ergo se habebit sicut organum intellectus agentis prout agit in intellectum possibilem*.

¹⁹ On the possibility of a contact between *phantasia* and intellect, see Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge, Volume One: Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions* (Leiden, 1994), 196.

²⁰ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet V*, q.21 (330a): *Est quidem praesens intellectus possibilis aliis virtutibus organicis quia est in ipsa essentia animae, quae est in qualibet parte corporis, et cuilibet organo praesens. Non tamen immutari potest intellectus possibilis nisi a phantasia, quia et in ipsius virtutibus sensitivis oportet dare gradus*.

²¹ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet V*, q.21 (330a-b): *Ita quod phantasia habeat quandam principalitatem respectu aliarum potentiarum sensitivarum, vel quia actualiori modo sunt ibi species, quam in [p. 330b] memoria, vel quia spiritualiori modo, quam in virtutibus aliis; rationi autem huiusmodi principalitatis innixa cum lumine intellectus agentis potest phantasia impressionem facere in intellectu possibili, quod non possunt aliae virtutes sensitivae*.

²² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta*, ed. I. Badius (Paris, 1518), XI, q.5 (vol. II, fols. 451^v, D - 452^r, D): *Ex parte autem intellectus sunt duo [...] quae ad vitalem operationem requiruntur. [1] Prima enim immutatio qua intellectus habet esse in actu est a causante ipsum, et hoc quo ad nudam vim intellectivam. [2] Secunda autem eius immutatio est ab intelligibili sibi praesente, et hoc non mediante aliqua specie ab illo impressa intellectui, sed ab ipso intelligibili immediate. [...] res autem obiecta quando praesens potest esse multo melius movet quam eius species, et est maioris virtutis et activitatis in agendo: propter hoc ex parte intellectus non debet poni species sicut ponitur ex parte sensus. Sed quemadmodum in sensu species existens in organo sive organum per illam speciem immutat vim sensitivam ipsam inclinando ad percipiendum per actum sensationis*

Given Giles' line of reasoning thus far, the role of sensory representations for our intellective processes needs further clarification: Are sensory representations of particular, sensible objects required only for our *initial concept-formation* via abstraction, or are they also required for *any actualization* of our intellective capacity and its contents? In other words, can there be thought without a sensory context, without some reference to the concrete reality of particulars in the here and now? As Giles puts it in commenting on the relevant passage in Aristotle's *De anima*, 'perhaps someone doubts whether we can think without sensory representations'.²³

Now, Giles says that one way to conceive of intellective activity is to focus on the ongoing, occurrent activity, and to conclude that once our ongoing thought stops, the conceptual content, the *species*, in our intellect disappears entirely. We can see how on this account an object would indeed have to be always present via the sensory representations of the *phantasia* – whether it is currently perceived or its sight recalled from memory (perhaps this is akin to the case of a newborn who has not yet generated any lasting concepts and can only have an occurrent thought about an object while it is present. Once the object is removed it is as if it had never existed, and no 'trace', that is, no conceptual content remains). Yet Giles rejects the fundamental premise of this scenario, namely the idea that once we stop thinking about *x* we retain no concept of *x* in intellect whatsoever. Giles argues that this account would eliminate

ipsum obiectum sensibile, sic in intellectu intelligibile praesens sub ratione obiecti universalis, vel in phantasmate vel in habitu, immediate immutat vi sua activa ipsum intellectum inclinando ipsum ad se percipiendum per actum intellectionis, et dispositione illa qua sic est inclinatus, est dispositus ultimate ad eliciendum intellectionem tamquam suam propriam operationem ('On the part of the intellect two things [...] are required for its vital function. [1] The first change through which intellect has being in actuality is from what causes it, and this occurs on the basis of the plain intellective power. [2] The second change of intellect is from the intelligible [object] that is present to it, and this occurs not through some species impressed from the intelligible [object] onto the intellect, but immediately from this intelligible [object] itself. [...] When a thing that is the object is *present* it can move much better than its species, and there is a greater power and activity in acting. For this reason on the part of the intellect no species needs to be posited in the way it is posited on the part of sense. However, just as in sense a species that is in the organ (or the organ through that species) renders the sensitive power inclined toward perceiving through the act of sensation this sensible object, so in the intellect something intelligible *present under the aspect of a universal object* – whether in a phantasm or in a habit – through its own capacity immediately renders the intellect inclined toward perceiving it through the act of intellection. And in virtue of that disposition through which it is so inclined the intellect is ultimately disposed toward eliciting [the act of] intellection as its proper function'). See C.J. Leonard, 'A Thirteenth Century Notion of the Agent Intellect' (1963), 331: 'The act of intellection is not caused by the transformed phantasmal species, for this would invert the principle of causality; the act of knowing is an autoproduction in which the species is only a *sine qua non*'. For an analysis of Henry of Ghent's views see Bernd Goehring, 'Henry of Ghent on Human Knowledge and Its Limits', *Quaestio* 12 (2012), 589–613.

²³ Giles of Rome, *Super libros de anima* III (fol. 75^{ra}): *Dubitare forte aliquis utrum possumus intelligere sine fantasmatibus*.

any intellectual, conceptual memory, and that it could not explain how we could ever be in a better epistemic state as a result of our intellectual activity:

For if the concept in our possible intellect does not remain in any way, then after the acquisition of knowledge, when we stop to actually think something, we will be in the same position with respect to understanding that we were in before, since we must again acquire concepts, just as before.²⁴

If we are to explain the phenomena adequately, Giles argues, we have to include some notion of intellectual, conceptual memory; otherwise we cannot account for any learning or long-term acquisition of concepts and knowledge. Thus Giles proposes to examine the possibility of thought without sensory representations in two ways, one by focusing on the object, and another by focusing on our intellectual capacity.

First Giles looks at the object of our cognition and thought and notes that while intellect's primary object is something universal, a universal exists in extramental reality only in concrete, sensible, material particulars. And here the level of abstraction in our mind is irrelevant. Giles points out that just as we cannot really separate a universal from its realization in some particular, our intellect can only understand it within the context of the sensory representation of some particular thing.²⁵ Finally, Giles turns to the processes of our intellectual capacity itself, distinguishing dispositional contents from their actualization in occurrent thought, which according to Giles is triggered by the *phantasia* and its sensory representations:

For although after occurrent intellectual activity concepts remain in the possible intellect, they remain in a certain dispositional state, and they do not remain at all in a state of perfect and complete actuality, for if the concepts always were in such a state of actuality, we would always actually be thinking with them. For this reason we also need the *phantasia*, after we have acquired concepts in the possible intellect, so that those concepts – which remain in a semi-realized and incomplete state after we stop thinking – can be brought anew into a state of full actuality/activation, so that we can through these reactivated concepts actually think again.²⁶

²⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super libros de anima* III (fol. 75^{ra}): *Nam si nullo modo remaneat species in intellectu possibili, postquam desinimus actu cogitare post acquisitam scientiam essemus eodem modo in positio ad intelligendum sicut et ante, cum oportet nos de novo acquirere species intelligibiles sicut prius.*

²⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super libros de anima* III (fol. 75^{ra}): *Universale autem quantumcumque intelligitur separatum et abstractum, semper tamen habet esse in aliquo particulari sensibili, quia omnia sunt in praemissis scilicet in particularibus, ut dicitur in Praedicamentis, propter quod sicut universale numquam secundum esse potest separari quin habeat esse in aliquo particulari, sic numquam potest intelligi ab intellectu nisi in fantasia alicuius particularis rei.*

²⁶ Giles of Rome, *Super libros de anima* III (fol. 75^{ra}): *Nam licet post actuale intelligere remaneant species in intellectu possibili, remanent in quaedam esse habituali, et non remanent omnino in actu perfecto et completo, quia si semper species haberent tale actuale esse semper per eas actualiter intelligeremus. Indigemus ergo fantasia etiam postquam habemus species intellectu*

Giles uses the phrases *in actu perfecto et completo* and the contrasting *in actu semipleno et incompleto* to distinguish the activation of concepts in occurrent thought from their possession as dispositional contents, when we are not currently using them. An example is our acquisition of foreign languages, for example my having learned how to say ‘Hi! How are you doing?’ in Italian, and my activating the relevant concepts when I greet my friend Paolo by saying to him ‘Ciao! Come stai?’

Giles takes the famous Aristotelian suggestion that the sensory representations in the *phantasia* are related to intellect in the way sensible things are related to sense, but qualifies the analogy by stressing that it does not extend to all aspects.²⁷ This is so because

Sensible things are always required for sensation so that forms are generated in the senses, but sensory representations (*i.e.* phantasms) are not always required for intellectual activity so that concepts are generated in intellect, but only for their acquisition; after we already have concepts, sensory representations are not required for generating concepts in intellect, but rather for bringing the concepts [already] contained in intellect from a dispositional to a fully actualized state.²⁸

In this manner Giles can interpret the Aristotelian dictum to mean that sensory representations are always required for any intellectual activity, although their role varies according to what function our intellect is currently performing. Whenever we are cognizing something for the first time the sensory

possibili, ut illae quae postquam cogitare desinimus remanent in actu semipleno et incompleto denuo per fantasiam fiant in actu completo, ut possimus per illas species sic ad actum reductas rursus actualiter cogitare.

²⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super libros de anima* III (fol. 75^{ra}): *Hanc autem rationem innuit Philosophus cum ait quod fantasmata se habent ad intellectum sicut sensibilia ad sensum, quod simile non est per omnem modum.* See Aristotle, *De anima* III 7 (431a14-5): τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. See Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, in Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, ed. Cl. Stroick (Ed. Colon. VII/1) (Münster i. W., 1968), 211, l. 82: *Sed intellectivae animae phantasmata ut sensibilia sunt* (‘To the thinking soul, phantasms serve as sensations’). Henry of Ghent quotes this dictum in *Quodlibeta*, IV, q.21 (345, ll. 241-2). – See also Aristotle, *De anima* III 8 (432a9-10): τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματα ἐστὶ, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης. See Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, in Albertus Magnus, *De anima* (223, ll. 78-9): *Phantasmata enim sicut sensibilia sunt, praeter quod sunt sine materia* (‘For phantasms are like sensations, except without matter’). Compare D.W. Hamlyn’s apt comment about Aristotle’s explanatory framework: ‘The intellect is treated in a way which is almost parallel to the way in which perception is treated’. See Aristotle, *De anima* Books II and III (with *Passages from Book I*), translated with introduction and notes by D.W. Hamlyn, with a report on recent work and a revised bibliography by C. Shields (Oxford, 1993), XI.

²⁸ Giles of Rome, *Super libros de anima* III (fol. 75^{ra-rb}): *Requiruntur ergo sensibilia semper ad sentire ad hoc [fol. 75^{rb}] quod fiant species in sensu, sed non semper requiruntur fantasmata ad intelligere ad hoc quod fiant species in intellectu, sed ad addicere requiruntur fantasmata ut fiant species; postquam autem iam habemus species non requiruntur fantasmata ut fiant species in intellectu, sed ad hoc requiruntur ut species quae sunt in intellectu in actu semipleno fiant in actu pleno.*

representations furnish the informational content so that we can generate new concepts. When we possess some concepts as dispositional content the sensory representations are required for fully activating our intellect and its contents. What our *phantasia* synthesizes is what allows our intellect to complete a certain thought in its accompanying sensory context.

4. Conclusion

I have argued in this essay that Giles uses the ideal case of the beatific vision to develop his notion of cognitive presence. In contrast to the beatific vision we generate mental representations whenever we need to *emulate* an object's direct cognitive presence to the mind. Giles argues that any mind-created and mind-dependent representation remains deficient compared to the object and its (hypothetical) presence. Giles maintains that the human intellect depends on sensory representations for all its activities, not merely the acquisition of contents but also their activation and use in thought. He holds that the acquired contents in our intellect should be explained in dispositional terms whenever we are not actually thinking. By contrast, actual, occurrent thought requires the re-presentation of a concrete, particular object. Giles concludes that there is no (human) intellective activity without sensory representations, just as there can be no sensation without sensible things.

The Reception of Augustine in the Theology of Alexander de Sancto Elpidio

Christopher M. WOJTULEWICZ, London, England, UK

ABSTRACT

If known at all, Alexander de Sancto Elpidio (O.E.S.A.) is perhaps best remembered for his *Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate*; his theology, however, remains somewhat shrouded in obscurity. Besides some references to his opinion in the *Sentences* commentaries of various Augustinians of the early fourteenth century, we do not yet possess any real conception of Alexander's theological positions, despite his prominence in Paris and being General of the Order from 1312. Now that we can be sure of the existence of part of one of his *quodlibeta*, as well as other theological works which includes an abridgement of Augustine's *City of God*, for the first time Alexander's thought can emerge and his position in the context of the debates of his day can be established. From his biography we see how Alexander was one of the most influential early Augustinians, assisting the intellectual development of the Order, securing its rootedness in the texts of Augustine, and contributing to an increasing body of thought we have come to identify – rightly or wrongly – as the 'Augustinian School'. This article will consider Alexander's biography and influence on the Augustinian Hermits, his encouragement for the acquisition of Augustine's texts, and will look at how he himself made use of Augustine.¹

Prosper de Reggio Emilia, the fourteenth century Augustinian Hermit, left a legacy of the debates which were taking place in Paris in the early decades of that century in the manuscript Codex Vaticanus Latinus 1086. That 'notebook'² gives a clear window into intellectual life at that specific time; but it also carries with it a broader interest for the question of the reception of Augustine, for this manuscript was compiled in the hands of an Augustinian at a time when

¹ I am grateful to the British research project 'Meister Eckhart and the Parisian University in the Early 14th Century – Codex Vaticanus Latinus 1086' at King's College London, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, for facilitating the research by which this article was written. I am particularly grateful to Pater Prof. Walter Senner OP for his invaluable help in researching Alexander de Sancto Elpidio, and to all those associated with the research project who have taken the time to consider and discuss my findings with me, including colleagues at the Max Weber Center for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies at the University of Erfurt.

² See William J. Courtenay, 'Reflections on Vat. lat. 1086 and Prosper of Reggio Emilia, O.E.S.A.', in Christopher Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 7 (Leiden, 2007), 345-58, 345.

the Order was growing and developing its sense of identity. Key names found therein – especially those of which we have little or no knowledge – give us a keen sense of the state of debates taking place, as well as insight into the sorts of interests that belonged to the Augustinian Order. The significance of this observation gives cause for the specific direction of this article: there are in fact two Augustinian ‘Alexanders’ of interest who are named in this manuscript.³ They are not authors of *quaestiones* (which comprise the larger, second section of the manuscript) but they are named in the *Sentences Commentary* of Prosper (the first part of the manuscript). One of those, Alexander Ungarus, is rather difficult to trace beyond his dates in Paris. He seems to have been incepted at Paris as *magister* in 1300,⁴ and in the list of Augustinians in the faculty in 1303 he appears alongside Jacobus de Orto and Amadeus de Castello,⁵ giving a greater sense of his placement in the development of the Order historically and intellectually. In the Bibliothèque Nationale Paris Lat. 3557 there does seem to be a ‘Sermo de Trinitate’ by an Alexander Hungarus, but this would require further investigation. The other Augustinian Alexander to which Prosper refers is Alexander de Sancto Elpidio, who is our focus here.

Alexander de Sancto Elpidio (sometimes Alexander de Marchia or Fassitelli)⁶ lectured on the *Sentences* in approximately 1299/1300,⁷ became *magister* in

³ Specifically, Prosper makes reference to them several times throughout his *Sentences* commentary, as preserved in the first part of this manuscript, in the margins on fol. 32^{rb}, fol. 58^{rb}, fol. 58^{va}, fol. 59^{ra}, fol. 64^{rb}, and fol. 72^{va}.

⁴ Adolar Zumkeller, *Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages*, edited by John E. Rotelle (Villanova, Pa., 1996), 33. Further literature on Alexander Ungarus is given in *ibid.*, 71 n. 110.

⁵ Heinrich Denifle, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* II/1 (Paris, 1891), 85, §613: *Ad magisterium recipiendum presentetur primo frater Alexander de Ungaria, secundo fr. Jacobus de Orto. Quod Amadeus de Castello vadat Parisius lector Sententias. Et quilibet qui Sententias est lector vadat per annum ante tempus inceptiois sue lecture. In studio in quo magister licentiat in sacra pagina fuerit, nullus lector disputet nisi ipse magister ex casu aliquo aliud observandum ordinaverit.* Although, oddly, Grampari seems to suggest that earlier in the manuscript it states that Jacobus de Orto became *magister* by special permission of Pope Benedict XI – see *ibid.*, fn. 3.

⁶ A. Zumkeller, *Theology and History* (1996), 30, see also 69 n. 89 for a summary of material published to date on Alexander. See also Adolar Zumkeller, ‘Alexander v. San Elpidio’, *LThK* 1 (Freiburg, 1993), 371. Alexander is referred to by his Augustinian contemporaries in various ways, including ‘Alexander de Marchia Augustiniensis = de S. Elpidio, Alex. Ord. S. Augustini, Alexander de Marcia Augustin, Alexander de Marsia Aug.!, Alexander de ver. (quidam de nostris), Ale. ver. = Alexander de mar<Marchia>’, which I quote from Damasus Trapp, *Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century: Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Booklore* (Louvain, 1956), 179 n. 37. The name ‘Fassitelli’ is also suggested by some, see Friedrich Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi* 2 (Madrid, 1950), 77; Carla Casagrande, ‘FASITELLI, Alessandro (Alessandro da Sant’Elpidio)’, *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 45 (Rome, 1995), <<http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alessandro-fassitelli>> (accessed on August 7, 2015); also Adolar Zumkeller, *Leben, Schrifttum und Lehrrihtung des Erfurter Universitätsprofessors Johannes Zachariae O.S.A. (†1428)* (Würzburg, 1984), 162 n. 467.

⁷ A. Zumkeller, *Theology and History* (1996), 15.

Paris in 1307,⁸ and was elected Prior General of the Augustinian Hermits in 1312 at the Chapter of Viterbo.⁹ It seems he sought to resign from office by at least 1324, but was not permitted to do so;¹⁰ Alexander clearly enjoyed the support of his Order. Indeed, Henry of Friemar had referred to him as ‘a very careful man, admirable for his prudence and very learned’.¹¹ The very same Henry seems to have recorded that at least in Italy by 1302 there was consensus among the Roman Curia that the Order was truly considered under the patronage of Augustine, due to the arrangements for celebrating Augustine’s feast day with them.¹² But it is then less than a year after Alexander’s death that William of Cremona, Alexander’s successor as Prior General, is granted by John XXII custody of the body of St. Augustine¹³ – a testament to the rapid advance of the Order, and indeed the success of the governance of the late Alexander. The prominence of his person would suggest he would likely feature in Prosper’s compilation in some sense, but it is not the case that Alexander features as an author of *quaestiones* in Vat. Lat. 1086. Alexander was named bishop of Amalfi on 18 February 1326,¹⁴ and died within eight months.¹⁵ If such a short period as bishop is indicative of the state of his health by 1326, there seems all the more reason to see the appointment flowing from the gratitude of John XXII.

Two dates are of significance for understanding the placement of Alexander in the context of the early fourteenth century: the trial of the Templars in 1308, and the trial of Marguerite Porete in 1309-1310. In both instances Alexander de Sancto Elpidio is named as one of the participants.¹⁶ Of the fourteen participants in the trial of 1308, nine (which includes Alexander de Sancto Elpidio) were also numbered among the twenty-one participants in the trial of 1310.¹⁷ To have been involved in both trials bears testimony to Alexander’s respect both politically and theologically. It would also seem that Alexander’s theological

⁸ William O. Duba, ‘Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus’, in *Theological Quodlibeta* (2007), 569-650, 642.

⁹ David Gutierrez, *The Augustinians in the Middle Ages 1256-1356*, trans. Arthur J. Ennis, History of the Order of St. Augustine 1/1 (Villanova, 1984), 80.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* Gutierrez quotes from *Analecta Augustiniana* 3 (Rome, 1903 ss), 466.

¹¹ D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 80.

¹² D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 15-6. Gutierrez attributes this to Henry of Friemar, but it is not clear from what source he is quoting, possibly L. Empoli, *Bullarium Ordinis erem. S. Augustini* (Rome, 1628), 102.

¹³ Eric Leland Saak, *High Way to Heaven: The Augustinian Platform Between Reform and Reformation 1292-1524*, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 89 (Leiden, 2002), 159.

¹⁴ D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 80. See also E.L. Saak, *High Way to Heaven* (2002), 158.

¹⁵ D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 171.

¹⁶ Paul F. Crawford, ‘The Involvement of the University of Paris in the Trials of Marguerite Porete and of the Templars, 1308-10’, in Jochen Burgdorf, Paul F. Crawford and Helen J. Nicholson (eds), *The Debate on the Trial of the Templars (1307-1314)* (Burlington, 2010), 129-44, 130-8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 136-8.

force on the primacy of the papal office was employed against the 'fraticelli',¹⁸ though it is difficult not to also connect this in some measure with his later stress on the maintenance of poverty within his own Order, as his concerns about the loss of mendicant status grew.¹⁹

Alexander is perhaps best known for his *Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate*,²⁰ fitting into the Order's theme of tracts on the papacy, alongside Giles of Rome and James of Viterbo, Alexander's teacher. Much of the political theology found therein is of course a good example of the coming together of various key members of the Order to form theological opinion in a way which allows us, at least on this subject, to point to something like an Augustinian school of thought. It would seem that Alexander was also the author of a *brevis tractatus de jurisdictione Imperii, et de autoritate summi Pontificis*, found in two other manuscripts which also witness to his *Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate*.²¹ Alexander formed a part of a group which has come to be known as the 'curialist writers'²² and completed his main tract in 1324²³ (a tract 'with similar or virtually identical titles' to those written by Giles of Rome and Peter Paludanus).²⁴ David Gutierrez summarizes the impact this had upon the Order:

From about the year 1325, Augustine of Ancona, Alexander of Sant'Elpidio and William of Cremona wrote in defense of the authority of the popes [...] On 18 Jan. 1326, Pope John XXII ordered that the first of these three friars be given one hundred florins 'for writing his books' (Denifle II 289). On Feb. 18 of the same year the pope named the second of the three bishop of Amalfi, and on 20 Jan. 1327, he sent to the third (who had become prior general eleven months before) the bull *Veneranda sanctorum patrum*, which was the one that contributed most of all toward consolidating the conviction of the Augustinian friars about their being the sons of St. Augustine.²⁵

Gutierrez even suggests that it is hard to underestimate the impact this period (more broadly 1301-1350) had upon later debates surrounding the papal office.²⁶ With equal, or indeed greater force than had been exerted three decades before with respect to the need for the members of the Order to adhere to the teachings of Giles of Rome, Alexander expressed both at the Chapter of

¹⁸ D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 80-1.

¹⁹ D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 80-1 and 99.

²⁰ For a list of manuscripts see Jürgen Miethke, *De potestate papae: die päpstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham* (Tübingen, 2000), 308-9. See also Adolar Zumkeller, *Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremitenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken* (Würzburg, 1966), 52 n. 88.

²¹ Paris, Bib. Nat. Lat. 4355, fols. 77^v-118^r and Lat. 4356, fols. 62^v-93^v.

²² Guillaume H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, *Jean Gerson – Apostle of Unity His Church Politics and Ecclesiology*, *Studies in the History of Christian Thought* 94 (Leiden, 1999), 248.

²³ E.L. Saak, *High Way to Heaven* (2002), 64.

²⁴ G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, *Jean Gerson* (1999), 249.

²⁵ D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 16-7 and 149.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 148.

Montepessulano and of Florence two years later, the need for all the members of the Order to strictly adhere to ‘commands and mandates of the pope’.²⁷ The development of this ‘political Augustinianism’, Gutierrez argues, is what gave rise to Alexander’s *Epitome librorum sancti Augustini de civitate Dei*, written ‘before 1317’.²⁸ One of the important witnesses to Alexander’s *Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate* (Paris Bib. Nat. Lat. 4230) seems to confirm this connection in a literal way, for it also contains this work on the *City of God*, as well as his much more overlooked *Expositio evangelii sancti Iohannis evangeliste*.²⁹ Both texts contain within them evidence of a close reading of Augustine himself. The manuscript is from the latter part of the fourteenth century, and contains a mix of mostly Augustinian texts (by Dionysius de Colle and Bernardus Oliverius) but also Isidore of Seville’s *Synonymorum* and a text by the Dominican friar Ricoldo de Monte Crucis.

Some confusion has surrounded the *quodlibeta* of Alexander. It seems that Alexander wrote three *quodlibeta*, but only the first has survived – and that only in part.³⁰ Victorin Doucet had produced a codicological assessment of the Neapolitan manuscript VII.C.6 which he published in 1932,³¹ where he identified a set of anonymous questions, which caused him, due to a reference within the text to a third *quodlibet*, to remark on how similar it was to a question by Gerardus de Bononia.³² Although Doucet did not at this point consider the texts to be by Alexander, only a short time later Palémon Glorieux identified and supposed that the text was either by Henry the German or some other Augustinian Hermit such as Alexander de Sancto Elpidio, who he mentioned as a possibility by name,³³ and, relying on the earlier work by Doucet, seems to have thought Alexander to have been the most likely author. William Courtenay has since confirmed Glorieux’s intuition by reading the *Sentences Commentary* of Gerardus de Senis, where the Chicago manuscript witness refers explicitly to the second *quaestio* of the *quodlibet* of Alexander de Sancto Elpidio, as found in

²⁷ E.L. Saak, *High Way to Heaven* (2002), 114.

²⁸ D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 21.

²⁹ The *Epitome librorum sancti Augustini de civitate Dei* is to be found in Paris Bib. Nat. Lat. 640, fols. 15-48 and Lat. 4230, fols. 55^{va}-101^{vb} (for the foliation of Lat. 640 I rely upon Friedrich Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi* 2 [Madrid, 1950], 77, §1174). The *Expositio evangelii sancti Iohannis evangeliste* is to be found in Paris Bib. Nat. Lat. 640, fols. 1-15 and Lat. 4230, fols. 37^{va}-53^{rb} (for the foliation of Lat. 640 I rely upon Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum* [1950], 77, §1173). Stegmüller also lists Paris Bib. Nat. Lat. 4160 as a witness to these two texts by Alexander, but the manuscript appears only to be a collection of papal bulls from Gregory XIII and Clement VIII.

³⁰ Victorin Doucet, ‘De Cod. Neapolitano. VII. C. 6’, *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 25 (1932), 518-24, 520 n. 1.

³¹ V. Doucet, ‘De Cod. Neapolitano. VII. C. 6’ (1932), 518-24.

³² *Ibid.* 520 n. 1.

³³ Palémon Glorieux, *La Littérature Quodlibétique* 2, Bibliothèque thomiste 21 (Paris, 1935), 302 and n. 2.

the Naples manuscript (*Utrum distinctio attributorum in essentia divina sumatur per comparisonem ad extra vel ad intra*).³⁴ It is to be noted, if only for the sake of informing a growing sense of the development of the Order, that Gerardus was theologically opposed to Alexander,³⁵ suggesting perhaps the degree to which Alexander was formed by his teacher Jacobus de Viterbo. It would seem that Alexander's theological position on the divine attributes was an important one at the time – Courtenay highlights two others, in addition to Gerardus de Senis, who quote Alexander on this subject: Michael de Massa and Thomas de Argentina (Thomas of Strasbourg).³⁶ Regarding what we already know of Alexander's theological position on this point, Maarten Hoenen writes:

From the quotations used by Thomas of Strasbourg we may deduce that Alexander of San Elpidio, of whose *Sentences* commentary we have no direct knowledge, held that God's essence virtually contains all the different attributes. These attributes become actual when God's essence is known by his intellect. [...] Opinions of Alexander were also quoted by Alfonsus Vargas.³⁷

More broadly Alexander is referenced in the works of several other Augustinians of the time, including the *Sentences* commentaries of Dionysius de Burgo,³⁸ Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus, and (later still) Johannes de Wasia,³⁹ as well as in the margin of an anonymous question in Vat. Lat. 1012.⁴⁰ After investigating the only known-surviving manuscript witness to Alexander's *quodlibet* in Naples myself, it was an unfortunate discovery that the *quodlibet* found therein is incomplete, containing only the first four of fifteen outlined questions.⁴¹

³⁴ The Latin title of the *quaestio* given here is from Glorieux (as found above, fn. 33). For the connection based on Courtenay, along with a short transcription of the relevant passage from Chicago, Univ. Libr. ms. 22, fol. 38^{rb}, see William J. Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism: Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of his Thought*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 99 (Leiden, 2008), 292. Courtenay also notes that the same reference to Alexander is also to be found in another witness to Gerardus de Senis' *Sentences* commentary, in Padua, Bib. Univ. ms. 2229; although these are the only two manuscripts that Courtenay has checked.

³⁵ Chris Schabel and William J. Courtenay, 'Augustinian *Quodlibeta* after Giles of Rome', in *Theological Quodlibeta* (2007), 545-68, 549.

³⁶ W.J. Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism* (2008), 292.

³⁷ Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought*, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 50 (Leiden, 1993), 61 n. 82.

³⁸ See his *Sentences* commentary in Erfurt, Bib. Ampl. 2^o 131, fol. 65^v.

³⁹ See Erfurt, Bib. Ampl. 2^o 110, fol. (87)86^v and fol. 150(149)^r.

⁴⁰ Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 1012 is known for containing the works of William of Alnwick and James of Ascoli, but in the penultimate section of the manuscript (fols. 66^{va}-110^{ra}) there are fifty-seven questions the authorship of which remains unclear. Alexander's name falls in the margin of a question entitled *utrum voluntas divina in eodem instanti possit in opposita* (fol. 99^{va}), see W.O. Duba, 'Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus' (2007), 640-9.

⁴¹ Naples, Bib. Naz. Cod. VII.C.6, fols. 7^{ra}-10^{rb}. Although only partial, I hope that Alexander can take his place within Glorieux's list of important Augustinian *quodlibeta* after Giles of Rome, as expounded upon in C. Schabel and W.J. Courtenay, 'Augustinian *Quodlibeta* after Giles of Rome' (2007), 546. I am in the process of producing an edition of the partial *quodlibet*.

The texts of Augustine and the Augustinian library in Paris

With regard to access to Augustine's texts, which is of course most significant for Alexander's work on the *City of God*, the period as a student through to his *magisterium* in 1307 would have been colored by the small number of available books at the *studium generale* in Paris. Two things make it difficult to know just what access was like to Augustine's works. The first was the Augustinian Constitutions, promulgated at Regensburg in 1290, which decreed that by bequest and acquisition the Augustinians had to exert all their efforts to expand the Order's libraries,⁴² which included the duty of the librarian to employ 'one or more copyists to make new [books], and by incorporating into the community library books left by deceased friars'.⁴³ Secondly, the same Constitutions required the Provincial to give money to former Parisian students, still more to the masters, to acquire books upon their return so that they would not go without.⁴⁴ With a mixture of bequests, acquisitions, and copying, it is difficult therefore to be clear about how rapid an expansion took place by the first two decades of the fourteenth century, and therefore about access to texts, except to add that the Constitutions were clearly enforced because, probably by the mid- and certainly by the end of the fourteenth century the Augustinian house in Paris owned some 55 manuscripts of Augustine's texts alone, and, it would seem, similar counts in the houses in Siena and Padua.⁴⁵ Such a rapid expansion of the libraries is not to be unexpected when one considers the explosion in the number of Augustinian students in Paris: from Alexander's time in Paris up to his death the number of lectorate students could have risen by as much as fifty percent,⁴⁶ though this is not necessarily to be considered the result of Alexander's influence, in part and certainly not in whole. The preservation of the libraries in the monasteries (that is, that the libraries remain intact and in the possession of the Augustinians), an effect no doubt of the general principle of the introspection of the Order, was emphasized by Alexander in the Chapter of Montpellier in 1324, enforced even with the penalty of excommunication.⁴⁷ Alexander had been given charge of the personal library of Giles of Rome earlier in 1316⁴⁸ – a baton, perhaps, which surely stimulated his enforcement of the preservation and expansion of the libraries. The legacy of

⁴² D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 160.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ The details of the number of manuscripts I refer to here are given in A. Zumkeller, *Theology and History* (1996), 13. See also David Gutierrez, *The Augustinians in the Middle Ages 1357-1517*, trans. Thomas Martin OSA, History of the Order of St. Augustine 1/2 (Villanova, 1983), 142-6.

⁴⁶ William J. Courtenay, 'The Augustinian Community at Paris in the Early 14th Century', *Augustiniana* 51 (2001), 219-29, 222.

⁴⁷ D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 161.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 160-1.

Alexander's bibliophilic decrees clearly bore fruit, for within six years of his death 'there were Augustinians among the caretakers of the papal library at Avignon'.⁴⁹

Alexander's *Commentary on the Gospel of John*⁵⁰

The commentary of Alexander is not long – some sixteen folios – and considers only the first part of the *Gospel of John*. It begins with a dedication to the cardinal-deacon of the Basilica of Santa Maria in Cosmedin in Rome, Francesco Caetani, who Alexander may well have come to know in Anagni.⁵¹ The dedication makes mention of Augustine's *City of God*, suggesting that in fact the two texts – his *Commentary on John* and his work on the *City of God* – were meant to be taken together, the latter being an exercise of systematic summarizing: one paragraph for each of the chapters of the books of the *City of God*.

The first part of Alexander's *Commentary on John* is divided into four principal questions centering on *John* 1:1, as he says:

The first lays out that in which the Word was. Secondly 'where' he was there, *and the Word etc.* Thirdly 'what' he was there, *and God [etc.]*. Fourthly, 'when' he was there, *he was in the beginning etc.*⁵²

According to the first of these Alexander says that there are three types of 'word' to be understood: 'We may distinguish between three types of similar word: *verbum conceptum*, *verbum imaginatum* and *verbum exterius prolatum*'.⁵³ Effectively the split is between what he calls, following Augustine, the *verbum interius* or *verbum cordis* and the *verbum exterius*. It is not clear whether, like Aquinas, Alexander applies the *verbum cordis* properly to God the Son;⁵⁴ nevertheless, it does seem to be part of his theological anthropology to distance

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 161.

⁵⁰ The following discussion relies upon my own transcription of Paris, Bib. Nat. Lat. 4230, fols. 37^{va}-53^{vb} (hereafter abbreviated as P), the microfilm of which has been digitised by Gallica, Bibliothèque nationale de France, <<http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9067672p/>> (accessed on August 9, 2015).

⁵¹ See the entry on Francesco Caetani in *Biographical Index of the Middle Ages*, compiled by Berend Wispelwey (Berlin, 2008), 215. It seems that Alexander was *primus lector* in Anagni, see C. Casagrande, 'FASITELLI, Alessandro' (1995), online (see fn. 6 above).

⁵² Alexander de Sancto Elpidio, *Expositio evangelii sancti Iohannis evangeliste* (P, fol. 37^{vb}, ll. 27-32): [...] *et secundum hoc dividitur in quattuor partes. Quia primo premit in quo erat verbum. Secundo ubi erat ibi, et verbum et cetera. Tertio quid erat ibi et deus. Quarto quando erat ibi, hoc erat in principio etc.*

⁵³ Alexander, *Expositio evangelii sancti Iohannis* (P, fol. 38^{ra}, ll. 2-5): *Distinguitur possimus triplex verbum similitudinem verbum conceptum, verbum imaginatum et verbum exterius prolatum.*

⁵⁴ See Vivian Boland, *Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis*, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 63 (Leiden, 1996), 325.

himself from an Augustinian emphasis on the dissimilarity between the interior word in man and the divine Word, as we will shortly explain.

Alexander adopts a basically Augustinian distinction between *verbum interius* or *verbum cordis*, and the *verbum exterius*. This Augustinian idea of the word of the heart or ‘interior word’ – a pre-verbalized language – is a concept which brings with it an encounter with the Trinity by an analogy with the Word which was with God from the beginning (*John* 1:1), as Augustine discusses in *De Trinitate* 15.10.19,⁵⁵ albeit with a strong emphasis on the *dissimilarity* between the two. Alexander seeks to reflect on the nature of the similarity or dissimilarity between the interior word in man, and the Word of God *in principio*, as well as the relationship within man between his *verbum cordis* and *verbum exterius*.

Such an analogy (between man’s interior word and the divine Word) hits the restriction of contingency, for man’s interior word is subject to change – a restriction which of course does not apply to God.⁵⁶ The same sort of restriction in man is found in Aquinas’ treatment of the problem, where Aquinas asserts that man’s self-knowledge and self-love act as an analogous experience of God’s consubstantiality.⁵⁷ This is analogous because it is a self-reflexive act, though it takes a secondary place in ascending to God, for the interior word of the human subject in the self-reflexive act can and does change. Thomas therefore, in appropriating Augustine’s thought, makes light of the emphasis on the dissimilarity between the interior word and the divine Word by arguing that there is an ‘*identity of being*’⁵⁸ between the self-reflexive act of man, and the Son being consubstantial with the Father. But Alexander does not so quickly commit himself to a line of argument that emphasizes the *dissimilarity* between our interior word and the divine Word, though he does recount it as being the view of some of the ‘modern doctors’,⁵⁹ omitting totally the fact that it is also the view of Augustine himself, and not only that, it is Augustine’s very next point in that part of *De Trinitate* from which Alexander quotes at this point in

⁵⁵ Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ed. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CChr.SL 50, 50A (Turnhout, 1968), 15.10.19 (485, ll. 68-72): *Quisquis, inquam, hoc intellegere potest iam potest uidere per hoc speculum atque in hoc aenigmate aliquam uerbi illius similitudinem de quo dictum est: In principio erat uerbum, et uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat uerbum*. See Edward Morgan, *The Incarnation of the Word: The Theology of Language of Augustine of Hippo* (London and New York, 2010), 34.

⁵⁶ E. Morgan, *The Incarnation* (2010), 35.

⁵⁷ Gilles Emery, ‘Trinitarian Theology as Spiritual Exercise in Augustine and Aquinas’, in Michael Dauphinais, Barry David and Matthew Levering (eds), *Aquinas the Augustinian* (Washington, D.C., 2007), 1-40, 37. For a discussion of this point see Christopher M. Wojtulewicz, ‘Augustine and the Dissolution of Polarity. Some Thoughts on Augustine Reception in the Late 13th and Early 14th Centuries According to Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart’, *SP* 97 (2017), 329-44.

⁵⁸ G. Emery, ‘Trinitarian Theology’ (2007), 37.

⁵⁹ Gutierrez notes that the expression ‘modern doctors’ commonly refers to the ‘principal Dominican and Franciscan masters’ of the day, in D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 161.

his commentary. Here we compare the two to illustrate what Alexander is doing with Augustine’s text:

Alexander de Sancto Elpidio	Augustinus Hipponensis
<i>Expositio evangelii sancti Iohannis evangeliste</i> (P, fol. 38 ^{rb} , ll. 16-24).	<i>De Trinitate</i> , 15.14.24 ⁶⁰
Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus XV <i>De Trinitate</i> : Verbum nostrum illud quod non habet sonum neque cogitationem soni sed eius rei quam videndo intus dicimus, simili est illo verbo dei quod <i>eterni</i> deus est quoniam sic et hoc de nostra <i>substantia</i> nascitur quemadmodum illud de scientia patris natum est <i>quod tamen verbum in nobis quod nihil aliud videtur dictem</i> [...]	Verbum autem nostrum, illud quod non habet sonum neque cogitationem soni, sed eius rei quam uidendo intus dicimus, et ideo nullius linguae est atque inde utcumque simile est in hoc aenigmate illi uerbo dei quod etiam deus est quoniam sic et hoc de nostra nascitur quemadmodum et illud de scientia patris natum est. Nostrum ergo tale uerbum quod invenimus esse utcumque illi simile, quantum sit etiam dissimile sicut a nobis dici potuerit non pigeat intueri.

The two largest omissions demonstrate a clear move away from i) the dissimilarity between man’s word and the divine Word (the omission ‘*Nostrum [...] intueri*’), and ii) the result of this, which is the ability of the interior word to be expressed exteriorly in language (the omission ‘*et ideo [...] utcumque*’) – an upshot of the alignment between the interior and exterior word in man which necessarily follows from a close similarity between the interior word and the divine Word.

Alexander goes on to say that ‘other modern doctors speak differently of the word in us – that it differs from the divine Word in many ways’.⁶¹ One may wonder at this point whether Alexander had full knowledge of or access to Augustine’s text; but thanks to his clear command of Augustine, especially as demonstrated in his abridgment of the *City of God*, it seems highly unlikely that he would not have had ready access to them. What sort of explanation does this leave? Perhaps Alexander is deliberately wanting to project Augustine’s

⁶⁰ Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 15.14.24 (497, ll. 32-9).
⁶¹ Alexander, *Expositio evangelii sancti Iohannis* (P, fol. 38^{rb}, ll. 26-9): *[...] quocumque aliorum doctorum modernorum aliter loquentium de verbo in nobis differt a verbo divino multiplex.*

own point (or, rather, Augustine's *emphasis*) onto the 'modern doctors' in order to give himself space to distance himself from it, so as to maintain an image of fidelity to Augustine.

Could it be that in attributing the matter to others, Alexander desires to play-down the degree to which the *verbum cordis* in man is *unlike* the Word of God? In other words, to push further the necessity of integrity between the interior, pre-linguistic reality, and the exterior product of communication? Again in other words, that there be no disjunction between what one thinks, says, or does – a very particular explanation of faithfulness to truth – lest one strike against that image of Trinitarian love in which man is created, which would be tantamount as much to self-deception as it would the deception of others. Such a theological view would go hand in hand with the kind of strong governance – the almost, on one register, oppressive and forceful declarations of truth and error – which then flowed from Alexander's pen as Prior General: a clear relationship between the *verbum cordis* and the *verbum exterior* means clear and exacting sentences when necessary, such as being 'bound in chains for five years' and '[expulsion] from the Order',⁶² as befell Nicholas of Fabriano, who he described as the 'diseased sheep',⁶³ only later to be liberated and created a cardinal by the antipope Peter of Corvaria, appointed by Louis of Bavaria.⁶⁴ Andrew of Recanati, similarly, was made bishop of Recanati after incarceration in Todi under the decision of Alexander.⁶⁵

Closely related to Alexander's framing of Augustine's argument about the *verbum cordis* relative to the divine Word is the linguistic impetus of the interior-exterior relation. From the comparison above we see that in addition to shifting Augustine's emphasis on dissimilarity to the 'modern doctors', Alexander also omits Augustine's words about the *verbum cordis* as something which 'therefore belongs to no language', thus favoring similarity. In omitting this, is Alexander seeking to emphasize the declarative ability of language and the relative difficulty in obscuring the divine image in man – an obscuring which inevitably follows from the discord that one accepts between the *verbum cordis* and the *verbum exterior* in acknowledging the stress on the dissimilarity with the Word? If this is indeed what Alexander is doing, that is to say, if he has *chosen* not to include Augustine's other point, then we may see here two good examples of the way in which Augustine was appropriated by Alexander.

Is there anything else that could cause us to think this? Alexander does make use, principally, of two other authors in his commentary: Hilary and Bede. With these he seems to show a greater desire for precision, putting in even greater relief the omissions from the text of Augustine we have already identified.

⁶² E.L. Saak, *Highway to Heaven* (2002), 237.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ For this historical detail see D. Gutierrez, *The Augustinians* (1984), 196.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

Alexander says, for instance: ‘So says Bede in a homily on this evangelist [John], not the evangelist himself’.⁶⁶ Alexander then goes on to relate this sort of treatment of the beginning of the *Gospel of John* to *John* 8:25,⁶⁷ further deepening the theological narrative of similarity over dissimilarity. This resonates with what György Heidl calls the ‘mystic beginning of creation’,⁶⁸ into which one enters already in the relationship between man’s *verbum cordis* and the divine Word *in principio*. This is because, Alexander says, ‘the Son [...] is the principle of creation by way of wisdom. Hence *John* 8[:25]: “I am the principle who is also speaking to you”. *In the beginning/principle was the Word*, so we say therefore that life is in God, because God is life itself’.⁶⁹ What this means is that the interior word in man is a kind of communicative speaking or pronouncing by the divine Word, exacting a deep union between the two in that same non-temporal *principium* of *John* 1:1, whilst bestowing on speech an ability to carry forth the meaning of the interior word.

Alexander de Sancto Elpidio belongs clearly within the history of the development of the Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine, but he also deserves a prominent place in the history of the reception of Augustine, especially where this gave rise to developments in the theology of the papacy. As our sense for the degree of access to Augustine’s texts in the early fourteenth century increases, we concomitantly develop an appreciation for Augustine’s deployment in the theological texts of the Order, and how this gave both a clearer identity as spiritual and theological sons of St. Augustine, whilst affecting, in practical terms, the course of the history of the Order. This sense of identity we may or may not choose to style as an ‘Augustinian School’; nevertheless, the production of editions of Alexander’s available texts, as well as a fuller assessment of their impact, particularly upon later members of the Order, seems both appropriate and necessary.

⁶⁶ Alexander, *Expositio evangelii sancti Iohannis* (P, fol. 39^{va}, ll. 6-8): *Sic dicit Beda in omelia super isto evangelio, non ait evangelista.*

⁶⁷ Alexander, *Expositio evangelii sancti Iohannis* (P, fol. 39^{rb}).

⁶⁸ György Heidl, *Origen’s Influence on the Young Augustine: A Chapter of The History of Origenism*, Gorgias Eastern Christian Studies 3 (Piscataway, 2003), 83.

⁶⁹ Alexander, *Expositio evangelii sancti Iohannis* (P, fol. 39^{rb}; ll. 8-13): *Filii qui est principium creaturarum per modum sapientie. Unde Iohannis VIII, ego principium qui et loquitur vobis. In principio erat verbum, sicut dicimus quod vita est in deo, quia deus est ipsa vita.*

1277 and the Sensations of the Damned: Peter John Olivi and the Augustinian Origins of Early Modern Angelism

Graham MCALEER, Baltimore, USA

ABSTRACT

Disembodied experience is a recurring theme in philosophy. This essay proposes that Early Modern idealism was shaped by strands of idealism in the Middle Ages. In light of the Condemnations of 1277, Peter John Olivi articulates an epistemology and metaphysics to explain how the separated souls of the damned could feel physical fire. To explain the possibility of sensation without a body Olivi relies on various principles of Saint Augustine. This essay documents Olivi's use of Augustine and links Augustine's idealist philosophy with Early Modern varieties.

What has Arthur Schopenhauer to do with 1277? In *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer makes an astute observation. In 1818, he seeks a course correction. Revisiting the development of modern philosophy from Descartes to Berkeley, and up through Thomas Reid and Kant, Schopenhauer identifies, and wants to block, the prevailing idea that the knowing subject is 'a winged cherub without a body'.¹ Schopenhauer, is, I think, correct: angelism is a fair summation of the philosophical doctrine wrought by the introduction of Descartes' idealism. What are its origins?

Towards the end of the essay, I offer a partial answer, but those familiar with early modern philosophy will see indications of the answer clearly enough in my discussion of Olivi and Augustine.

At Paris in 1270, Bishop Tempier condemned the proposition – the disembodied souls of the damned do not feel physical fire – and he reiterated the point in 1277 and condemned the proposition that disembodied souls suffer physical fire is not explainable philosophically though by faith one might believe this.²

¹ Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* 1 (New York, 1969), 99.

² The propositions and their exact wording are listed in many places but see François-Xavier Putallaz, 'L'âme et le feu: Notes franciscaines sur le feu de l'enfer après 1277', in Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr. and Andreas Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts: Studien und Texte* (Berlin, 2001), 889-901.

It seems the Bishop of Paris has backed a losing horse. Sensation without a body seems a non-starter. Aren't sensations a boundary experience, occurring at the frontier of where the body interacts with the surrounding world? Moreover, don't sensations register as either on the body, about the body, or expressive of where the body is? What's true of sensations generally seems very true of the sensation of touch. How can we be touched by physical fire if we have no expanse of flesh upon which the sensations register? If Bishop Tempier has backed a losing horse, then, the philosophical puzzle opens onto a grave problem: if, prior to the general resurrection of all bodies at the end of days, the damned have no bodies, it surely matters not that fire rages about them in hell?

The French Franciscan theologian and political theorist, Peter John Olivi (1248-1298) thought the stakes were very high. Few medieval theologians are darlings of contemporary European leftists, but Olivi is much heralded by the leading Italian philosopher and anarchist, Giorgio Agamben.³ There is an irony here.

Despite the philosophical conundrum, the Bishop likely felt very confident in his condemnations. After all, Saints Augustine and Gregory defended the idea of disembodied sensation and Jesus himself spoke of the parched rich man in hell who appealed to Abraham to let Lazarus bring him water 'for I am tormented in this flame' (*Luke* 16:24). And St. Ambrose had insisted that this was no mere parable but that Jesus was narrating an event.

The Bishop may also have been confident for another reason. Perhaps he had an inkling that a goodly number of the church's theologians would investigate the character of sensation and find ingenious ways to show the plausibility of disembodied sensation. Olivi happily obliged. Stepping on the toes of the anarchist, Olivi thought that unless people were assured of the flames of hell awaiting them, sin would have an intolerable liberty (*haberet intollerabilem libertatem*). God's justice requires that who sins most, is most gravely punished. It is a deliverance of right reason that: 'It is required that who sins against the highest good is punished with the most vile and harsh penalties' (*Decens enim est quod qui peccavit in summum bonum, puniatur in villissimis et acerbissimis penis*).⁴ Absent this proportionality, the order of the universe itself is ruptured. To Olivi's mind, the stakes could not be higher.

Clearly, the Bishop found Aquinas' attempt to solve the riddle wholly inadequate. Aquinas' naturalism left him no explanation for a disembodied sensation and thus he argued that the damned suffered hellfire for it is akin to a prison, flames surround the will and block its movement. Thomas' answer poses a number of riddles itself but an interesting part of the theory is that it is built around humiliation: something physical, fire, controls something noble, the spiritual will.

³ Giorgio Agamben, *The Highest Poverty* (Stanford, 2013).

⁴ Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super IV sententiarum*, ed. P. Maranesi (Rome, 2004), part IV, q.7 (150, ll. 35-40).

With an important exception in Scotus,⁵ Franciscans were as unimpressed as the Bishop with Thomas' humiliation theory. In an excellent article, François-Xavier Putallaz notes that a staple of the Franciscan *Correctorium* literature – devoted to pointing out Thomas' errors – was his shyness on whether disembodied sensation is possible.⁶ Having sat in the lectures of Bonaventure and known to have read the *Correctorium* closely,⁷ Olivi positively rails against Thomas' theory not hesitating to conclude: it is dangerous, it is ridiculous, and it has no connection to the Catholic faith.⁸

Unlike Aquinas, but very like Giles of Rome,⁹ Olivi does not think sensations require movements of physical organs. A sensation is a mental seizing of an object-content. As shall be seen momentarily, Olivi raises the bar high for what might adequately count as being tormented by hellfire. Intriguingly, he does not follow Giles in what seems so important to the latter: that there be a perception of an expanse of flesh burning. What matters to Giles is the phenomenology of burning flesh but to Olivi what matters is an emotional response to the burning. Olivi derives this position from Augustine's *De musica*.

Olivi is part of a general Franciscan position that, like Augustine, places emphasis on the power of the soul to generate perception, thinking of the soul as a total cause of perception, with the sensed object having no more than an occasionalist standing. The soul scans objects rather than suffers to be affected by them.¹⁰ Members of the Augustinian Order of Hermits, like Giles, and some Dominicans, like Kilwardby,¹¹ had comparable theories. In these latter cases, however, Aristotle also figures prominently.¹² Olivi is no such a theorist.

The seminal work of Trapp dates the rise of Augustinianism to the fourteenth century.¹³ Problems abound in defining what exactly Augustinianism amounts to in the later Middle Ages. Eric Saak has focused on certain philosophical and

⁵ See Graham McAleer, 'Duns Scotus and Giles of Rome on Whether Sensations are Intentional', in Mary Beth Ingham (ed.), *John Duns Scotus, Philosopher*, Archa Verbi. Subsidia 3 (Münster, 2010), 111-8.

⁶ F.-X. Putallaz, 'L'âme et le feu: Notes franciscaines sur le feu de l'enfer après 1277' (2001), 892-4.

⁷ Sylvain Piron, 'The Formation of Olivi's Intellectual Project', *Oliviana* 1 (2003), <<http://oliviana.revues.org/8>> (accessed on December 7, 2015).

⁸ Olivi, *Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super IV sententiarum* IV, q.7 (151-3).

⁹ See Graham McAleer, '1277 and the Causality of Damnation in Giles of Rome', *The Modern Schoolman* 83 (2006), 285-300.

¹⁰ F.-X. Putallaz, 'L'âme et le feu: Notes franciscaines sur le feu de l'enfer après 1277' (2001), 894-5.

¹¹ José Filipe Silva and Juhana Toivanen, 'The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter John Olivi', *Vivarium* 48 (2010), 245-78.

¹² José Filipe Silva, 'Robert Kilwardby', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/robert-kilwardby/>> (accessed on December 1, 2015).

¹³ Damasus Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century', *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), 146-274.

doctrinal positions and asked which thinkers espouse thoroughgoing Augustinian doctrines; Olivi is interesting here. He dies right at the end of the thirteenth century. Giles of Rome was born five years earlier than Olivi yet outlived him by nearly twenty years. In a number of articles, I have argued that Giles had a pronounced Augustinian sensibility, but Eric Saak is right to point out that Giles relies on passages from Augustine and Aristotle in about equal measure in developing his signature positions.¹⁴ In his questions on the damned, Olivi neither cites Aristotle, nor employs Aristotelian concepts, nor bothers to argue with him.

Olivi places the bar high for what can stand as an adequate account of the disembodied soul truly suffering in the fires of hell. He documents four commonly held theories and puts them in order of seriousness. Thomas' theory is stated first and is judged a complete non-starter. Next up is a theory where the experience of hellfire is, psychologically, the same as dreaming. The third theory argues that the soul is preternaturally *as if* sensibly afflicted by the burning (*quasi sensibiliter afflictivam*).¹⁵ The fourth position belongs to Saint Bonaventure¹⁶ and Olivi endorses it, once, as he puts it, it is properly crafted (*credo quod est verus si sane et proprie explicetur*).¹⁷ On this theory, God binds the fire to the soul, which through its own active power naturally apprehends the fire (*quod anima naturaliter apprehendat ignem et speciem eis per propriam vim activam*); this leads to the emotion of hatred (*affectio detestativa*) and triggers the effort to flee from the fire. Fear of burning fills the soul even though no burning according to nature is actually possible (*sicut si per naturam nocere posset ei, ita quod timet ubi non est timor secundum naturam*).¹⁸

But how does the soul through its own power apprehend the fire if it has no bodily sensations? Olivi's answer has three parts, and each part he claims to get from Augustine. The parts are: perceptual idealism, the definition of pain, and a theory of emotional judgement.

Turning to Augustine's *De musica*, Olivi makes an analogy between the damned's negative emotional reaction to the flame and Augustine's argument that a song strikes us as discordant when the music is out of proportion with our affective register. How good is the analogy? Even if in the two cases there is an internal emotional reaction still the music example relies on vibrations registering in the body to which our emotions then react. However, this way of thinking – external objects registering with the spirit and compelling internal

¹⁴ Eric L. Saak, 'Augustine in the Later Middle Ages', in Irena Backus (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 2001), I 391.

¹⁵ Olivi, *Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super IV sententiarum* IV, q.7 (150, ll. 47-50).

¹⁶ The editor of *Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super IV sententiarum* comments that Olivi follows Bonaventure, 'quasi alla lettera la formulazione della soluzione' (2004), 58.

¹⁷ Olivi, *Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super IV sententiarum* IV, q.7 (159, ll. 314-5).

¹⁸ Olivi, *Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super IV sententiarum* IV, q.7 (151, ll. 68-73).

reactions – is wrong according to Olivi's lights. Spirit is an active epistemological power, a permanent openness to the world; something like an absorbing psychological gauze spread out onto the world, but able to hone in on particular objects of attention. This intentionality, Olivi termed, *aspectus*, and objects that become the object-contents of intentional consciousness he termed terminative causes, that is, the object is the spot where self-actualizing mental perceptions arrive, not where they start. Spirit expresses the object in its intentionality. This is what a perception is.¹⁹

It is clear then that Olivi actually has nothing to explain about how the 'jump' happens between hellfire and spirit without a mediating sensuous flesh. That humans have such a flesh in our ordinary sub-lunar state is always accidental to our actually having perceptions.²⁰ Nothing special happens to the disembodied because we are always, even as embodied, more akin to angels anyway. Indeed, it goes both ways. True angels relate to one another in certain physical ways. Olivi seems to think of the good angels as a press gang. In the age of sail, the Royal Navy had the authority of impressment: crews would be sent into towns to forcibly conscript new crewmembers. The good angels, Olivi tells us, register their own power in demons by means of an effective touching or physical pressure (*per viam efficacie tactive seu inpressive*) otherwise they could not detain demons or torture them painfully (*alias boni angeli non possent demoni violenter detinere aut movere aut afflictive torquere*).²¹

Angels, he says, move in two ways. First, they move from one place to another.

The [second way they move] is by keenness and a virtual range of sight, or the intentions of their powers, here and there spread forth or directed to diverse objects, just as is experienced in us, not only when we are stirred [by the will] to various acts of perception and seeing, but also when beginning to daydream we experience the intentions of the inner and outer senses drawing back to the interior and then amidst the excitement [of the dream] we experience the intentions virtually spreading out to the exterior. And this Augustine teaches both in *On Genesis* 12 and in his book *On the Trinity*.²²

¹⁹ See Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge* 1 (Leiden, 1994), 216 and 220.

²⁰ Olivi, *Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super IV sententiarum* IV, q.7 (163, ll. 441-3).

²¹ Peter John Olivi, *Quaestio de locutionibus angelorum*, c.7, q.7-8, para.34, *Oliviana* 1 (2003), <<http://oliviana.revues.org/18>> (accessed on December 5, 2015).

²² Olivi, *Quaestio de locutionibus angelorum*, c.7, q.7-8, para.17: *Est enim in substantiis spiritualibus duplex motus et ad presens unus est quo tota eorum substantia de uno loco vadit ad alium locum, alius est quo acies et virtuales aspectus seu intenciones suarum potentiarum hac vel illac ad diversa obiecta prohiuntur seu diriguntur, sicut experimur in nobis, non solum quando ad varia cogitanda vel videnda movemur, sed etiam quando in inicio ingressus in sompnum sentimus intenciones sensuum interiorum et exteriorum retrahi ad interior, in hora vero excitacionis sentimus eas virtualiter protrahi ad exterior. Et hoc ipsum docet Augustinus tam XII Super Genesim ad litteram quam in libro De Trinitate.*

This perceptual idealism is linked to two other elements of Augustine's epistemology, one derived from his *City of God* and the other, *De musica*.

Four concurrent causes join to make the suffering of the damned: the suitability or proportionality of the object (fire), the divine power that binds the soul and its object, the affectivity of the soul, and the impotence of the will.²³

Citing Augustine's *City of God*, pain is what opposes our will (*dissensus voluntatis*) (an axiom in Schopenhauer's philosophy, of course). Olivi explicitly rejects Avicenna's definition of pain – pain is the division of parts of the body – arguing this definition is correct enough for those things with bodies but Augustine's definition is far preferable being more formal and universal.²⁴ Citing Augustine's *De musica*, our sensibility is ordered by an affective rule of proportionality (*complantata affectio proportionalium*) that is the basis of our love of objects. Sensation is never raw, therefore, but always under an emotional, aesthetic judgement. Indeed, under moral and political judgement: for this affective register is an active power; it diversifies and channels our acts of will. Objects contrary to this affectivity are thus contrary to our will, also, and are both painful and provoke hatred. God inserts as a punishment an affective range into the damned such that hellfire impresses an emotional disproportion on the damned (*affectio proportionis contrarie ad proportionem seu impropotionalitatem ardoris infernalis*). Spirits always have affectivity and the penal emotional dynamic inserted by God is thus a naturally functioning power (*quia ita est sibi inserta ac si ab initio fuisset sibi connaturalis*) with a resulting permanent fear of burning and mortification of the will (*resultat dolor intensissimus et quasi connaturalis effectus*).

Of course, with God implanting into the damned an emotional register that reacts horribly to hellfire, room is left for God to insert a different affective range that would not similarly be adversely affected by fire. My mind leaps at once to *Game of Thrones* and the dragon queen, Daenerys Targaryen, but likely Olivi is thinking of *Exodus* 3:2: 'And the angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush'.

In closing, I would like to mention the medieval tributaries of modern idealism. Likely, there are many. One, I am sure, is Aquinas' account of angelic time consciousness. Another, surely, is 1277. Descartes, Malebranche, Berkeley, Hume, and Thomas Reid, all think disembodied sensation possible, and some even think it normative. Reid, to my mind, one of the most astute of all philosophers, thinks Berkeley's idealism not easily answerable. 'Nor can any man shew, by any good argument' writes Reid, 'that all ours sensations might not have been as they are, though no body, nor quality of body, had ever

²³ Olivi, *Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super IV sententiarum* IV, q.7 (161, ll. 366-71).

²⁴ Olivi, *Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super IV sententiarum* IV, q.7 (149 and 163).

existed'.²⁵ In Berkeley, angelism is full-blown: the only things that exist are minds and mental events. Berkeley's arguments are ingenious but Descartes is in the background and the stamp of 1277 permeates his opening *Meditations*.

I will imagine that the sky, air, earth, colours, shapes, sounds and everything external to me are nothing more than the creatures of dreams by means of which an evil spirit entraps my credulity. I shall imagine myself as if I had no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, no senses at all, but as if my belief in all these things were false.²⁶

Modern idealism owes much to its medieval parent: no 'winged cherub without a body' save for the likes of Peter John Olivi's Augustinianism. Admittedly, for Berkeley, flesh, objects, the world, are all but interconnections amongst ideas. The history books tell us that the medievals are all confirmed realists, but I wonder. Berkeley ultimately thinks that objects and space and time are structures of language and Reid pursues this idea concluding that perceptions are signs witnessing to extra-mental objects.²⁷ When Olivi speaks of perception as a *similitudo et sigillaris expressio* of a terminative cause or object, one can but wonder how different that is from Reid's theory of natural signs: a topic for another day.

²⁵ Thomas Reid, *Inquiry and Essays* (Indianapolis, 1983), 40 and 44.

²⁶ René Descartes, *Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings* (London, 2003). There are, of course, a number of passages like this.

²⁷ T. Reid, *Inquiry and Essays* (1983), 43-4.

The Bible as Argument: Augustine in the Literal Exegesis of Peter Auriol (c. 1280-1322) and Nicholas of Lyra (c. 1270-1349)

Florian WÖLLER, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany

ABSTRACT

With the rise of theology as a scientific discipline in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, biblical exegetes turned their attention to the literal sense of Scripture. Modern scholarship has often noted that this transformation yielded the demise of patristic exegesis and particularly of Augustine's biblical hermeneutics. In contrast to this, however, the debate about the literal sense in late medieval theology constantly referred to Augustine. This article discusses two accounts of the literal sense in the light of the general trend in scholastic exegesis to look for theological argument in the letter of the Bible. While the claim that it is only the literal sense that provided theology with arguments to be used in its discursive reasoning was believed to be Augustine's opinion, the respective *auctoritas* from Augustine's letter to the Donatist Vincentius (*ep.* 93) developed a life of its own in late medieval exegesis. The article concludes that this second life of Augustine did not originate in a careful study of the Latin Father's works but rather in the vitality of scholastic thought.

To give an account of Augustine's presence in the history of Christian thought is a formidable endeavor. The extent to which this is true has most recently been demonstrated by the *Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine* (2013), which in its whole layout may be counted among the projects of a *Großwissenschaft* declared dead long ago. While this monumental guide at the same time documents and fosters a renewed interest in Augustine's reception throughout the ages, it also points out the methodological difficulties inherent in the very concept of reception. For its own pragmatics, the *Oxford Guide* takes into account 'only historically demonstrable instances of knowledge of Aug[ustine] and (normally conscious) interaction with his person and/or his thought', as Karla Pollmann, the chief-editor, states.¹ Going well beyond a simple record of explicit quotations of Augustine, the *Oxford Guide* thus

¹ Karla Pollmann, 'The Proteanism of Authority: The Reception of Augustine in Cultural History from his Death to the Present. Mapping an International and Interdisciplinary Investigation', in Karla Pollman and Willemien Otten (eds), *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine* (Oxford, 2013), I 3-14, 6-7.

offers an insight into the various forms of a direct reception of Augustine after the dissemination of his works. However, with regard to the late Middle Ages and, more specifically, large parts of scholastic thought, this approach has specific limitations, because alongside a direct reception of Augustine, for example, in exponents of the so-called *religio Augustini*, we also find the ubiquitous and invisible Augustine as well as an Augustine dramatically reduced to a recurrent set of quotations (*auctoritates*).² Karla Pollmann aptly describes this latter phenomenon as a ‘mechanism that guaranteed, possibly even enhanced and stimulated, renewed reception’ by way of a “‘filtering” of Aug[ustine]’s thought through later individuals who also managed to exert a powerful influence in the history of thought’.³

This article discusses how and to what effect two works of late medieval exegesis relied on Augustine, when they dedicated themselves to a specifically literal exposition of the Bible. As I will show, both works – the *Compendium sensus literalis totius sacrae Scripturae* (1319) by Peter Auriol and the *Postilla literalis super totam Bibliam* (1322/3–1331) by Nicholas of Lyra – used Augustine at a most crucial point, namely when they argued for their own understanding of the literal sense of Scripture. Although Augustine did not figure as their only authority, the ‘filtered’ father of the church (to use Pollmann’s expression) provided the foundation of Auriol’s and Lyra’s respective exegetical methods. As will be clearer below, both accounts of Scripture’s literal sense depend on the same passages in Augustine, and because Auriol’s and Lyra’s approaches are uniquely distinct, they represent telling examples of the late medieval transformations of Augustine’s influence. I will argue that the transformations examined here depended on and thrived by the ‘filtering’ of Augustine through Thomas Aquinas.

1. *Non prima vera* – the literal turn in late medieval exegesis

For the purpose of this article, we may gather the characteristic presence of Augustine in large parts of late medieval theology from the literary debate concerning Nicholas of Lyra’s *Postilla literalis* between the Spanish bishop Paul of Burgos and the German Franciscan Matthias Döring. Paul of Burgos (c. 1353–1435), who had converted from the Jewish to the Christian faith, composed a thorough and brilliant examination of Lyra’s commentary, somewhat

² It is not by chance that the majority of contributions to the present volume focus on members of the Augustinian Hermits, the most prominent context of the so-called *religio Augustini*. For an excellent discussion of the troubles with ‘Augustinianism(s)’ in the late Middle Ages, see Eric L. Saak, *Creating Augustine: Interpreting Augustine and Augustinianism in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 2012), 1–22.

³ K. Pollmann, ‘The Proteanism’ (2013), 5.

ambiguously called the *Additiones*,⁴ which circulated together with Lyra's prologues to, and also entire copies of, the *Postilla litteralis*.⁵ A *vademecum* for the critical reader, the *Additiones* raise three major objections against Lyra's biblical exegesis. While two of them address his reception of Jewish exegesis (and thus correspond to the modern perception of Nicholas' commentary), Paul's other objection attacks Nicholas' place in the Christian exegetical tradition. According to Paul, Nicholas preferred his own expositions – and 'sometimes even those by Jews' – to the expositions by the teachers of the church: 'Among these holy teachers he often seems to attack Saint Thomas, sometimes expressly, sometimes tacitly'.⁶

One reason why this critique has rarely caught modern attention⁷ may be that Paul finds explicit fault with Nicholas' exegetical method at only one, seemingly minor, point: the potentiality of the literal sense of Scripture for theological argument. According to Paul, Nicholas' notion of the literal sense was too narrow, while the latter 'seems to think that the literal sense is only that from which a valid argument against adversaries can be drawn'.⁸ Paul granted that 'only from the literal sense of Sacred Scripture can one draw an efficient argument, as Augustine says ... yet, not from every literal sense in Sacred Scripture is efficient argument drawn'.⁹ What a catholic exegete needs to consider in order to extract efficient and valid arguments from the literal sense, according to Paul of Burgos, is a series of normative and circumstantial criteria such as the agreement of the exegesis by the *doctores sancti* and the faith of those against whom the exegete's arguments are directed.

As I will show below, the Augustinian *auctoritas* according to which the literal sense alone provides the theologian with an efficient argument is paramount for both Peter Auriol and Nicholas of Lyra. And perhaps it is this crucial importance of what the medievals believed to be Augustine's assessment of the

⁴ Paul conceived of his *Additiones*, which he advised the reader to use only after having studied Lyra's exegesis, as a supplement and corrective to Lyra. See Paul of Burgos, *Additiones*, PL 113, 47A-B. On diverging accounts of Paul's attitude towards Nicholas, see Yosi Yisraeli, 'A Christianized Sephardic Critique of Rashi's *Peshat* in Pablo de Santa Maria's *Additiones ad Postillam Nicolai de Lyra*', in Ryan Szpiech (ed.), *Medieval Exegesis and Religious Difference. Commentary, Conflict, and Community in the Premodern Mediterranean* (New York, 2015), 128-41, 129 n. 8.

⁵ On Paul's *Additiones* and his own exegetical approach, see Ian Christopher Levy, 'The Literal Sense of Scripture and the Search for Truth in the Late Middle Ages', *RHE* 104 (2009), 818-25.

⁶ Paul of Burgos, *Additiones* (PL 113, 46B).

⁷ Lesley Smith, 'Nicholas of Lyra (d. 1349)', in Karla Pollmann and Willemien Otten (eds), *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine* (Oxford, 2013), III 1447-8, 1448, nicely reflects this: 'N[icholas] is predominantly a student of the literal sense of Scripture, and so Aug[ustine] is much less useful to him than Jewish commentators, who allow him to focus on the meaning of the Hebrew text'.

⁸ Paul of Burgos, *Additiones* (PL 113, 14D).

⁹ Paul of Burgos, *Additiones* (PL 113, 14A); my emphasis.

literal sense,¹⁰ which also incited the Franciscan Matthias Döring (c. 1390-1469) to write a polemic against Paul of Burgos' *Additiones*.¹¹ Döring attacked all three of Paul's objections against the *Postilla litteralis* but was exceptionally fierce in defending his confrère Nicholas against Paul with regard to the authority of Augustine. The German accuses the Spaniard of *laesa maiestatis*, when he, Paul, 'seems to prefer the sayings of Saint Thomas to the sayings of Augustine, Gregory [the Great], Jerome, and others'. Furthermore, 'it would have been modest for the *Burgensis* to not prefer Saint Thomas to the Blessed Augustine, as if all sayings of Saint Thomas were first true (*quasi omnia dicta sancti Thomae sint prima vera*)'.¹² Döring, who in his *Sentences* commentary presented himself as a Scotist,¹³ obviously tried to rehabilitate Lyra's *Postilla litteralis* in the most general way. The invective against Paul of Burgos' predilection for Aquinas, however, cannot escape our particular attention, for going beyond just defending Nicholas, Döring here tried to take literal exegesis out of the hands of Aquinas and of those who followed him. From a modern historiographic point of view, this may come as a surprise because it is Thomas Aquinas who is regularly credited with the beginnings of the medieval turn towards the literal sense in biblical exegesis.¹⁴

Aquinas built his account of Scripture's literal sense on three assumptions. First, he argued that the primary author of Sacred Scripture is none other than God. By way of his omnipotence God is able to endorse signs or words as well as things with signification. Therefore, in contrast to what man can do, *i.e.* give a signification only to words, God can do both: he can make the things that are signified by words also signify something else. Within biblical exegesis, these are the spiritual senses of Scripture, namely if things signify other things, while the literal sense lies in the words that signify things alone.¹⁵ Second, if theology

¹⁰ It is of course imperative to give the reference to Augustine here, even if only to show that the medievals interpreted and adapted the passage from the letter to the Donatist Vincentius, according to the medieval theological vocabulary. Augustine, *Epistulae*, ed. A. Goldbacher, CSEL 34/2 (Vienna, 1898), ep. 93.8.24 (470): *Quis autem non inpudentissime nitatur aliquid in allegoria positum pro se interpretari, nisi habeat et manifesta testimonia, quorum lumine inlustrentur obscura?*

¹¹ On Döring (the 'Doctor armatus') in general, see Katharina Colberg, 'Döring, Matthias', in *Verfasserlexikon* (Berlin, 1980), II 207-10.

¹² Paul of Burgos, *Additiones* (PL 113, 62A-B).

¹³ On Döring's *Sentences* commentary and its doctrinal profile, see Severin V. Kitanov, 'The Concept of Beatific Enjoyment (*Fruitio Beatifica*) in the *Sentences* Commentaries of Some Pre-Reformation Erfurt Theologians', in Philipp W. Rosemann (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* 3 (Leiden, 2015), 315-68, 341-3.

¹⁴ With regard to the literal turn in late medieval exegesis, Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (3rd ed.; Oxford, 1983), 300 unambiguously writes: 'St. Thomas defined the new position'.

¹⁵ For this and the following remarks on Aquinas, unless otherwise stated, I am referring to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Leonina, *Opera Omnia* IV (Rome, 1888), I, q.1, a.10 (25a-26b). All translations of the *Summa theologiae* are taken from Alfred J. Freddoso, *New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae*, <<http://www3.nd.edu/~afreddoso/>

is based upon the word of God, the theologian needs to understand what the author of Scripture intends. Now, the intention of the author is what the literal sense says. But since the intellect of the author of Scripture, God, grasps everything at once 'it follows that, as Augustine says in *Confessions* 12, it is not inappropriate for a single scriptural passage to have more than one sense even with respect to the literal sense'. We thus may end up with further, perhaps multiple nested spiritual senses, if you will, in the literal sense.¹⁶ Thirdly, there is no confusion of senses in Scripture, Aquinas argued, because all spiritual senses are built upon the literal sense. 'And, as Augustine explains in the letter against the Donatist Vincentius, it is from the literal sense alone that an argument can be drawn (*trahi*), and not from those things that are said allegorically'. In conclusion, one should always start with the literal sense when expounding the Bible and work one's way to the spiritual senses.

Now, returning to Matthias Döring's rebuttal of Paul of Burgos' objections against Nicholas of Lyra, Döring's point becomes clearer. To prefer Aquinas to Augustine – when it comes to the literal sense of Scripture – in Döring's eyes meant to deny the very foundations of Aquinas' account of the literal sense. What Döring argues, I take it, is that Aquinas is nothing without Augustine, which is why Aquinas' account of the literal sense is indeed not 'prima vera'. Döring's is a valuable reminder for modern scholars to acknowledge Aquinas' implicit and explicit references to Augustine. Aquinas' first claim – the divine authorship has endorsed signs (*signa*) and things (*res*) with signification – has a distinct Augustinian ring without giving any direct reference,¹⁷ while the second and the third claims both have their explicit quotations from Augustine, however decontextualized they are. On the one hand, therefore, Döring may have had a point here. On the other hand, however, he seemed to be too quick with dismissing Aquinas for making his point about Augustine, since it was Aquinas who 'filtered' Augustine in such a way that the latter remained an important authority for the literal turn in late medieval theology. Aquinas, indeed, was nothing without Augustine; however, from this perspective, Augustine was nothing without Aquinas.¹⁸

summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques01.pdf> (accessed on December 5, 2015). From the vast secondary literature on Aquinas' biblical exegesis, I only point out Thomas Prügl, 'Thomas Aquinas as Interpreter of Scripture', in Rik van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (eds), *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, 2005), 386-415.

¹⁶ On the modern debate on the plurality of literal senses of Scripture in Aquinas, see I.C. Levy, 'The Literal Sense' (2009), 785-6.

¹⁷ See Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* (fn. 38 below).

¹⁸ For a critical account of this phenomenon in the fifteenth century, see Karlfried Froehlich, '"Always to Keep the Literal Sense in Holy Scripture Means to Kill One's Soul": The State of Biblical Hermeneutics at the Beginning of the Fifteenth Century', in Earl Miner (ed.), *Literary Uses of Typology from the Late Middle Ages to the Present* (Princeton, 1977), 20-48.

2. Peter Auriol and the literality of biblical theology

In late medieval exegesis theologians were first and foremost expected to expound the literal sense. According to Thomas Aquinas this sense contained the intention of Scripture's primary author, God, as it was handed down through the writers of the biblical books, who figured as the secondary or 'instrumental' authors.¹⁹ This idea of the literal sense as the author's intention could not only be applied to 'biblically based' theology (*i.e.* a theology whose foundation is extracted from the Bible) but also to 'systematic' theology as well as to philosophy: the commentaries on, *e.g.*, Aristotle in philosophy, or Peter Lombard's *Sentences* in 'systematic' theology were supposed to respond, at least in the prior part of every section (the so-called *expositio textus*), to the question that the *Philosophus* or the *Magister* intended. In other words, in Aristotle's and Peter Lombard's works there was no room for anything other than a literal sense. Consequently, they were read according to what their authors intended; and so was the Bible.²⁰

It is of course hard to say if the biblical commentary influenced the 'systematic' commentary or if it was the other way around. Yet, it is safe to say that the new concept of theology as a scientific discipline provided the background for the literal turn in medieval exegesis or, to use a more general term, in hermeneutics. Looking back at the twelfth century, Beryl Smalley described this transition of theology as a coming to terms. Theology's new 'method is argumentative, not exegetical. At last theologians felt sufficiently sure of themselves to drop the fiction that all their work was a mere training for the allegorical interpretation. They formally freed theology from exegesis, and hence exegesis from theology'.²¹ From Smalley's perspective, the literal turn is part of the larger transformation of theology into an argumentative and discursive discipline. What mattered to scholastic theologians in the thirteenth and following centuries was not the spirited interpretation of meanings hidden in the texts that they were expected to expound, but rather the theological content (which, by way of its *theological* nature, was argumentative) to be drawn from the text.²² This general attitude towards texts as sources for theological argument of course neatly coincided with Augustine's *auctoritas* quoted above, according to which it is only from the literal sense that an argument can be drawn.

¹⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones de Quolibet*, ed. Leonina, *Opera Omnia* 25/1 (Rome, 1996), q.7, a.6, ad 5 (29a-b).

²⁰ See the explicit equation between reading Aristotle's *Physics* and the Bible in Peter Auriol below, fn. 29.

²¹ B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible* (1983), 293-4.

²² On the place of the Bible in thirteenth and fourteenth century university curricula at Oxford and Paris, see William J. Courtenay, 'The Bible in the Fourteenth Century: Some Observations', *CH* 54 (1985), 176-87, especially 178-82.

The turn towards the literal sense, however, does not imply that the arguments taken from the Bible were applied to 'systematic' theology in a uniform way. For this, the method of theological inquiry proposed by the Franciscan Peter Auriol offers an excellent example.²³ Auriol based his 'declarative theology' (*theologia declarativa*) on the observation that theologians search for reasons to support the truths of Christian faith. This, Auriol tells us, is true for Thomas Aquinas and 'generally all theologians'.²⁴ Now, Aquinas and many others employed a method that was commonly called deductive theology (*theologia deductiva*). Deductive theologians claimed to use the truths (or articles) of faith, which they drew, e.g., from Scripture, as principles from which they then deduced theological conclusions. Auriol's main concern with deductive theology was that it picked up the truths of faith, insofar as they figured as principles, in order to prove the conclusions of theology, and not the other way around. Therefore, a method that truly fulfills the task of theology, namely to support the truths of faith, should not use them as principles but rather as conclusions. This was what Auriol proposed: for him, theology did not infer conclusions *from* the truths of faith, but rather adduced reasons or 'declarations' *for* these truths, and hence used them as conclusions rather than principles.²⁵

This difference in method of 'systematic' theology could yield a difference in the use that deductive and declarative theologians respectively made of the arguments contained in the literal sense of Scripture. For Aquinas, these arguments served as principles in his deductive theology and thus as the foundation of his systematic thought; the literal sense of Scripture was not the only source for 'systematic' theology, but it was clearly the most important.²⁶ It is hardly surprising that with his divergent methodological approach to theology in general, Peter Auriol also had a different idea about the relation between Scripture's literal sense and 'systematic' theology. What Auriol saw at work in the Bible was declarative theology itself: each and every biblical book argued for a truth of faith as the book's conclusion. Even more than that, the biblical writers, according to Auriol, argued syllogistically and thus themselves presented the

²³ As an introduction to Peter Auriol, see Russell L. Friedman, 'Peter Auriol', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/auriol/>> revised version as of September 8, 2015 (accessed on December 5, 2015).

²⁴ Peter Auriol, *Scriptum in Primum Sententiarum*, prologue, section 1, ed. E.M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1952), 139, nr. 24. On 'declarative theology', see Stephen F. Brown, 'Declarative and Deductive Theology in the Early Fourteenth Century', in Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (eds), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26 (Berlin, 1998), 648-55; on Auriol's method in theology Florian Wöller, *Theologie und Wissenschaft bei Petrus Aureoli. Ein scholastischer Entwurf aus dem frühen 14. Jahrhundert*, *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* 117 (Leiden, 2015), 262-74.

²⁵ It is important to stress that the conclusions of declarative theology have the status of conclusions only in a loose sense because theological 'declarations', from which these conclusions are deduced, do not generate the intellectual certitude typical for a 'real' conclusion.

²⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q.1, a.8, corpus, ad 2 (21b-2b).

arguments that according to Augustine were to be drawn from the literal sense.²⁷ Accordingly, in his biblical commentary, the *Compendium litteralis*, Auriol offered a genuine theology of the Bible (in the sense of a subjective genitive). He did not use the literal sense of Scripture as the foundation of his own theological thought, but rather attributed proper theological thought to the biblical authors themselves. According to Auriol, then, John the Evangelist, for example, defended one single argument in his gospel, namely that ‘this man [Jesus Christ] was the son of God and true God’. Mark, on the other hand, argued for the proposition that Jesus Christ ‘was King and even the emperor of all things and beings’.²⁸

Auriol provided two reasons for this approach to Scripture. First, theology, properly speaking, is an intellectual habit. The intellect acquires such a habit by performing acts of a certain kind, thus being disposed to perform further acts of the same kind. According to Auriol, the intellectual habit and its respective acts are partially specified by their proper subject matter, *i.e.* what these acts consider.²⁹ Now, one way to acquire an intellectual habit is to read a book on a specific subject matter, as for example Aristotle’s *Physics*: ‘He who studies the book of *Physics* acquires in himself a habit of physics, which is the same in kind as the one that Aristotle had’. Thus, to become a physicist by way of reading Aristotle’s *Physics* means to know physics in the very same way that Aristotle knew physics. The same holds true for theology: ‘He who studies the Bible does not acquire a habit through which he knows what is written, but rather through which he learns about God [*i.e.* the subject matter of theology] what those who wrote had known’.³⁰ Therefore, to become a theologian by way of studying the Bible does not mean to understand something about God without any intermediaries, but rather to acquire the theological habit that the biblical authors had – which, by definition as a theological habit, is about the subject matter of theology, God.

²⁷ As far as I can see, Peter Auriol did not quote the passage from Augustine’s *Epistula* 93, 8 (see fn. 10 above) in any of the extant works but only alluded to it in his *Reportatio in quantum librum Sententiarum* (Rome, 1605), d.1, q.1, a.1 (12B): *Scriptura autem non est argumentatiua, ubi tantum est mistica, non litteralis*.

²⁸ Peter Auriol, *Compendium sensus litteralis totius Sacrae Scripturae*, ed. Philibert Seeboeck (Quaracchi, 1896), 193. For more on Auriol’s account of the syllogistic character of biblical theology, see William O. Duba, ‘The Man in the Middle: Peter Auriol’s Syllogistic Commentaries on the Gospel of John’, in Fabrizio Amerini (ed.), ‘In principio erat Verbum’. *Philosophy and Theology in the Commentaries on the Gospel of John (II-XIV Centuries)*, Archa Verbi. Subsidia 11 (Münster, 2014), 229–46.

²⁹ I have dealt with Auriol’s account of intellectual and, more specifically, scientific habits in my *Theologie und Wissenschaft* (2015), 228–48.

³⁰ Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, prol., s.1 (150, nr. 63). Auriol directed this passage against Godfrey of Fontaines; see Pasquale Porro, ‘Dalla pagina alla scientia. L’identificazione tra libri e sapere scientifico nel Medioevo scolastico e il caso anomalo della teologia’, *Quaestio* 11 (2011), 225–53; 242–53.

Secondly, Auriol argues that the subject matter of theology can be broken down into six parts, which are all extensively dealt with in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. Accordingly, the subdivisions of theology are reflected in the general structure of the *Sentences*.³¹ The Bible, however, has a different structure: 'The books of the canonical Scriptures cannot be distinguished by this pattern, but rather by the teachers who by writing their own respective theology, as it were, handed down some things that pertain to all these six matters in writing'.³²

Yet, the doctrinal intention of the biblical authors was not the only device by way of which Auriol gave a structure to Scripture. He also used rhetorical criteria in order to divide the biblical books into groups. Auriol claimed that the whole Bible has eight modes of teaching (*octo modi docendi*). The Pentateuch teaches according to a 'political and legislative' mode, while books like *Joshua*, *Judges*, *Ruth*, or *Kings* teach in a 'historical or chronological' mode. The *Psalms*, *Lamentations*, and the *Song of Songs* teach according to a 'hymnical and poetic' mode. Some of the prophets employ a 'prophetic and declarative mode, as if through a mode of homilies, sermons, and public proclamations', and so forth.³³ Auriol did not offer an outright definition of the literal sense of Scripture. Yet, from his reflections on biblical theology in the sense mentioned above as well as from his rhetorical assumptions we can safely conclude that for him it was the letter written down by the human authors of Scripture in a specific mode that constituted the literal sense. According to Auriol, the exegete did not have to extract the arguments *from* the letter, but could rather find them *in* the letter itself.

This does neither mean that Auriol denied the possibility of other interpretations of the Bible and respective senses; but it was not what he was interested in, theologically.³⁴ Nor does Auriol's preference for the literal sense mean that the letter of biblical theology itself does not have a deeper dimension. Auriol divided *Isaiah*, for example, into two rhetorical parts, whose extensions roughly coincide with the modern distinction between *Isaiah* and *Deuteroisiah*. The prophet had first written a tragedy, Auriol tells us, about the exile of the Judaic

³¹ Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, prol., s.5 (313-4, nr. 83). On Auriol's account of the subject of theology, see F. Wöller, *Theologie und Wissenschaft* (2015), 180-222.

³² Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, prol., s. 5 (314, nr. 84).

³³ Peter Auriol, *Compendium sensus litteralis*, 28-9. The whole list, together with a stimulating although sometimes imprecise interpretation, is discussed in Christopher Ocker, *Biblical Poetics Before Humanism and Reformation* (Oxford, 2002), 48-51.

³⁴ This nicely transpires from Auriol's introductory remarks to his historical exegesis of *Rev.* 4:22 (*Compendium sensus litteralis* [451-8]), where he proposed three possible approaches, according to the 'imaginative', the 'moral', and the 'literal' sense. Auriol opted for the latter: *Secundum vero sensum litteralem dici potest, quod continetur in istis sex visionibus futurorum eventus quoad tribulationes et persecutiones, quas passura erat Ecclesia maxime in tempore antichristi* (*ibid.* 454). On Auriol's *Apocalypse* commentary, see David Burr, 'Mendicant Readings of the Apocalypse', in Richard K. Emmerson and Bernard McGinn (eds), *The Apocalypse in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, 1992), 89-102, 100-1.

people and then added a comedy about its consolation. 'In this consoling treatise the prophet deals with a twofold subject matter and a twofold reason for consolation, first with a spiritual consolation, that is the liberation from sin, which was achieved by Christ, and secondly with a corporeal consolation from captivity and exile, which was achieved by Cyrus'.³⁵ Contrary to what a modern reader might expect, both these narratives in the second part of *Isaiah*, according to Auriol, belong to the literal and not to the allegorical sense, simply because it is this that Isaiah had written and taught.³⁶ We may thus also see Auriol's attention for the rhetoric 'modes' employed by biblical theologians as an attempt of 'adding depth' to the literal sense.³⁷

3. With Augustine between Aquinas and Auriol: Nicholas of Lyra

If compared to Peter Auriol, the presence of Augustine in Nicholas of Lyra seems more articulate.³⁸ Auriol invoked Augustine only in the context of rhetorical and spiritual skills that are required for literal exegesis,³⁹ while the predominant idea about the literal sense as a container for theological argument remained an implicit reference to the Latin Father. Now Lyra, in the second prologue to his *Postilla litteralis*, used a series of Augustine's *auctoritates*, including the quotation from the letter to the Donatist Vincentius. Lyra argued: 'Those who wish to make progress in the study of Holy Scripture must begin by understanding the literal sense, most importantly because only from the literal sense, and not from the mystical sense, an argument can arise (*fieri*) for the proof or declaration (*declaratio*) of a doubtful point. This is what Augustine says in his letter against the Donatist Vincentius'.⁴⁰

This use of Augustine, of course, sounds similar to what we have seen in Aquinas. Like the Angelic Doctor, Lyra also seems to argue that according to Augustine only the literal sense of Scripture provides a theologian with arguments; therefore, one ought to begin biblical exegesis with understanding the literal sense. However, in addition to the point that Lyra's expression 'proof or

³⁵ Peter Auriol, *Compendium sensus litteralis*, 127.

³⁶ Peter Auriol, *Compendium sensus litteralis*, 133.

³⁷ Thus it has been proposed by Alastair J. Minnis, 'Quadruplex Sensus, Multiplex Modus: Scriptural Sense and Mode in Medieval Scholastic Exegesis', in John Whitman (ed.), *Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to Modern Period*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 101 (Leiden, 2000), 231-56.

³⁸ For an introduction to Lyra and his exegesis, see Philip D.W. Krey and Lesley Smith (eds), 'Introduction', in *Nicholas of Lyra: The Senses of Scripture*, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 90 (Leiden, 2000), 1-12.

³⁹ For example in Peter Auriol, *Compendium sensus litteralis*, 12-3. The reference is to *De doctrina christiana* 3.37.56; see Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, ed. R.P.H. Green (Oxford, 1995), 194 (134).

⁴⁰ Paul of Burgos, *Additiones* (PL 113, 29).

declaration' does not sound like Aquinas' deductive theology (but rather like Auriol's declarative theology),⁴¹ Lyra's wording of Augustine's authority also suggests that he indeed had a different idea than Aquinas about how theological argument is contained in the Scriptures. While Thomas believed that the arguments are 'drawn' (*trahi*) from Scripture,⁴² Nicholas chose the semideponent *feri* in order to explain how an argument is generated from the literal sense. It is not the exegete who extracts an argument from Scripture. Rather, the argument 'arises' – that is to say the literal sense itself, with the help of the exegete, generates the argument.

Lyra's tendency towards a biblical theology in Auriol's rather than in Aquinas' sense is further corroborated in his prologue to *Genesis*. Here Nicholas presented three options for how to understand the first book of the Bible given that it is loaded with obscurities and problems. His first option was that of Augustine, 'who expounded the six days not on account of their temporal succession but insofar as they refer to the angelic cognition related to the six genres of created things'. The second option goes back to Averroes who taught 'that in heavenly bodies there is no matter, properly speaking'. The third option, meanwhile, assumes the contrary, namely that 'in heavenly bodies there is matter, properly speaking'. Nicholas dismissed Augustine's approach, 'most importantly because other saints and teachers have said that Moses talked to the ignorant people who could not understand the spiritual but only the corporeal and thick things, which is why he did not make explicit mention of the creation of angels'. Therefore, Augustine's approach 'is too far away from the literal sense', *i.e.* from what Moses intended.⁴³ Nicholas eventually decided to tackle his exposition according to the remaining two options, which he thought to be somewhat close to the literal sense. He did not worry about the fact that those two ways of expounding *Genesis* were contradictory – the first holds that there is *no* matter in heavenly bodies, while the second affirms the opposite. Rather, in his commentary Lyra considered both as valid explanations of the events during the first six days.⁴⁴

This strategy reveals how Nicholas of Lyra, the champion of literalistic exegesis, understood the literal sense. It is the first and most important dimension of Holy Scripture. However, in order to bring the arguments contained therein to light, the exegete may employ 'external evidence', as, for example in the

⁴¹ Unfortunately, I have not been able to check any of Lyra's (unedited) 'systematic' works for traces of declarative theology.

⁴² See above, fn. 15.

⁴³ The quotations from Lyra's *Genesis* commentary are from *Biblia cum glosa ordinaria et expositione Lyre litterali et morali, necnon additionibus ac replicis* (Basel, 1498), 23^r.

⁴⁴ See the comment on this passage in A.J. Minnis, '*Quadruplex Sensus*' (2000), 252: 'Lyra's *Genesis* commentary thus professes the possibility of different literal expositions of a Biblical text, of different ways of reading its literal sense, and the freedom of the reader to pick and choose' (my emphasis).

Genesis commentary, of natural philosophy. This ‘external evidence’, then, functions like a hermeneutic key, making the letter of Scripture speak for itself. Nicholas’ biblical exegesis, therefore, is as much about the literal sense as it is about creating access to it and thereby making it fit for theological argumentation. Unlike Aquinas’, this exegesis does not draw theological argument from the Bible but rather expounds the Bible in such a way that its theology indeed arises from the literal sense. In consequence, Lyra’s account of the literal sense as a container for theological argument indeed leans away from Aquinas and towards Auriol. With the latter it shares the confidence in a genuinely biblical theology on the one hand; on the other, however, the literal sense does not speak on its own, as Auriol thought, but rather makes itself known with the help of the exegete. Lyra’s account of the literal sense thus occupies a middle ground between Aquinas and Auriol.

The contrast between Nicholas of Lyra and Peter Auriol also emerges in another context. Nicholas was convinced that in his own day the literal sense of Scripture was obscured and neglected. Partially, he said, the errors of scribes, who deviated from the true text, were responsible. Partially, it was the inexperience of the correctors (or rather of the revisers, as we may call them) who put ‘full stops at many places where they should not be’. Furthermore, the literal sense was obfuscated by bad translations and the ignorance of Hebrew. But most of all, it was the theologians’ fault that this sense – which is supposed to be plain and clear – appears as dark and confused. First they (*modus exponendi communiter traditus*) multiplied the mystical senses, thus they ‘suffocated’ the literal sense, and then split it up into so many particulars that ‘they confounded the understanding and memorization, and distracted the intellect from the insight into the literal sense’.⁴⁵ Nicholas’ complaint against the staggering number of divisions and subdivisions within the biblical text might have well been directed at commentators like Auriol, who, in Nicholas’ eyes, were just too enthusiastic with their different means for giving structure to Scripture. For Lyra, both Auriol’s rhetorical and doctrinal divisions and further subdivisions were just another way of killing the letter.

4. Conclusion

With regard to the fifteenth century, Karlfried Froehlich has noted: ‘To concern oneself with the glory of the literal sense was *en vogue*’. Furthermore, the omnipresent talk about the literal sense had a broad Augustinian framework, in which the accents, however, fell differently. One important aspect of the controversy, therefore, was a ‘fight over the words of St. Augustine’.⁴⁶ Looking

⁴⁵ Paul of Burgos, *Additiones* (PL 113, 29-30).

⁴⁶ K. Froehlich, ‘Always to Keep the Literal Sense’ (1977), 44-8.

at the fourteenth-century authors discussed in this article, I cannot but subscribe to Froehlich's first two points. Thanks to the 'filtering' in Aquinas' account of the literal sense, Augustine indeed remained the paramount authority for the discussions considered here. And because of reasons that run deep in the transformation of theology into a scientific discipline the talk about the literal sense was as *en vogue* as it was necessary for scholastic theologians to reflect about the relation between their 'systematic' theology and Sacred Scripture.

But was there a fight over the words of Augustine in the fourteenth century? Looking at the discussions in Aquinas, Auriol, and Lyra, I think this would be an exaggeration and perhaps even wrong. For at least with regard to the most important point that our authors took from Augustine – the potentiality of the literal sense for theological argument – they did not (and possibly could not) enter into a debate over what Augustine had originally intended. Taken out of its original context in the letter to the Donatist Vincentius, this Augustinian authority developed a life of its own in scholastic debates. It prompted Aquinas to claim that 'systematic' theology derived its principles from the literal sense of Scripture. Thus the exegete, who was a 'systematic' theologian at the same time, harvested, as it were, the arguments contained in Scripture. Peter Auriol's contention that the biblical letter itself contained the theologies of the biblical authors redefined the literal sense as well as the task of the exegete. The only work that Auriol expected from a professional reader of the Bible was to structure the text of Scripture in such a way that the genuinely biblical theology came to the fore. Nicholas of Lyra, then, blamed exegetical methods like Auriol's for obfuscating the literal sense. According to him, the arguments contained in Scripture's literal sense needed a hermeneutic key in order to become heard. Unlike Aquinas, Lyra saw theological agency in the letter of the Bible, but also unlike Auriol, he believed that an exegesis that only split up the letter actually obscured the biblical message rather than helping the Bible to convey its message effectively.

From my quick survey of literalistic medieval exegesis, it seems that Augustine was indeed always present. Yet, the different uses our medieval authors made of his authority seems to suggest that in the general reflections on how to read and expound the Bible, Augustine cannot be identified with a unique position. Although Augustine's position on biblical hermeneutics was indeed flexible, to say the least, his ambiguous presence in late medieval exegesis points us to what I think is an important conclusion: Augustine's role may not be described in terms of influence or even orthodoxy. Rather, his is a fluid and flexible, yet ubiquitous presence.

Richard FitzRalph on Whether Cognition and Volition are Really the Same: Solving an Augustinian Puzzle

Severin V. KITANOV, Salem, USA

ABSTRACT

This article explores the influence of Augustine on Richard FitzRalph's discussion of the nature of the relationship between cognition and volition. FitzRalph was a medieval scholastic secular theologian and philosopher of Irish origin. Historians have characterized FitzRalph as a fourteenth-century Augustinian, but detailed and comprehensive research on the precise character of FitzRalph's Augustinianism is scarce. As can be seen from a closer examination of FitzRalph's early work, his *Lectura* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, FitzRalph was a very conscientious reader of Augustine; FitzRalph frequently cites the texts of major Augustinian works at length, and he demonstrates sensitivity to subtle nuances of meaning in Augustine's writing. FitzRalph's solution to the problem of the identity and difference between cognition and volition is the outcome of a careful exegesis of Augustine's *De Trinitate*, and it represents at the same time an attempt to secure a *via media* in the early fourteenth-century scholastic debate regarding the ontological status of the faculties or powers of the human soul, a position that acknowledges the multi-dimensionality and diversity of the soul's operations while concurrently affirming the substantial unity and integrity of the soul.

1. Introduction: FitzRalph's Augustinianism

The secular Irish theologian and philosopher Richard FitzRalph (*ca.* 1300-1360) was among the giants of early fourteenth-century scholastic thought. Judged by Gordon Leff as a staunch Augustinian traditionalist and unoriginal scholastic author 'who stood firm upon the old' and 'outside the main currents of his time',¹ FitzRalph was for some time neglected by twentieth-century historians of medieval scholastic theology and philosophy. It is primarily on account of the scholarly contributions of Katherine Walsh,² William J. Courtenay,³

¹ See Gordon Leff, *Richard FitzRalph, Commentator of the 'Sentences': A Study on Theological Orthodoxy* (Manchester, 1963), 175.

² See Katherine Walsh, *A Fourteenth-Century Scholar and Primate: Richard FitzRalph in Oxford, Avignon and Armagh* (Oxford, 1981).

³ See William J. Courtenay, *Schools & Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England* (Princeton, 1987), 268; *id.*, *Adam Wodeham: an introduction to his life and writings* (Leiden, 1978), 75-81.

Katherine H. Tachau,⁴ and, most recently, Jean-François Genest,⁵ Michael W. Dunne⁶ and Father Simon Nolan⁷ that the value of FitzRalph's thought has been reconsidered, studied afresh, and more sympathetically appraised if not decisively rehabilitated.

Richard FitzRalph was an accomplished academic and a distinguished church prelate. He pursued studies in the liberal arts and theology at Oxford University (1315-28), eventually receiving a doctorate in theology (1331) and serving as University Chancellor (1332-34). FitzRalph's ecclesiastical career, on the other hand, involved an appointment as Dean of Lichfield in 1335, a sojourn at the papal court in Avignon and participation as papal legate in conciliation conferences with the Greek and Armenian churches, and, ultimately, an election as Archbishop of Armagh in 1346, a post FitzRalph occupied until the end of his life.⁸

Often called by his contemporaries *Doctor Hibernicus*, on account of his Irish origin, and *Armachanus*,⁹ in honor of his service as Archbishop of Armagh

⁴ See Katherine H. Tachau, *Vision and certitude in the age of Ockham: optics, epistemology and the foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345* (Leiden, 1988), 236-43.

⁵ Jean-François Genest, 'Aux origines d'une casuistique: la révélation des futurs contingents d'après la lecture de Richard FitzRalph sur les *Sentences*', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 69 (2002), 239-98; 70 (2003), 317-46; *id.*, 'Contingence et révélation des futurs. La *questio biblica* de Richard FitzRalph', in Jean Jolivet, Zénon Kaluza and Alain de Libera (eds), *Lectio varietates. Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904-1987)* (Paris, 1991), 199-246.

⁶ See Michael W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph on the Human Mind as a Trinity of Memory, Understanding and Will', in A. Musco, C. Compagno, S. D'Agostino and G. Musotto (eds), *Universalità della Ragione. Pluralità delle Filosofie nel Medioevo. XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia Medievale, Palermo, 17-22 settembre 2007*, Biblioteca dell'Officina di Studi Medievali 14.II.1 (Palermo, 2012), 443-50; *id.*, 'Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*', in Philipp W. Rosemann (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard 2* (Leiden, 2010), 405-37; *id.*, 'Richard FitzRalph of Dundalk (c. 1300-1360) and the New World', *Archivum Hibernicum* 58 (2004), 243-58; *id.*, 'A Fourteenth-Century Example of an *Introitus Sententiarum* at Oxford: Richard FitzRalph's Inaugural Speech in Praise of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard', *Mediaeval Studies* 63 (2001), 1-29.

⁷ See Michael W. Dunne and Simon Nolan (eds), *Richard FitzRalph: His Life, Times and Thought* (Dublin, 2013).

⁸ For the details of FitzRalph's life and career, see Stephen E. Lahey, 'Richard Fitzralph', in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500*, vol. 1 (Dordrecht a.o., 2011), 1126b-9a; Katherine Walsh, 'Fitzralph, Richard (b. before 1300, d. 1360)', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004; online ed. May 2010), <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9627>> (accessed on July 7, 2010); K. Walsh, *A fourteenth-century scholar and primate* (1981); Michael Haren, 'Richard FitzRalph of Dundalk, Oxford and Armagh: scholar, prelate and controversialist', in James McEvoy and Michael Dunne (eds), *The Irish Contribution to Scholastic Thought* (Dublin, 2009), 88-110; Michael Dunne, 'Fitzralph, Richard (c. 1299-1360)', in Thomas Duddy (ed.), *Dictionary of Irish Philosophers A-Z* (London, 2006), 129-32; *id.*, 'A Fourteenth-Century Example of an *Introitus Sententiarum* at Oxford' (2001), 1-7.

⁹ However, neither title was associated exclusively with FitzRalph. An entire set of logical writings were mistakenly attributed to FitzRalph under the title 'Armachanus' although they were written by a fifteenth-century occupant of the see of Armagh, the Franciscan theologian John Foxholes (d. 1474). See Michael W. Dunne, 'John Foxholes OFM Armachanus (†1474): a note

(1346-60), FitzRalph was regarded both in England and on the continent as an important theological authority. FitzRalph was in fact among the eighteen theologians asked by Pope Benedict XII to correct the erroneous views of his predecessor, Pope John XXII, on the beatific vision.¹⁰ In his role as papal representative in discussions with the Greek and Armenian churches in 1337-1344, FitzRalph authored the *Summa de quaestionibus Armenorum* – an exploration of the doctrinal differences between the Catholic and Orthodox churches tailored to the reading and exegesis of Scripture.¹¹ As Stephen Lahey has pointed out, the *Summa* would become a key source for theological discussions of doctrinal issues during the Counter-Reformation.¹² FitzRalph's service as Archbishop of Armagh was dominated by efforts to reform the Irish church as well as by FitzRalph's involvement in the mendicant controversy, an involvement which culminated in the composition of an eight-volume critique of the mendicant orders titled *De pauperie salvatoris*. FitzRalph's *De pauperie salvatoris* would in due course be associated with the thought of the English reformer John Wyclif.¹³

It is known that later in his life FitzRalph had a religious epiphany that motivated him to cast-off the scholastic training of his youth and to devote himself entirely to prayer and the study of Sacred Scripture. Michael Dunne has suggested that this turn in FitzRalph's spirituality was driven by 'a personal reading of Augustine',¹⁴ but, as we shall see below, the thought of St. Augustine was a significant source of inspiration for FitzRalph already during his early days as a commentator on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* at Oxford. Courtenay, for example, finds likely evidence of Augustine's influence on FitzRalph in the fact that FitzRalph composed a commentary on Augustine's *De Trinitate* (*Glosulae super De Trinitate*), a commentary that was cited by Adam Wodeham but that has not survived.¹⁵ In the same vein, Dunne observes with respect to FitzRalph's *Lectura* that FitzRalph not only refers to Augustine's writings but also 'tends to provide long quotations from Augustine, indicating a close personal reading that may in fact have led him to read Scripture more closely and ultimately to reject his academic life as "croaking in the pond with the

on his logical treatises formerly attributed to Richard FitzRalph', in *Richard FitzRalph* (2013), 199-203.

¹⁰ For FitzRalph's view of the beatific vision, see William O. Duba, 'Conversion, vision and faith in the life and works of Richard FitzRalph', in *Richard FitzRalph* (2013), 103-27, esp. 111-27.

¹¹ Focused studies of FitzRalph's *Summa de quaestionibus Armenorum* can be found in W. Duba, 'Conversion, vision and faith' (2013), 103-27, 121-6; Chris Schabel, 'Richard FitzRalph on the *Filioque* before and after his conversations with Barlaam the Calabrian', in *Richard FitzRalph* (2013), 128-55, 138-53.

¹² See S. Lahey, 'Richard FitzRalph' (2011), 1126b.

¹³ For a detailed discussion and assessment of the influence of FitzRalph's anti-mendicant views on Wyclif, see Stephen Lahey, 'Richard FitzRalph and John Wyclif: untangling Armachanus from the Wycliffites', in *Richard FitzRalph* (2013), 159-85.

¹⁴ See M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura*' (2010), 436.

¹⁵ See W.J. Courtenay, *Schools & Scholars* (1987), 319-20.

other toads'''.¹⁶ One may indeed describe FitzRalph's relationship with Augustine as a lifelong commitment to Augustinian spirituality that underwent two dissimilar yet integrated phases – viz. an early phase of training in the subtleties of scholastic dialectic and a later phase of preoccupation with pastoral concerns and orientation toward biblical exegesis. The difference between the two phases is also reflected in the style of FitzRalph's writings – the scholastic works¹⁷ of FitzRalph's university years, on the one hand, and many sermons and two massive *summae* written in a dialogue form stemming from FitzRalph's life as church official, on the other hand. As William Duba has shown, however, FitzRalph's rejection of scholasticism was mostly an expression of dissatisfaction with excessive philosophizing in the realm of theology and a conscious effort to resume and deepen St. Anselm's project of *fides quaerens intellectum* within its most proper context – viz. the reading and interpretation of Scripture.¹⁸

Scholars disagree about the precise character of FitzRalph's Augustinianism. According to the older assessment propounded by commentators such as Leff, FitzRalph was profoundly influenced by the Augustinianism of the Parisian secular theologian Henry of Ghent.¹⁹ More recent scholarship, however, has found the older assessment to be generally unsatisfying and not supported by the conscientious analysis of FitzRalph's texts.²⁰ It can be said that Leff's assessment is right at least in the very broad sense that FitzRalph concurred with Henry that a dependable theoretical account of the human mind and its faculties requires the corrective lens of the Augustinian perspective, viz. 'to preserve a due balance between the mind's dependence upon God and its natural freedom both in knowing and willing'.²¹ As we shall have the occasion to see below, FitzRalph understood that interpreting and applying Augustine's perspective was no easy matter, and, as a few recent commentators have noted, he did not always follow in Henry's footsteps and even criticized some of Henry's views.²²

2. FitzRalph's Oxford lectures on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard

FitzRalph delivered his lectures on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in 1328-1329. These lectures were partially reworked by FitzRalph into the *Opus correctum* (1330-1332). Along with later writings such as the *Summa*

¹⁶ See M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura*' (2010), 421.

¹⁷ For a complete listing of FitzRalph's scholastic works including those mistakenly attributed to FitzRalph, see M.W. Dunne, 'John Foxholes' (2013), 199-201.

¹⁸ For an illuminating discussion, see W. Duba, 'Conversion, vision and faith' (2013), 105-11.

¹⁹ See G. Leff, *Richard FitzRalph* (1963), 13, 59-66, 82-3, 109, 139, 175.

²⁰ See K.H. Tachau, *Vision and certitude* (1988), 238 n. 104.

²¹ See G. Leff, *Richard FitzRalph* (1963), 109.

²² See W. Duba, 'Conversion, vision and faith' (2013), 115-21, 126-7; K.H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude* (1988), 238 n. 104.

de quaestionibus Armenorum and the *De pauperie salvatoris*, FitzRalph's *Lectura* on the *Sentences* completes the corpus of FitzRalph's most significant and influential theological works. Even though it covers all four books of Lombard's *Sentences*, FitzRalph's *Lectura* is not a comprehensive commentary in the sense that it does not address every single Lombardian distinction. Most of FitzRalph's questions focus on the first two books of the *Sentences*. Book 3 contains only one question and book 4 comprises, possibly, two questions.²³ The asymmetrical treatment of the material of the *Sentences* is typical for the time period and demonstrates the tendency of early fourteenth-century scholastics to give preference to some themes rather than others depending in part on how much time the *bachalarius Sententiarum* had at his disposal – just about one year at Oxford – and in part on what was considered a challenging, fruitful, or fascinating topic.²⁴ FitzRalph's question-based commentary reveals a strong interest in various aspects of human psychology, especially in the faculties and acts of volition, cognition and memory, in God's omnipotence and knowledge of future contingents, in the creation of the world and the nature of time and motion, in the origin of angelic sin, angelic locomotion, and the scope and mechanism of angelic cognition.²⁵ Although it is generally speaking a theological work, modern-day scholars who have studied FitzRalph's *Lectura* in its entirety have highlighted the work's prevalent philosophical dimension.²⁶

²³ The only question found in the extant manuscripts containing the full text of FitzRalph's *Lectura* is listed as question 29 in Dunne's table of questions and is devoted to the problem of the presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist. However, the table of contents of one of the manuscripts featuring the shorter text of FitzRalph's *Lectura* – viz. Worcester, Cathedral Library, Q 71, saec. XIV – also mentions the question *Utrum suffragia Ecclesie prosint defunctis in purgatorio* and lists its contents, although the body of the question itself is not found in any of the available manuscripts. See M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura*' (2010), 413 n. 21, 417, fn. 28. For a thorough analysis and discussion of FitzRalph's treatment of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, see M.W. Dunne, 'Accidents without a subject: Richard FitzRalph's question on the Eucharist from his *Lectura* on the *Sentences*', in *Richard FitzRalph* (2013), 11–29, 15–28.

²⁴ For a brief discussion of the relationship between FitzRalph's *Lectura* and the content of Lombard's *Sentences*, see M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura*' (2010), 422–4. For a detailed discussion and edition of FitzRalph's introductory sermon to Lombard's *Sentences*, a rare example of the so-called *introitus Sententiarum* that theology bachelors at Oxford were expected to deliver upon initiating their lectures on the *Sentences*, see M.W. Dunne, 'A Fourteenth-Century Example of an *Introitus Sententiarum* at Oxford' (2001), 10–5, 22–9. For a comprehensive and richly-illustrated account of the transformation of the *Sentences* commentary in the fourteenth century, see Philipp W. Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's Sentences*, Rethinking the Middle Ages 2 (Peterborough, 2007), 93–136.

²⁵ See the table of questions in M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura*' (2010), 408–13.

²⁶ See M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura*' (2010), 429–35. For a sketch of FitzRalph's epistemology in the *Sentences* commentary, see S. Lahey, 'Richard FitzRalph' (2011), 1127a–8a.

3. The Question of whether cognition and volition are really the same

The question whether cognition and volition are really the same appears in the context of FitzRalph's treatment of the reflection of the image of the Trinity in the human mind in book 1, q.6 of FitzRalph's *Lectura*. Question 6²⁷ (titled *Utrum mens humana sit ymago trinitatis increate*) consists of 6 articles²⁸ and comprises a dozen folio pages in MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 15853 (hereafter *siglum* P), fols. 24^{vb}-36^{vb}.²⁹ Article 1 asks whether memory, intellect, and will are really distinct from each other (*Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas distinguantur ab invicem realiter*). Article 2 examines whether there is a certain cognitive habit in the rational spirit (*Utrum in spiritu rationali sit aliquis habitus cognitivus*). Article 3 discusses whether actual thinking differs in reality from a species in the memory (*Utrum actualis cogitatio distinguatur realiter a specie in memoria*). Article 4 addresses whether cognition and volition are really the same (*Utrum cognitio et volitio sint idem realiter*). Article 5 is concerned with whether the parts of the created image are equal (*Utrum partes ymaginis create sint equales*). Article 6 contains FitzRalph's answer to the principal question (*Ad quaestionem principalem*).³⁰

In what follows, we focus on the fourth article of FitzRalph's discussion of the presence of the image of the divine Trinity in the human mind, and we refer the reader to Michael Dunne's research for further discussion of the remaining articles.³¹ FitzRalph's examination of the issue of the real identity of cognition and volition has been approached briefly by Leff,³² but we advance the discussion by delving a bit deeper into the text of article 4 and by taking note of the argumentative detail and nuances of FitzRalph's treatment. Article 4 occupies roughly three folio pages, with a very short section containing FitzRalph's reply

²⁷ I follow Dunne's numbering of the questions of book 1 of FitzRalph's *Lectura*, not the actual numbering in codex Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 15853, which omits question 3 – *Utrum unicus actus intellectus vel voluntatis sit respectu diversorum distinctus* – and numbers the question on the *imago Trinitatis* as question 5. See M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura*' (2010), 408-13.

²⁸ The division of q.6 (=q.5) in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 15853 (hereafter P) presents only 5 articles, although the portion of the text devoted to the responses to the principal questions is later designated in the margin of the manuscript as article 6. See FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5 (P, fol. 25^{va}, fol. 36^{rb}).

²⁹ In one of the manuscripts containing FitzRalph's *Lectura* – Oxford, Oriel College, 15 saec. XIV (1389) – questions 7-9 of book 1 are treated as articles of question 6. Since the titles of these three questions appear to be closely related to the subject matter of question 6, Dunne suggests that the questions may indeed be more correctly regarded as articles of question 6 rather than as independent queries. See M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura*' (2010), 410 n. 12. Dunne also draws attention to the interesting fact that FitzRalph's question about the image of the Trinity in the human mind is regarded in MS Vatican Ottoboni 179 as a 'self-contained work'. See M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph on the Human Mind' (2012), 444 n. 6.

³⁰ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5 (P, fols. 25^{va}, 28^{rb}, 30^{ra}, 32^{va}, 35^{ra}, 36^{rb}).

³¹ See M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph on the Human Mind' (2012), 444-9.

³² G. Leff, *Richard FitzRalph* (1963), 104-9.

to the main question and the bulk of the text consisting of *pro et con* arguments and of FitzRalph's rejoinders to the arguments against FitzRalph's own thesis. FitzRalph presents 11 arguments in support of the thesis that cognition and volition are the same (let's call this the identity thesis), and 13 arguments in defense of the opposite thesis, *i.e.* that cognition and volition are not really the same (let's call this the non-identity thesis). Apart from occasional references to Aristotle, Averroës, Gregory the Great, St. Anselm, and Peter Lombard, the most frequently cited authority in the *pro et con* arguments is Augustine, and the most repeatedly consulted Augustinian work is, not surprisingly, *De Trinitate*, although occasionally we see FitzRalph drawing material from other influential Augustinian works such as *Confessions* and *De libero arbitrio*.

Even though our aim is to present the Augustinian *pro et con* arguments in order to showcase FitzRalph's persistent reliance on the work of St. Augustine, we will be able to appreciate the philosophical rigor and sophistication³³ of FitzRalph's discussion of the issue at hand if we also give a couple of the *pro et con* arguments that are not derived from the writings of Augustine. The following two related arguments offered in favor of the real identity of cognition and volition illustrate the philosophical acumen and complexity of early fourteenth-century discussions of human knowledge and psychology, on the one hand, and represent versions of familiar and frequently used arguments, on the other hand. The first argument (also argument number 1 in the text of the question) claims that if cognition and volition are not really the same, then a past state of affairs, *viz.* a certain bygone volition can fail to have existed. How so? Suppose that God reveals to Socrates a very pleasurable future contingent act in such a way that Socrates sees this act as encompassed in the Word and desires the act to occur. Let Socrates' desire of the respective future act be *a* and the future fulfillment of Socrates' desire be *b*, and let some time go by so that Socrates' initial volition is now bygone. If *b* does not occur at all, then Socrates would not have seen *b* in the Word as a future state of affairs and would, consequently, not have known *b*. But if this is the case, then Socrates would not have had the desire *a* with respect to *b* because, as Augustine points out, one cannot want or love (*amare*) the unknown. Therefore, Socrates' bygone desire would either not have occurred at all, which is not what is initially assumed in the argument, or would cease to exist after having existed in the past, which is impossible.³⁴ The second argument (argument number 5 in the

³³ I disagree with Leff's verdict that FitzRalph's commentary displays 'an absence of tautness and of rigour and a tendency to lapse into mere formalism, as in the citing of authority after authority, which on too many occasions makes it appear perfunctory'. See G. Leff, *Richard FitzRalph* (1963), 174.

³⁴ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fol. 32^{va-b}): *Et arguo quod sic, quia aliter sequitur positio possibilis, quod aliquod praeteritum, scilicet, aliqua volucio praeterita potest non fuisse, quod tamen est impossibile. Probo quod hoc sequitur. Suppono quod Deus revelet Sorti vel alicui alteri aliquem actum futurum contingentem multum delectabilem per suam essentiam, ita quod*

text of the question) states that God can annihilate the cognition of some thing or some state of affairs while preserving the volition of the same thing or state of affairs, and thus one would have a volition with respect to some unknown thing or state of affairs, which is impossible.³⁵

In response to the first of the aforementioned arguments, FitzRalph concedes that it is impossible to change the past. FitzRalph's strategy involves distinguishing between what is necessary and what is contingent in Socrates' knowledge of the future, a distinction which reflects what God's essence represents in a necessary way and what it represents in a contingent way.³⁶ Thus, if God reveals to Socrates that *b* will occur in the future, then Socrates knows *b* necessarily (*necessario novit b*) but does not know necessarily that *b* will occur in the future (*non necessario novit b esse futurum*). In other words, if *b* has the character of a genuine future contingent, then the modal status of Socrates' knowledge that *b* will occur in the future can only be contingent, not necessary. The same analysis applies to God's knowledge that *b* will occur in the future. Ultimately, if Socrates has direct access to God's essence, then Socrates will inevitably know *b* if God's essence represents *b*, but Socrates would not know that *b* will occur in the future if God's essence does not represent *b* as bound to occur in the future.³⁷

Sortes non cognoscat illud futurum nisi in verbo, et pono quod Sortes velit illud ita quod habeat volucionem respectu istius, et sit volucio ista a, et effectus futurus volucionis b, et transeat tempus ita quod ista volucio sit praeterita. Tunc arguo sic: b non erit, ergo Sortes non vidit in verbo b esse futurum, et per consequens Sortes non cognovit b, quia aliter non novit nisi in verbo, per positionem, et sequitur ulterius Sortes non novit b, ergo non voluit b, cum nullus potest amare incognitum, secundum Augustinum 8^o [et] 10^o De trinitate, cap. 7. Ergo non fuit; ergo volucio praeterita non sit. Omnes istae consequentiae sunt necessarie, et primum antecedens est mere contingens, ergo ultimum consequens.

³⁵ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fol. 33^{ra}): *Quinto: tunc posset Deus adnihilare cognitionem manente volucione, et aliquis amaret tunc incognitum, quod est impossibile secundum Augustinum, 8^o et 10^o De trinitate, et 3^o De libero arbitrio, cap. 42^o.*

³⁶ Jean-François Genest presents this argument and notes that this is the first time that FitzRalph formulates a solution to the problem of future contingents that he will eventually generalize. See J.-F. Genest, 'Aux origines d'une casuistique' (2003), 334: 'En effet, si Dieu révèle à Socrate que B est futur, il est nécessaire que Socrate ait connu B, mais non qu'il l'ait connu *comme futur*, et cela est également vrai de la science de Dieu à l'égard de B: elle est aussi contingente que B. Donc, même si B n'était pas futur, Socrate connaîtrait néanmoins B, parce que l'essence divine représenterait B. Ici apparaît pour la première fois une réponse que FitzRalph généraliserait ensuite: ce qu'il y a de nécessaire dans les effets de la vision n'est pas causé par ce que le Verbe représente de manière accidentelle (le futur), mais par ce qu'il représente de manière nécessaire, c'est-à-dire la seule essence (*nuda essentia*) de la chose future' (author's italics).

³⁷ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fol. 34th): *Ad primum argumentum quod aliter esset possibile aliquam volucionem praeteritam non fuisse, dico quod non sequitur. Et ulterius ad argumentum posito isto casu cum arguitur b non erit, ergo Sortes non vidit in verbo b esse futurum, ergo Sortes non cognovit b, dico quod prima consequentia est bona et secunda non valet. Unde si Deus revelaret Sorti b esse futurum, dico quod tunc hoc facto Sortes necessario novit b, sed non necessario novit b esse futurum. Sed ita contingenter sicut b est futurum, ita contingenter*

FitzRalph's reply to the second of the above-mentioned arguments calls attention to a logical contradiction in the proposed hypothetical scenario. Saying that God can annihilate the cognition of a thing/state of affairs while the volition of the same thing/state of affairs remains in place suggests that the volition is both included in (*processit ab ista cognitione*) and occurs independently from the cognition. But if the cognition and its corresponding volition are altogether separate and diverse entities, then God can conserve the emergent volition, although the volition would not really be a volition in the sense that it is actively caused by the will and constitutes the will's own action. According to FitzRalph, an occurring volition depends naturally upon the conservation of its corresponding cognition more so than the physical medium which receives and retains sunlight depends upon the conserving force of the sun. In other words, one can certainly talk about the remaining volition in this case as a kind of quality or thing (*res*) preserved by God in the will, although it would be incorrect to call it a genuine volition, since a genuine volition requires cognition.³⁸

The rejoinders to the two arguments we have presented divulge the core of FitzRalph's view on the relationship between cognition and volition. According to FitzRalph, cognition and volition are different and separate acts of the rational soul. Genuine volition presupposes cognition and cannot occur naturally without a preceding act of cognition. This view is articulated succinctly but clearly in FitzRalph's response to the question of article 4:

With respect to the article, and because of the arguments, I hold the following side, which is that the volition of something is not the cognition of the same, although the volition of the thing is perhaps the cognition of itself [the volition] insofar as it [the volition] is present to the intellect, and on account of the fact that the will in willing necessarily carries out its own action just as any other agent. And thus the action of the will of the one willing, after [the moment] he has not willed, is something new

novit Sortes b esse futurum, immo Deus ita contingenter novit b esse futurum. Set etsi b non foret futurum, adhuc Sortes cognosceret b, quia essentia divina representaret, scilicet, b, sicut Deus adhuc cognosceret b et non cognosceret b esse futurum, et ideo non sequitur quin Sortes amat b et quod a volucio Sortis fit. De hoc plenius dicerem et melius in articulo de praescientia futurorum et in articulo de revelacione futurorum contingencium.

³⁸ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fol. 34^{va-b}): *Ad quantum argumentum cum arguitur quod si cognicio non sit volucio posset Deus adnihilare cognitionem stante volucione, et sequitur quod aliquis amaret incognitum, hoc posito dico quod non sequitur, quia propositio ista includit impossibilia, scilicet, Deus adnihilat cognitionem manente volucione que processit ab ista cognitione, quia includit volucionem esse sine cognitione. Sed bene concedo ex quo volucio et cognicio sunt res diversae, quod Deus potest cognitionem adnihilare isto manente quod nunc est volucio. Sed dico quod adnihilata tunc illud [quod] pro nunc est volucio, non erit volucio sed erit in voluntate a Deo tanquam a conservante, non a voluntate, quia voluntas non potest conservare istam rem absque cognitione, ex quo ipsa pendet naturaliter a cognitione plusquam medium potest conservare lucem solis absque sole conservante. Et manifestum est cuilibet quod illud quod nunc est volucio et accio voluntatis non erit accio voluntatis nisi quando pendebit a voluntate, et ideo non sequitur quod aliquis potest velle incognitum.*

emerging in and from the will, and not something prior that has emerged before the will has willed.³⁹

A closer look at the series of authoritative *pro et con* arguments prefacing FitzRalph's response to article 4 shows that the problem FitzRalph addresses in the body of the article is in great part derived from St. Augustine's discussion in *De Trinitate* of the manner in which the powers and acts of the human soul reflect the divine Trinity. Four out of the eleven arguments in support of the identity thesis and three out of the thirteen arguments in defense of the non-identity thesis depend entirely on statements borrowed from Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Let's examine some of these *pro et con* arguments and see what they tell us about the Augustinian puzzle FitzRalph is struggling to resolve.

One of the crucial textual passages from *De Trinitate* summoned in the context of the arguments for the identity thesis – especially in the case of the ninth objection – states that a right will cannot fail to *know* how to act, that charity must *know* whatever it is that it desires, and that love remembers and understands.⁴⁰ As FitzRalph's response to the ninth objection indicates, the objector must have understood Augustine as saying that the human will has a memory and intelligence of its own, somehow independently of the mind as a unitary substance.⁴¹ One aspect of the crux of the problem that preoccupies FitzRalph in article 4 is, therefore, how far one can push the distinction between the faculties

³⁹ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fol. 34th): *Ad articulum propter illa argumenta teneo hanc partem, scilicet, quod volucio respectu alicuius rei non est cognitio eiusdem, quamvis fortassis volucio rei sit cognitio sui ipsius propter hoc quod ipsa est praesens intellectui, et propter hanc causam quia voluntas in volendo necessario agit suam accionem sicut quodlibet aliud agens. Et ideo accio voluntatis volentis, postquam non voluit, est aliquid de novo factum in se ipsa et a se ipsa, non aliquid prius factum antequam ipsa velit.* For a slightly different translation of the same passage, see M.W. Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph on the Human Mind' (2012), 447.

⁴⁰ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fol. 33^{ra}): *Praeterea, XV^o De trinitate, cap. 64, 'numquid dicturi sumus voluntatem nostram quando recta est nescire quid agit, porro si scit, inest ei quaedam sua sciencia', et post, 'An audiendus est quisquam dicens caritatem nescire quid agat que non agit propriam?', et in fine capituli dicit quod 'voluntas habet appetendi scienciam', et cap. 65, 'amor mens meminit et intelligit', haec ibi.*

⁴¹ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fols. 34^{vb}-35^{ra}): *Ad nonum, de auctoritatibus Augustini XV^o De trinitate, capitulis 64^o et 65^o, dicentis quod 'voluntas quando recta est scit quid appetit', et 'voluntas habet scienciam appetendi', et 'vere audiendus quisquam dicens caritatem nesciri quid agat', et 'amor meminit et intelligit', dico quod illae auctoritates intelliguntur aliter quam verba pretendunt, ita quod Augustinus non vult plus dicere nisi quod habens amorem et caritatem scit quid agit, et habet scienciam appetendi, et meminit, et intelligit, nec plus intelligit. Unde hiis omnibus dictis, exponitur quid intendit per illa, cap. 65^o, dicens sic, 'ipse quoque amor meus cum meminit et intelligit etsiam quid appetere debeat, quid vitare, per meam, non per suam memoriam meminit, et per intelligenciam meam, non suam quidquid intelligenter amat intelligit, quod breviter dici potest – ego per omnia illa tria memini, intelligo, et amo, qui nec sine memoria, nec intelligencia, nec amor, sed illa habeo', haec ille. Ecce quam plane exposuit se sicut ego praedixi.*

of the intellect and the will and their corresponding activities.⁴² Assuming that the activities of cognition and volition are completely distinct or separate from each other leads to inferring too much from the Augustinian characterizations of the right will's knowledge or of charity's capacity to remember and understand. Interpreting Augustine's claims out of context gives rise to viewing the will as having a life of its own, as being a fully autonomous and self-directing source of activity. Still, this interpretation would be correct if it is applied to the distinction between the persons of the divine Trinity, where each person can be said to constitute a unique, autonomous and irreducible entity.

The other aspect of the crux of the problem that FitzRalph is addressing concerns the extent to which the faculties of the intellect and the will and their corresponding activities are integrated within the fabric of the human mind. Are they integrated in exact proportion to the way in which the persons of the uncreated divine Trinity are unified within the absolute simplicity of God's being? A quick glimpse at a few of the arguments for the non-identity thesis suggests that FitzRalph's answer is a definitive 'no'. Thus, the sixth argument for the non-identity thesis stresses that if cognition and volition were really the same, then it would be impossible to discern the image of the uncreated Trinity in the human mind on the basis of the mind's various acts, and this would in turn obviate the rationale behind the entire enterprise of Augustine's *De Trinitate*.⁴³ FitzRalph also brings up multiple passages in *De Trinitate* where Augustine explicitly differentiates the soul's activity of willing from that of thinking.⁴⁴ Lastly, citing Augustine's concluding observations regarding the way in which the difference between the emanation of thought from memory, on the one hand, and the will's movement of love that joins memory and thought together as parent and offspring, on the other hand, parallels the difference between the origination of the Word from God the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit, FitzRalph writes:

This is the conclusion of the whole book *On the Trinity*, and the expression of his intention in it, namely, to come to know as far as he can that the trinity in his own mind is the image of the Trinity, and thus to come to understand as far as he can the Trinity as

⁴² Leff also points to this Augustinian background of FitzRalph's discussion of the equality of the faculties of the human mind *vis-à-vis* the equality of the divine persons. See G. Leff, *Richard FitzRalph* (1963), 54-5.

⁴³ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fol. 33^{vb}): *Sexto, aliter in mente non esset ymago trinitatis secundum suos actus, et ita superflueret totius Augustini De Trinitate, cum ipse in toto libro nitatur precise declarare quomodo potest cognosci trinitas increata ex istius ymagine per eius trinitatem creatam.*

⁴⁴ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fol. 33^{vb}): *Praeterea, per auctoritates innumerabiles potest argui quod volucio non est sicut cogitacio, IX^o De trinitate, cap. 19^o, 'verbum nostrum et mentem de qua gignitur meus amor coniungit, sequi cum eis complexu incorporeo sine ulla confusione constringit'. Item, cap. 29^o, 'cur mens noticiam suam gignit cum se novit, et amorem suum non gignit cum se amat', quam conclusionem tractans capitulis 30^o et 31^o, declarat primo quod verbum proprie paritur sed amor non, sed amor precedit partum verbum.*

it is in God, and the similarity between the emanations of the [divine] persons and those emanations of the trinity in our own mind, and it becomes patently clear now that the word is not actual love.⁴⁵

Now that we understand better the Augustinian problem that exercises FitzRalph's dialectical and hermeneutic skills, we can revisit FitzRalph's response to article 4 and shed more light on the position that FitzRalph is defending. When FitzRalph says with respect to a naturally occurring volition that 'the volition of the thing is perhaps the cognition of itself [the volition] insofar as it [the volition] is present to the intellect', FitzRalph must mean that the volition does not take place in complete isolation from the remainder of the mind as a unitary substance. In this sense, whenever the will wants something, anything at all, the intellect is simultaneously aware of the volition. One may perhaps say that the volitional activity of the soul is on some very basic level cognitively transparent, insofar as the volition of any given object also involves the soul's awareness of itself as willing. That the volition of an object involves reflexive awareness not as a further act of cognition directed at that same volition is also clear from FitzRalph's reply to an ingenious argument for the identity thesis that features the problem of infinite regress. The argument points out that if cognition and volition were really distinct, then a blessed individual (*beatus*) who knows his own volition and wills his own knowledge cannot possibly do so unless he knows by means of a further volition which would then require another cognition, and so on *ad infinitum*.⁴⁶ FitzRalph grants the conclusion of the argument and repeats what he had asserted earlier in his response to article 4, *viz.* that volition is the cognition of itself even though it is not the

⁴⁵ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fols. 33^{vb}-34^{ra}): *Praeterea, XV^o De Trinitate, cap. ultimo, Augustinus alloquens seipsum quaerit, 'quare non potuisti figere aciem mentis in luce illa supra mentem, que tibi ostendit diversitatem inter nativitatem Filii, et processione[m] Spiritui Sancti, scio enim quod non potes. Ipsa tamen lux tibi ostendit in te tria ista, in quibus tu summe istius quam fixis oculis contemplari non dum vales ymaginem trinitatis agnoscens. Ipsa ostendit tibi verum verbum esse in te, quando de sciencia tua gignitur ymago simillima istius cogitationis quam memoria continebat, ista duo re idem parentem ac prolem tria voluntate sive dilectione tamen genite, quam cogitatione, quam voluntatem de cognitione procedere nullus abigit notandum esse eius ymaginem'. Ecce conclusio totius libri De Trinitatis, et expressio intencionis eius in isto, ut, scilicet, cognosceret ut posset istam trinitatem in mente sua esse ymaginem trinitatis, et ita intelligeret ut posset esse trinitatem in Deo, et similem esse personarum emanaciones istis emanacionibus trinitatis mentis nostrae, nunc satis claret quod verbum non est amor actualis.*

⁴⁶ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fols. 32^{vb}-33^{ra}): *Quarto sic: beatus quilibet cognoscit suam quamlibet volucionem et vult quamlibet cognicionem suam, et non cognoscit suam volucionem per aliud, quia illud aliud est volitum per aliam volucionem, et ita est cognita pari ratione per aliam cognicionem, et ita erit processus in infinitum, vel est standum in primo, quod volucio cognoscitur per se ipsam. Et ita cognicio est volucio. Et confirmatur argumentum per hoc quod volucio est praesens intellectui, ergo cognoscitur per se ipsam, sicut enim arguit Augustinus X^o De Trinitate, capitulis 19^o et 22^o, quod mens cognoscit se semper per se, quia semper sibi praesens est.*

cognition of the object willed.⁴⁷ We can conclude that FitzRalph remained true to the spirit of St. Augustine by emphasizing the singularity and integrity of the human mind while at the same time preserving the mind's multi-dimensionality. We can also say that this very effort to balance Augustine's attention to the mind's cohesive unity against Augustine's concern with shielding the distinctiveness of each facet of the Trinitarian image in the human mind is what sets FitzRalph to some degree apart from his contemporaries and why he deserves to be studied.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ FitzRalph, *Super sententias* I, q.5, a.4 (P, fol. 34^{va}): *Ad quartum potest concedi conclusio sicut dictum est in posicionem, quia volucio est cognicio sui ipsius et non est cognicio primi voliti per istam.*

⁴⁸ Tachau observes that the debate about the distinction between the soul and its powers and acts was initiated by Richard Campsall at Oxford around the year 1316. Realizing that a host of problems result from an extreme nominalist position that denies any real distinctions in the human soul, a position embraced by William of Ockham, FitzRalph sought to establish a more moderate position in the debate. See Katherine H. Tachau, 'Adam Wodeham and Robert Holcot as witnesses to FitzRalph's thought', in *Richard FitzRalph* (2013), 79-95, 92-3. See also Severin V. Kitanov, 'Is it better for the king of England to be a king of England than a duke of Aquitaine? Richard FitzRalph and Adam Wodeham on whether beatific enjoyment is an act of the intellect or an act of the will', in *Richard FitzRalph* (2013), 56-78, 75-6.

Augustine in Richard FitzRalph (c. 1300-1360)

Simon NOLAN, Maynooth, Ireland

ABSTRACT

This article addresses the general topic of Augustine in Richard FitzRalph (c. 1300-1360). The influence of Augustine on FitzRalph's writings is ubiquitous. Augustine is his constant guide at every stage in his intellectual development and the decisive element in the shaping of many of his theological doctrines throughout his life. FitzRalph gives his reader long and accurate quotations from a wide variety of Augustine's works in a way which makes him an important witness to the wider fourteenth-century revival in Augustinianism. However, there are other ways in which FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland, considered himself to have real affinity with Augustine the Christian bishop. In the famous 'Autobiographical Prayer' from his *Summa de quaestionibus Armenorum*, FitzRalph's account of his personal conversion consciously imitates both the style and content of Augustine's *Confessions*. Recent scholarship has acknowledged the profound influence of Bishop Grandisson of Exeter on FitzRalph; some of Grandisson's own highly annotated texts of Augustine have survived. This article will seek to come to some conclusions concerning the particular character of FitzRalph's Augustinianism by focusing on FitzRalph's specific take on a rather traditional Augustinian theme: the Trinity of memory, intellect, and will.

Richard FitzRalph¹

Richard FitzRalph was born in Dundalk, Ireland around 1300. Although his contemporaries referred to him as 'Hibernicus', he was born of an Anglo-Norman family. He was a fellow of Balliol College, where he gained his MA, and later went to University College, where he graduated with a doctorate in theology in 1331. He became Chancellor of the University of Oxford in 1332, embarking thereafter on a successful ecclesiastical career both in England and in Ireland. On his first visit to Avignon, only five years after concluding his lectures on the *Sentences*, FitzRalph was consulted as one of the eighteen

¹ For details concerning the life and work of Richard FitzRalph, see Katherine Walsh, *A Fourteenth-Century Scholar and Primate: Richard FitzRalph in Oxford, Avignon and Armagh* (Oxford, 1981); Michael Dunne and Simon Nolan (eds), *Richard FitzRalph: His Life, Times and Thought* (Dublin, 2013). The *FitzRalph Critical Edition Project* at the Department of Philosophy, Maynooth University, Ireland is directed by Michael Dunne whose kind assistance in completing this article is acknowledged.

leading theologians of Europe by Pope Benedict XII to correct the views of his predecessor, John XXII, on the beatific vision. He became Archbishop of Armagh in 1347. FitzRalph is perhaps best known for his opposition to the mendicant orders on the question of evangelical poverty and his defense of the rights of the secular clergy against the friars. It was while pursuing his suit against the mendicants that he died at Avignon in 1360. In the company of William of Ockham (c. 1287-1347), Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1290-1349), and Adam of Wodeham (c. 1295-1358), FitzRalph became one of the four most frequently cited insular theologians in the fourteenth century.

FitzRalph was regarded during his lifetime as one of the leading thinkers at Oxford. Although his later fame was mainly due to his polemical writings, especially regarding the poverty question, he was acknowledged as a significant interlocutor by thinkers such as Robert Holcot (d. 1349), Adam Wodeham, John Wyclif (c. 1330-84), and Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358), among others. He was particularly well-regarded for the careful formulation of his arguments on matters such as infinity, future contingents and the relation of the will to the intellect. His was the first book by an Irishman to be printed (as an incunabulum) and his theory of dominion was still being discussed in the sixteenth century.

FitzRalph and Augustine

FitzRalph's *Lectures on the Sentences* (1328-1329), with their lengthy and careful quotations from Augustine, are indicative of a close and detailed reading of Augustine's texts, reflecting what might be regarded as a general trend in the fourteenth century towards taking longer quotations from Augustine, and from a greater variety of his works, than before. The 'opening speech', or *introitus*, to FitzRalph's lectures is largely fashioned out of quotations from Augustine and from Sacred Scripture. The main theme is that of the Fall and the *two cities/two loves* motif of Augustine's *De civitate Dei*. FitzRalph's speech is ostensibly in praise of Peter Lombard and the usefulness of his *Sentences* in combatting heresy, but FitzRalph draws his particular list of heresies from Augustine's *De heresibus*. In his entry on FitzRalph in the *Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, Michael Dunne concludes: 'It is clear that it was normal for FitzRalph to go directly to the primary sources in Augustine rather than drawing up stocks of references given in previous authors'.²

FitzRalph's famous 'Autobiographical Prayer' from his *Summa de questionibus Armenorum* is revealing of the real affinity FitzRalph saw between himself and Augustine. The text of the prayer is written in conscious imitation of Augustine's *Confessions* and attests to FitzRalph's having gone through a kind

² Michael Dunne, 'Richard FitzRalph', in Karla Pollmann and Willemien Otten (eds), *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 2013), II 996-7.

of religious conversion at Avignon. Whatever the precise nature of FitzRalph's conversion, he writes in a style, full of emotion and redolent of Augustine: 'At last, O Solid Truth, You so shone upon me from above, that I burned to seize and hold You, the Truth, Jesus promised to us in the Law and the Prophets ... I sought You in Your Sacred Scriptures, intimately and importunately, not only by reading, but also with prayer, until you came to meet me joyously in Your ways'.³ FitzRalph is not alone in the period in seeking to give witness to personal conversion in the style of Augustine: Bradwardine has a similar piece. But FitzRalph does see in Augustine's journey from secular rhetorician to Christian bishop the pattern for his own move from Oxford academic to Bishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland.

Another important biographical consideration relevant to assessing FitzRalph's Augustinianism is the influence of John Grandisson, Bishop of Exeter from 1327 to 1369. The work of Michael Haren and others has done much in recent years to bring the relationship between FitzRalph and Grandisson into relief.⁴ We know Grandisson, whose patronage FitzRalph gained, was an assiduous reader of Augustine; his highly annotated personal copy of Augustine's *Confessions* survives. For FitzRalph and for other members of Grandisson's circle, Augustine had deep autobiographical resonances.

One topic concerning which FitzRalph was to have a lasting influence was that of *dominium*, or lordship. Augustine's statements in *De civitate Dei* that humanity has dominion over the beasts (*civ.* 19.15) and that all things belong to the just (*civ.* 14.18) led FitzRalph in his own *De pauperie Salvatoris* (1356) to develop his argument for dominion or lordship based on grace. He argued that grace alone entitled the person to lordship even over temporal things.

A trinity of memory, intellect, and will

As a focus for discussion of the relationship between Augustine and Richard FitzRalph we look here to his *Lectura on the Sentences* of 1328-1329, book 1, question 5, concerning the trinity of memory, intellect, and will.

³ L.L. Hammerich, 'The Beginning of the Strife between Richard FitzRalph and the Mendicants, with an Edition of his Autobiographical Prayer and his Proposition *Unusquisque*', *Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Hist.-fologiske Meddelelser* 26 (1938) 3-85, 21: *Tandem, Veritas solida, sic michi desuper radiasti, quod exarsi te, Veritatem, Jesum in lege ac prophetis nobis promissum ... in ipsis litteris tuis sacris intimis atque inportunis non tam leccionis studiis quam oracionis suffragiis.*

⁴ See Michael Haren, 'The Influence of Bishop Grandisson of Exeter: with A Critical Edition of Sermons 62 and 64 of FitzRalph's Sermon Diary', in Michael Dunne and Simon Nolan (eds), *Richard FitzRalph* (2013), 30-55. See also Linda Olson, 'Reading Augustine's "Confessions" in Fourteenth-Century England. John de Grandisson's Fashioning of Text and Self', *Traditio* 52 (1997), 201-57.

In his *De Trinitate* books 8-15 Augustine reflects on the assertion of the book of *Genesis* (1:26) that the human being is made in the image and likeness of God. Augustine is interested in exploring what this tells us about God and what it tells us about the makeup of our inner lives. His exploration becomes a kind of search for triadic human activities, activities that are distinct and yet somehow one. In particular, Augustine explores the trinity of memory, understanding, and will.

When a medieval author of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries came to deal with these ideas it was most commonly not primarily within the context of a reading of the Augustine's *De Trinitate* but as part of examining what Peter Lombard had written in his *Sentences* book 1, dist. 3. Marcia Colish comments that Peter Lombard in seeking analogies of the Trinity in the human mind, especially the analogy of memory, understanding, and will, does so in ways more authentically Augustinian than some of his contemporaries:

In the first place, he gives full weight to the analogy of memory, intellect and will, as well as bringing in the analogy of *mens*, *notitia*, and *amor*. Secondly, he pursues with Augustine, the limits of these analogies as well as their suggestive force as similitudes.⁵

So, for Lombard, memory, understanding, and will are a *good analogy* because here there are not three minds, three lives, or three essences. Each rather is a function of the same, single, subsistent mind. Lombard helpfully adds that these three functions of mind are understood in relation to each other and are thus *relative* or *relational* concepts. At the same time, the relationships involved are not mere accidental qualifications but are part of the *essential* make-up of the human being. Thus, memory, understanding, and will are one and have a oneness as mind. However, as Augustine asserts in *De Trinitate*, they are also three with reference to each other, co-equal, and each is equal to the other three because they contain each other, and all are contained by each.⁶ On the side of caution, Lombard follows Augustine in acknowledging that the mental trinity of remembering, understanding, and loving is a natural image of God but yet even the best image is inadequate to represent a Triune God who is both simple and eternal.⁷ Lombard points out that a human being may possess these three faculties of memory, intellect, and will, but together they do not comprise the sum total of his being (since the human mind inheres in a spirit attached to a body and its modes of knowing and acting are conditioned by this fact) whereas the three persons of the Trinity *do* comprise the totality of God's being.

Looking to Richard FitzRalph's discussion of the trinity of memory, intellect, and will in his *Lectura* is to consider a text which had some currency in the

⁵ Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1994), I 242.

⁶ See, Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ed. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CChr.SL 50, 50A (Turnhout, 1968), 10.11.18 (330-1).

⁷ See, Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 15.27.50 (531-3).

fourteenth century. Wodeham, who attended the Sentential lectures of FitzRalph, intriguingly refers to a commentary of FitzRalph on Augustine's *De Trinitate* which has been lost. But Wodeham has another reference to a *Tractatus de ymagine Trinitatis* which is in fact none other than the discussion from FitzRalph's *Sentences* commentary which would appear to have circulated as a separate text. Indeed in one extant manuscript this portion of text is identified as a distinct tract of FitzRalph.⁸

Book 1, Question 5

The structure of question 5 is as follows (following the so-called 'short text' of the *Lectura*): there are eight arguments against the principal question, namely 'that the human mind is an image of the Trinity', followed by one argument for the question. This is followed by the *decisio questionis* which is divided into four articles and a conclusion:

Article 1: 'Whether memory, understanding, and will are really distinct from each other'

Article 2: 'Whether actual cognition is really distinct from the species in memory'

Article 3: 'Whether knowledge and willing are really the same'

Article 4: 'Whether the parts of the image are equal'

FitzRalph continues: 'And once we have dealt with these, which seem to be the major difficulties relating to the central question, finally I will state what I think with regard to the proposed question'.⁹

Article 1

The first article addresses the issue of 'Whether memory, understanding, and will are really distinct from each other'. FitzRalph seeks to distance himself from the tendency in Scotus to regard memory, understanding, and willing as the same. They are not the same for FitzRalph, but they are not really distinct either. They are distinguished inasmuch as the soul expresses itself differently through these powers.

⁸ See Katherine Tachau, 'Adam Wodeham and Robert Holcot as Witnesses to FitzRalph's Thought', in Michael Dunne and Simon Nolan (eds), *Richard FitzRalph* (2013), 79-95.

⁹ FitzRalph, *Lectura* I, q.5 (W, fol. 17^{rb}): *Et istis pertractatis que videntur maiores difficultates tangentes questionem principalem, ultimo dicam quid sensero ad questionem propositam*. Citations from FitzRalph are taken in what follows from either W = Worcester, Cathedral Library MS Q.71; or P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 15853.

In a digression FitzRalph argues against the position of Aquinas who states that understanding and *memory* are one power while understanding and *will* are two powers.¹⁰ Acknowledging the debate concerning the unicity of substantial form in the human being, FitzRalph asserts: ‘Whether one posits only one soul in man or two, I state that the sensitive powers are the sensitive soul itself and the intellectual powers are the rational soul itself ... thus it seems to me that it is best to say that all of the sensitive soul is its power ... and that the activity of any part is that of the totality as such and is only of the part in an accidental way’.¹¹ Thus, the powers of the soul are not really distinct from the soul but are distinguished only in an accidental way through being exercised, for example, through one organ rather than through another.

Article 2

The second article of question 5 addresses the issue of ‘Whether actual knowledge is really distinct from the species in memory’. The issue of the role of the species in human sensation and intellection was the subject of intense debate in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.¹² At times there was the polarised debate between those who argued for a role for some kind of species and those who argued against such a role. At other times there was debate among those who espoused variations of the species doctrine as to what precisely constituted species. At issue was the positing of various kinds of species, or representations, or images of objects. There was, for example, the species in the air or other media between the object and the one perceiving it; this was known as the *species in medio*. There were species in the sense organs (sensible species). There were species in the intellect (intelligible species). For his part FitzRalph is discussing the role of the species in memory: *species in memoria*. In general FitzRalph was a defender of the species doctrine. Elsewhere in the text of the *Lectura* (in book 2, q.1, a.2: ‘Whether time and motion

¹⁰ See Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis*, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, d.3, q.2, a.2 (101-3).

¹¹ FitzRalph, *Lectura* I, q.5 (W, fol. 18^{ra}): *Vnde videtur michi melius dicere quod tota anima sensitiva est sua potencia, scilicet virtus ymaginativa et virtus sensitiva, etc., quam dicere quod pars sensitiva que est in oculo vel in cetera parte eius est virtus visiva, et alia pars eius sensus communis, et ita de aliis. Quia ex quo tota anima sensitiva totius animalis est una forma indistincta specie in suis partibus, accio cuiuscunque partis est accio totius per se, et partis tantum per accidens. Et ideo tota per se vocatur potencia anime denominata ab illa accione quam exerceat per organum certum, et alia potencia quatenus exercet accionem per organum aliud.*

¹² See Gaston Rabreau, *Species. Verbum. L'activité intellectuelle élémentaire selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1938); Katherine Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345* (Leiden, 1988); Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1994-5); Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in The Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1997).

are really distinct from their subjects and from each other') FitzRalph makes a digression and defends the species theory and refers to a respected contemporary (a *valens*), who held a different view.¹³ The *valens* in question could well be Ockham, since FitzRalph was old enough to have heard him speak before the former left Oxford in 1324. And Katherine Tachau has pointed out that FitzRalph was not alone in opposing Ockham's elimination of the species.¹⁴ FitzRalph's opposition puts him in the company of John of Reading (d. 1346), Walter Chatton (c. 1290-1343), Robert Holcot, William Crathorn (fl. 1330's) and Adam Wodeham. But Tachau has also indicated that opposition to the species was already well articulated in early fourteenth-century thinkers such as the Carmelite, Gerard of Bologna (d. 1317) and in Dominicans such as James of Metz (fl. 1300) and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (c. 1275-1332/4).¹⁵ Mention of the English Carmelite master John Baconthorpe (c. 1290-1347) is often made in relation to FitzRalph, although, as Katherine Walsh asserts, a direct teacher-pupil relationship is unlikely.¹⁶ Interestingly, though, Baconthorpe, whom at the very least FitzRalph heard, was a strong opponent of the species doctrine.¹⁷ As we noted, FitzRalph's concern is with the *species in memoria*. His shifting of the discussion from a focus on the *species in medio* would seem to have influenced the treatment of Holcot and especially that of Crathorn.¹⁸

Relying on Henry of Ghent, FitzRalph argues that the species in the memory is really distinct from actual knowledge as follows:

Thus it appears to me that the reply to this article is as Henry of Ghent says in Quodlibet VII, q.13, that actual knowledge is really distinct from the species in memory that is in the intellectual memory, because otherwise it does not seem to me that actual knowledge would be the action of the intellect – and this is something which is conceded by everyone. For it seems to me that how the action takes place can only be understood if one takes it that the intellect is its efficient cause. Again if the intellect is the efficient cause of the action then it is not the [same as the] species which was there before it, because that was firstly in the cause, and thus it does not arise now from something anew when the intellect understands in act.¹⁹

¹³ FitzRalph, *Lectura I*, q.5 (P, fol. 147^{rb}): *Puto dico quod isti si non sentirent species in oculis suis nec sonos participant in auribus omnino non crederent talia esse, set dicerent quod visus esset sua visio et auditus audicio et aer lucidus esset lumen sicut ego quemdam valentem aliquando audiui dicentem sic. Et dicunt aliqui quod omnis color est lux et omnis sapor est qualitates prime commixte et odor est sapor, immo ego aliquando non credebam aliquid esse nisi substantiam vel aliquam 5 qualitatum primarum scilicet 4^{or} elementares et lucem innitens paucitati rerum.*

¹⁴ See K.H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude* (1988), 236-42.

¹⁵ See K.H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude* (1988), 3-4, 97, and 130.

¹⁶ See K. Walsh, *A Fourteenth-Century Scholar* (1981), 69.

¹⁷ See L. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis* (1994-5), I 284-6.

¹⁸ Both Holcot and Crathorn lectured on the *Sentences* in the years 1330-1332 around the time when FitzRalph was *magister regens*.

¹⁹ FitzRalph, *Lectura I*, q.5 (P, fol. 31^{vb}): *Ideo videtur michi esse dicendum in isto articulo, sicut dicit Doctor Sollempnis, 7 Quodlibet, q.13: quod actualis cogitacio sit distincta realiter a*

This particular argument of FitzRalph was the focus of attention of Crathorn in his *Questions on the First Book of the Sentences*, q.7 'Whether every rational creature is the image of the Trinity'. His eighth *conclusio* lists the arguments of FitzRalph, which he rejects, and then proposes his own. Crathorn writes as follows:

The eighth thesis (*conclusio*) is that actual produced knowledge (*notitia actualis genita*) is really distinct from the species preserved in memory... Firstly, I will put forward the arguments of others which they make on behalf of this thesis and I will take them apart because it seems to me that they do not succeed; then I will prove the conclusion in another way.²⁰

He begins:

For Master Richard FitzRalph argues for this thesis, firstly as follows: The intellect in knowing necessarily does something (*aliquid agit*) and consequently it does some action, because otherwise the intellect would do something and then no action would arise from it. Therefore actual or produced knowledge arises from the intellect, but the species in memory does not arise from the intellect but from an intention in the imaginative power...

Secondly FitzRalph argues as follows: When the intellect knows, if the species which was in memory beforehand were its knowledge and its action, then the intellect would have an action and yet would not be the cause of this action...

Thirdly as follows: If the species in memory were actual knowledge, then in moving from the first to the second act it would have nothing new if the species which was there before or the habitus became actual, and thus as such did not change in any way, because nothing has changed in it.²¹

specie in memoria sive in intellectu: quia aliter non videtur michi quod cogitatio actualis esset actio intellectus, quod tamen conceditur ab omnibus. Non enim videtur michi posse intelligi quomodo esset eius actio, nisi intellectus esset eius causa efficiens; et si intellectus est causa efficiens eius, tunc non est species que prefuit, quia ista prius fuit in causa, et ideo nunc non fit ab aliquo nouiter, quando intellectus actu intelligit.

²⁰ William Crathorn, *Quaestiones*, ed. Fritz Hoffmann, *Quästionen zum Ersten Sentenzenbuch. Einführung und Text* (Munster, 1988), q.7, concl.8 (339): *Octava conclusio est quod notitia actualis genita distinguitur realiter a specie conservata in parte memoriali vel in memoria... Primo ponam rationes aliorum, quas faciant pro ista conclusione et solvam eas, quia videtur mihi quod non concludunt; et postea aliter probabo conclusionem.*

²¹ Crathorn, *Quaestiones*, q.7, concl.8 (340): *Arguit autem pro ista conclusione Magister Richardus filius Radulphi primo sic: Intellectus in cogitando necessario aliquid agit et per consequens facit aliquam actionem, quia aliter intellectus aliquid ageret et tamen nulla actio fieret ab eo; igitur actualis cognitio vel notitia genita fit ab intellectu, sed species in memoria non fit ab intellectu, sed fit ab intentione in imaginative nec per passionem ipsius memoriae nec per actionem, ut patet per Philosophum tertio De anima. Igitur actualis notitia vel cognitio genita est aliquid in intellectu et ab intellectu distinctum realiter a specie conservata in memoria. Secundo arguit sic: Quando intellectus cogitate, si species, quae praefuit in memoria, sit sua cogitatio et sua actio, tunc haberet actionem et tamen non esset causa huius actionis in aliquot genere causae. Probo: Non in genere causae efficientis, cum non efficiat illam actionem, nec in genere alterius causae manifestum est. Et hoc non est intelligibile scilicet quod aliquid sit actio alicuius et quod*

These arguments says Crathorn are not successful:

With regard to the first it should be stated that the major premise is not true because the intellect or the intellective power is not active or effective with respect to produced knowledge unless like something which removes by prohibiting, as I shall state in the question on the freedom of the will; but produced knowledge is effected by the species preserved in memory, not in a partial manner only but completely. Therefore, this argument assumes something which is false.

With regard to the second argument it should be replied to it as it was with regard to the first, because it presumes the same as the first, namely that produced knowledge arises effectively from the soul or the intellective power, which is false.

With regard to the third it should be said that this argument also presupposes something which is false, because if the species which is preserved in memory which is called a habitus or habitual memory, becomes the actual understanding of it, as it can do through the power of God, it does not follow that no change was made in the knower, because this can only happen by means of the transfer of the species and the linking of it with the intellect or by means of the transfer of the species from the rear ventricle of the brain to the middle or frontal ventricle.²²

Crathorn then continues:

Therefore I argue in a different way for this thesis as follows: it is impossible that something can produce or cause itself; but actual produced knowledge is produced and caused by a species preserved in memory; therefore produced knowledge is not the species preserved in memory.²³

Essentially Crathorn agrees with FitzRalph's conclusion but finds flaws in his arguments. Crathorn would appear to have been more interested in testing the detail of FitzRalph's arguments than in identifying any broader doctrinal differences.

in nullo genere causae illud sit causa respectu illius actionis. Tertio sic: Si species in memoria esset cogitatio actualis, tunc exiens de actu primo in actum secundum nihil novum haberet, si species quae praefuit sive habitus fieret actus, et ita talis nullo modo mutaretur, quia nihil in ipso aliter se habet.

²² Crathorn, *Quaestiones*, q.7, concl.8 (340-1): *Ad primam dicendum quod maior illa non est vera, quia intellectus vel potential intellective non est active vel effective respectu notitiae genitae nisi sicut removens prohibens, ut dicam in quaestione de liberate voluntatis; sed notitia genita efficitur a specie conservata in memoria, non partialiter tantum sed totaliter. Ideo ista ratio supponit unum falsum. Ad secundum dicendum sicut at primum, quia illa omnino supponit idem quod prima, scilicet quod notitia genita fiat effective ab anima vel potentia intellective, quod falsum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio etiam accipit falsum, quia si species conservata in memoria, quae vocatur habitus vel cognitio habitualis, fieret actualis ipsius intellectus, sicut fieri posset per potentiam dei, non sequeretur quod nulla mutatio esset facta in cognoscente, quia hoc non posset fieri nisi per translationem specie et coniunctionem ipsius cum intellectu vel per translationem illius specie de posteriori cellula ad mediam vel anteriorem.*

²³ Crathorn, *Quaestiones*, q.7, concl.8 (341): *Arguo igitur aliter pro ista conclusio sic: Impossibile est quod aliqua res gignat vel efficiat seipsam; sed notitia actualis genita gignitur et efficitur a specie conservata in memoria; igitur notitia genita non est species conservata in memoria.*

Article 3

Moving to FitzRalph's text and to article 3: 'Whether knowledge and willing are the same' FitzRalph states that they are not:

Because of the arguments, I take the side that willing something is not the same as knowing the same thing, even if perhaps the willing of something is the knowledge of the same because it is present to the intellect: and for this reason namely that when the will wills it necessarily carries out its action, just like any other agent, and thus the action of the will of the one willing, after he did not will is something new which arose in it and from it, not something carried out before it willed.²⁴

One gets a flavour of FitzRalph's colourful way of arguing from the following:

If willing were the same as knowing, as in the following example, it would follow that the greatest happiness would be same as the greatest misery, that merit would become demerit, and that the highest justice would become iniquity, so that God would be iniquity and mortal sin. ... Supposing that God made the devil know everything which God now knows through His substance ... without changing anything else in the devil. Having done this, the devil is still miserable to the greatest extent. However, the misery of the devil is a certain wanting or refusing in his will. However, all wanting or refusing ... is knowing, and the devil has the same knowledge as God. Therefore, the greatest misery of the devil is the same as the greatest happiness of God. Consequently, by the same argument, the greatest justice is the worst iniquity, because the worst iniquity is the perverse will of the devil, and all of this will is the same as God ... and so it follows that God is the iniquity of the devil and his mortal sin.²⁵

Article 4

In article 4 of question 5, FitzRalph deals with the way in which the parts of the image can be considered to be equal and this by reason of their acts where

²⁴ FitzRalph, *Lectura* I, q.5 (P, fol. 34^{ra}): *Ad Articulum. Propter illa argumenta teneo hanc partem: scilicet, quod volucio respectu alicuius rei non est cognicio eiusdem; quamvis fortassis volucio alicuius rei sit cognicio sui ipsius, propter hoc quod ipsa est presens intellectui: et propter hanc causam, quia voluntas in volendo necessario agit suam accionem, sicut quodlibet aliud agens, et ideo accio voluntatis volentis postquam non voluit est aliquid de novo factum in seipsa et a seipsa, non aliquid prius factum antequam ipsa uelit.*

²⁵ FitzRalph, *Lectura* I, q.5 (P, fol. 33^{rb}): *Supposito quod Deus faciat dyabolum cognoscere omnia que ipse nunc cognoscit per substanciam suam, supplendo per suam substanciam vicem omnium cognicionem quas habet dyabolus, nullam aliam mutacionem faciendo in dyabolo. Hoc facto, adhuc dyabolus est summe miser. Set miseria eius est aliqua uolucio uel nolucio in uoluntate eius. Set omnis uolucio siue nolucio, cum idem sit iudicium de eis, est cognicio; et dyabolus per positum non habet aliquam cognicionem quam Deus: ergo miseria dyaboli summa est Deus, et Deus est summa beatitudo. Ergo summa beatitudo est summa miseria, et per consequens summa iusticia est summa iniquitas per eandem racionem; quia summa iniquitas est peruersa uoluntas dyaboli, et omnis talis uoluntas est Deus, ut probatum est. Ergo, et cetera; et ita sequitur quod Deus sit iniquitas dyaboli et eius peccatum mortale.*

no one of them is impeded in its activity by the other. However, he notes that memory, understanding, and will in this life (*in via*) are sometimes unequal. Sometimes we see that memory is greater than understanding in one person, and understanding is greater than memory in someone else. Furthermore, in the case of two other people, both memory and understanding are surpassed by the greatness of love. In the next life (*in patria*), however, they will be equal, when they will be cured of all weakness; there the mind will not be impeded by anything and will be in a complete natural disposition.

Interestingly, at one point Crathorn makes an approving reference to FitzRalph in connection with the issue of the parts of the image. He notes FitzRalph's employment of a distinction drawn from Averroes between a part *according to belief* and a part *according to imagination*.²⁶ Crathorn also places FitzRalph in the company of Ockham. For our purposes it is interesting to hear how Crathorn rates FitzRalph highly as an interpreter of Augustine on the Trinity. Crathorn writes:

A part *according to belief* is that which in itself is really a part just like a hand is part of a man. However, a part *according to imagination* is when something is considered as if it were a part. Thus Augustine called a created image the rational mind and the parts of the image the natural powers of the same, namely, memory, understanding, and will, each of which is the true substance of the soul; it, however, is indicated by each of these three terms when taken as a part. ... This is the way that Ockham and FitzRalph explain (*exponunt*) Augustine and I hold that they do so well because Augustine does not speak correctly and does not distinguish in the way he talks between the terms which signify and the thing which is signified.²⁷

Final Article – FitzRalph's *decisio quaestionis*

In the final article of question 5, FitzRalph gives his reply to the principal question 'Whether the human mind is an image of the Trinity.'²⁸ He begins by stating that he is adopting the definition of image given by Augustine in 83 *Questions*, q.74, that an image is a likeness which is expressed by another, in one of two ways: either in the same nature as in the divine persons or in a different

²⁶ Averroes, *Physica* (Venice, 1562), I, com.5 (fol. 8^r).

²⁷ Crathorn, *Quaestiones*, q.7, concl.12 (344-5). *Pars secundum fidem vocatur illud, quod in se et realiter est pars sicut manus est pars hominis. Pars vero secundum imaginationem est illud, quod non est pars realiter sed secundum considerationem, quia consideratur per modum partis. Ideo beatus Augustinus vocavit imaginationem creatam ipsam mentem rationalem, et partis imaginis vocavit potentias naturales eiusdem, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quarum quaelibet est vera substantia animae, ipsa tamen significatur per quemcumque istorum trium terminorum per modum partis ... Sic enim exponit Ockham et FitzRalph beatum Augustinum et credo quod bene, quia beatus Augustinus ut videtur improprie loquebatur non distinguens in modo loquendi inter terminum significantem et rem significatam.*

²⁸ FitzRalph, *Lectura* I, q.5 (P, fol. 36^r).

nature as in the case of the mental word with regard to that which it represents, and in the case of the mind with regard to the uncreated Trinity. He states that the human mind is an image of the uncreated Trinity because it is a certain likeness of it which has been expressed by it. However, it is an *imperfect* image because it is not a complete likeness, nor is it equal to the Trinity in everything, for example, not in the way that the Son is the image of the Father in the uncreated Trinity.

FitzRalph's views on the distinction between memory, intellect, and will and on the role of the species in memory have already been considered above.

In a further argument it is asked whether the mind is more an image of the Trinity than a man and an argument is used, drawn from Aristotle, that happiness together with a minimum of goods is better than happiness alone.²⁹ If this is the case, then a human mind together with some good or other is better than a mind alone; therefore, a composite of mind and body, namely a man, is better than a mind alone. FitzRalph asserts, however, that he regards the mind as being a truer image than a man. He refers to Anselm's opinion that that which among beings is most noble is most like God, but acknowledges at the same time Aristotle's point that man is a more noble being than a mind. FitzRalph's solution here is to say that 'most noble' can be understood in two ways, intensively or extensively (*intensive vel extensive*). Anselm, he states, is speaking *intensively* but Aristotle speaks *extensively* where he says that happiness with a minimum of goods is better or more to be chosen than happiness alone. However, in the first way, the mind is a more noble being than a man and so it is more truly an image and likeness of God than a man.

With regard to the sixth principal argument, FitzRalph states that when it is said that the mind is an image of the Trinity because it remembers, understands, and loves, he accepts this, but the main reason why the mind is an image of the Trinity is because it is a capacity for the Trinity (*capax Trinitatis*) and the other reason is because it can remember, understand, and love itself. And this is what Augustine means in *De Trinitate*, 14, 23.

In his response to the seventh argument, FitzRalph interprets Augustine in a way which is very close to that of Peter Lombard (as characterised above). FitzRalph asks what is meant by 'image'; is it to be found in the essence of the mind or in its acts. He states that it is more to be found in the essence because the essence itself is the image and the acts are not the image. Yet it might be argued that the mind is an image when considered together with these acts since it can grasp God through its acts and so then it is more of an image when it has this act than when it does not. This, however, says FitzRalph, does not follow because the mind is an image to the greatest extent because of its substance. Therefore, it is not more of an image at one time than at another.

²⁹ Aristotle, *Ethics* I 8 (1099a 32-1099b 7).

With regard to the final argument, FitzRalph states that he concedes that when the mind has these three acts, namely remembering, thinking and willing, that it is a truer (*verius*) image of the Trinity than when it does not have any act at all. He concludes the question as follows:

However, when it is argued that then the mind is less like the Trinity than when it does not have anything besides itself because in the uncreated Trinity nothing is thus really distinct in the way that one act of the mind is different from another, I state, as I did in the reply to the first argument, that when it has these three acts it is more similar to the Trinity inasmuch as it is a trinity but it is less similar to the Trinity by reason of these acts, inasmuch as the Trinity is a being which is simple to the highest degree; and this proves the argument and nothing more, and this is true.³⁰

Conclusion

That FitzRalph would quote frequently from Augustine is neither remarkable nor unusual but he does seem to be an important witness to a certain Augustinian revival in the fourteenth century on the evidence of his lengthy citations of Augustine, relying on a good variety of texts. At other times, especially at key moments in his argument, FitzRalph also seems to harken back to the Neo-Augustinianism of Henry of Ghent. FitzRalph's very reliance on the Trinitarian analogy of memory, intellect, and will may seem rather conservative or even 'old fashioned' in comparison to other seemingly more innovative approaches to psychology and to Trinitarian theology in the fourteenth century. However, FitzRalph may be seen to bring developing perspectives to bear in his discussion of the distinction between the soul and its powers (and the distinction between the powers themselves) and, above all, in his discussion of the *species in memoria*; the latter in focusing on memory comes across as addressing a profoundly Augustinian theme in a new way. We have seen how FitzRalph – under the influence of Grandisson whose protégé he was – saw real affinities between his own life and that of Augustine and sought to imitate him in life and work. We have also pointed to the influence of Augustine in FitzRalph's theory of *dominium* and have noted how FitzRalph was rated as an interpreter of Augustine by William Crathorn.

³⁰ FitzRalph, *Lectura* I, q.5 (P, fol. 36^{va-vb}): *Ad ultimum: concedo quod quando habet illos tres actus, tunc est uerius ymago trinitatis quam quando non habet aliquem actum; et cum arguitur quod tunc mens est minus similis trinitati quando non habet aliquid preter se: quia in trinitate increata nichil est sic diuersum in re, sicut est unus actus mentis ab alio: dico sicut dixi in responsione ad primum argumentum, quod habitis istis actibus est similior trinitati quatenus trinitas est, set minus est similis ratione illorum actuum ipsi trinitati, quatenus est ens summe simplex; et hoc probat argumentum et non plus, et hoc est uerum.*

Loving Justice: Cicero, Augustine, and the Nature of Politics in Robert Holcot's *Wisdom of Solomon* Commentary

Jack HARDING BELL, Durham, USA

ABSTRACT

This essay examines the use of Augustine's political thought in a fourteenth-century commentary on the *Wisdom of Solomon* by Robert Holcot, O.P. (ca. 1340-3). One of the most popular single-book exegetical commentaries of the Middle Ages, Holcot's *Postilla super librum Sapientiae* makes extensive use of Augustine's *City of God* in order to argue that, for any political community to be just, its rulers and citizens must be 'ruled' by the grace of God. Yet as my essay shows, Holcot's use of Augustine is conflicted. Holcot's insistence that the justice of the community depends upon the state of its rulers' souls conflates the justice of the state with that of the City of God, which Augustine is at pains to keep separate. I argue that Holcot's commitment to a sacramental theory of kingship is largely responsible for his confusion about Augustine's critique of Cicero. I also make some suggestions on how the commentary can be read in light of the monarch that ruled England in Holcot's day: Edward III.

The front of the gold noble that Edward III minted in 1344 depicts the English king aboard a ship at sea.¹ Edward, monstrously oversized, is bearing his regalia and arms, clutching a sword and shield nearly as big as the boat on which he stands. Behind him and slightly to the right is the ship's mast, which runs both horizontally and vertically to form an image of a cross. The coin's reverse contains the heraldry that Edward had recently adopted on account of his new claim to the French throne: at the center a lily, flanked by leopards, fleur-de-lis, and crowns on each petal of the flower. Around the outer edge of the coin reads the following verse: *IHC transiens per medivm illorvm ibat*, 'Jesus passing through the midst of them went his way' (*Luke* 4:30).

The two sides of this coin provide a glimpse into the powerful ideology of Edward's kingship. On the one hand the noble proclaims Edward III to be the consummate warrior-king. He is aboard the *Christopher*, his flagship, which

¹ Images of the noble, the first gold coin produced by the English crown, abound in modern literature; see Mark Ormrod, *Edward III* (New Haven, 2012), plate 8; for a color image, see Jonathan Alexander and Paul Binski (eds), *Age of Chivalry: Art in Plantagenet England, 1200-1400* (London, 1987), plate 664.

had been captured by the French and later recovered by members of Edward's party at the battle of Sluys (1340). The coin also gestures to the king's imperial ambitions: in the same year as the victory, Edward, already crowned as king of England in 1327, had declared himself the true heir to the French crown. Edward had a legitimate claim: his mother, Isabella of France, was the last in the Capetian line, and the current French king, Philip VI, was only a distant cousin to the previous king. However, the propaganda that emerged from his council and court did not make much of this dynastic right. Instead, it was Edward's virtue and holiness, coupled with Philip's moral corruption and descent into tyranny, that warranted Edward's invasion of France. The Christological imagery and language on the coin point to Edward's sacramental status as a monarch not only chosen by God but profoundly intimate with God's providential plan for the nation, France, and beyond. He is both Christ and Christ-bearer, the sacramental sign of God's gracious selection of England as the next great empire and the materialization of that selection. The coin itself was an effort of Edward's to stem the flow of English sterling into foreign markets.² Here in the twin icons of this coin, then, is 'Edward become Jesus', as D. Vance Smith puts it: 'first the English king as the international, evanescent body of value, now the central body of the Middle Ages incarnated as an English national subject ... and appearing as the image of England, the substantial body that the coin's *symbolon* could only hint at' (242).

The notion of a sacramental kingship was not new to the later Middle Ages,³ but as Mark Ormrod has argued, Edward's employment of it largely was.⁴ 'At the heart of [Edward's] public image', Ormrod writes, 'lay [the] belief in the providential nature of kingship. The king was brought up to believe that the monarch's task was not merely to respond to events but also to actively shape the destinies of crown and people'.⁵ His claim to both English and French crowns was staked to this image. Crucial to the perpetuation of this image was the king's ritual performance of his 'personal piety', which included pilgrimages to and patronage of Anglo-Saxon royal saints as well as the semi-official cult

² See T.H. Lloyd, 'Overseas Trade and the English Money Supply in the 14th Century', in N.J. Mayhew (ed.), *Edwardian Monetary Affairs, 1279-1344*, British Archaeological Reports, British Series xxxvi (London, 1977), 110-1; cited in M. Ormrod, *Edward III* (2012), 258.

³ For visual and applied art that depicts Edward as a holy king, see J. Alexander and P. Binski, *Age of Chivalry* (1987), 489-504. On the notion of the office of king as a sacred or sacramental office, see most famously (and controversially) Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton, 1957). On Edward III's rule in particular, see Nigel Saul, *For Honour and Fame: Chivalry in England, 1066-1500* (London, 2011), ch. 6, and Juliet Vale, *Edward III and Chivalry: Chivalric Society and its Context, 1270-1350* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1982).

⁴ When Edward was under the regency of his mother, Isabella, and her lover Roger Mortimer, an English baron, Edward's council exploited the king's 'celebrity status' as a means to overthrow Isabella and Mortimer's *de facto* rule; see M. Ormrod, *Edward III* (2012), 97-8.

⁵ *Ibid.* 97.

that Edward revived around the rule of his grandfather, Edward I.⁶ After the opening of war with France (1337), fantasies of English domination abroad were explicitly linked to Edward's virtue and sacral office. Less than a decade later, Edward, unhappy with the networks of dissemination established through prayers in local churches, enlisted the help of the Dominicans, the famous 'preaching friars' of the Middle Ages.⁷ The chancery sent the head of the Dominican order of England detailed accounts of the causes of the war with France, outlining the abuses of Philip VI's overlordship of England. The goal of the request, the letter stated, was to 'inform the intellects and enliven the hearts of the faithful' for war.⁸

The following essay suggests that the sacramental propaganda surrounding Edward's claim to the French crown receives a surprising theoretical elaboration in a biblical commentary on the *Wisdom of Solomon* by Robert Holcot, a theologian who belonged to the very order Edward would ask for aid. To an extent, this claim is counter-intuitive. Holcot probably delivered these lectures *ca.* 1340-1343, after Edward officially claimed the French crown as his own but several years before his court called on the Dominican order for assistance in spreading his imperialist and expansionist message. Moreover, the commentary itself is a long, multi-disciplinary, digressive theological work that spanned a full two-year university lecture cycle. Holcot probably delivered the lectures as a partial duty of the office of regent master in theology.⁹

Despite these facts, the following essay suggests that there are good reasons for viewing the commentary as a political-theological justification of the version of politics assumed by Edward's propaganda. From the very outset Holcot frames his text and the biblical book itself as being of tremendous political import.¹⁰ In the first lecture on *Wisdom*, Holcot informs his audience that the meaning of the term 'wisdom' to which the title refers is neither speculative nor theological, but is in fact a 'summa' of all virtue – 'the art of life' itself, he will later say (citing Seneca).¹¹ When he specifies the three 'ends' of wisdom,

⁶ M. Ormrod, *Edward III* (2012), 100-1.

⁷ *Ibid.* 266.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Holcot would have taken this office after being regent master at Oxford. The second regency is a working hypothesis – his first regency was at Oxford – and it was posited by Beryl Smalley in 'Robert Holcot, O.P.', *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 26 (1956), 5-97 and more generally *English Friars and Antiquity in the Fourteenth Century* (New York, 1961). For a recent (and positive) re-assessment of this view, see John T. Slotemaker and Jeffrey C. Witt, *Robert Holcot* (Oxford, forthcoming). On the curricula of the medieval theologian at Oxford and Paris, see William J. Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England* (Princeton, 1988).

¹⁰ For a recent analysis of the commentary as a political work, see J.T. Slotemaker and J.C. Witt, *Robert Holcot* (forthcoming), ch. 9.

¹¹ I follow the scholarly tradition in referencing the Basel 1586 early modern edition of Holcot's commentary. Where possible, I have checked my references against Oxford, Balliol ms. 27, as close to an autograph copy of Holcot's that we have (see Smalley, 'Robert Holcot, O.P.' [1956],

he claims they are 'to order and to make a man worthy for three things: the governing of civil community ... to fight hostile adversity ... [and] to correct childishness and foolishness'.¹² According to the Ciceronian myth of political origins that follows, the wise man is the one who calls his fellow human beings out of the wilderness of private self-seeking and into the realm of the common good and reason.¹³ The *sapiens* is an Orpheus, able to gather all individual persons who were scattered across the hills and forests and, through persuasive speech and arguments, make of them one 'useful and morally good thing' (*rem reducens utilem et honestum*).¹⁴

The cast of Holcot's early remarks on the nature of wisdom is Ciceronian.¹⁵ Politics, rather than being the natural, teleological flowering of principles internal to human nature, requires persons who are wise and capable of persuasive speech to bring forth the latent capacities for reason and the common good in others. Left to their own devices, human beings 'lead a scattered, brutish existence devoid of rationality, religion, family, and law'; they seek to promote their own personal gain to the detriment of others.¹⁶ Princes and those in power therefore need experience in arguments, figures, myths, and biblical exempla with which to capture and mold the minds of the people in their charge.¹⁷ What makes Holcot's political reflections unique for the purposes of this volume is his insistence that the justice of the state depends in large part upon the state of the monarch's soul. Channeling Augustine's insistence that true justice is the true worship of God (*verus cultus dei*), Holcot claims that the Christian ruler, in order to be just, must be formed in the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Justice consists in giving things their due; hence, any state that fails to give God his due fails to be just. It follows that the wise man, the philosopher, is also the just man: that is to say, wise *and* justified, a lover of wisdom *and* a follower of Christ.

The present essay analyzes Holcot's eclectic political theology as it emerges in his reading of both Cicero and Augustine. This reading is largely conflicted because, while Holcot borrows so much from the *City of God* in his exegesis, his construal of justice as the 'true worship of God' raises the question of

11). In my references I include the lecture number followed by the page number in parentheses; e.g.: Holcot, *Sap. lect.* 2 (7); 74 (262).

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ For Cary Nederman's influential argument for a third, Ciceronian medieval tradition of political thought (in addition to the Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions), see 'Sin and the Origins of Society: The Ciceronian Tradition in Medieval Political Thought', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49 (1988), 3-26. For an analysis of Cicero's political views, see Neal Wood, *Cicero's Social and Political Thought* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991).

¹⁶ C. Nederman, 'Sin and the Origins of Society' (1988), 7; Holcot, *Sap. lect.* 2 (8).

¹⁷ On the use of Holcot's commentary in the context of Dominican preaching, see B. Smalley, 'Robert Holcot, O.P.' (1956), 5-97.

whether divine justice can be so easily assimilated to the justice of a temporal realm. Augustine famously answers this question in the negative: the City of God belongs to Christ, not any secular ruler, and while it makes use of temporal goods it does so with *diversa fide, diversa spe, diverso amore* from that of the earthly city.¹⁸ Holcot finally prefers Cicero's conception of a political community to the exclusion of Augustine's, yet he retains Augustine's claim that true justice is the true worship of God. I suggest that what causes Holcot's preference for Cicero is his commitment to the notion of a sacramental kingship.

1. Robert Holcot and Edward III

Born in the small village of Holcot, Robert Holcot lived his life within the roughly triangular area between nearby Northampton (where he entered the Dominican priory at the age of 18), Oxford (where he completed his studies in the liberal arts and theology, lecturing on both Lombard's *Sentences* and the Bible), and London (where he probably lived and taught in the Dominican priory).¹⁹ He returned to the priory of Northampton in 1343, where he received licenses to hear confession until his death from the plague in 1349.²⁰ While there is no evidence to suggest that he served Edward III, he did frequent the household of Richard de Bury, a Benedictine cleric who entered Edward III's service as early as 1319.²¹ De Bury was one of the most trusted and 'the greatest of the king's household clerks'.²² Edward appointed him to serve as Keeper of the Privy Seal (1329-1333) until he promoted him to the bishopric of Durham (1333); later, de Bury would serve the king as Treasurer of the Exchequer (1334) and Chancellor (1334-1335).

De Bury is perhaps most famous for his avid book collecting, a hobby that is celebrated in a text called the *Philobiblon* or 'the love of books'.²³ The work is most commonly attributed to de Bury, but a number of early manuscripts indicate that the *Philobiblon* was actually ghost-written by Holcot on de Bury's

¹⁸ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb, CChr.SL 47, 47A (Turnhout, 1955), 18.54 (47A, 656, ll. 92-3).

¹⁹ On Dominican education, see M. Michèle Mulchahey, 'First the Bow is Bent in Study': *Dominican Education before 1350* (Toronto, 1998); on Holcot's regency at Oxford, see Hester Goodenough Gelber, *It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford* (Leiden, 2004), 94.

²⁰ See the biographical entry on 'Rupertus Holcote' in Iohannes Trithemius, *Liber de scriptoribus ecclesiasticis* (Basel, 1494), 90.

²¹ M. Ormrod, *Edward III* (2012), 11-2.

²² *Ibid.* 132.

²³ On the term 'classicizing' as opposed to 'humanist' or 'early humanist', see B. Smalley, *English Friars* (1961), introduction.

behalf.²⁴ In the *Philobiblon* the pursuit of wisdom is cast in imperialistic and nationalistic terms. In line with the Ciceronian conception of politics discussed above, de Bury argues that 'it is the office of the wise man to order rightly both himself and others' (*est autem sapientis officium bene ordinare et alios et seipsum*). Thus, it falls to 'princes and prelates, judges and doctors, and all other leaders of the commonwealth' 'to show zeal for the vessels of wisdom' (*i.e.* books).²⁵ Edward is uniquely zealous among monarchs to promote classical learning and book-collecting in the English nation; indeed, de Bury partially attributes the recent flowering of theological and philosophical learning among the so-called 'moderni' in England to Edward's imperialistic ambitions abroad. De Bury remarks that the official business of the King abroad provided the occasion to collect numerous books from the 'Athens' of Europe (Paris). Now, with Edward's continental ambitions slowly taking shape, the tides of learning have shifted: 'admirable Minerva', having 'already visited the Indians, the Babylonians, the Egyptians, and Greeks, and the Arabs and Romans, [and] Paris, ... has happily come to Britain, the most noble of islands, a microcosm itself'.²⁶ The French publicly decry the 'subtlety' of the English yet in secret study the writings of their English peers by candlelight.²⁷ Edward's *translatio imperii* walks hand in hand with *translatio studii*: just as the virtuous king has rightly claimed the crown of France for his own, so his scholars and schoolmen now lay claim to the wisdom once in the possession of the French. The pursuits of wisdom and justice go together: Edward's vassalage to the Valois king has reversed, and in Edward's wake England's scholars have risen above their French counterparts.

Holcot's *Wisdom* commentary begins similarly by highlighting the relationship between wisdom and the justice of the state, but the work goes to much greater lengths to specify what justice is and how it relates to wisdom, the 'summa' of all virtue. In the first lecture on the first verse, 'love justice, you that are judges of the earth' (*dilige iustitiam qui iudicatis terram*), Holcot begins by dividing up the first half of the book according to the complementary purposes of *Wisdom*'s author.²⁸ In the first, chapters 1-5, Solomon shows us

²⁴ For a discussion of these manuscripts, including the argument for de Bury's authorship, see the introduction to the Oxford parallel text edition of the *Philobiblon*, ed. and trans. by E.C. Thomas and Michael Maclagan (Oxford, 1960), xxxv-lxxiii.

²⁵ De Bury, *Philobiblon*, 130: *Quapropter principes et praelati, iudices et doctores et quicunque rei publicae directores, sicut prae aliis sapientia opus habent, ita prae aliis vasis sapientiae zelum debent.*

²⁶ De Bury, *Philobiblon*, 107: *Minerva mirabilis nationes hominum circuire videtur, et a fine usque ad finem attingit fortiter, ut se ipsam communicet universis. Indos, Babylonios, Aegyptios atque Graecos, Arabes et Latinos eam pertransisse iam cernimus. Iam Athenas deseruit, iam a Roma recessit, iam Parisius praeterivit, iam ad Britanniam, insularum insignissimam quin potius microcosmum...*

²⁷ De Bury, *Philobiblon*, 107.

²⁸ The so-called 'divisio textus' of late medieval biblical commentary; Holcot, *Sap. lect.* 3 (9).

how to acquire wisdom. Wisdom's 'medium', Holcot tells us somewhat ambiguously, is justice, and before we can have justice (and by consequence wisdom) we must learn to love it (*primo proponit quod ad habendum sapientiam oportet amare iusticiam*).²⁹ What follows from his reading of this biblical command are a series of arguments for the priority of the love of justice over the acts of justice. Drawing on John of Salisbury's organic metaphor for the body politic, Holcot argues that just as nature in the generation of animals begins with the head, the heart, and lungs and other principal members of the body (and not the hand or the foot), so also does Solomon begin with the 'head' of the state.³⁰ The celestial bodies are held and contained by the *primum mobile* and derive their motions from the same; in a like manner, the state derives its unity and purpose from the ruler who serves over it. Moreover, it is important for the ruler in particular to love justice because the people tend to follow the habits and loves of those in power.³¹ Whatever the king finds precious and valuable – 'in clothing, in acts, in food' – is generally held to be so by his subjects.³² And so it is no wonder that, if the king were to love justice, his subjects would love it, too.

At this early stage Augustine figures marginally as an authority for the centrality of justice and not some other moral virtue, like prudence or courage. Without justice, Holcot asks, quoting Augustine, what are kingdoms except bands of robbers; what are unjust kings, except tyrants?³³ Yet there are important preliminary moves being made at this early stage in the commentary that Holcot will explicitly link to the *City of God*. Most important among these is Holcot's thesis that the love of wisdom is the precondition for the acquisition of justice (and therefore wisdom). It is not sufficient that a person perform just acts; he must do them out of love. Justice, Holcot says, is 'the rectitude of the will preserved on account of itself' (*iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata*), and he specifies four kinds of rulers who perform justice without actually loving it. First, there are those who do not love justice but do just things in order to appear so to others; the second kind are those who perform just acts out of anger and vindictiveness, not out of love; third, those who pretend to love justice but do so only on account of money, the money and bribes that come along with their office; the fourth and worst of all are those who, in the guise of loving justice, go soft on criminals when they should punish

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*: *Notandum autem quod in generatione animalis natura non incipit a digito vel a pede, sed a corde, pulmone, et capite, et membris principalibus...*

³¹ On the organicist imagery see Cary Nederman, 'The Physiological Significance of the Organic Metaphor in John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*', *History of Political Thought* 8 (1987), 211–24.

³² Holcot, *Sap. lect.* 3 (10): *In ornatu, gestu, vel victu illud trahitur ad consequentiam a subditis...*

³³ *Ibid.*

according to the fittingness of the crime.³⁴ Holcot's painstaking analysis of each of these categories of types of false lovers of justice is meant to convey the centrality of intention. Without the ruler living justice for its own sake, the justice of the state is justice in name only.

2. *Iustitia a cultu dei incipit*

In the next lecture on *Wisdom* 1:1-2, Holcot offers the dramatic thesis on which his interpretation of the rest of *Wisdom* will hinge: the justice of the state, the *res publica*, begins with the proper worship of God (*iustitia a cultu dei incipit*).³⁵ Holcot claims that these two verses of book 1 give voice to Solomon's wish to show that the path towards the justice of the state begins with the ordering of the soul; first with the ruler, second with his people. And in order for the ruler's soul to be ordered he must first order it to God in mind (*in mente*), in words (*sermone*), and in every aspect of his life (*in tota conversatione*). The ordering of the soul's desires is accomplished through the supernatural infusion of the three theological virtues, faith, hope, and love, each of which is mentioned in the letter of the text (*et haec tria in textu ista notantur*). These virtues dispose the soul towards its supernatural end in the participation in the life of God, but they are also essential to good governance of secular society. Only with God ruling the secular ruler's soul can there be justice among his people.

Holcot's argument draws extensively on Augustine's celebrated critique of Cicero's claim that Rome was once a just republic. I will examine this critique in a moment. What is significant in Holcot's treatment of Augustine is the manner in which he argues for its validity. He appeals to Augustine, but his justification is largely the biblical text itself. He thinks these verses contain a literal reference to the three theological virtues: '*sentite de Domino in bonitate et in simplicitate cordis quaerite illum; quoniam invenitur ab his qui non temptant illum apparet autem eis qui fidem habent in illum*'. Holcot claims that these verses insist that the ruler must 'think of the Lord in goodness', that is, in faith; he must not 'tempt' God but persevere in hope; and he must 'seek him in the simplicity of heart', that is, in charity. For this reason, Holcot claims, the 'wisdom' that is the subject of Solomon's book is a 'summa' of every virtue: 'wisdom' that is 'is from on high, which includes faith, and hope, and charity with all other cardinal virtues – because [Solomon] does not speak concerning wisdom strictly exactly as it is a certain kind of intellectual virtue, trimmed or shortened [wisdom], as I said in the beginning of the book'.³⁶

³⁴ Holcot, *Sap. lect.* 3 (11-2).

³⁵ *Ibid.* (9); 4 (14); See also *ibid.* 118 (394): *Sapientia ... quae est verus dei cultus*.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 74 (261-2): *Quia vero finis et perfectio sapientiae est facere hominem habilem ad se ipsum et ad alios gubernandum virtuose ... sapientia, inquit, quae sursum est, quae includit fidem,*

Holcot thinks the theological consequences of this verse are clear: the acquisition of ‘wisdom’ does not merely include but is constitutively founded on the rule of one’s will and reason by God, a rule that originates with the infusion of theological virtue. Without the souls of both ruler and ruled being ordered to God, secular affairs can never hope to be just. It is the concept of a wisdom as a ‘summa’ of virtue that allows Holcot to make his argument: not only must a ruler be a *sapiens*, a wise man who knows how to persuade his people to unify into a common thing, but his desires must be informed and ruled by grace. Spiritual justice is ‘every rational will subject to God’, choosing God for his own sake,³⁷ and it is sought in earnestness and with pious devotion (as the author of *Wisdom* makes clear in his supplication to God for wisdom in chapter 7).

3. Augustine and Cicero

Augustine’s claim that true justice consists in the worship of God emerges in the context of his celebrated discussion of Cicero’s definition of a ‘people’ (*populus*) or ‘political community’ as ‘an association united by a common sense of right and a community of interest’ (*coetum iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatum*) in the *City of God*.³⁸ If justice consists in giving things their due (e.g. XIV 4, but especially XIX 21-3), Augustine argues, then Rome could hardly merit its claim to being a *populus*, a community ‘united by a common sense of right’. There was never any true justice (*vera iustitia*) in Rome in the first place.³⁹ ‘True justice is found only in that commonwealth whose founder and ruler is Christ’, Augustine posits, and so any state that fails to give what we owe to God – our worship – fails in its aspirations to be just. ‘What kind of justice is it that takes a man away from the true God and subjects him to unclean demons?’⁴⁰ From its origins Rome has denied to its citizens the forms of divine worship and honor they need to flourish. ‘...When a man does not serve God’, Augustine asks, ‘what amount of justice are we to suppose to exist in his being?’ In serving God the soul rules the body, and in the soul reason, ‘which is subject to its Lord God’, orders the desires and inclinations of the will.⁴¹

spem, et charitatem cum omnibus virtutibus cardinalibus: quia non loquitur de sapientia stricte prout est quaedam virtus intellectualis, praecise sicut in principio libri dictum fuit.

³⁷ Holcot, *Sap. lect.* 13.

³⁸ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 19.21 (CChr.SL 47A, 687, l. 8-688, l. 10); my quotation is from the translation by Henry Bettenson (Oxford, 2003), 73. For a recent re-evaluation of Augustine’s critique of Cicero, see Gregory W. Lee, ‘Republics and Their Loves: Re-Reading *City of God* 19’, *Modern Theology* 27 (2011), 553-81.

³⁹ G. Lee, ‘Republics’ (2011), 556.

⁴⁰ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 19.21 (CChr.SL 47A, 688, ll. 27-9); G. Lee, ‘Republics’ (2011), 556, 572.

⁴¹ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 19.21 (CChr.SL 47A, 689, ll. 53-7); Bettenson (2003), 881-4.

On this conception of justice it remains a question whether any secular political community could legitimately claim to be a *populus*. While the City of God is unique in offering the true sacrifice and true worship (*verus cultus*) to God, Cicero's definition is unhelpful for distinguishing the values and practices that separate the heavenly city from its earthy counterpart. And so Augustine revises the definition and offers one that allows him to set in clearer relief the cities' teleological differences across time. According to the new definition, a people is 'the association of a multitude of beings united by a common agreement on the objects of their love'.⁴² On this definition Rome, Athens, as well as the 'tyrannies of the Orient' count as political communities.⁴³ With justice removed Rome is clearly a *populus*, since its people have with consistency sought out earthly goods and rule of others from the earliest stages of its success. Its persistent idolatry and violence testify to Rome's ongoing and self-perpetuating lust for rule, a desire that is only partly held in check by its love of praise and vainglory.⁴⁴ By contrast the heavenly city is characterized by its shared love of its creator, the Lord; its highest good is not the love of praise but the peace of all creation that is found in being subject in faith to God.⁴⁵ The highest the earthly city can hope for is a mere compromise (*composition*) between wills that would otherwise be at war with one another. Its common good (*bonum commune*) is the possession of earthly goods, a goal that pits each city against one another and thus perpetuates violence, disorder, and spiritual slavery. The *bonum commune* of the heavenly city is God himself (*cum bonum commune diligitur ... quod summum ac verissimum deus est*).⁴⁶ While both cities rely on temporal goods for survival *in via*, the differences between them are nonetheless 'fundamental'.⁴⁷

4. Holcot's 'Augustinianism'

Holcot is aware of these two definitions of a *populus* or political community in the *City of God* and the issue of justice that separates them. In lecture 199, a discussion of *Wisdom's* re-telling of Israel's liberation from Egypt, Holcot

⁴² Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 19.24 (CChr.SL 47A, 695, ll. 2-3); quoted in G. Lee, 'Republics' (2011), 556.

⁴³ Rowan Williams, 'Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the *City of God*', *Milltown Studies* (1987), 55-72, 60; Williams notes the irony of Rome's inclusion in the 'descent' from Athens to Persia, 'for without God's justice, one is merely on the way to becoming the other' (60).

⁴⁴ For discussion, see R. Williams, 'Politics and the Soul' (1987), 61.

⁴⁵ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 19.13 (CChr.SL 47A, 678-80). On the relationship between *pax* and *ordo* for Augustine, see G. Lee, 'Republics' (2011), 568-9; R. Williams, 'Politics and the Soul' (1987), 62-4; and John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Malden and Oxford, 2006), conclusion.

⁴⁶ Augustine, *Epistola* 137.5.17 (122, ll. 6-9), in *Epistulae*, ed. A. Goldbacher, CSEL 44 (Vienna, 1904); quoted in G. Lee, 'Republics' (2011), 571.

⁴⁷ G. Lee, 'Republics' (2011), 570.

notes Augustine's use of both definitions as well as his own puzzlement regarding the saint's apparent equivocation. The biblical text in question (*Wis.* 18:9-10) takes up the 'sacrifices' the Israelites 'secretly' (*absconse enim sacrificabant*) offered behind closed doors while the angel of the Lord struck down the first-born of Egypt. One nation was unified by 'unanimously order[ing] a law of justice' (*iustitiae legem in concordia disposuerunt*); the other, plunged into confusion and anarchy by calamity. The 'final cause' or 'end' of the Israelites' 'law of justice', Holcot claims, is the unanimity of the souls of individual persons, a unity that is in fact the purpose of all just laws. The 'sacrifices' were hidden because they were made under the Old Law and did not receive their full expression until the death and resurrection of Christ, which brought about true peace and justice to human beings. Cicero's own definition of a people is thus superior to Augustine's more modest definition.⁴⁸

The implication of Holcot's preference is that, under the New Law, the ordering of temporal justice to align with the spiritual justice of God is not just a distant and finally unattainable goal. A ruler whose dispositions are ordered by the theological virtues – the monarch who is truly 'wise' – can unite the affairs of his people into 'one thing' in the sight of God. Holcot prefers Cicero's definition of a political community over Augustine's because Cicero's retains the possibility of a Christian *saeculum*, an age in which the City of God and city of man do not so much become one but converge into overlapping and complementary jurisdictions. Such a convergence hinges on the theological formation of the ruler whose words, acts, and whole 'bearing' of his life actively shape and unite the affairs of his people with the exemplar of divine justice. 'The nations' that *Wisdom* tells of God bestowing to man for the health of humankind as a whole are, specifically, the *Christian* nations, 'who bear the sacraments throughout the whole world', thus 'totally providing the remedies' for sin.⁴⁹ Rather than being responsible for temporal justice only, then, the Christian ruler must also take ownership for the spiritual well-being of his kingdom. The king's status as a Christian 'wise man' thus entails the legitimate *translatio* of his kingdom to other nations who remain in the thrall of unjust and tyrannical rule.

It is worth considering how far this preference for Cicero distances Holcot from the saint whose political thought he attempts to follow. For Augustine, the justice of the state can never be identical to the justice of the City of God because the earthly city and the heavenly city are not, and never were, the same

⁴⁸ Holcot, *Sap. lect.* 199 (656-7): *Tamen De Civi[tate Dei], cap. 21, dicit Augustinus, quid sit populus secundum sententiam Scipionis: dicit quod respublica est res populi: populum autem dicit Scipio, non omnem coetum multitudinis, sed coetum iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatum. Aliam adhuc replicat definitionem populi 19 De civitate Dei, cap. 22, quae est talis: populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis, rerum, quas diligit, concordii communione sociatus. Prima tamen definitio videtur melior, quae populum ponit esse coetum iuris consensu sociatum.*

⁴⁹ See Holcot, *Sap. lect.* 13.

community. To be sure, Augustine does wax poetic on the virtues of Theodosius, the emperor who displays many of the virtues that Augustine seeks in the Christian who finds himself in a position of secular power.⁵⁰ However, Rowan Williams rightly points out that what set Theodosius apart is 'law and coercion employed for the sake of the subject by one who is manifestly not in thrall to *libido dominandi* or vainglory, because he is capable of sharing power and accepting humiliation'.⁵¹ Good government is a largely 'pastoral reality' that categorically rejects triumphalist and expansionist ideologies. 'Imperial adventures, arising out of the *libido dominandi*, are always a distraction from the real problems of a community',⁵² and so the ruler must never identify the community he is the guardian of with the City of God itself. Otherwise, he labors under the delusion that he, not God, is the founder and protector of the heavenly city, a belief that would constitute 'an abandonment of the Church's integrity'.⁵³

Holcot seems to want both more and less from his Christian *sapiens*: less, in that the sacramental office of the priesthood and its possession of the 'two keys' plays an indispensable sacramental role for the nation that the king cannot himself perform; more, in that the Christian ruler's sanctity is simultaneously the sign of his legitimacy, the source of his nation's unity, and the cause for his empire's expansion. Holcot is clearly not a Wycliffite. His philosopher-king is not one of 'God's vicars' who maintain dominion over both the church and kingdom *in via*.⁵⁴ Yet the ideal Christian monarch – the ruler formed in every moral, intellectual, and theological virtue – enables secular kingdoms to become something more than the temporary harmony of the deeply conflicted interests of its citizens. The best way to consider what Holcot thinks the state becomes under the Christian *sapiens*, then, is a sacrament of God's divine rule of the universe, a sign bearing within it the reality of the thing signified. In an extensive and enthusiastic discussion of the English coronation rituals, Holcot highlights the rituals' emphasis on the fact that just as Christ is the ruler of the world so is the king the ruler of his nation. As the priest is a mediator between God and man, so the king becomes 'a mediator between clerics and the plebes', a role, Holcot paraphrases in the language he has used throughout the commentary, that the ruler cannot perform unless he is 'a worshipper of justice as a zealot for the faith' (*cultorem iusticiae et fidei zelatorem*).⁵⁵ It is the king who

⁵⁰ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 5.26 (CChr.SL 47, 161-3); Bettenson, 221-3. For discussion see R. Williams, 'Politics and the Soul' (1987), 64.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 65.

⁵² *Ibid.* 65-6.

⁵³ *Ibid.* 66.

⁵⁴ For an introduction to Wyclif's views and their development, see Stephen Lahey, *John Wyclif* (Oxford, 2009), ch. 7.

⁵⁵ Holcot, *Sap. lect.* 75 (265): *Et quanto cerum sacris altaribus propinquiorem prospicis, tanto ei potiorum in locis congruis honorem impendere memineris: quatenus mediator dei et hominum, te mediatorem cleri et plebis ... declarant debere esse cultorem iusticiae et fidei zelatorem.*

is finally responsible for making the amalgam of classes and estates into 'one thing' under the sight of God.

Although Holcot never explicitly mentions Edward III, I want to conclude this essay with one striking passage that Holcot discusses in his treatment of the forms of speech that do violence to the just society. Holcot, again referencing Augustine, says that there are two cities in this world, the City of God and the City of man. And just like any two cities have differences in dialect, so do the citizens of these two cities have different 'dialects': one, of truth; the other, falsehood. The dialect of falsehood has been pushed on the City of man unnaturally by the devil's tyranny of the world. Holcot's illustration of this linguistic oppression is the legacy of the old French king, William the Conqueror, who conquered all of England and abolished (Holcot's word is a bit more pejorative: *destruere*) its native tongue, such that anyone who wished to learn Latin in the schools had to learn French first. Holcot observes that the English still live with this perverse and unnatural tradition today.

William the Conqueror may only be a figure for the devil incarnate, but Holcot's political theology does not take much dressing over to see its imperial and expansionist implications. And what is particularly striking for the purposes of this volume is his complex and conflicted use of Augustine's *City of God* to develop it.

Peter Lombard's Inheritance: The Use of Augustine's *De Trinitate* in Gregory of Rimini's Discussion of the Divine Processions

John T. SLOTEMAKER, Fairfield, USA

ABSTRACT

The present article considers Gregory of Rimini's trinitarian theology with a particular focus on the distinction between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit. The article examines the views of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, William of Ockham, and Adam Wodeham regarding the distinction between divine generation and divine procession, arguing that, on Augustinian grounds, Gregory of Rimini rejects the various explanatory models posited by these predecessors. Gregory defends, instead, a trinitarian minimalism according to which the divine processions are distinct *se ipsis* (in and of themselves), such that any explanatory model for how they are distinct is inadequate. In this regard, Gregory returns to the theological position of Augustine of Hippo and Peter Lombard, introducing new passages from Augustine's *De Trinitate* and re-introducing passages that were cited by Peter Lombard but ignored by the majority of thirteenth-century scholastics (*e.g.*, Thomas, Henry, Ockham, and Wodeham).

Students of Thomas Aquinas' trinitarian theology have often argued that the theology of Augustine of Hippo is merely the antecedent, or logical precursor, to the more developed trinitarian thought of the Angelic Doctor. One commonly held position, for example, has linked Augustine's account of relative and substantial predication in *De Trinitate* 5-7 with Thomas' account of subsisting relations (*relatio subsistens*) and their corresponding opposed relations (*relationis oppositio*) of origin.¹ While such readings of Augustine and his

¹ For a recent account that continues to see Thomas' doctrine of *opposed relations* as the normative extension/interpretation of Augustine, see Gilles Emery, *The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God* (Washington D.C., 2011), 88-90. Building on a discussion of Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Augustine, Emery argues (here 88) that 'the Catholic tradition will speak of a "relative opposition" or of "opposed relations" in order to signify the distinction of divine persons by such relative properties'. The problem, of course, is that a doctrine of the divine relations (*e.g.*, as found in Basil, Gregory, and Augustine) need not imply the Thomistic doctrine of opposed relations and can instead be interpreted as non-opposed relations or disparate relations (in scholastic parlance). In fact, the doctrine of opposed relations necessitates the procession of the Holy Spirit *a filio* and, as such, is rejected by the Greek

medieval readers often do violence both to Augustine and late medieval theologians, they continue to be defended. This, despite the fact that the ongoing re-narration of Augustine's trinitarian theology has rejected such simplistic narratives and created some distance between Augustine and his late medieval readers.²

The theological divergence between Augustine and his thirteenth-century readers is perhaps the most pronounced with respect to theological epistemology; by theological epistemology we mean: (1) what can be known about the divine Trinity, and (2) what are the sources of such knowledge. At the outset, therefore, we turn our attention to the question of theological epistemology.

Lewis Ayres has argued that for Augustine,

the foundational quality of a Scripture that points toward divine mystery, the complexity of that Scripture's speech, and our knowledge of human noetic fallenness and necessary humility all undergird the provisional and complex nature of Augustine's mature Trinitarian styles. Thus ... while Augustine offers us a peculiarly deep and compelling articulation of Nicene principle, we should follow Augustine in his own recognition that the 'catching' all three [persons] is only ever well done if the necessary failure of all such attempts this side of the final vision is confessed.³

Augustine, as Ayres argues, is clear in *De Trinitate* 15 that what one can know about the Trinity is contingent on revelation and, in short, remarkably limited this side of the eschaton.

The present article will examine the ways in which the fourteenth-century Augustinian theologian, Gregory of Rimini, interprets Augustine's theological

speaking East (as well as by numerous scholastics theologians in response to Thomas). On this, see John T. Slotemaker, 'John Duns Scotus and Henry of Harclay on the Non-Necessity of Opposed Relations', *The Thomist* 77 (2013), 419-51. Emery continues his narrative, arguing that in 1442 the Council of Florence (here 89) adopts Thomas' understanding of the divine relations (e.g., opposed relations) when it states that 'these three persons are one God ... and *everything is one where the opposition of a relation does not prevent this*'. While *prima facie* this quotation seems to support Emery's claim, the last phrase (here italicized) is a quotation from Anselm of Canterbury (referred to by fourteenth-century scholastics as the *ratio Anselmi*) that is endorsed by defenders of both opposed relations and disparate relations. For diverse interpretations of the *ratio Anselmi*, see John T. Slotemaker, 'The Development of Anselm's Trinitarian Theology: The Origins of a Late Medieval Debate', in Giles E.M. Gasper and Ian Logan (eds), *Saint Anselm of Canterbury and His Legacy* (Toronto, 2012), 203-21. The point is twofold, first, there is no conciliar decision that endorses opposed relations as the normative Catholic doctrine over and against disparate relations, second, Augustine's understanding of the divine relations does not necessarily entail opposed relations.

² See Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge, 2010), 268-72. For a recent account of the reception of Augustine's *De Trinitate* see Roland Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken: Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu 'De trinitate'* (Tübingen, 2007). Though Kany repeats many of the somewhat tired characterizations of medieval thought; see my introductory article above, 'The Reception of Augustine's thought in the Late Middle Ages: A Historiographical Introduction', fn. 50.

³ L. Ayres, *Augustine* (2010), 325. See Luigi Gioia, *The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate* (Oxford, 2008).

epistemology alongside the trinitarian theology of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, William of Ockham, and Adam Wodeham.⁴ These earlier thinkers, Gregory argues, defended distinctions between the two emanations within God (*i.e.*, generation and spiration) that cannot be known or defended theologically; such distinctions, he argues, not only violate a sense of theological humility, but expressly go against the teachings of Augustine.

Gregory's trinitarian theology defends what could be called an apophatic or minimalist approach that, he argues, is consistent with the theology of Augustine of Hippo. My focus will be on establishing Gregory's theological position and his use of sources. What will be evident is that Gregory was not satisfied with the standard quotations of Augustine's *De Trinitate* found in the Lombard's *Sentences* such that he interjected new passages into the debate and, in the process, changed the nature of Augustinian reception in the fourteenth century.

1. A note on theological method

Gregory of Rimini followed William of Ockham in arguing that theology was not a science in the strictest sense of the term. However, it does not follow from this that theologians do not progress in their knowledge of the faith: indeed, Gregory argues that theologians do progress in their knowledge of the faith, it is simply that such knowledge is not a science in a strict Aristotelian sense. Gregory argued that theology is *deductive* and proceeds from the truths contained in Holy Scripture. In response to Peter Aureoli – who had argued that theology was *declarative* – Gregory insists that ‘the habit that the theologian develops is a *habitus creditivus*, not a *habitus declarativus*’.⁵ What Stephen Brown has demonstrated is that in response to Aureoli's claim that declarative theology is a kind of wisdom in the sense defended by Augustine,⁶ Gregory ‘mount[ed] a counteroffensive that reinterpreted Aureoli's Augustinian base’.⁷ In

⁴ On thirteenth- and fourteenth-century trinitarian theology, see Russell L. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350* (Leiden, 2013); *id.*, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge, 2010); and Michael Schmaus, *Der ‘Liber propugnatorius’ des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, II. Teil: Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen* (Münster, 1930).

⁵ Stephen F. Brown, ‘Declarative and Deductive Theology in the Early Fourteenth Century’, in Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (eds), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (Berlin, 1998), 648-55.

⁶ See S.F. Brown, ‘Declarative and Deductive Theology’ (1998), 653.

⁷ S.F. Brown, ‘Declarative and Deductive Theology’ (1998), 654. Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum*, ed. A. Damasus Trapp and Venicio Marcolino (Berlin, 1981), I, prol., q.1, a.2 (19, ll. 16-8): *Hoc confirmat etiam dictum proprium Augustini, quod idem iste doctor pro se allegat, sed inadvertenter, ut aestimo, cum non pro eo, sed prorsus contra eum militet.*

a sense, therefore, the debate between Aureoli and Gregory can be understood as a debate about the proper reading of Augustine.⁸

Throughout his commentary on book 1 of the *Sentences*, Gregory argues that his trinitarian theology – e.g., his interpretation of the divine processions, relations, and persons – is consistent with Augustine's *De Trinitate*. A significant aspect of Gregory's methodology is his biting criticism of the trinitarian theology of the late thirteenth century that, from his perspective, extended beyond what could be known about the divine nature. Gregory's argument entailed a significant re-reading of Augustine and introduced into the debate new texts from Augustine's *De Trinitate*. In short, Gregory's re-reading of Augustine was intimately linked with his defense of *deductive* theology and his extensive critique of Peter Aureoli.

2. Gregory and the divine emanations

In book 1, distinction 13 of the *Lectura* – examining whether or not procession (*processio*) is generation (*generatio*) – Gregory reviews the various opinions and theories regarding the distinction between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.⁹ Gregory summarizes the diverse arguments regarding how the two divine emanations are distinguished within the one divine essence. Here we consider Gregory's review of his predecessors prior to explicating his understanding of the distinction between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.

(1) Regarding the distinction between divine generation and procession, Gregory considers the opinions of: Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Adam Wodeham, and William of Ockham. Thomas Aquinas argued that the number of causes of the respective divine emanations is a sufficient means of distinguishing them.¹⁰ Generation and spiration are distinct, therefore, because the generation of the Son is caused by one, while the procession of the Holy Spirit is caused by two.¹¹ In response Gregory argues that this method of distinguish-

⁸ Damasus Trapp categorized Gregory's theological method as historico-critical given his return to the sources. See *id.*, 'Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century: Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore', *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), 146-274, 147-50.

⁹ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 197, ll. 4-5).

¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis*, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, d.13, q.1, a.2 (I, 304): *Dico igitur secundum hoc, quod est in divinis aliqua processio secundum quam una persona procedit ab una; et haec est processio generationis, secundum quam Filius est a Patre, et ideo dicitur esse per modum naturae vel intellectus; procedit enim ut Filius, et ut Verbum: quia in utroque modo istarum processio-num, scilicet naturae et intellectus, est unius ab uno processio. Item est aliqua processio in divinis quae est simul a duobus, scilicet ab eo qui procedit et ab eo a quo procedit...*

¹¹ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 198, ll. 2-7): *Assignant tamen aliqui differentiam harum productionum ex differentia producentium, quoniam filius est ab uno tantum,*

ing the persons is not sufficient: just because the Son is begotten from one person and the Holy Spirit is spirated from two persons, it does not follow that the two emanations are distinct.¹²

Henry of Ghent argued that the distinction between the two emanations is found in the two different principles of production as located in the divine intellect and the divine will.¹³ For Henry, the distinction between the two emanations is found in the fact that they have a distinct source, as the Son is generated from the divine intellect and the Holy Spirit spirated from the divine will.¹⁴ However, as Gregory argues, there is not a sufficient distinction (really, formally, or otherwise) between the divine intellect and the divine will to justify distinguishing the two divine emanations based on the divine intellect and will. As Gregory argues, 'the intellect and will in God are in no way distinguished *ex natura rei*', thus any products of the intellect and will cannot be distinguished based on that source.¹⁵

Adam Wodeham argued that the two divine emanations are distinct because of their diverse modes of proceeding:¹⁶ the Son emanates *quomodo natus* (as one who is born) whereas the Spirit emanates *quomodo datus* (as one who is given). Gregory criticizes the opinion of Wodeham arguing that it is probably not accurate to restrict emanation *quomodo natus* to the Son alone, in the sense that one could say of the Holy Spirit that He proceeded, along with the Son,

spiritus sanctus a duobus, filius autem nullus potest esse duorum, nisi unus illorum sit pater et alter mater; quod in trinitate imaginari absurdissimum est. Et hanc rationem assignat Augustinus 15 De trinitate capitulo 27 et Anselmus Monologio 55 capitulo.

¹² Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 198, ll. 8-13): *Sed ista ratio non est evidenter usquequaque sufficiens, quia, ubi productum eodem modo penitus est a duobus nec aliter ab uno quam ab altero neque ab ambobus simul quam ab altero tantum, ibi productio ex hoc praecise, quod est a duobus, non videtur minus debere dici generatio quam si esset ab uno tantum ceteris similiter concurrentibus; unitas enim et pluralitas producentium non variat rationem productionis...*

¹³ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestiones ordinariae*, art. LIII-LV, ed. Gordon A. Wilson and Girard J. Etzkorn (Leuven, 2014), art.54, q.9 (347, ll. 31-3): *Ut videamus differentiam actuum notionalium generandi ex una parte et essentialium intelligendi atque volendi ex alia, oportet videre quomodo isti actus habent formari in intellectu et voluntate.*

¹⁴ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 198, ll. 21-3): *Alii assignant differentiam ex principio quo unius et principio quo alterius; dicunt enim quod productionis filii principium quo est intellectus, et productionis spiritus sancti est voluntas.*

¹⁵ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 198, ll. 24-8): *Istud etiam non valet: Tum quia neutrius productionis est aliquod principium quo distinctum a principio quod, ut supra probatum est. Tum quia intellectus et voluntas in deo nullo modo ex natura rei distinguuntur, ut etiam supra patet; et ideo, si unius illarum est intellectus principium, etiam voluntas erit eius principium, et e converso.*

¹⁶ See Adam Wodeham, *Lectura secunda*, ed. Rega Wood and Gedeon Gál (St. Bonaventure, 1990), d.6, q.1 (II, 312, ll. 7-9): *Ad secundum patet prius. Dico tamen quod 'procedere quomodo natus' est nasci; et 'quomodo datus' est spirari, et nasci et spirari realiter distinguuntur (see also, id., *Ordinatio Oxoniensis* I, d.6, q.1 [Paris, Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne 193, fol. 87^{va}]).*

quomodo natus.¹⁷ Gregory's argument seems to be that unless it is customary to *deny* that the Holy Spirit proceeds *quomodo natus* (which it is not), the distinction between generation *quomodo natus* and procession *quomodo datus* is not sufficient to distinguish the two emanations.

William of Ockham held that the difference between the two emanations in God is indicated through the two distinct products of those emanations (*ex ipsis productis*). Thus, the generation of the Son as *verbum* is distinct from the procession of the Holy Spirit as *bonum*, in that the two distinct products indicate a distinction between generation and procession.¹⁸ Despite thinking that this distinction is subtle, Gregory argues that it is not proper to say that the Holy Spirit is *not* the 'Word of the Father and the Son', in the same way that one states that generation and spiration are distinct. That is, Gregory rejects the distinction of persons implied in such statements: the Holy Spirit is 'of the Father' in an equal way to the Son being 'of the Father'.¹⁹ In short, one ought to reject a distinction forced upon the emanations as a result of a distinction between the products as *verbum* and *bonum*: there is no distinction here other than the distinction between the persons themselves.

Gregory rejects, therefore, any form of distinction between the two divine emanations that is grounded in a distinction between the sources of the emanations (Thomas/Henry), diverse modes of proceeding (Wodeham), or a difference between the end products (Ockham). The fundamental intuition informing Gregory's trinitarian theology is that there are minimal distinctions between the divine emanations. For Gregory, the divine emanations are simply distinct in and of themselves (*se ipsis*).

¹⁷ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 198, ll. 29-31; II, 199, ll. 1-2): *Alii dant differentiam ex diversitate modi procedendi, quia unus procedit 'quomodo natus', alius autem 'quomodo datus', et hanc ponit Augustinus 5 De trinitate capitulo 14. Sed nec istud sufficit, cum non declarat quod spiritus sanctus non procedit quomodo natus.*

¹⁸ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 199, ll. 3-11): *Aliter assignatur ista differentia ex ipsis productis. Nam filius est verbum, quod pater intelligendo se producit; spiritus sanctus autem est donum, quod pater et filius se amando producant. Verbum autem ex eo quod verbum simile est rei intellectae, cuius est verbum; sed donum non ex eo quod donum est simile, sed potest esse dissimile. Productio autem viventis similis producenti est generatio. Quamvis ergo spiritus sanctus, qui est donum patris et filii, sit similis patri et filio, non minus quam filius patri, quia tamen non est similis ex hoc, quod est donum, ideo eius productio non est generatio. Et ista ratio sumitur ab Anselmo Monologio 55 capitulo.*

¹⁹ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 199, ll. 12-20): *Quamvis autem haec sit subtilis via ad manifestandum differentiam praedictam, nihilominus tamen nec ipsa evidens est, quoniam aequè incognitum est nobis quod spiritus sanctus non sit verbum patris et filii, sicut quod eius productio non sit generatio. Et aequè immanifestum est quod ipse non sit verbum, sicut quod ipse non sit filius. Unde, cum spiritus sanctus sit aequè similis patri et filio sicut filius patri, et intellectio et volitio nullo modo distinguantur ex natura rei in deo, non apparet, cur spiritus sanctus non sit verbum, quod se intelligendo producant pater et filius, ita bene sicut filius est verbum, quod se intelligendo pater producit.*

(2) Having rejected the four models Gregory offers his own account of the distinction between the two emanations. He writes,

I say that spiration and generation are distinct productions and are formally distinct in and of themselves (*se ipsis*), just as the Son, who is generation, and the Holy Spirit, who is spiration, are distinct in and of themselves (*se ipsis*), as was said above; and that spiration is not generation, nor is generation spiration, just as the Holy Spirit is not the Son, nor is the Son the Holy Spirit, *i.e.* gift; and that the procession of the Holy Spirit just is spiration, because the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit, or gift; and the procession or production of the Son is generation, because the Son is the Son, or word.²⁰

Following this argument Gregory concludes by remarking that 'it is not possible for me to understand' the distinction between divine generation and divine procession. In defense of this position, Gregory offers three specific quotations, two from Augustine and a third from John Damascene.²¹

In defense of the argument that it is impossible to understand the distinction between divine generation and procession, Gregory references passages from Augustine's *De Trinitate* and *Contra Maximinum Arianum*. At the very end of *De Trinitate*, Augustine reflects on the arguments that he developed over the course of the previous fifteen books. Throughout books 8-15 Augustine examined numerous analogies with respect to the nature of the divine emanations. At the end of the work, however, Augustine strikingly *retracts* some of his previous arguments; or, if he does not retract them, he qualifies them by indicating the limitations of those previous analogies. Reflecting on human knowledge in the afterlife, Augustine writes:

We shall see the truth there without any difficulty, and shall enjoy it to the full because it is most clear and most certain. Nor shall we seek anything by reasoning of the mind, but by contemplating we shall perceive why the Holy Spirit is not the Son when he proceeds from the Father (*sed contemplante cernemus quare non sit filius spiritus sanctus, cum de patre procedat*). In that light there shall no longer be any question, but here

²⁰ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 199, ll. 22-8): *Dico ergo quod spiratio et generatio sunt distinctae productiones et se ipsis formaliter sunt distinctae, sicut filius qui est generatio et spiritus sanctus qui est spiratio sunt se ipsis distincti, ut supra dicebatur, et quod spiratio non est generatio nec generatio est spiratio, sicut spiritus sanctus non est filius nec filius est spiritus sanctus, id est donum; et quod processio spiritus sancti ideo est spiratio, quia spiritus sanctus est spiritus sanctus seu donum, et processio seu productio filii est generatio, quia filius est filius seu verbum.*

²¹ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 199, l. 28-200, l. 5): *Quod autem iste sit verbum et filius, non sit autem donum, et per consequens eius productio, quae non est nisi ipse – unde dicitur productio filii intransitive, id est quae est filius –, sit generatio et non spiratio, et quod ille sit donum, non sit autem verbum nec filius, ac per hoc eius productio sit spiratio et non sit generatio, dico quod non est mihi possibile intelligere, sicut etiam dicit de se Augustinus 15 De Trinitate capitulo 24 et Contra Maximinum, ut habetur in littera. Damascenus etiam libro 1 capitulo 11 ait: 'Quoniam est quidem differentia generationis et processionis, didicimus; quis autem est modus differentiae, nequaquam'. Quamvis autem ista intelligere non possumus, veraciter tamen sic esse confitemur et credimus.*

below it appeared to me from experience itself to be so difficult – and I do not doubt that it shall also appear so to those who read these writings carefully and intelligently – that as often as I wished to show something similar to that thing in that creature which we are, according to a promise made in the second book of this work to speak of it in another place, my words inadequately expressed the ideas, be they what they were, that I had formed about it in my mind, although even in my actual understanding of it I felt that I had made an attempt more than I had achieved success ... as we pointed out in this fifteenth book, the three things belonging to one person could not, as man's purpose required, be fitted to those three persons.²²

In this concluding chapter of *De Trinitate* Augustine famously acknowledges that there is no strict analogy between the 'three things belonging to one person' and the divine Trinity. And, as Gregory reminds the reader, Augustine's fundamental question in this passage is not limited to the adequacy of the psychological analogies: more fundamentally, Augustine acknowledges that he struggled to articulate the basic distinction between the two divine emanations.

This passage is introduced into the debate by Gregory who simply makes reference to book 15, chapter 25 of Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Despite supporting Lombard's basic approach to the question, this quotation is not found in Lombard's *Sentences* or in the corresponding passages of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, William of Ockham, or Adam Wodeham. Here one must conclude that Gregory was either reading the text of *De Trinitate* or found the passage in another source: though, we can be sure that that other source was not the *Sentences* or (probably) the previous commentators on the *Sentences*.

Augustine completed his *De Trinitate* around 420 and in 427 or 428 returned to this topic in a public debate with Maximinus the Arian. Gregory makes reference to this debate recorded in *Contra Maximinum Arianum*. Though Gregory is uncharacteristically imprecise in his reference (giving only the title of the work), there can be little doubt that he was referring, at a minimum, to three citations of the *Contra Maximinum* preserved in the Lombard, *Sentences* I, d.13.²³ Of these three citations, the first articulates the basic question of the debate,²⁴ the second offers Augustine's explication of divine generation and procession,²⁵ and the third treats Augustine's reply to how the divine generation

²² Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ed. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CChr.SL 50, 50A (Turnhout, 1968), 15.25.45 (523, ll. 17-35). I am using the translation of Stephen McKenna, *The Trinity*, FC 45 (Washington, 1963), 513.

²³ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum IV-V (Rome, 1971, 1981), I, d.13, c.3 (I, 123, ll. 1-5, 7-20, 21-32). I am using the translation of Giulio Silano, *The Sentences, Book I. The Mystery of the Trinity* (Toronto, 2007), 70-1. See Augustine, *Contra Maximinum Arianum*, PL 42, 743-814, 770-1.

²⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* I, d.13, c.3 (I, 123, ll. 1-5).

²⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* I, d.13, c.3 (I, 123, ll. 7-20): *Augustinus dicit: 'Ecce respondeo, sive capias sive non capias: De Patre est Filius, de Patre est Spiritus Sanctus, sed ille genitus est, iste procedens; ideo ille Filius est Patris, de quo est genitus; iste autem Spiritus utriusque, quoniam de utroque procedit. Sed ideo, cum de illo loqueretur, ait: De Patre procedit, quoniam Pater*

and procession are distinct. It is presumably the third quotation that attracted Gregory's attention. Augustine writes:

As to the difference between being born (*nasci*) and proceeding (*procedere*), who can explain it with regard to that most excellent nature? Not all that proceeds is born, although all that is born proceeds; in the same way, not every two-footed creature is a man, although every man is a two-footed creature. This much I do know; I do not know how, and am neither able, nor sufficient, to distinguish between that generation (*generatio*) and this procession (*processio*). This is the case because both of them are ineffable, as the Prophet says speaking of the Son: Who shall recount his generation?²⁶

In this passage – written almost a decade after *De Trinitate* was concluded – Augustine is more explicit about the fact that one simply cannot know or understand the distinction between the divine emanations.²⁷ This is not to say that the emanations are not distinct: neither Augustine nor Gregory would hold that this admission of human epistemic limitation implies that the two emanations are not distinct *in re*; it is simply that human beings cannot understand the ultimate ground of this distinction.

This passage from Augustine was central to Peter Lombard who argued that 'in this life, we are not able to distinguish between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit'.²⁸ However, this particular passage from Augustine essentially drops out of the debate in thirteenth-century *Sentences* commentaries, as theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent came to reject Augustine's theological epistemology and downplayed these quotations from Augustine found in the *Sentences*.²⁹

processionis eius est auctor, qui talem Filium genuit, et gignendo ei dedit ut etiam de ipso procederet Spiritus Sanctus. Nam nisi procederet etiam de ipso, non diceret discipulis: Accipite Spiritum Sanctum, eumque insufflando daret, ut a se quoque procedere significans aperte ostenderet flando, quod spirando dabat occulte. Quia ergo si nasceretur, non tantum de Patre, nec tantum de Filio, sed de ambobus utique nasceretur, sine dubio filius diceretur amborum. Ac per hoc, quia filius amborum nullo modo esset, non oportuit nasci eum de ambobus; amborum est ergo Spiritus procedendo de ambobus'.

²⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* I, d.13, c.3 (I, 123, ll. 21-8): *Augustinus dicit: 'Quid autem inter nasci et procedere intersit, de illa excellentissima natura loquens explicare quis potest? Non omne quod procedit nascitur, quamvis omne procedat quod nascitur; sicut non omne quod bipes est, homo est, quamvis bipes sit omnis qui homo est. Hoc scio. Distinguere autem inter illam generationem et hanc processionem nescio, non valeo, non sufficio. Ac per hoc, quia et illa et ista est ineffabilis, sicut Propheta de Filio loquens ait: Generationem eius quis enarrabit?'*

²⁷ Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, PL 10, 2.9 (58): 'Let man not think to reach by his own mind the sacred mystery of generation'; and Ambrose of Milan, *De fide*, PL 16, 1.10 (566): 'It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent'.

²⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* I, d.13, c.3 (I, 122-3; Silano I, 70).

²⁹ Thomas, *Scriptum* I, d.13 (I, 297-311); Henry, *Summa Qu.* art.54, q.9 (347-53). See also William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, distinctiones IV-XVIII*, ed. Girard Etzkorn (St. Bonaventure, 1977), d.13 (413-23); and Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, ed. PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura (Quaracchi, 1882), d.13 (I, 230-43). The exception is Wodeham, *Lectura*, d.13 (III, 196, ll. 30-5, 41-5) who, following his

The third text that Gregory cites is from John of Damascus' (†749) *Fount of Knowledge*.³⁰ In reference to the distinction between the two emanations, the Damascene argues that, 'we have learned that there is a difference between generation and procession, but what the manner of this difference is we have not learned at all'.³¹ Throughout the Damascene's discussion of the Trinity in *De fide orthodoxa*³² he argues that, while the two emanations are distinct, the cause or reason for this distinction remains unknowable or indemonstrable by means of human reason alone. This passage is quoted in full by Gregory but is not found in the *Sentences* or the corresponding passages in Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, William of Ockham, or Adam Wodeham.³³ Therefore, one must conclude that Gregory's source for this quotation is not Peter Lombard or several of the significant commentaries that preceded his in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.

Having considered Gregory's patristic authorities, it is necessary to briefly return to his argument that the two emanations in God are distinct *se ipsis*. As Gregory understands the Scriptures and the patristic authorities, there is ample evidence that the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit are two distinct emanations within the divine nature. That is, there really are two distinct emanations within God. However, following Augustine, John of Damascus, and Peter Lombard, Gregory argues that as human beings 'we are not able to understand' (*intelligere non possumus*) the source, or foundation, of the distinction between divine generation and divine procession. For Gregory, the source of human knowledge regarding the distinction between the divine emanations is essentially a matter of faith and belief. He states, explicitly, that

response, provides a short *dubitatio* that returns the discussion to Augustine and the question of whether or not one can know the distinction between the two emanations. It is not insignificant that Wodeham is closest to Gregory chronologically and in other ways.

³⁰ *The Fount of Knowledge (Fons scientiae)*, PG 94, 521-1228, while the third section is titled the *Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (Expositio accurata fidei orthodoxae)*, hereafter *De fide orthodoxa*, PG 94, 789-1228. I cite the Latin translation of *De fide orthodoxa* retained in the PG, as it is arguably closest to the text Gregory (perhaps only via Lombard) would have been familiar with.

³¹ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* I 8 (PG 94, 823): *Spiritus vero sanctus et ipse quoque ex Patre est, non gignendi tamen modo, sed procedendi. Et quidem generationem inter et processionem discrimen intercedere edocti sumus: caeterum quis sit huius distinctionis modus, prorsus nescimus*. The translation (with some modification) is from the Greek and found in, *St. John of Damascus: Writings*, FC 37, trans. Frederic Chase (Washington, 1999), 184. In Gregory the text is reduced to: *Lect.*, d.13, q.1 (II, 200, ll. 2-4): *Quoniam est quidem differentia generationis et processionis, didicimus; quis autem est modus differentiae, nequaquam*. See John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* I 8 (PG 94, 818): *Solus etiam Filius genitus est: ex Patris enim substantia absque initio ullo ac tempore genitus est. Solus denique Spiritus sanctus ex Patris quidem substantia progreditur, non generatione, sed processione; ita enim a divina Scriptura edocemur: tametsi alioqui generationis ac processionis modus nulla ingenii vi comprehendi possit*.

³² See John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* I 8 (PG 94, 807-34).

³³ See also Bonaventure, *Sent.* I, d.13 (I, 230-43).

Christians confess and believe that there is a distinction between the two processions, such that the distinction is held by faith alone (even if Gregory does not employ the language, *sola fide*, in the present discussion).³⁴

Gregory extends this argument in his examination of the divine persons, arguing that the divine persons themselves are distinct *se ipsis*.³⁵ Gregory denies, therefore, any explanatory models that distinguish between the divine persons and their respective personal properties; however, with regard to the distinction between the divine persons, his patristic authorities and sources are not as explicit. In the discussion of the divine emanations – as we have seen – Gregory has authoritative patristic quotations that support his general argument and his broader approach to trinitarian theology.

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, I return to two aspects of the present article. (1) First, regarding the theological content of the article, I want to return to the point made above concerning theological epistemology. In many ways, Augustine's trinitarian theology is often linked with that of Thomas Aquinas and other thirteenth-century theologians. This, I think, is unjustified in a certain sense. Augustine was much more hesitant to make claims about what distinguishes the divine emanations or the divine persons than the majority of thirteenth-century theologians. Thomas, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus were all comfortable positing a particular type of distinction between the individual divine emanations or between the divine persons. Augustine, by contrast, was much more cautious. In terms of his theological epistemology, Augustine is radically distinct from the majority of thirteenth-century theologians. By contrast, the theology of Gregory of Rimini begins to reclaim the theological minimalism (or apophaticism) that one finds in Augustine. Thus, regarding doctrinal content, I would argue that in many ways Gregory is correct that his own reading of Augustine is a true retrieval of an authentic Augustinian theology.

(2) Second, what can one learn about fourteenth-century citation practices of Augustine by studying Gregory of Rimini's trinitarian theology? What this study has demonstrated is that while Peter Lombard was the general source of quotations of Augustine, the citation practices among thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholastics is far from uniform.

³⁴ Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.13, q.1 (II, 200, ll. 7-9): *Ad rationem principalem dico quod illa definitio non est perfecte explicativa generationis divinae nec cum ea convertibilis nec aliqua talis a nobis dari potest, cum illa generatio sit incomprehensibilis a nobis.*

³⁵ See Gregory of Rimini, *Super primum*, d.26/27 (III, 59-78).

First, one notes that authors were extremely selective in the passages of Augustine that they borrowed from the Lombard. In the present article this was evident in the fact that the majority of the authors studied did not endorse Lombard's basic theological argument, and, as such, omitted almost all of Lombard's supporting citations from Augustine. Thus, Henry, Thomas, Ockham, and Wodeham omitted the majority of Lombard's quotations from distinction 13 of book 1 because they rejected the trinitarian minimalism that was found in the citations of Augustine and quoted by Peter Lombard. As we saw, it was Gregory of Rimini who presumably re-read the *Sentences* and re-introduced these quotations into the debate. Primarily, one can argue, because Gregory agreed with the theological opinion of Augustine and Peter Lombard.

Second, the case study here also observed several instances of passages that are not found anywhere in the *Sentences* – or, preliminarily in the commentary tradition – but were later introduced into the debate. Because Gregory of Rimini so strongly wanted to defend this particular reading of Augustine, he introduced into the debate several quotations from book 15 of Augustine's *De Trinitate* that are not found in the *Sentences*. What this suggests, I think, is that Gregory began the process of re-reading Augustine's *De Trinitate* (or otherwise accessing other citations) and was not content with the quotations from the *Sentences* alone. This is unique, as the majority of scholastic quotations of Augustine's *De Trinitate* in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century commentaries on the *Sentences* are actually taken directly from Lombard *Sentences* or the commentary tradition.

A complete study of the reception of Augustine in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries remains a *desideratum*, but one thing is clear: until there are more detailed studies of citation practices among later scholastics, our knowledge of the reception of Augustine remains woefully inadequate. Of course, such work requires critical editions of the relevant texts, and until such texts are produced it is difficult to get a broader view of precisely how Augustine was being read in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. That said, while many authors in the fourteenth century were happy to simply quote the stock quotations found in the *Sentences*, it is clear that Gregory of Rimini was not satisfied with such an approach and attempted a broader re-reading of Augustine's *De Trinitate*.

Gregory of Rimini's Augustinian Defense of a World *ab aeterno*

John W. PECK, S.J., University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN, USA

ABSTRACT

Although by faith medieval Christian philosophers and theologians believed the world had a temporal beginning, reading Aristotle's *Physics* led them to ask whether creation *ex nihilo* necessarily means the world has finite past duration. Gregory of Rimini's wide and deep study of Augustine informed his intervention in the debate over a possible world from eternity. This article highlights two significant uses Gregory's *quaestio* makes of Augustine: first, it explains how a single line from *De Genesi ad litteram* permits Gregory, in the context of the eternity of the world debate, to collapse the distinction between God's creating the world and his conserving it. I hope to show that, for Gregory, even in the actual world which has finite past duration, God's creative power displays itself equally at this instant as it did when God first caused the universe to exist. Second, the article examines Gregory's use of a single passage from Augustine's *De Trinitate* 6. There Augustine compares fire's production of brightness to the Father's production of the Son. From that comparison, Gregory formulates two arguments for the view that it is possible for something other than God to have been from eternity. The second of those arguments is particularly unusual in the history of the eternity of the world debate, for though it takes its starting point from Christian faith, specifically the belief that God the Father eternally produces God the Son, it affirms the Aristotelian view that an eternal world is possible. Since the argument's starting point cannot be known by human intelligence apart from faith, Gregory arrives at an Aristotelian conclusion in a manner wholly at odds with the spirit of Aristotle's thought.

Whether one can rationally demonstrate the world's temporal beginning caused considerable controversy among medieval thinkers. Access to more of Aristotle's works around 1200 largely occasioned the controversy,¹ and throughout the thirteenth century much of the debate over the eternity of the world focused on how Christian thinkers should engage his doctrine when it

¹ John Wippel notes that until shortly after the death of Abelard, medieval scholars had access only to a portion of Aristotle's works in Latin translation. These works, which included the *De interpretatione* and the *Categories*, were collectively known as the *Logica vetus*. See John Wippel, *Medieval Reactions to the Encounter between Faith and Reason* (Milwaukee, 1994), 8-10.

contradicted faith.² As most medieval theologians were Christians, they held the world's finite past duration as a divinely revealed truth, taught by Scripture. Nevertheless, a strong tradition held there is no contradiction in the idea of a world created *ex nihilo* from eternity. The most important representative of this tradition is Thomas Aquinas, who dedicated the opusculum *De aeternitate mundi* to the question. The upshot of Aquinas' discussion is that 'creation' signifies that God is creatures' *principium*, whether or not creatures have an *initium*.³ Moreover, Aquinas denied that Aristotle taught explicitly that the world is eternal. He thought the Stagirite viewed the eternity of the world as an open and perhaps unresolvable question from the perspective of natural philosophy. From Aquinas' many interventions in the debate, it is clear he was concerned to show that receiving Aristotle's doctrine on this point does not necessarily make one a heretic.⁴

² Admittedly, the mind of Aristotle with respect to the eternity of the world was not always clear to medieval thinkers. At *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, *Opera Omnia* II (Ad Claras Aquas, 1885), d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2 (2-23), Bonaventure rehearses four putatively demonstrative arguments of Aristotle for an eternal world, drawn almost entirely from the *Physics*. Yet in the same question, he notes that many *moderni* interpret Aristotle to mean only that the world did not begin from natural causes. Luca Bianchi, *L'errore di Aristotele: La polemica contro l'eternità del mondo nel XIII secolo* (Firenze, 1984), 29, attributes Bonaventure's uncertainty regarding Aristotle's position to the immature state of Aristotle scholarship when Bonaventure was working on his *Sentences* commentary. The next fifteen years saw great strides in exegesis of Aristotle's texts. Thereafter, his doctrine of the eternity of the world could no longer be seen as a minor lapse in Aristotle's judgment, but rather as a constitutive element of his system. Although fourteenth-century thinkers, e.g. Peter Auriol, devoted an article of their respective questions on the eternity of the world to determining the opinion of Aristotle, by 1300 no one was in serious doubt about Aristotle's view of the matter.

³ I wish to thank Christopher Wojtulewicz for this way of phrasing Aquinas' point. This assertion naturally provokes the question of why God created the world with a temporal start. If creation means ontological dependence, and creatures can depend on God for existence from eternity, why didn't God create a world from eternity? Such a question must be of interest to Christian theologians eager to understand the data of Revelation. For Aquinas, although the world's temporal beginning was not necessary, the world is more suitably ordered to its end for not having always existed, since this shows how God transcends the world, causing it freely, and not as natural causes produce their effects, see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, ed. Leonina, *Opera Omnia* XIII (Rome, 1918), II, q.35 (349). In other words, God created the world to have a temporal beginning for pedagogical reasons, and not because it belongs to the nature of created things that they begin in time.

⁴ Aquinas' reading of Aristotle on this topic is complicated, subtle, and perhaps not entirely correct. The most concise text in which Aquinas interprets Aristotle on the eternity of the world is Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Leonina, *Opera Omnia* IV (Rome, 1888) I, q.46, a.1 (478-80). There he claims Aristotle did not intend to demonstrate the eternity of the world absolutely speaking; instead, he only intended to demonstrate the falsehood of Anaxagoras' and Empedocles' respective accounts of how the world began. At *De potentia Dei*, q.3, a.17 Aquinas says Aristotle was correct to refute these two accounts, since both imply that the efficient cause of the world's motion itself undergoes change, which is absurd. See Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, ed. P. Bazzi, *Quaestiones Disputatae* II (Turin, 1949). In the same text,

As in most lively medieval discussions, Augustine played an important role in this debate. Thinkers on both sides mined his corpus for texts favoring their positions. Richard Dales observes that Augustine 'was the single greatest influence and source of ideas, doctrines, insights and arguments on the subject of the eternity of the world for the highly skilled and technically proficient philosophers of the Latin scholastic period'.⁵ To offer one example, thinkers on both sides cite *The City of God* 10, 31. Augustine mentions an image some Platonists used to show how the world is eternal: if a foot is planted in mud from eternity, its print is eternal too. The foot is the efficient cause of the print from eternity. Just so, the Platonists argue, God causes the world, and the world is coeternal with God.⁶ This image is almost ubiquitous in the medieval debate. Aquinas cites it with approval,⁷ as do later Dominicans like James of Metz.⁸ It is cited and contradicted by thinkers on the other side, like John Pecham,⁹ Arlotto of Prato,¹⁰ Bonaventure,¹¹ and Henry of Ghent.¹²

The fourteenth-century Augustinian Gregory of Rimini was an uncommonly thorough student of Augustine.¹³ That, coupled with Augustine's influence in the eternity of the world debate, make it little wonder Gregory's *quaestio* on the topic makes ample use of Augustine's works. I will focus on two philosophically and theologically significant features of Gregory's *quaestio* that depend on his reception of Augustine. First, Gregory's use of Augustine permits him, in the context of the eternity of the world debate, to articulate a new concept of what it means for God to create *ex nihilo*. Second, with Augustine's

Aquinas reports how at *Topics* I 9 Aristotle numbers whether the world is eternal among the unresolvable questions.

⁵ Richard C. Dales, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World* (Leiden, 1990), 13.

⁶ Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, ed. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge, 1998), 441.

⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *De aeternitate mundi*, ed. Leonina, *Opera Omnia* XLIII (Rome, 1976), 88, II. 221-31. Immediately after citing this passage from *The City of God*, Aquinas observes that Augustine gives no indication he regards the Platonist doctrine of eternal creation as contradictory. If the possibility of a world from eternity contained a contradiction, Aquinas reasons, Augustine would surely have perceived this, especially since as a Christian Augustine believed that the world had a temporal start.

⁸ John W. Peck and Chris Schabel, 'James of Metz and the Dominican Tradition on the Eternity of the World, ca. 1300', forthcoming in *Medioevo* 41 (2016), Appendix II, 22.

⁹ John Pecham, *Questions Concerning the Eternity of the World*, ed. Vincent Potter (New York, 1993), q.2, a.2 (35-6).

¹⁰ Richard C. Dales, 'Friar Arlotto of Prato on the Eternity of the World', *Collectanea franciscana* 56 (1986), 37-51, 41.

¹¹ Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2 (22). Bonaventure notes that his opponents' foot-in-the-mud image makes for a circular argument, since it presupposes the eternity of matter.

¹² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* I, ed. R. Macken, *Opera Omnia* V (Leiden, 1979), q.7-8 (31).

¹³ Gregory was such a careful reader of Augustine that he was able to call Peter Auriol and others to task for incorrect citations and quotations of Augustine's works, see Christopher Schabel, 'Gregory of Rimini', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2010 Edition, <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/gregory-rimini/>> (accessed on December 7, 2015).

help Gregory develops a notion of the relation between faith and Aristotelian natural philosophy at odds with others who affirmed the possibility of a world *ab aeterno*.

1. *Aer praesenti lumine non est factus lucidus, sed fit*

Ironically, the question of a possible eternal world led medieval theologians to think, not about long stretches of time, but instants. To some, *e.g.* Bonaventure, it was obvious that being created *ex nihilo* means existing first at t_1 after not existing at t_0 .¹⁴ Thinkers in this tradition minded two temporal gaps: between when a creature first exists and the moment prior; and between when a creature first exists and the moment thereafter. They wanted to show that what God creates *ex nihilo* necessarily temporally succeeds (if only by an instant) God's will to create it.¹⁵ They also wanted to show that the event of creation lacked duration, and that the existence of creatures after their initial instant depended on God preserving them. For example, Peter Auriol, one of the thinkers to whom Gregory's *quaestio* is aimed, argued for a *vis productionis*, a durationless force whereby God produces a creature. For Auriol, if the *vis productionis* had duration, *i.e.* if it were to cause a creature to exist beyond the creature's initial instant, the creature would exist independently of God for that time. Since this is contrary to faith, Auriol claims God created the world in an instant, before which there was nothing, and after which God conserves the world in being.¹⁶

Gregory's *quaestio* uses a brief text from Augustine to prove that God does not necessarily temporally precede creatures. In *De Genesi ad litteram*, to illustrate a justified person's ongoing need for grace, Augustine says: 'Air is not made lucid by a present light, but becomes [lucid]'.¹⁷ As air is lucid only when

¹⁴ Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2 (22). Of course, one wonders *when* there was t_0 . In other words, how could there be a time when there was nothing? Christian thinkers, even those who agreed with Aquinas that an eternal world is possible, needed to answer this question, since they accepted the world's temporal beginning as a matter of faith. For his part, Bonaventure argues that since God created the *mobile* and causes it to move at that instant, there was no time 'before' the first instant (*In II Sent.*, d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2, ad 2 [23]).

¹⁵ For example, see the first *contra* argument in Ricardus de Mediavilla, *In secundum librum Sententiarum* (Brescia, 1591; reprint Frankfurt, 1963), d.1, a.3, q.4 (17).

¹⁶ Peter Auriol, *Commentaria in primum[-quartum] librum Sententiarum* (Rome, 1605), II, d.1., q.1, a.2 (15): *Sed creatura vi productionis suae non habet quod duret, nisi per instans. Alias per aliquam durationem posset durare sine conservatione, et pari ratione non video quare non per totum tempus. Consequens est contra fidem, quia pro quocunque tempore creatura indiget conservante secundum fidem ... Ergo productio creaturae de se non habet, quod duret, nisi pro instanti; ergo mensuratur instanti transeunte; quare non potest esse aeterna.*

¹⁷ Augustine, *Sancti Aurelii Augustini De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim; eiusdem libri capitula. De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber. Locutionum in Heptateuchum libri septem*, ed.

there is a present source of light, so the justified person remains just only if God's grace remains. A justified person does not remain just if grace departs; he does not own his justice. On the contrary, he becomes just in every consecutive instant that God gives grace. From this image Gregory reaches three conclusions leading him to affirm a possible eternal creation. First, he says: 'It is possible for something to come to be from God all at once, even though neither it, nor any part of it begins to be then'.¹⁸ Suppose at t_x the sun illumines a quantity of air, but that the sun illumined the same air at the instant just prior, t_{x-1} . The sun illumines the air at t_x without the air beginning to be lucid then. That the air was lucid at t_{x-1} makes it no less true that it becomes lucid at t_x , since the sun's activity at t_x causes the air to be lucid then, and if the sunlight weren't present, the air would be dark. The time during which the air is lucid is a series of instants, at each of which the air *becomes* lucid.

Gregory's second conclusion follows from the first: 'It is possible that something comes to be all at once from God without any sudden or successive change'.¹⁹ If a thing comes to be necessarily as the result of change, it is impossible for anything to come to be without then beginning to be; but this is contrary to the first conclusion, which has already been proved.²⁰ That air can become lucid at t_x though it was already lucid at t_{x-1} proves that something can come to be without even an instantaneous change occurring.²¹ Finally, Gregory reaches a third conclusion: 'It is possible for something other than God to have been from eternity'.²² He argues as follows:

If the total productive cause of anything other than God (which could be produced all at once) was from eternity without defect of anything requisite for producing it, it was possible that something other than God has been from eternity. But the total productive cause, namely God, of anything other than God, for example, an angel, which could be produced whole, was from eternity without defect of anything requisite for producing it; therefore, *etc.*²³

Joseph Zycha (Vindobonae, 1894), VIII 12 (249-50); cited in Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, vol. 4, ed. A. Damasus Trapp (Berlin, 1979), II, d.1, q.3, a.1 (IV, 104, ll. 31-2): *Aer praesenti lumine non est factus lucidus, sed fit.*

¹⁸ Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (104, ll. 16-7): *Possibile est aliquam rem simul totam fieri a deo, et tamen nec ipsam nec aliquid eius tunc incipere esse.*

¹⁹ Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (104, ll. 6-7): *Quod possibile est aliquam rem totam simul a deo fieri sine aliqua mutatione subita vel successiva.*

²⁰ Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (105).

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (104, l. 8): *Possibile fuit aliquam rem aliam a deo fuisse ab aeterno.*

²³ Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (106, ll. 2-7): *Tertia conclusio probatur primo sic: Si alicuius rei alius a deo, quae tota simul potuit produci, causa totalis productiva fuit ab aeterno absque defectu alicuius requisiti ad producendum illam, possibile fuit aliquam rem aliam a deo ab aeterno fuisse. Sed alicuius rei alius a deo, quae tota simul produci potuit verbi gratia angeli, causa totalis productiva scilicet deus fuit ab aeterno absque defectu alicuius requisiti ad producendum illam. Ergo, etc.*

With the aid of Augustine's image of sunlight illuminating air, Gregory has shown that something comes to be even though it just was; moreover, such becoming requires no change. Now he argues that since from eternity God lacks nothing he needs to produce a creature, God can produce a creature from eternity.

These three conclusions permit Gregory to defeat arguments of Peter Auriol and others who deny the possibility of a world from eternity. For reasons mentioned above, Auriol argues: 'No production of a creature measured by a passing instant can be eternal; but every production of a creature, from the force whereby it is a production of a creature, is measured by a passing instant, therefore...' ²⁴ Auriol worries that, if production has duration, *i.e.* if the *vis productionis* causes a thing to exist over a span of two instants, one risks saying a thing can be without God. Since the *vis productionis* causes a thing to exist only for a durationless instant, creation cannot be eternal *a parte ante* or *a parte post*. For Auriol, a thing is created necessarily in a single instant. But Gregory disagrees. Though he concedes production is measured by an instant, his first conclusion has shown that something can be produced at t_x without first being produced then. Per his second conclusion, nor is it necessary that a change occurred from t_{x-1} to t_x . Instead, the eternal God, the complete productive cause of all creatures, can produce the same creature all at once in each instant of an infinite series of consecutive instants. Thus, far from implying that creatures can exist apart from God, Gregory's argument for a possible eternal world shows that creatures are produced whole by God at each *now*.

The eternity of the world debate, with its focus on God's effects in consecutive instants, has occasioned Gregory to articulate a doctrine of creation that emphasizes God's ongoing omnipotence over creatures. In effect, Gregory has collapsed the distinction between creation and conservation. For example, he fields an objection according to which something cannot be created for as long as it exists, since this would mean a thing is in continual becoming, as *dies et agon*. He replies: 'As long as a creature has being from another, and not from something, it is always created'. ²⁵ Moreover, it is in continual becoming not as *dies et agon*, *i.e.* as something that becomes successively, but as something which, 'although it is and was made, still in all time and at any instant both has being and actually comes to be all at once through an agent'. ²⁶ If, as Auriol *et alii* argue, God created the world *ex nihilo* necessarily at a specific *now*, before

²⁴ Peter Auriol, *Commentaria*, II, d.1., q.1, a.2 (15): *Nulla productio creaturae mensurata instanti transeunte potest esse aeterna; sed omnis productio creaturae, ex vi qua est productio creaturae habet quod mesuretur instanti transeunte, ergo.*

²⁵ Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (112, ll. 23-4): *Quamdiu creatura habet esse ab alio, et non de aliquo, semper creatur.*

²⁶ Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (112, ll. 10-1): *Quamvis ipsum sit et factum sit, in toto tamen tempore et quolibet eius instanti ipsum habet esse et actu totum simul fit ab agente.*

which there was nothing and after which he conserves the world in being, the *now* of creation is the manifestation par excellence of God's omnipotence. After all, what could bespeak God's power more than his ability to create *ex nihilo*? On the other hand, Gregory's reception of Augustine's observation about light has led him to develop a vision of creation according to which God creates the world *ex nihilo* at every instant. As a Christian Gregory accepts the dogma of the world's temporal beginning: *de facto* God created the world from nothing at a specific moment. Gregory's argument in favor of a possible eternal world shows, however, that the present moment is as much an effect of God's omnipotence as was the world's first moment. Even now God creates the world *ex nihilo*. As air becomes lucid at every moment the sun illumines it, and as a person is justified at every moment God gives the grace of justification, so at every moment something other than God exists, God creates it from nothing.

2. *sicut splendor ... esset coaeternus si esset ignis aeternus*

Let's return to Gregory's third conclusion, since his use of Augustine in that context is significant for his view of the relationship between faith and Aristotelian natural philosophy. Gregory gives two arguments for the third conclusion, the second of which is more significant for my purposes. But the first provides important preparation for the second, so I'll spend some time discussing it first. According to the third conclusion, 'it is possible for something other than God to have been from eternity'. Gregory regards the minor ('God was from all eternity without defect...') as certain. To prove the major ('If the total productive cause of anything other than God...'), he enlists the help of Augustine, who in *De Trinitate* VI challenges Arius' view of what it means that the Son is born of the Father. Augustine reports that, for Arius, since the Son is born of the Father, he cannot be coeternal with him. Arius argued thus, 'Not understanding that, for God, even being born is from all eternity; that the Son is coeternal with the Father, just as brightness which is generated and diffused by fire is coeval with it, and would be coeternal, if fire were eternal'.²⁷ Augustine's saying that if fire were eternal, its brightness would be coeternal, clarifies what Augustine regarded as Arius' error. His principal mistake was *not* that he applied a creaturely notion of generation to the Father's generating the Son; after all, fire 'begets' its brightness in a creaturely way. It consisted, rather, in thinking that production necessarily occurs through change. On the contrary,

²⁷ See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ed. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CChr.SL 50, 50A (Turnhout, 1968), 6.1.1 (228, ll. 12-5): ... *non intelligens etiam natum esse deo sempiternum esse ut sit coaeternus patri filius, sicut splendor qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur coaeus est illi, et esset coaeternus si esset ignis aeternus.*

Augustine insists, in certain divine and creaturely productions the product is simultaneous with the producer's producing.

How does Gregory use Augustine's example to prove the major premise of the argument for the third conclusion? First, he confronts the objection that Augustine's example, while valid for natural causes like fire, does not apply to free agents. Since God acts freely, and fire emits brightness naturally, the simultaneity of fire and brightness does not prove an eternal creation is possible. In answer, Gregory observes that Augustine's conditional contrary to fact ('If fire were eternal...') holds only in virtue of another proposition, *i.e.* 'when a naturally sufficient active cause is posited, necessarily with the other requisite things, the action is posited at the same time'.²⁸ He reasons that, if Augustine is right about there being nothing contradictory in a natural created cause eternally producing its effect, *a fortiori* nor is it impossible for a free agent to produce an effect coeternal with itself.²⁹ After all, free causes are not less powerful for being free. The only difference is that, when it comes to the free agent, the production is not necessary. Next, Gregory notes that when Augustine proposes his fire/brightness example, he supposes the concurrence of God as the freely acting superior agent. Thus even if fire were eternal and brightness coeternal with it, God would still be the primary cause of the fire and the fire's act of producing brightness. The argument Gregory constructs from Augustine's example is clear: there's nothing contradictory about an eternal fire producing coeternal brightness; moreover, such production supposes the concurrence of the first cause; but God does not require a secondary cause to create;³⁰ therefore, 'it is possible for something other than God to have been from eternity'.

Thereafter, Gregory argues to the third conclusion in a second way, in which he makes further use of Augustine's fire/brightness image. As I mentioned at the outset, the debate surrounding the possibility of an eternal creation is interesting partly because it reveals how medieval thinkers understood the relationship between faith and Aristotelian natural philosophy. Gregory proposes a vision

²⁸ Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (106, ll. 19-20): *Posita causa sufficiente naturaliter activa cum ceteris necessario requisitis, simul ponitur actio.*

²⁹ In the same passage Gregory is quick to add that God is not the only free cause who can have an effect coeternal with itself. He insists that, for Augustine, the proposition, 'if a created will were from eternity, with the other things requisite for willing, it would be possible for its volition to be co-eternal', is no less necessary than the proposition about the coeternity of fire and its brightness.

³⁰ In his reply *ad auctoritates*, Gregory argues for God's self-sufficiency in creating. In the *quod non* portion of the *quaestio*, Hugh had been cited as arguing that the omnipotent power of God 'could not have anything else coeternal besides itself' (*non poterat aliud praeter se habere coaeternum*). But Gregory notes that Hugh's text continues as follows: *quo in faciendo iuaretur* ... Thus, according to Gregory, '[Hugh] wishes only to deny some eternal matter not made by God, out of which [God] made other things; without [eternal matter], and only from it, could God make the things he made, and thus he was helped by something coeternal, as the Manichees opined' (Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 [117, ll. 18-32]).

of that relationship different from that of other medieval proponents of the possibility of an eternal creation. Gregory's second argument for the third conclusion begins with a premise known by faith. He argues: 'The Son of God truly has been produced from eternity. Therefore, something other than God could be produced from eternity'.³¹ From faith he affirms the Aristotelian position. Gregory's argument has a few steps: first, he claims the notion of a product produced from eternity is no more contradictory than the Son's eternal generation by the Father. For, 'if [a contradiction] seemed to be implied, this would seem precisely because eternity is repugnant to a product with respect to what came before. But this is common to both [the Son's eternal generation and an eternal world]'.³² In other words, the Son's eternal generation reveals that having a temporal beginning is not essential to being a product. The Son is produced, but has no temporal beginning; therefore, there's nothing contradictory about the world lacking a temporal start.

Of course, an obvious objection arises: That the notion of an eternal product is not contradictory *per se* does not mean that just any product can be eternal. Considered as a product, the Son of God is unique since 1) he is consubstantial with the One producing him,³³ and 2) the Father generates him necessarily since it is his personal property to do so. Gregory handles 2) with ease. In the tradition of Aquinas,³⁴ he observes that even when God acts freely he does not deliberate. Thus there needn't be a delay between God's act of willing creation (which is necessarily an eternal act), and the world's temporal duration.³⁵

Augustine helps Gregory answer 1). First, he responds that producer and product being of different natures presents no obstacle to coeternity, 'provided that the complete and sufficient producer is eternal, and the effect can be produced all at once'. Next, Gregory observes that if producer and product must be consubstantial to be coeternal, then Augustine's fire/brightness example would be null. According to the example, brightness would be coeternal with fire, although it is not consubstantial with fire. Finally, Gregory reminds his readers of Augustine's purpose at the beginning of book 6 of *De Trinitate*, i.e. to defeat Arius' objection to the Son's coeternity with the Father. Of course, an unspoken premise of Arius' objection is that Father and Son are not of the

³¹ Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (106, ll. 35-6): *Filius dei fuit vere productus ab aeterno. Igitur aliqua res a deo potuit esse producta ab aeterno.*

³² Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (107, ll. 2-4): *Nam si qua videretur implicari, hoc praecise videretur, quia producto repugnaret aeternitas a parte ante. Hoc autem commune est utrique.*

³³ At *In II Sent.*, d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2 (22), Bonaventure also argues that the Father can produce the Son from eternity, since the Son is not produced *ex nihilo*; rather, the Son is of the same essence as the Father and exists necessarily. One finds the same point from Arlotto of Prato in R.C. Dales, 'Friar Arlotto of Prato' (1986), 46 [2].

³⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *De aeternitate mundi* (87, ll. 119-24).

³⁵ Gregory of Rimini, *Super secundum*, d.1, q.3, a.1 (107).

same nature. Since convincing Arius' followers to change their minds about the coeternity of Father and Son requires Augustine to argue on his opponents' terms, he shows that even two beings like fire and brightness (which are not of the same substance) can still be coeternal. If this is true of fire and brightness, why shouldn't it also be so for the Father and the Son? Augustine's strategy in the passage is thus to tackle the Arian heresy one piece at a time: on the way to convincing Arius' successors that Father and Son are consubstantial, he argues that the Father's immutability requires the Son to be coeternal with him. All of which is to say that, if two different substances cannot be coeternal with one another, Augustine's argumentation at *De Trinitate* VI, 1 is both incorrect and methodologically flawed, which none of Gregory's readers would have been happy to admit.

Gregory's use of Augustine to prove his third conclusion holds special significance in the medieval debate over the possibility of a world from eternity. Gregory was not the first thinker whose view of the issue was informed quite explicitly by the data of Christian revelation. Thinkers like Henry of Ghent³⁶ and Peter Auriol³⁷ preceded him in this respect. Moreover, Gregory stands in a long tradition of thinkers who affirmed the possibility of a world from eternity, though the Christians in that tradition all believed that, in fact, the world has a finite temporal duration *a parte ante*. What makes Gregory's intervention unique is his use of revealed principles to arrive at the Aristotelian view that an eternal world is possible. Others who affirmed the possibility of a world from eternity, e.g. Boethius of Dacia,³⁸ Thomas Aquinas,³⁹ and William of

³⁶ At *Quodlibeta* I, Henry argues: 'If it is posited that [the world] always had being from God from eternity, not only did it never acquire being from God newly [*de novo*] from some beginning of time, but is it altogether impossible that it ever acquired being from God newly in some beginning of time. But this is simply false and impossible, since faith, which posits that the world was sometime made new by God, holds the contrary' (Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* I, q.7-8 [41-2]).

³⁷ As we have seen, Auriol intervenes in the debate at *Scriptum super II Sent.*, d.1., q.1, a.2 (15). He sides with Henry of Ghent in the view that an eternal world implies the necessity of creation. The most important parts of Auriol's discussion concern the duration of the force of production (*vis productionis*). For Auriol, creation must occur in an indivisible instant, since if the *vis productionis* has duration, the world could exist without God conserving it; *but this is contrary to the faith*, which holds that things' continued existence requires there be something conserving them; therefore, a being's production lasts only an instant and cannot be eternal.

³⁸ Boethius argued that a natural philosopher, *qua* natural philosopher, perforce must deny that God created the world with a temporal beginning, since such an affirmation threatens the integrity of natural philosophy as a science, see Boethius of Dacia, *On the Supreme Good, On the Eternity of the World, On Dreams*, trans. John F. Wippel (Toronto, 1987), 51.

³⁹ As is well known, Thomas Aquinas argued that, reasoning from principles naturally available to the human intellect, one can neither prove nor disprove the eternity of the world, see especially *Summa theologiae* I, q.46, a.1 (478-80). Since the notion of a world from eternity contains no contradiction, it was possible for God to create such a world, see *De aeternitate mundi* (88, ll. 211-3).

Ockham,⁴⁰ had done so by purposefully bracketing out principles known by faith. In contrast to Gregory's question on the eternity of the world, the absence of starting points taken from divine revelation characterizes the contributions of each of these thinkers to the debate. Alongside the contributions of others affirming the possibility of a world from eternity, Gregory's arguing from eternal Trinitarian processions stands out in sharp relief.

There is something unsettling, however, about Gregory's use of revealed doctrines as principles in the debate. When the debate over the eternity of the world began, it was philosophical in nature, and that was largely the point.⁴¹ After all, medieval Christian theologians all held in faith that the world began in time. The debate flourished between thinkers like Aquinas and Bonaventure, who argued from natural principles. The philosophical discussion about the eternity of the world is interesting inasmuch as it concerns what unaided human reason can discover about the doctrine of creation. Bringing revealed principles to bear on the debate risks diverting it away from the important philosophical ends for the sake of which it began. Moreover, since Christians *in statu viatorum* do not see revealed principles as clearly as God and the blessed do, it is not always clear what one legitimately deduces from them. Different theologians may arrive at radically diverse conclusions from the same revealed principle. For example, Henry of Ghent also brings Christian faith in Trinitarian processions to bear on the eternity of the world debate. He argues that if one affirms the possibility of an eternal world, then God's production of the world begins to resemble the Father's production of the Son. Of course, Henry admits that the Father begets the Son in unity of substance, while the world is produced in an alien substance. Nevertheless, the similarity implied suffices to convince Henry that an eternal creation is impossible.⁴² Thus, from the very same revealed principle, *i.e.* the Father's production of the Son, Henry and Gregory deduce contrary conclusions.

⁴⁰ Proceeding from philosophical principles, Ockham likewise argues that a world from eternity is possible. Nor does he shrink from this view when he fails to reconcile the eternity of the world with God's freedom to create or not to create, see William of Ockham, *Quaestiones Variarum*, ed. Girardus I. Etzkorn, Franciscus E. Kelley and Josephus C. Wey in *Guillelmi de Ockham: Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Opera Theologica VIII* (St. Bonaventure, 1984), q.3 (87-92).

⁴¹ For example, consider the approach of St. Bonaventure, ostensibly the leader of those opposing the possibility of an eternal creation. At *In II Sent.*, d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2, he makes six arguments against such a possible eternal world. All six are properly philosophical and founded on principles derived from Aristotle's *Physics*. Five of the arguments concern the nature of the infinite and the absurdities that would arise in the event of a world from eternity. The sixth claims that a thing whose matter and form are produced out of nothing necessarily has a temporal start. In the question's *respondeo*, Bonaventure argues: 'To propose that the world is eternal or is eternally produced by positing that all things have been produced from nothing is entirely contrary to truth and reason ... and it is so contrary to reason, that I don't believe any philosopher, no matter how little his intelligence, has posited this' (*ibid.* 22).

⁴² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta I*, q.7-8 (36-7).

So, by way of conclusion, I wish to make two points. First, Gregory of Rimini's contribution to the eternity of the world debate may be interpreted as validating the methods of some contemporary analytic philosophers who ask about possible worlds. The goal of their approach, of course, is to learn something about the actual world. In his *quaestio* Gregory asks about a possible world from eternity, and this inquiry leads him to interesting conclusions regarding God's creative activity in the actual world. Second, Gregory's use of revealed principles in arguing for his third conclusion presents us with a certain irony: although Gregory concludes in favor of the traditional Aristotelian position, *i.e.* that an eternal world is possible, he threatens to destroy Aristotelian natural science in the process. Aristotle was always committed to the view that each science, *e.g.* natural philosophy, has principles proper to it, and that doing science means reasoning from the principles proper to one's science. Although Gregory agrees with an important conclusion of Aristotelian natural philosophy, he damages the integrity of that science by arguing on the basis of principles that transcend it.

Tradition, Authority, and the Grounds for Belief in Late Fourteenth-Century Theology

Jeffrey C. WITT, Baltimore, USA

ABSTRACT

This article aims to offer some reflections on fourteenth-century uses of Augustine's famous dictum, 'I would not believe the gospel if the authority of the church did not move me to do so'. In particular the article draws attention to the way uses of this authoritative statement appeared in medieval debates about *both* the nature of religious authority *and* what constitutes proper theological practice. In other helpful considerations of uses of this quotation in the fourteenth century, the former has received the bulk of the emphasis. This article reflects on the ways these two issues are related. It argues, in a preliminary way, that scholastic thinkers' different interpretations of this quotation with respect to the locus of church authority push them toward different understandings of the fundamental starting points of theology and *vice versa*.

In this brief survey, I aim to offer some reflections on fourteenth-century uses of Augustine's famous dictum, 'I would not believe the gospel if the authority of the church did not move me to do so'.¹ Here I draw attention to the way this authoritative statement was used in medieval debates about *both* the nature of religious authority *and* what constitutes proper theological practice. In other helpful considerations of uses of this quotation in the fourteenth century, the former has received the bulk of the emphasis.² But it is my working view that these two issues are closely related, and this article is part of a larger project of considering how these issues intertwine. In the course of this article, I point out how medieval thinkers' different interpretations of this quotation with respect to the locus of church authority push them toward different understandings of the fundamental starting points of theology. Likewise, the inverse seems true; different interpretations of this quotation in the context of

¹ Augustine, *Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti*, PL 192, I, 5.6 (176): *Ego vero Evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae Ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas*.

² This is decidedly the focus of Marijn de Kroon in his investigation of this passage in *We Believe in God and in Christ. Not in the Church* (Louisville, 2009). De Kroon's collections of sources, translations, and commentary have been very helpful to my own reflections. Still, his concern is decidedly on the role this quotation plays in establishing proper religious authority. Therefore, I think, he under emphasizes the important role this passage played in debates about theological practice and theological principles.

the nature of theology push theologians toward disparate views on the nature of church authority.

Before getting to the fourteenth century, we need a little bit of background. Most important for the reception history of this quotation is its early use in support of canon 9, of distinction 11, in the first book of Gratian's *Decretum*.³ The thrust of the canon is to support and establish a particular sense of church tradition. Oberman calls this the 'two-sources' theory, in which Scripture and an extra-scriptural tradition constitute, together, authoritative church tradition. But Oberman also notes a reactionary trend in the late Middle Ages that 'should be seen as a protest against the growing acceptance of the ... two sources theory'.⁴ This trend, he suggests, is visible in the likes of Bradwardine and Wyclif.⁵ Alternatively, it is identified as Tradition I and asserts the complete and exhaustive sufficiency of Holy Scripture for theological work. Nor should Bradwardine and Wyclif be seen as avant-garde in this respect. Aquinas makes rather clear statements identifying himself as member of Tradition I.⁶ In contrast, Tradition II, the two-sources theory, suggests the insufficiency of Scripture for theological work. As we will see, paying attention to how a thinker interprets the Augustinian passage is one clue to understanding how they view the role of Scripture and extra-scriptural authority in proper theological practice.

William of Ockham

A clear and influential discussion of this passage occurs in Ockham's treatise *Dialogus de potestate papae et imperatoris*.⁷ It is worth noting straightaway that while the Protestant Reformers (and often the modern reader) understood the pressing issue to be whether or not this quotation supported or detracted

³ Gratian, *Decretum Gratiani*, ed. Aemilius Friedberg, *Corpus Iuris Canonici* (Graz, 1959), I, d.11, c.9: *palam est...* (I 25).

⁴ Heiko A. Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Cambridge, 1963), 371.

⁵ For Bradwardine, see H.A. Oberman, *Harvest* (1963), 372; *id.*, *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine a Fourteenth Century Augustinian: A Study of his Theology in its Historical Context* (Utrecht, 1958), 22-7; for Wyclif, see Oberman, *Harvest* (1963), 372-3.

⁶ See for example Thomas' claim – noted by H.A. Oberman, *Harvest* (1963), 369 n. 20 – in the *Summa* indicating that Sacred Scripture is the sole authoritative source of theology: *Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi apostolis et prophetis factae, qui canonicos libros scripserunt, non autem revelationi, si qua fuit aliis doctoribus facta*. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Leonina, *Opera Omnia* IV (Rome, 1888) I, q.1, a.8, ad 2 (22).

⁷ For an overview of this work and its place in Ockham's political philosophy, see George D. Knysh, *Fragments of Ockham Hermeneutics* (Winnipeg, 1997); *id.*, *Political Ockhamism* (Winnipeg, 1996) as well as the web resource edited by John Kilcullen and Geroge Knysh, 'Ockham and the Dialogus', <www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/wock.html> (accessed on December 12, 2015). See also Takashi Shogimen, *Ockham and Political Discourse in the Late Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2007).

from the doctrine of *sola scriptura*, this was not Ockham's primary concern. Rather, he was focused on interpreting this quotation in such a way that the historical church tradition was seen as having a higher and superior authority over present church authorities, *i.e.* the current pope and the bishops alive in his day. His concern was to show that what Augustine meant by 'church' was the entire succession of bishops extending from the first apostles down to the present day. This sense of 'church' needs to be sharply distinguished from the 'church' signifying the current pope or any particular church council.

Ockham's words, interpreting the statute asserted by Gratian, are as follows:

Here the catholic church refers to the bishops and the peoples who have succeeded one another from the days of the apostles right up to the present day. And it is in this sense that Augustine understands the term 'church' where he asserts: 'I would not believe the gospel were it not that the authority of the church compels me'.⁸

However, despite his concern to distinguish between 'church' as the aggregate of church history and the 'church' as the current pope and his statutes, Ockham's interpretation does compel him to take a stand on the sufficiency of scriptural authority vis-à-vis the church, what Oberman identified as the key issue distinguishing Tradition I and Tradition II. When 'church' is taken in the second way – as referring merely to the present church authorities – Ockham has no problem claiming that the Gospel (or Scripture) has a higher authority than the church.⁹ However, when 'church' is understood as the historical aggregate of church authorities and its offered wisdom, he says, it is 'more greatly to be believed than the Gospel. Not because the Gospel is to be doubted in any way whatsoever, but because the sum is greater than its parts'.¹⁰

This declaration rather clearly shows that Ockham understands church tradition in the second sense that Oberman has identified. By demarcating Scripture as *a part* of a greater whole, he indicates that he understands authoritative tradition as something that includes *both* a scriptural authority *and* an extra-scriptural

⁸ William Ockham, *Dialogus de potestate papae et imperatoris. Compendium errorum Joannis XXII*, in *Monarchia S. Romani Imperii sive Tractatus de iurisdictione imperali, regia, et pontificia seu sacerdotali* (Frankfurt, 1614; reprint: Turin, 1959), I, c.4 (402, ll. 43-6): *Ubi ecclesia catholica episcopos et populos a tempore apostolorum usque ad hodiernum diem sibimet succedentes importat. Et sic accipit nomen Ecclesiae Augustinus cum asserit, quod non crederet evangelium, nisi eum auctoritas ecclesiae compelleret*, trans. M. de Kroon, *We Believe in God* (2009), 2.

⁹ Ockham, *Dialogus*, I, c.4 (402, ll. 48-9): *Et per consequens probari non potest, quod maior fides exhibenda sit sacris canonibus, quam evangelio sancto / ... it is impossible to prove that we should place more faith in the sacred tenets of ecclesiastical law than in the holy gospel*, trans. M. de Kroon, *We Believe in God* (2009), 3.

¹⁰ Ockham, *Dialogus*, I, c.4 (402, ll. 48-9): *Conceditur tamen, quod magis credendum est ecclesiae, quae est multitudo catholicorum omnium, qui fuerunt a temporibus prophetarum et apostolorum usque modo, quam evangelio: non quia de evangelio sit aliquialiter dubitandum, sed quia totum maius est sua parte*, trans. M. de Kroon, *We Believe in God* (2009), 3.

authority. Furthermore, Ockham arrives at this position, in part, through his interpretation of the Augustinian passage, noting that while Augustine is not asserting the superiority of the pope or any specific church council over Scripture, he does think that the wider historical church tradition holds a superior position over Scripture. Thus, with the critical statute in Gratian's *Decretum*, he can affirm that 'in cases of doubt about faith and certainty about faith, the authority of the Catholic Church must have the last word'.¹¹ But by 'church', of course, he means the wider extra-scriptural church tradition, not merely the current pope.

It is this issue of doubt, and the role of Scripture and authority in resolving that doubt, that is of interest here, particularly in the context of the scholastic understanding of proper theological discourse and the true first principles of theology. If theology is to be understood as a quasi-Aristotelian science, its practitioners must be able to trace its conclusions back to agreed upon starting points, so that its deductions and inferences can be methodically verified, and, like a quasi-demonstration, exist without doubt.

The question, then, is where does theology begin? What kind of foundational authority does it need in order to begin and in order to obtain a status that goes beyond mere faith? Ockham, following Gratian's statute, clearly acknowledges certain issues of doubt within the faith that Scripture, by itself, cannot reconcile, and thus it would seem that theology must extend further to other authoritative resources.¹²

It is on precisely this issue of doubt and the sufficiency of scriptural authority for theological work that we see the question of the proper interpretation of the Augustinian passage emerge once more a few decades later in the fourteenth century. We can see this in a couple of different authors. First, provisionally in the writing of Hermann of Schildesche and then more extensively in the context of Gregory of Rimini's criticism of Francis Marchia's views on the proper starting point of theological discourse.

¹¹ Gratian, *Decretum*, I, d.11, c.9 (I, 25): *Palam est quantum in re dubia ad fidem et certitudinem valeat catholicae ecclesiae auctoritas*, trans. M. de Kroon, *We believe in God* (2009), 2. See the use by Ockham in *Diaologus*, I, c.4 (402, ll. 41-3). See also above fn. 3.

¹² More time would allow us to point to Ockham's general adoption of Peter Aureoli's 'declarative' understanding of theology, which puts an emphasis on the use of principles of the natural sciences to support Scripture and the truths of faith as opposed to 'deductive' theology which generally sees itself as taking the authority of Scripture for granted and deducing further truths implicitly contained in Sacred Scripture. See Ockham's assertion: *Ad aliud, concedo quod potest vocari declarativus*, in Ockham *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q.7 (OTH I:198). See also Stephen F. Brown, 'Peter of Candia's Hundred-Year "History" of the Theologian's Role', *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991), 156-90; *id.*, 'Declarative and Deductive Theology in the Early Fourteenth Century', in Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (eds), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26 (Berlin, 1998), 648-55; and Jeffrey C. Witt, 'Interpreting Augustine: On the Nature of "Theological Knowledge" in the Fourteenth Century', *SP* 69 (2013), 359-71.

Hermann of Schildesche

Hermann of Schildesche read the *Sentences* at Paris, sometime around 1330/31 or 1331/32 and became master of the theology in 1334.¹³ While his *Sentences* commentary does not seem to have survived, his work *Tractatus contra haereticos negantes immunitatem et iurisdictionem sanctae ecclesiae* provides us with another interpretation of the Augustinian passage. Schildesche's explicit focus is on the 'beginning of the articles of faith'. In other words, he is asking about the authoritative foundation of all other articles of faith that are derived from this foundation. Schildesche argues, with the help of Augustine, that it begins with the larger church community whose authority and wisdom establishes the authority of Scripture from which all other articles of belief are derived.

He writes:

The third reason derives from the fact that the holy church handed down books to us, and also sanctioned them. Those books are the source of all the articles of faith. The third reason, thus, is as follows: That whereby we believe the Scripture is the fundamental principle of the articles of the faith. But this belief in the Scripture comes about because we believe in the church. And this is why Augustine states ... I would not believe the gospel if the authority of the holy church did not move me to do so.¹⁴

This passage is notable, in part, because of its ambiguity. In one breath he identifies Scripture as a fundamental principle, *but then* asserts that our belief in the veracity of Scripture is itself a deduction from a higher principle, namely the veracity of church tradition, which 'sanctions' the authority of Scripture. It is the church's possession of an independent extra-scriptural wisdom that would seem to ground the veracity of Scripture. On such a reading, it falls under the purview of the theological science to not only deduce the articles of faith from the contents of Scripture, but likewise to trace the deductions from the authority of the church community directly to one's trust in the veracity of Scripture itself.

A brief example might be helpful here. Imagine entering a new city (for example Oxford) with a guidebook as an authority to the best sights to see and best restaurants to visit. After asserting to a friend that a particular route is the

¹³ Adolar Zumkeller, 'Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und Philosophisch-Theologische Lehre', *Analecta Augustiniana* 27 (1964), 167-262, 210-1.

¹⁴ Hermann de Scildis, *Tractatus contra haereticos negantes immunitatem et iurisdictionem sanctae ecclesiae*, ed. Adolar Zumkeller (Würzburg, 1970), 7, ll. 62-7: *Tertia ratio sumitur ex eo, quod sancta Ecclesia tradidit et authenticavit nobis libros, unde omnes articuli colliguntur, et est talis: Illud est nobis principium articulorum fidei, per quod credimus Scripturae, unde articuli colliguntur; sed hoc est eo, quod credimus in sanctam Ecclesiam. Unde dicit Augustinus ubi supra: 'Evangelio non crederem, nisi me sanctae Ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas'*, trans. M. de Kroon, *We Believe in God* (2009), 6.

best way to see the city, you may be charged with justifying your proposal. The question, then, is what exactly are you required to justify. Is it taken for granted that your guidebook is authoritative and therefore you only need to articulate the inferences you made from this book to arrive at the proposed route, or does the authority of your guide book itself rest on a prior set of authoritative beliefs that, when combined, establish the guide book as authoritative? Schildesche seems to be of the latter opinion and presumably sees it is a part of the theologian's job to articulate these beliefs.

Francis Marchia and Gregory of Rimini

Schildesche's position, however, puts him at odds with his fellow Augustinian Hermit, Gregory of Rimini, who in his criticisms of Francis of Marchia's description of the principles of theology, reinterprets the Augustinian passage so as to take an opposing position: that is, to see the scriptural book as possessing an independent authority of its own and admitting of no prior deduction that the theologian can be responsible for establishing.¹⁵

While Francis of Marchia describes the theological process as a primarily deductive habit,¹⁶ – the goal of which is to make explicit what is implicit in Scripture – Gregory of Rimini is concerned with Marchia's description of the very first principles that the theologian appeals to in this process of deduction.

Marchia's position on this point lies first in his understanding of Aristotle. He writes that, according to Aristotle, we assent to something either 'on account of itself' (*propter se*) or 'on account of something else' (*propter aliud*).¹⁷ But the fact that 'Scripture is true', for Marchia, is clearly not something we assent to *propter se*. Therefore, it must be something we assent to *propter aliud*. Therefore, it must be an authority grounded on and deduced from higher principles that the theologian must recognize. Marchia, for example, points to miracles as an authoritative sign that leads us to the further conclusion that 'Scripture is the Word of God and is therefore true'.¹⁸ And, from the context

¹⁵ For another discussion of this debate in the context of a discussion of the meaning of faith, see Jeffrey C. Witt, 'Acquired Faith and Mair's Theological Project', in John T. Slotemaker and Jeffrey C. Witt (eds), *A Companion to the Theology of John Mair* (Leiden, 2015), 41-73, 68-70.

¹⁶ Francis of Marchia, *Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Quaestiones praeambulae et Prologus*, ed. N. Mariani, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum* 31 (Grottaferrata, 2003), I, prol., q.1, *passim* (447-68, esp. 460, n. 53, ll. 264-7; 465, n. 72, ll. 41-6).

¹⁷ Francis of Marchia, *Commentarius* I, prol., q.1, a.1 (451, n. 23, ll. 93-6): *Tunc quero de primo: quare tu ei assentis? Quia vel propter se vel propter aliud crediturum; non propter aliud, tum quia tunc illud non esset primum, tum quia tunc queram etiam de illo: quare ei assentis?, nec propter se.*

¹⁸ Francis of Marchia, *Commentarius* I, prol., q.1, a.1 (461, n. 54, ll. 274-83): *Sed dices; quomodo est notum vel constat quod ista sint revelata a Deo? Dico quod ex aliquibus per se notis, puta per signa supernaturalia per se nota et certa, saltem secundo genere certitudinis, qualiter*

of Rimini's own response, this would appear to be how Marchia interprets the Augustinian passage in question. The authority of the church – perhaps established by the miracles it has performed throughout its history or even just its astounding continuity or the commonly recognized wisdom of its leaders – is itself a foundation prior to the authority of Scripture. And because this authoritative voice asserts the veracity of Scripture as God's word, we are justified in taking Scripture as an authoritative guide. The important point to note here is that Marchia implicitly understands the Augustinian passage as suggesting that there is theologically relevant intellectual work that precedes a mere deduction from Scripture. And this work requires an extra-scriptural authority in order to be carried out.

Rimini acknowledges the distinction between *propter se* and *propter aliud*. However, he thinks Marchia, by not realizing that something can be assented to *propter aliud* in two ways, has backed himself into corner in which he must agree that theological justification goes beyond its scriptural principles. Rimini explains: to assent to something *propter aliud* can mean to assent 'on account of a prior syllogism', but it can also mean 'on account of some other reason than the self-evidence of the proposition'. Rimini thinks that assent based on experience works in the latter way.¹⁹ We assent to the fact that the 'cat is on the mat' because we are present and we experience that fact and not because we deduced it from a prior syllogism. But at the same time, the fact that the 'cat is on the mat' is not self-evident strictly speaking and therefore is not assented to *propter se*. It is with this distinction in mind that Rimini interprets the Augustinian passage. He writes:

Augustine does not say he believes the Gospel on account of some assent that he has given to some other principle, the truth of which has been demonstrated or proved to be true through a syllogism. Rather, he only says that [he believes] from the authority of the church as if some cause is moving him to faith in the Gospel. And it is as if he said, I would not have believed the Gospel unless the sanctity of the church *stirred me* to do so (emphasis mine).²⁰

sunt nota et certa principia philosophica vel moralia, licet non tanta certitudine quanta est in mathematicis, ... per se enim notum est cuicumque, etiam philosopho, signa excedentia limites et facultatem totius naturae, qualia sunt resurrectio mortuorum et miracula alia quae sunt visa pluries, oportere reduci in causam primam, limites totius naturae excedentem.

¹⁹ Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum*, ed. A. Damasus Trapp and Venicio Marcolino, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1981), I, prol., q.1, a.2 (21, ll. 18-21): *Nam hoc est falsum, sicut patet in principiis, quae sumuntur ex experientiis singularium, quorum assensus causa est experimentum, cuius causae etiam fuerunt experientiae multae singularium, ut dicitur 2 Posteriorum in fine...*

²⁰ Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura* I, prol., q.1, a.2 (21, ll. 24-30): *Nec auctoritas Augustini est contra, quoniam Augustinus non dicit se credere evangelio propter assensum, quem habeat ad aliquod aliud principium, ex quo evangelium demonstretur vel syllogistice probetur esse verum, sed solum ex auctoritate ecclesiae tamquam ex causa movente ipsum ad fidem evangelii; et est quasi simile huic dicto, quod iste vel alius dicere potuisset: Non crederem evangelio, nisi me ecclesiae sanctitas commoveret...*

The ‘stirring’ – likened to a ‘spur or stimulus’ by Kroon²¹ – is for Rimini, not a prior syllogism or argument of any kind. It is better thought of as a miraculous kind of ‘prompting’ that has no prior explanation. The result is that Rimini sees the authoritative scriptural starting points of theology as standing in need of no prior justification. On the contrary, the theologian must begin with a kind of faith in the veracity of Scripture as absolutely fundamental and exhaustive. Without this kind of faith, theology cannot begin. The mystery of the church would seem to have some part to play in the inception of that faith, but it is clearly a divine act for which human investigation and deduction cannot substitute.

In sum, Rimini explicitly excludes any prior justification of the veracity of Scripture from the discipline of theology. Further, he would seem to be tending toward a departure from the wider sense of tradition, invoked by Ockham and affirmed by Schildesche, which sees Scripture as a subordinate part of a larger authoritative tradition. By emphasizing, the importance of the stirring or prompting that moves the individual, Rimini is asserting, at least with respect to theological praxis, the total sufficiency of the scriptural tradition.

With this divergence between Rimini and Marchia noted, I want to turn finally to two further appearances of this Augustinian passage in the very late fourteenth century that suggest a continued divergence between two camps or ways of interpreting this text which, in turn, correspond to two diverse ways of conceiving of the task of theology itself.

Pierre d’Ailly

First, it is notable that in the *Sentences* commentary of Pierre d’Ailly, we not only see a description of theology complementary to Rimini’s,²² but, when it comes to his explanation of the principles of theology, we see Rimini’s explanation of the Augustinian passage lifted directly from Rimini’s text and placed within d’Ailly’s commentary.²³ Such repetition would appear to indicate a

²¹ M. de Kroon, *We Believe in God* (2009), 10.

²² For a general introduction to Pierre d’Ailly, see Bernard Guenée, *Between Church and State: The Lives of Four French Prelates in the Late Middle Ages*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, 1991), 102-258; and Louis B. Pascoe, *Church and Reform: Bishops, Theologians, and Canon Lawyers in the Thought of Pierre d’Ailly* (Leiden, 2005). For an introduction to his commentary on the *Sentences*, see Monica Calma, ‘Pierre d’Ailly: Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard’, *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 47 (2007), 139-94.

²³ Pierre d’Ailly, *Quaestiones super Primum, Tertium et Quartum Librum Sententiarum. I: Principia et Quaestio circa Prologum*, ed. Monica Brinzei (Turnhout, 2013), I, prol., q.1, a.3 (201-2, ll. 108-14): *Sed contra primum correlarium arguitur, quia, sicut dicitur in I Topicorum, principia sunt: ‘que non sunt per alia, sed per se ipsa habent fidem’. Sed auctoritates contentae in sacro canone non per se ipsa, sed per aliud habent fidem, scilicet per auctoritatem Ecclesie, iuxta illud Augustini Contra epistolam fundamenti, capitulo 2: ‘Ego Evangelio non crederem, nisi me Ecclesie catholice commoveret auctoritas*. In response to this objection d’Ailly goes on to use Rimini’s response seen above; see the apparatus to Brinzei (2013), 202-3.

whole-hearted approval of Rimini's interpretation of the passage and its utilization as support for a very distinct understanding of theological practice.²⁴

This portrait of d'Ailly, however, is complicated by a second use of the passage, this time in his political works on the nature of church authority rather than in his explicitly theological works. Here we see him quite clearly utilizing the distinction between two senses of the word 'church' invoked by Ockham to interpret the Augustinian passage. There he writes:

If I speak of the universal church, this sometimes has the meaning of the congregation of all believers who are now alive. Sometimes the meaning is more general, and may refer to the congregation of all the faithful who have succeeded one another from the time of Christ and the apostles until the present day ... In this sense the authority of the church is greater than that of the gospel, because the evangelist, or the author of the gospel, is part of the church.²⁵

D'Ailly, therefore, represents an ambiguous case that is often overlooked. While in his *Sentences* commentary he appears to follow Rimini wholesale, his political work appears to hold out the possibility of an extra-scriptural tradition, the material of which could potentially fall underneath the purview of the theologian. Like Ockham, the central thrust here is by no means to assert the authority of a single pope over Scripture. However, he is arguing for the greater authority of a church council, as a representative of the historical tradition and the universal church, over both Scripture and the current pope. Thus, he paves the way for an extra-scriptural source of religious truth. For this reason, Oberman identifies d'Ailly as a clear representative of those acknowledging an extra-scriptural tradition, and de Kroon sees him as a clear follower of Ockham.²⁶ However, it should be noted that neither Oberman nor de Kroon mention d'Ailly's use of Rimini's interpretation of the Augustinian passage in his own discussion of theological principles.

Peter Plaoul

Finally, one last example from the very end of the fourteenth century confirms the influence of Ockham's distinction between two senses of the word 'church' to explain Augustine's assertion. In this case, there is little ambiguity

²⁴ For an important discussion of d'Ailly's understanding of theological praxis and its close relationship to the view espoused by Rimini, see L.B. Pascoe, *Church and Reform* (2005), 208-25.

²⁵ Pierre d'Ailly, *Utrum Petri Ecclesia Lege gubernetur*, in Jean Gerson, *Opera Omnia*, ed. L.E. Dupin (Antwerp, 1706) I 665-6: *Nam sumendo eam pro Ecclesia universali quandoque sumitur pro congregatione omnium fidelium actu existentium. Quandoque vero generalis sumitur pro congregatione omnium fidelium a tempore Christi vel Apostolorum usque nunc succentium; ... Et isto modo accipit Augustinus Ecclesiam in Libro Contra Manichaeos ... Hoc enim modo Ecclesia est majoris auctoritatis quam Evangelium sit; quia hujus Ecclesiae Evangelista seu scriptor Evangelii pars existit*, trans. M. de Kroon, *We Believe in God* (2009), 12-3.

²⁶ See H.A. Oberman, *Harvest* (1963), 382 and M. de Kroon, *We Believe in God* (2009), 14.

about whether the wider sense of tradition includes teachings or dogma preserved by the church that were not written down and therefore lie outside of Scripture. This discussion is found in a source that is omitted in other surveys of this quotation because it has only emerged as part of my ongoing editorial work on the *Sentences* commentary of Peter Plaoul.²⁷

Peter Plaoul lectured on the *Sentences* in the academic year of 1392/93.²⁸ In lecture 76, Plaoul spends some time answering the question of whether or not the church or Scripture is of greater authority. The answer, he says, depends on the way in which church is understood.

He writes first:

The church seems to be of greater authority than Scripture. First because the church, understood in its primary signification ... immediately receives from the Holy Spirit the entire teaching contained in the Bible, and is received in a living subject in a manner which is more noble than in other subjects. In the second place, the church is greater in its extension, for many [within the church] knew things that were not written down.²⁹

The last line here rather explicitly shows that Plaoul is committed to an authoritative extra-scriptural tradition, which is maintained and preserved by the community that is the church. At the same time, he follows up this declaration by saying: if by 'church', we simply mean the congregation of faithful people and prelates gathered in this council, then Scripture is of greater authority than the church.³⁰

It is at this point that the objection comes, invoking the authority of Augustine. How can you say that Scripture is of greater authority than the church when Augustine says: 'I would not believe the Gospel if the authority of the

²⁷ See <<http://petrusplaoul.org>> and <<http://lombardpress.org>> (accessed on December 20, 2015).

²⁸ For a recent biography of Plaoul, see Hélène Millet, 'Pierre Plaoul (1343-1415): Une grande figure de l'université de Paris éclipsée par Gerson', in *Itinéraires du savoir de l'Italie à la Scandinavie (X^e-XVI^e siècles): Études offertes à Élisabeth Mornet* (Paris, 2009), 179-200; Thomas Sullivan, 'Plaoul, Petrus', in *Parisian Licentiates in Theology, AD 1373-1500: A Biographical Register*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 2004-11), II 433. For an early discussion of his *Sentences* commentary, see Palémon Glorieux, 'L'Année universitaire 1392-1393 à la Sorbonne à travers les notes d'un étudiant', *RevSR* 19 (1939), 429-82. For an updated overview and justification for the lecture numbers used in the citations below, see Jeffrey C. Witt, 'Peter Plaoul's Lecture Commentary on the *Sentences*', *Manuscripta* 58 (2014), 159-270. The sigla R refers to a representative witness, Reims, Bibliothèque Municipale, ms. 506.

²⁹ Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 76 (R, fol. 121^{rb}): *Patet quia ecclesia sumpta primaria significatione, ut sumitur septima decima propositione, recipit immediate a Spiritu Sancto totam doctrinam in biblia contentam, et modo nobiliori in subiecto vitali quam alibi. Secundo ipsa ecclesia fuit extensive maior, quia plures sciverunt qui non scripserunt, et ex illis fuit unus immensus, qui fuit apostolus et praedicator veritatis. Ideo, ratione circumstantiae personae, ecclesia est immensa auctoritatis, licet adhuc ecclesia et scriptura ad idem innitantur.*

³⁰ Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 76 (R, fol. 121^{rb-va}): *Capiendo 'ecclesiam' pro aggregatione fidelium vel praelatorum in consilio celebrando, quantum ad hoc, scriptura videtur maioris auctoritatis.*

church did not move me to do so'.³¹ Plaoul responds with a more detailed exposition of Augustine's famous claim. The objection can be answered by assuming that by 'church' Augustine meant the 'church' in its primary signification, meaning the tradition of church that includes both what is written and extra-scriptural wisdom that has been passed down throughout church history. In this case, Augustine did not mean that the opinion of the present church council should outweigh the scriptural tradition.³²

Clearly following Ockham's analysis, as d'Ailly did, Plaoul thinks that by 'church', Augustine means an aggregate of teachings and truths compiled from what was written down in Scripture and by what was known but not written down. Such an interpretation allows us to reconstruct the grounds for belief in Scripture along the lines suggested by Hermann of Schildesche and Francis of Marchia. Contra Rimini, Plaoul would seem to agree with Schildesche and Marchia that church tradition includes extra-scriptural truths that one must recognize in order to believe that Scripture is the Word of God and that Scripture is true.

Concluding reflections

Stepping back, it is clear that Ockham's reading of this quotation is decisive in the late fourteenth century. While Ockham's initial aim was not primarily to assert an extra-scriptural tradition, his interpretation of the Augustinian passage

³¹ Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 76 (R, fol. 121^{va}): *Sed respondendum est ad Augustinum dicentem 'Evangelio non crederem nisi auctoritas ecclesiae ad hoc me compelleret', igitur auctoritas ecclesiae est maior quam auctoritas scripturae quod est contra propositionem immediate praecedentem.*

As an aside, it is important to recognize that Plaoul uses the word *compelleret* here rather than *commoveret*. This use is noticed by Oberman in d'Ailly's own treatment of the passage in the same context and is consistent with the form of the quotation used in Ockham's *Dialogus*. According to Oberman, in d'Ailly's text: '*commovere* ... is replaced by *compellere* and interpreted as *approbare*, a term which suggests more duality between Scripture and church than the phrasing of Augustine's text itself', H.A. Oberman, *Harvest* (1963), 385. Rimini (and d'Ailly in his *Sentences* commentary), in contrast, preserves the phrase *commoveret* (see above fn. 20 and 23), which is consistent with the sense in which the church does not stand apart as a separate authority, but rather is a motivating cause to accept Scripture as the first and highest authority.

³² It is worth noting that Plaoul then offers a second response, conceding perhaps that Augustine did mean 'church' in the second mode, that is, the opinion of a present council of prelates and preachers of the church. In this case, then, Augustine would only have meant that he would not have known about the Gospel unless that church had told him about it. And this, he says, does not imply that the present church council would have greater authority than the authority of Scripture to which the church points. He explains: *Secundum modo potest intelligi quod licet in secunda significatione sumatur ecclesia, tamen sensus esset 'evangelio non crederem nisi auctoritas ecclesiae ad hoc me compelleret', id est, nescivissem hoc esse evangelium, et per consequens non adhaererem nisi ecclesia tradidisset. Cum hoc tamen non stat quin auctoritas scripturae sit quodammodo maior*, Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 76 (R, fol. 12^{va}).

– against those attempts to assert the pope’s authority over Scripture – ultimately did just this. This reading is then followed most clearly by d’Ailly and Plaoul in political contexts, who firmly assert the presence of an extra-scriptural authority, for which a theologian must account.

Further, this quotation has been at the center of controversies about the proper starting point of theology. The question going forward is to what degree one’s position on the authoritative nature of tradition is intertwined with his or her position on proper theological practice. Rimini, for example, as we saw, uses the Augustinian quotation to support a conception of theological practice that fundamentally begins with Scripture alone. This description of theological practice almost certainly suggests that he would deny the presence of an extra-scriptural theological authority. In contrast someone like Plaoul, who is very clearly committed to an extra-scriptural source of tradition, shows signs of a very different approach to theology. In a longer article, this could be explored in more detail, but suffice it to say that Plaoul conceives of theology primarily as a practice of argumentation for the truths of Scripture from various concepts of God possessed independently of Scripture. For example, Plaoul wrestles with the question of whether or not the fact that ‘God is’ is the first principle of theology or whether or not it is a conclusion of theology. While acknowledging that it can function as a conclusion when gleaned from Scripture, he also insists that the truth of Scripture itself rests on this principle. He explains:

That ‘God is’ can be found and deduced from Sacred Scripture, and yet, as it has been said, Sacred Scripture is deduced from the fact that ‘God is’, because from the fact that ‘God is’, this teaches man, and it teaches and instructs him in a mental science, and consequently a written and vocal [science] is required for the salvation of humanity.³³

This reasoning shows that, for Plaoul, strictly speaking, the first principle of theology is not the truth of Scripture or a truth contained therein, but rather the proposition that ‘God is’.³⁴ When this proposition is fully understood, assisted by the light of faith, one can recognize its logical consequences, including the need for providential instruction on how to attain salvation.

For Plaoul, everything depends on the quality of the concept of God that one possesses. Most errors about the divine occur because one does not begin with a sufficiently robust concept of God.³⁵ Thus, he claims there are infinite types

³³ Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 18 (R, fol. 26^{va}): *Etiam reperitur ‘Deum esse’ et deducitur ex Sacra Scriptura ‘Deum esse’, et tamen, ut dictum est, Sacra Scriptura deducitur ex eo quod Deus est, quia eo ipso quod Deus est, docet hominem, et sibi docet et instruit scientiam mentalem, et consequenter scriptam et vocalem requisitam pro salute generis humani.*

³⁴ Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 18 (R, fol. 26^{vb}): *Pono istam conclusionem secundum: quamvis Deum esse sit simpliciter et absolute primum principium...* (emphasis mine).

³⁵ For example, Plaoul states: *Et breviter dicendum quod generaliter omnes errores, quos habuerunt philosophi de ipso Deo et eius proprietatibus, habuerunt ortum ex defectum praedicti conceptus, licet aliqui habuerunt verum conceptum ipsius Dei, quia non omnis conceptus ipsius*

of theology, determined by the gradations of perfection proper to each concept of God. Further, faith is primarily referred to as an illuminating power and not as a commitment to a particular proposition, such as 'all Scripture is true and trustworthy'. He states: 'Faith does not enter into the theological process as part of the antecedent, proving the conclusion'.³⁶ Instead, he sees faith as a necessary illuminating power, strengthening the power of our intellect so that we can see the concept of God clearly and then deduce further theological truths.³⁷ Faith is an illuminating power that strengthens the natural intellect and allows it to accurately grasp truths about God.³⁸ Only when the natural intellect is strengthened in this way is it possible to have a sufficiently clear concept of God such that trustworthy truths and propositions can be derived: truths that include propositions leading one deductively to trust the scriptural tradition.

For example, as noted above, the first principle of theology for Plaoul is not, 'that Scripture is true', but that 'God exist'. From this fact, many other truths follow including the third theological principle that 'God sufficiently provides the law and teaching for supernaturally directing [human beings] to salvation'.³⁹ From this, one can deduce further that God, in his immense goodness, will sufficiently teach the minds of men, and thus, consequently, will provide a sufficient vocal means of instructing the mind. Finally, Plaoul says, the deduction leads to confidence that the Bible is this providentially instructing Word of God and that it is true and can be trusted.⁴⁰

Finally, we can connect this view of theology directly back to Plaoul's position on the existence of an extra-scriptural tradition and his interpretation of Augustine's famous dictum. In the very same passage where Plaoul explains how the veracity and trustworthiness of Scripture can be deduced from a sufficiently

Dei est sufficiens ad hoc quod sit subiectum theologiae, etc., Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 17 (R, fol. 25^{va}).

³⁶ Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 18 (R, fol. 25^{va}): *Fides non intret processum theologicum tamquam pars antecedentis theologicam conclusionem probantis...*

³⁷ He explains that, while faith is not relied upon as a prior proposition, it remains necessary to strengthen the weakness of the natural intellect: ... *ipsam tamen requiritur ad sic scientifice assentiendum ... Secunda pars conclusionis satis radicata fuit in praecedentibus, nam lumen naturale sibi derelictum non posset attingere ad speciales articulos fidei, nec ad veritates theologiae speciales, ergo etc.*, Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 18 (R, fol. 25^{va-vb}).

³⁸ According to Plaoul, faith does three things. It fortifies the intellect, illuminates it, and liberates it from error. *Primo enim, ut tactum est, fides fortificat intellectum. Secundo illuminat intellectum. Et tertio liberat ipsum ab assensu errorum et apparentiarum sophisticarum contra veritates theologicas*, Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 18 (R, fol. 25^{vb}).

³⁹ Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 18 (R, fol. 27^{vb}): *Tertium principium posset poni quod Deus providit sufficienter lege et doctrina supernaturalibus dirigentibus ad salutem.*

⁴⁰ Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 18 (R, fol. 27^{vb}): *Primum est quod sufficienter docuit genus humanum de salute sua mentaliter, consequenter vocaliter, et consequenter in scriptura. Ex quo sequitur, secundo, quod Biblia et omnia in Scriptura Sacra contenta sunt assentienda tamquam approbata a Spiritu Sancto et a Deo dirigendo et docendo hominem in necessariis requisitis ad suum finem consequendum et salutem suam.*

clear concept of God – and therefore scriptural authority rests on a prior extra-scriptural authority – he explains that church, understood as the aggregate of the prophets, apostles, and Christ, is superior to Scripture because these were the minds through which God’s mental direction and guidance was vocalized. Further, even considered apart from the historical church’s connection to Christ, and considered as a mere aggregate of preachers, Plaoul again insists on the church’s superiority because it possesses ‘many more noble mental pieces of knowledge’ than the necessary and useful, but limited propositions that were vocally recorded in Scripture.⁴¹

In conclusion, the identification of d’Ailly’s use of Rimini’s interpretation of the Augustinian passage and the discovery of Plaoul’s use of this quotation serve to remind us how much more we have to learn about the fourteenth century and how many more texts need to be edited and made accessible before we can tell any kind of definitive story about the medieval reception of this passage. At this point, only a greater sampling of late medieval interpretations of this Augustinian passage coupled with that author’s views about theological method will help us to confirm such a connection. For the moment, however, the present survey hopes to be enough to suggest that this is a fruitful line of pursuit.

⁴¹ Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, lectio 18 (R, fol. 27^{vb}): *Uno modo pro aggregatione omnium prophetiarum, apostolorum, etc., et isto modo auctoritas Sacrae Ecclesiae est immense, quia realiter Christus fuit unus apostolorum qui fuit auctoritatis immensae et isto modo Ecclesia esset maioris auctoritatis quam Sacra Scriptura. Item capiendo Ecclesiam pro aggregatione omnium praedictorum secluso capite quantum ad auctoritatem infallibilem sunt similes quia habuerunt multes mentales notitias nobiliores quoad ipso quam sit Sacra Scriptura.*

Augustinian, Humanist or What? Martin Luther's Marginal Notes on Augustine

Pekka KÄRKKÄINEN, Helsinki, Finland

ABSTRACT

Martin Luther began his career as a theologian in a convent for Augustinian Hermits in Erfurt. His earliest writings contain marginal notes on Augustine's works. Luther was not only interested in Augustine as an Augustinian Hermit. Instead of basing his theological thinking on the usual authorities, such as the standard theologian of the order, Giles of Rome, Luther called for a return to the theological purity of earlier writers, such as Peter Lombard and especially Augustine. This approach may be seen as a humanist return to the sources. Despite this programmatic remark, Luther seems to have retained much of the late medieval theological tradition. Curiously enough, the authorities he cites are not writers of his own order, but those of the *via moderna*, followed by secular theologians in his home university. This article will investigate whether we can find characteristics of Luther's different intellectual contexts in his early reading of Augustine and how these characteristics fit in the overall picture of his theology during this early phase.

Introduction

Western theology seems to be replete with marginal notes on Augustine. Whether or not this is true in general, it certainly applies literally to Martin Luther's earliest writings. The earliest surviving witnesses of Luther's theological thinking date from the time when he was an Augustinian Hermit in Erfurt, and they consist of glosses to different theological texts, many of them from Augustine.¹

Luther is an important historical figure in the transition between the Middle Ages and the Age of Reformation. In terms of intellectual history in general, the Lutheran Reformers formed one important part of the Renaissance humanists' criticism of medieval intellectual culture. Luther had been strongly influenced by the Erfurt humanist circle since the beginning of his studies in the University.² However, at the time these comments were produced, he also had to prove

¹ Jun Matsuura (ed.), *Martin Luther, Erfurter Annotationen 1509-1510/11*, Archiv zur Weimarer Ausgabe der Werke Martin Luthers 9 (Köln, 2009).

² Helmar Junghans, *Der Junge Luther und die Humanisten* (Göttingen, 1985), 71-93.

to his scholastic teachers that he was competent in the traditional lectures of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. This lecturing formed the major part of the studies for the theological degree of Bachelor of *Sentences*.³

However, Luther's interest in the Augustinian corpus seems not to have risen out of his duty to lecture on the *Sentences*. Already before beginning the lectures, Luther had begun reading Augustine's works and writing glosses on them, which have survived in our time in the copies he used. Nevertheless, after beginning the lectures on Lombard's *Sentences*, Luther's work with Augustine intensified. We cannot say for sure whether Luther read Augustine's works only for himself or whether he lectured on them to the students as he did with the *Sentences*. In any case, the number of glosses shows that he systematically went through individual works of Augustine, which would suggest public lecturing.

The dating of the glosses has been recently established by Jun Matsuura, who has published a completely revised edition of Luther's early marginal glosses with an extensive introduction. According to Matsuura, some of Luther's comments on, for example, *Confessions* and *De doctrina Christiana*, date from the time before the *Sentences* lectures, whose dating we know from other sources. Parallel with the lectures on the first book of the *Sentences*, Luther commented on Augustine's *De Trinitate* and perhaps the *Enchiridion*. Together with the second book of the *Sentences*, Luther continued commenting on the *Enchiridion* and some other minor works, and again on *Confessions* and *De doctrina Christiana*, adding to them *De civitate Dei*.⁴

It seems that Luther read Lombard following the humanist principle of 'back to the sources' (*ad fontes*). After trying to figure out the true meaning of Lombard's own text and leaving aside much of the later medieval commentary tradition, he plunged into the sources upon which Lombard had built his theology. The first and foremost was Augustine.

Luther drafted his method of proceeding in a comment written on the inside of the front cover of his copy of Lombard's *Sentences*. There he praised both Lombard and Augustine in the following words:

Although I have held that the spoils of philosophy are not to be utterly rejected insofar as they are suitable to the sacred matters of theology, nevertheless the prudent restraint and unsullied purity of the Master of the *Sentences* seem extremely proper, in that in every respect he so relies upon the lights of the Church, and especially upon Augustine (the brightest light, whose praise is never sufficient), that he seems to hold in suspicion, as it were, whatever is anxiously explored but not yet known by the philosophers.⁵

³ Jun Matsuura, 'Einleitung', in *id.* (ed.), *Martin Luther, Erfurter Annotationen 1509-1510/11* (2009), XLIX.

⁴ *Ibid.* LVII-LVIII.

⁵ J. Matsuura, *Martin Luther, Erfurter Annotationen 1509-1510/11* (2009), 258: *Quamquam non penitus refutandam praedam philosophiae ad sacra theologiae accommodam duxerim, tamen in hoc vehementer placet Magistri Sententiarum prudens continentia et puritas intemerata, quod*

Of course, Luther also had one advantage over his fifteenth-century predecessors: the newly printed editions of Augustine's works. In 1505-6 in Basel, Veit Amerbach had published the first complete edition of Augustine's works, which seems to have been available in the bookshelves of the Erfurt Augustinians. Luther did not yet use this edition as the base text of his lectures, but used other editions, including Amerbach's earlier editions of *De Trinitate* and *De civitate Dei*. However, in the case of texts that were not available in earlier printed editions, Luther used Amerbach's complete edition.⁶ Like several humanists before him, Luther also provided emendations to the texts he used based on other printed editions and possibly also available manuscripts. Also here, Amerbach's complete edition was to him a great help.⁷

However, despite his humanist aspirations, Luther was still bound to his late medieval background in several ways. Since Luther is known as a major critic of medieval theology, in the following I will focus on Luther's critical remarks and through them evaluate how far he advanced from the late medieval reading of Augustine at this phase of his career.

Luther, Augustine and the criticism of ancient philosophers

Luther is especially fond of those passages in which Augustine rebukes the ignorance of the philosophers. In some of these cases, Luther seems to apply Augustine's words to ancient philosophers or his own contemporaries, but due to the lack of explicit references and the vagueness of the content, the targets are hard to identify. These cases may be taken more as a kind of rhetorical strengthening of cases where Luther offers more substantial criticism based on Augustine's views.⁸

In some cases Luther uses Augustine to argue against certain views of Aristotle. Criticism of the use of Aristotle in theology was to become a major topic in Luther's later reformatory theology, and it is interesting that in these early texts Luther made use of Augustine in supporting the criticism. Accordingly, Luther inserts glosses such as 'Aristotle does not notice this'⁹ or 'against Aristotle'.¹⁰ In commenting on Augustine's discussion of happiness in *De Trinitate* XIII, Luther calls Aristotle a 'story-teller' (*fabulator*) because the Philosopher considers

in omnibus ita innititur ecclesiae luminibus, maxime illustrissimo iubari et nunquam satis laudato Augustino, ut tanquam suspecta habere videatur quaecunque a philosophis sunt anxie explorata sed nondum nota. Trans. Philipp W. Rosemann, 'Conclusion: The Tradition of the Sentences', in Philipp W. Rosemann (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* 2 (Leiden, 2010), 522.

⁶ J. Matsuura, 'Einleitung' (2009), CV-CVI.

⁷ *Ibid.* LXXIII-LXXVI.

⁸ Luther, *Erfurter Annotationen*, 153, 195, 229, 237.

⁹ *Ibid.* 197.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 244.

happiness as the fulfilment of one's own virtue, in contrast to Augustine.¹¹ In the comments on the same issue in *De civitate Dei* XIX, Luther also wonders how his contemporaries do not notice the discrepancy between Aristotle's view and the Christian faith as Augustine did.¹²

Luther had to do some work in identifying the positions Augustine rejects as Aristotelian, but in the case of the Stoics, he was able to rely more on Augustine's explicit references. Above all, Luther adopts Augustine's rejection of the Stoic ideal of *apatheia*.¹³ Among the late medieval theologians, this was not particularly original.¹⁴ However, in the midst of the growing influence of ancient Stoicism during the sixteenth century, it may be noted that Luther very consciously preserved this part of Augustine's legacy, and it was carried on by his colleague Philipp Melanchthon even into the latter part of the century.¹⁵

Luther, Augustine, and the criticism of Scotus

Luther used a similar strategy regarding the medieval authors, especially for John Duns Scotus. For example, when reading Augustine's *De Trinitate* I 8, Luther finds support for the rejection of the Scotist doctrine of the possibility of the enjoyment of one Trinitarian person without the others, in the following words of Augustine: 'Whether, therefore, we hear, show us the Son; or whether we hear, show us the Father; it is just as much right, since neither can be manifested without the other'.¹⁶ Luther is here far from being original: the same passage was quoted by Ockham and Peter of Ailly against Scotus. Luther even lacks the next necessary logical step, which was explicated by Ockham, from the assertion that 'the Father cannot be manifested without the Son' to the assertion that 'the Father cannot be thought of (*intelligere*) without the Son'.¹⁷ Luther simply states that the passage is 'against Scotus'.¹⁸

¹¹ *Ibid.* 607.

¹² *Ibid.* 645.

¹³ *Ibid.* 629.

¹⁴ Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford, 2004), 282.

¹⁵ Günter Frank, 'Stoa und frühneuzeitliche Rationalität: Philipp Melanchthons Konzept der Geistphilosophie', in Barbara Neymeyr, Jochen Schmidt and Bernhard Zimmermann (eds), *Stoizismus in der europäischen Philosophie, Literatur, Kunst und Politik: Eine Kulturgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Moderne* (Berlin, 2008), 550-2.

¹⁶ Augustine, *De Trinitate* 1.8, according to Luther's copy in Luther, *Erfurter Annotationen*, 565: *Siue ergo audiamus: ostende nobis filium: siue audiamus: ostende nobis patrem: tantumdem valet: quia neuter sine altero potest ostendi.*

¹⁷ William Ockham, *Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio* I d.1 q.5 (461-2), in Guillelmi de Ockham, *Opera Theologica* I (St. Bonaventure, 1967); Peter of Ailly, *Quaestiones magistri Petri de Ailliaco cardinalis Cameracensis super libros Sententiarum* (Strasbourg, 1490; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), I, q.2 a.3 (BB).

¹⁸ Luther, *Erfurter Annotationen*, 565.

Therefore, this case stays inside the boundaries of the late medieval school of *via moderna*. Luther's silence concerning the specific argumentation found in his predecessors gives the impression of some dependence on their views. However, in favour of Luther, one must note that in his comments on Lombard's *Sentences*, Luther does indeed develop his argumentation against Scotus somewhat independently.¹⁹ The comments on the *Sentences* also reveal a generally more robust use of the technical terminology of late medieval Trinitarian theology, which owes much to standard authorities of the *via moderna*, above all to Peter of Ailly.²⁰

Criticism of Augustine?

We have seen that Luther used Augustine in his attacks on several kinds of writers, both philosophers and theologians. What about Augustine himself? Did Luther see the Church Father as some kind of infallible norm of orthodoxy? Far from it. Luther did indeed raise a critical tone also against Augustine, although with uttermost constraint and caution. The clearest case of Luther's most moderate criticism of Augustine is found in the discussions concerning divine persons and their attributes.

In *De Trinitate* 6 and 7, Augustine explicitly rejects an earlier Latin pro-Nicene reading of 1Cor. 1:24, which states that the divine Father is wise through the divine Son. Augustine's point seems to have been that the 'Nicene' formulas 'God of God' and 'Light of Light' imply that the Father shares all the divine attributes through his own divine essence and not through the Son, since it is the Father who communicates these attributes to the Son.²¹ Luther particularly strongly disliked the idea of refuting the formulation 'the Father is wise through the Son'. He suggested that the better solution would be to make a distinction between the different uses of the term 'wise'. Used as an absolute term, the Father would be called wise through the unborn wisdom, which is the divine essence. Used as a relational term, the Father would be called wise through the born wisdom, who is the divine Son.²²

The clearest statement on the issue is not found in Luther's comments on Augustine, but in his comments on Lombard's *Sentences*. Even there he does not want to openly contradict Augustine, but begins with a reservation: 'If Augustine would not say the contrary, I would say...' and then proceeds to state that 'the Father is not wise through himself, but through the Son who is

¹⁹ Pekka Kärkkäinen, 'Martin Luther', in Philipp W. Rosemann (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard 2* (Leiden, 2010), 478.

²⁰ P. Kärkkäinen, 'Martin Luther' (2010), 480-3.

²¹ Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge, 2010), 236-7, 240.

²² Luther, *Erfurter Annotationen*, 583.

his wisdom'. Luther's argument is that the term 'Father' is a relational term: you cannot name the first person of the divinity as Father without an allusion to a Son. Therefore it is unnecessary to posit wisdom as an attribute of the Father apart from his being in unity with the Son. Consequently, whenever the Father is mentioned, he can be said to be wise through the Son, who is his wisdom. Interestingly, Luther refers favourably to a text by Ambrose quoted by Lombard with the same distinction, which states that 'you cannot name or say "Father" without at the same time naming the Son also'. So Luther seems to prefer the earlier pro-Nicene reading over Augustine in this particular case, although he refrains from claiming it as true.²³

Conclusion

In these early glosses, the young reformer appears as an eager reader of Augustine, but as such is still bound in many ways to his immediate intellectual context in late medieval theology. He tries to find a solid foundation for his theology in Augustine's writings, but uses inherited forms of discussion and does not wish to openly contradict the Church Father or his own scholastic heritage. To sum up, Luther's intention was to be genuinely Augustinian, a humanist, and a theologian of the *via moderna* all at the same time.

²³ *Ego nisi aliter diceret beatus Augustinus, ego dicerem quod pater non est pater nisi ex filio siue filiatione: ita nec seipsum sapiens sed per filium qui est eius sapientia, qua est sapiens... Ratio est, quia pater est relatiuum. Et vt hic dicit Ambrosius, non potest nominari nec dici pater, nisi connominetur et filius. Ibid. 301. See also Pekka Kärkkäinen, *Luthers trinitarische Theologie des Heiligen Geistes* (Mainz, 2005), 57.*

Bullshitting Augustine: Patristic Rhetoric and Theological Dialectic in Philipp Melanchthon's *Apologia* for the Augsburg Confession

David C. FINK, Greenville, USA

ABSTRACT

The evangelical reformers of the sixteenth century deployed patristic sources for a wide variety of uses, often appealing to the authority of the ancients in polemical contexts to give added weight to their biblical exegesis. This essay explores the gap between dialectical and rhetorical use of the writings of Saint Augustine in the early work of Philipp Melanchthon, in connection with arguments over justification by faith in the latter's Pauline exegesis and the *Apologia* of the *Augsburg Confession*. The essay argues that even as Melanchthon's understanding of justification developed away from the position of Augustine in the later 1520's and early 1530's, he continued to claim the sanction of Augustine's support up until the publication of his 1532 commentary on *Romans*. Moreover, correspondence from this period suggests that Melanchthon was aware of the gap between his patristic rhetoric and his theological dialectic, a fact that raises difficult questions concerning Melanchthon's probity in his appeals to patristic authority. These questions are set within the wider context of Melanchthon's intellectual development, and it is argued that rather than an outright lie, Melanchthon's disingenuous appeals to Augustine can best be understood as a form of bullshit, a category which may be of some help in illuminating the contested reception of patristic authorities in the polemics of the Reformation era.

As historians, we are trained to read our sources with empathy. My own Doktorvater liked to remind his graduate students that for historians, the only commandment that really mattered was the fourth (or, for Jews and Calvinists, the fifth): 'Honour your father and your mother, that you may live long in the historical guild'. It's not our job to argue with our sources; it's our job to understand them. Indeed, empathy is the prime virtue of a historian: the ability to transcend the assumptions and commitments of our own time and to encounter the past as truly other is what makes history worth doing, and is itself an act of honouring our forebears. And yet, just as the honour owed one's parents is never absolute, so also there must be limits on the historian's willingness to interpret the past 'on its own terms'. In this essay, I explore a peculiar case in which the intractable nature of the sources themselves has forced me to

qualify the historian's default position of empathy – not to accuse, but to understand my sources.

Over the course of his long career, Philipp Melanchthon drew heavily on the writings of Augustine in the formulation of his own theology, and frequently appealed to the authority of the venerated saint in his public disputes with Catholic opponents. But Melanchthon's own theology, as well as his understanding of Augustine, was continually evolving, especially in the first 10-15 years of his career as a public figure. Toward the end of this period, a significant gap opened up between Melanchthon's public, rhetorical use of Augustine, and the trajectory of his own theology on the doctrine of justification by faith. I suspect that scholars working on patristic reception history are frequently aware of such gaps, but what makes this case different is the fact that we are in possession of a piece of personal correspondence which demonstrates that Melanchthon was as well. Later in his career, Melanchthon toned down his appeals to Augustine's authority and even publicly distanced himself from Augustine's position on this question – perhaps a tacit recognition that his earlier rhetoric had run away from him. Yet the reformer's apparently fast-and-loose deployment of patristic texts can only partially be understood on the subject's own terms. Fortunately, we have close at hand a homespun metaphor – though one not lacking in critical rigor – which nicely explains the phenomenon at hand, while also showing some promise for making sense of a wider range of appeals to patristic warrant in polemical contexts.

Contra Parisienses

On April 15, 1521, the faculty of theology at the University of Paris issued a *Determinatio* condemning 104 propositions culled from the pages of Martin Luther's treatise *On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, published the previous year. The document declared Luther to be an 'archheretic who had revived the fanaticism of the Manichaeans, the Hussites, the Wycliffites, the Begars, Pepuzians, Arians, Lamperians, Waldensians, and Bohemians'.¹ This rhetorical strategy was typical of many of the initial responses to Luther by conservative polemicists: rather than engaging directly with his scriptural exegesis or historical argumentation, the Sorbonne merely identified Luther's position with old heresies which had long since been refuted. Since there were, after all, no new heresies, no new counter-arguments were required.²

¹ Clyde L. Manschreck, *Melanchthon. The Quiet Reformer* (New York, 1958), 66. See the *Determinatio*, ed. Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider, in *Philippi Melanthonis opera quae supersunt omnia* 1, Corpus Reformatorum 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1834), 366-88.

² Ralph Keen, 'The Fathers in Counter-Reformation Theology in the Pre-Tridentine Period', in Irena Backus (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists* (Leiden, 1997), 701-43, 715-6.

Luther himself was occupied by the imperial diet at Worms when the Sorbonne issued its condemnation, but his young colleague at Wittenberg, Philipp Melanchthon, responded on Luther's behalf two months later in an essay entitled, *Against the Furious Decree of the Parisian Theologasters*.³ Melanchthon's ire had been piqued not only by the imperious tone of the *Determinatio*, but also by the Sorbonne's refusal to answer Luther's critique of the church's sacramental system on its own terms. 'They accuse Luther of heresy', Melanchthon wrote, 'not because he dissents from Scripture, but because he dissents from the universities, from the holy fathers, and from the councils'.⁴ Melanchthon responded with one of the clearest articulations of what would become the Protestant Scripture principle: it is Scripture that is axiomatic in theology, and later tradition – to include councils, universities, and the holy fathers – is to be judged by its faithfulness to Scripture, not the reverse. 'It is this', observes Peter Fraenkel, 'that allows [Melanchthon] to envisage calmly the possibility of dissenting from the ancients, especially where the changed situation of the present makes it necessary'.⁵

In point of fact, however, Melanchthon had no intention whatever of conceding that Luther's teaching actually did represent a break with the early church. On the contrary, he was adamant that 'the return to Scripture is identical with the return to the best teaching of the Fathers'.⁶ Throwing down the gauntlet on one of the central points in dispute, Melanchthon challenged his readers to consider whether Luther's teaching on grace and free will was not in complete agreement with that of St. Augustine.⁷ Indeed, Melanchthon turned the rhetorical guns of the Sorbonne theologians against themselves by arguing that the Luther controversy was really a re-enactment of another ancient battle against heresy, the Pelagian controversy.⁸ To be sure, Luther may have expressed himself differently from Augustine in some places, but this was simply a question of Luther having achieved greater clarity (*argutius*), not a difference in substance.⁹ Melanchthon finished his polemic with a rhetorical flourish worthy of his training as a humanist *rhetor*: 'Behold! In the chief place, and thus in the

³ Philipp Melanchthon, *Adversus Furiosum Parisiensem Theologastrorum decretum Philip. Mel. pro Luthero apologia* (CR 1: 398-416).

⁴ Melanchthon, *Adversus Furiosum Parisiensem* (CR 1: 402).

⁵ Peter Fraenkel, *Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the Patristic Argument in the Theology of Philip Melanchthon*, Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance 46 (Geneva, 1961), 34.

⁶ P. Fraenkel, *Testimonia Patrum* (1961), 34.

⁷ Melanchthon, *Adversus Furiosum Parisiensem* (CR 1: 403): *Iam nec hoc permittemus vobis, adversari vel patribus, vel consiliis Lutherum. Et ut de patribus primum loquar, an non Lutheri de libero arbitrio, de gratia, si recte rem aestimes, sententia tota Augustini est.*

⁸ Melanchthon, *Adversus Furiosum Parisiensem* (CR 1: 403). See also P. Fraenkel, *Testimonia Patrum* (1961), 32.

⁹ Melanchthon, *Adversus Furiosum Parisiensem* (CR 1: 404): *Fortassis alter alicubi quiddam dixit argutius et multa Lutherus diligentius (rumpite vos interim, Magistri nostri) quam Augustinus. Sed hoc ad rei summam non ita multum facit.*

one which reigns above all, Luther has Augustine on his side (*Lutherus habet ὁμόψηφον Augustinum*), by no means the meanest of the fathers'.¹⁰

This seems to have been Melanchthon's considered judgment throughout the 1520's and up through the negotiations surrounding the imperial diet at Augsburg in 1530 – that is, Luther's teaching on justification by faith alone represented a repristinization and clarification of Augustine's mature theology, especially as represented in the anti-Pelagian writings.¹¹ Not long after the Augsburg debates, however, Melanchthon seems to have come to see things differently. We may take as our *terminus a quo* the *Apology of the Augsburg Confession*, with its lengthy defence of the confession's fourth article (*De iustificatione*), and as our *terminus ad quem* the 1532 edition of the *Römerbrief-Kommentar*, in which Melanchthon explicitly broke with Augustine's position.

Pro Augustinum

Melanchthon had begun work on the *Apologia* in July of 1530 based on a transcription of the *Confutatio* as it had been read aloud before the Emperor. He did not receive a copy of his opponents' text, however until October of that year, upon which he felt constrained to answer what he described as the 'insidious and deceitful arguments' advanced against the article on justification in particular.¹² The article in question was a short, terse distillation of evangelical teaching which hewed closely to the vocabulary and syntax of Paul's language in the *Epistle to the Romans*:

¹⁰ Melanchthon, *Adversus Furiosum Parisiensem* (CR 1: 404): *Ecce in primario loco adeoque in eo in quo potissimum regnat Lutherus habet ὁμόψηφον Augustinum et patronum minime vulgarem*. Melanchthon displays a humanist's delight in embroidering his prose with obscure classical expressions. The Greek word ψῆφοι refers to the small, round stones used by the ancient Athenians to count votes (e.g., Herodotus, *Hist.* 9.55), and eventually the word came to stand for the vote itself (e.g., Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 680).

¹¹ Fraenkel asserts that 'from his very earliest years Melanchthon felt bound to criticize the great African's conception of faith as insufficient in evangelical eyes', P. Fraenkel, *Testimonia Patrum* (1961), 300, but the only source he cites for this claim prior to 1531 is a pamphlet of 1522 containing a short note, *quonam iudicio legendi Autores*, ed. Heinrich Ernst Bindseil, in *Philippi Melanthonis opera quae supersunt omnia* 20, Corpus Reformatorum 20 (Frankfurt am Main, 1854), 705-8. Here Melanchthon warns that Augustine 'speaks feebly' (*tenuius loquitur*) in his treatise *De fide et operibus*, failing adequately to distinguish between 'historical faith' (*historica cognitione*) and 'faith in God' (*fiducia in Deum*). He concedes, however, that Augustine writes more clearly in many other places. In what follows, I will be arguing for a shift, right around 1531, in Melanchthon's attitude to Augustine's conception of justification by faith, a shift unrelated to this earlier complaint about Augustine's lack of clarity. Thus, I am unpersuaded by Fraenkel's contention that Melanchthon was critical of Augustine's conception of faith 'from his very earliest years'.

¹² See Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert (eds), *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (Minneapolis, 2000), 108.

Likewise, [the Lutheran pastors] teach that human beings cannot be justified before God by their own powers, merits, or works. But they are justified as a gift on account of Christ through faith when they believe that they are received into grace and that their sins are forgiven on account of Christ, who by his death made satisfaction for our sins. God reckons (*imputat*) this faith as righteousness (*Rom. 3* and *4*).¹³

This formulation is capable of sustaining a wide range of interpretations, from the purely forensic models of later Protestant Orthodoxy to a view of justification much closer to that of St. Augustine, involving both the acceptance and the transformation of the sinner.¹⁴ The language of imputation is clearly forensic, but because the formulation simply repeats the biblical syntax, no explicit foreclosure is made on a traditional Augustinian reading of justification as a transformative process concurrent with God's acceptance of the sinner into grace and forgiveness of sins.

This impression is only heightened by Melancthon's rhetorical strategy in the *Apology*, where he cites Augustine six times in unqualified support of the evangelical position.¹⁵ Not only this, he even suggests that Luther's teaching is compatible with Augustine's way of describing salvation as a 'reward' (*munus*) for the working of God's grace in the believer. This is clearly a response to the argument advanced by the imperial theologians in the *Confutatio*, which charged the reformers with utterly severing the link between grace and good works, thereby falling into the ancient heresy of Manichaeism in their zeal to avoid Pelagianism. 'All Catholics', the *Confutatio* concludes, 'admit that our works of themselves have no merit, but God's grace makes them worthy to earn eternal life'.¹⁶ The *Confutatio* had thus shifted the terms of the debate from the

¹³ *The Book of Concord* (2000), 38-41. The Latin and German texts are found in Ernst Friedrich Karl Müller (ed.), *Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche* (Leipzig, 2010), 56: *Item docent, quod homines non possint iustificari coram Deo propriis viribus, meritis aut operibus, sed gratis iustificentur propter Christum per fidem, cum credunt se in gratiam recipi et peccata remitti propter Christum, qui sua morte pro nostris peccatis satisfecit. Hanc fidem imputat Deo pro iustitia coram ipso, Rom. 3 et 4.* The German text reads: 'Weiter wird gelehrt, daß wir Vergebung der Sunde und Gerechtigkeit vor Gott nicht erlangen mögen durch unser Verdienst, Werk und Genugtu, sonder daß wir Vergebung der Sunde bekommen und vor Gott gerecht werden aus Gnaden umb Christus willen durch den Glauben, so wir glauben, daß Christus fur uns gelitten habe und daß uns umb seinen willen die Sunde vergeben, Gerechtigkeit und ewiges Leben geschenkt wird. Dann diesen Glauben will Gott fur Gerechtigkeit vor ihm halten und zurechnen, wie Sant Paul sagt zun Romern am 3. und 4.'

¹⁴ Robert Kress points out that although Article IV was rejected by the Catholic theologians charged by Charles V with drafting the *Confutatio* at the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, the text 'does not teach a merely external and forensic justification, as if nothing happened in the justified human being'. Robert Kress, 'The Roman Catholic Reception of the Augsburg Confession', *Sixteenth Century Journal* 11, no. 3 (1980), 115-27, 119.

¹⁵ *The Book of Concord* (2000), 125 (*Nat. et gr.* 40.47; *Gr. et lib. arb.* 8.19); 136 (*Spir. et lit.* 13.22); 138 (*Spir. et lit.* 29.51); 149 (*Ret.* 1.19.3); and 171 (*Gr. et lib. arb.* 6.15).

¹⁶ Philipp Melancthon, *Responsio Pontifica seu Confutatio Augustanae Confessionis* 1.4, ed. Heinrich Ernst Bindseil, in *Philippi Melanthonis opera quae supersunt omnia* 27, Corpus

simple contrast between faith and good works presented in the *Confessio Augustana* to the more complex question of the relation between justification and God's transformative grace. This is an important development, as it made clear that the primary disagreement between the Catholics and the reformers was not over the necessity of grace for justification – and thus, not simply a rehash of the Pelagian controversy. Rather, the debate now centred on the mode in which God's grace is given. And by claiming that grace-empowered works were accepted by God as the basis for eternal life, the Catholic theologians aligned themselves firmly with Augustine, whose celebrated dictum, 'when God crowns our merits, he is simply crowning his own gifts', would often be cited by figures on both sides of the debate.¹⁷

But Melanchthon was not yet willing to concede that Augustine was δμώηφον with his opponents. Rather, he attempted to reinterpret Augustine's terms by reading 'reward' as 'compensation' (*compensatio*) for afflictions and works, rather than as merits which have any sort of claim on God's justice:

What then about rewards? First, if we were to say that eternal life is called a reward, because it is owed to the justified on account of the promise, we would not be speaking unreasonably. For there is a correlation among the gifts with reference to one another, just as Augustine also says, 'God crowns his own gifts in us'. However, Scripture calls eternal life a reward, not because it is owed on account of works, but because it compensates for afflictions and works, even though it happens for a completely different reason. Just as an inheritance does not come to a son of a family because he performs the duties of a son, nevertheless, it is a reward and compensation for the duties he performs. Therefore, it is enough that the word 'reward' is connected to eternal life because eternal life compensates for works and affliction.¹⁸

Whether or not this is a convincing reading of Augustine's argument is beyond the scope of this essay. The outcome, however, is clear: the Augustinian language of reward for grace-empowered works was removed from its original context (*i.e.*, a transformative model of justification) and redeployed in a much more limited sense to describe 'bodily and spiritual rewards, which are bestowed both in this life and in the life to come'.¹⁹ In other words, Melanchthon kept Augustine's language, while reinterpreting it in a much more circumscribed sense.

Reformatum 27 (Frankfurt am Main, 1859), 81-184, here 95: *Omnes catholici fatentur, opera nostra ex se nullius esse meriti; sed gratia Dei facit, illa digna esse vita aeterna*. See also Robert Kolb and James A. Nestingen (eds), *Sources and Contexts of the Book of Concord* (Minneapolis, 2001), 108-9.

¹⁷ Augustine, *Epistola* 194.5 (190, ll. 14-5), *Epistulae*, ed. A. Goldbacher, CSEL 57 (Vienna, 1911): *Cum Deus coronat merita nostra, nihil aliud coronat quam munera sua*. See also *id.*, *De Gratia et libero arbitrio*, PL 44, 6.15 (890-1).

¹⁸ See the *Apologia*, in *The Book of Concord* (2000), 171 (4.362c)

¹⁹ See the *Apologia*, in *The Book of Concord* (2000), 171 (4.362d).

Tanquam Augustinum

In the Preface to the *Apology*, Melanchthon explained that throughout the controversy he had ‘always made it a point to adhere as closely as possible to traditional doctrinal formulas in order to promote the attainment of concord’.²⁰ We get further insight into how Melanchthon executed this rhetorical strategy in a remarkable letter written the same year as he was composing his response to the imperial theologians. In the fall of 1530 and the spring of 1531, Melanchthon sent out drafts of his *Apology* as it progressed and solicited input from a number of his colleagues, including Johannes Brenz. Brenz wrote back sometime in the spring of 1531, advancing what appeared to Melanchthon and Luther as a rehash of Augustine’s view, namely that justification consisted not merely in the external pronouncement of God’s favour, but in the interior renewal brought about by the Holy Spirit.²¹ In contrast with the irenic tone in the *Apologia*, Melanchthon’s reply is striking for its candid assessment of Augustine’s position:

You still cling to the fancy of Augustine (*Augustini imaginatione*), who argued as he did in order to deny that the righteousness of reason is reckoned before God for righteousness; and he thought rightly. But later it was imagined that we are reckoned righteous because of this fulfilment of the law, which the Holy Spirit effects in us. ... This fancy locates righteousness in our fulfilment [of the law], in our cleanness or perfection, even if this renewal is supposed to follow from faith. But tear your eyes away from this renewal and from the law entirely, to the promise and to Christ, and consider that we are righteous and find peace of conscience because of Christ – this is our acceptance before God – and not because of that renewal.²²

Here Melanchthon articulated what would prove to be his mature position, the strictly forensic conception of justification which decisively set Protestant

²⁰ See the preface to the *Apologia*, in *The Book of Concord* (2000), 110 (11-2).

²¹ Johannes Brenz’s letter is not extant; its content must be surmised based on the reply by Melanchthon and Luther.

²² Philipp Melanchthon, *Texte 1151*, ed. Walter Thüringer, in *Melanchthons Briefwechsel: Kritische und kommentierte Gesamtausgabe: Texte* (Stuttgart, 2003), 108, l. 4-109, l. 18: *Tu adhuc haeres in Augustini imaginatione, qui eo pervenit, ut neget rationis iusticiam coram deo reputari pro iusticia; et recte sentit. Deinde imaginatur nos iustos reputari propter hanc impletionem legis, quam efficit in nobis spiritus sanctus. Sic tu imaginaris fide iustificari homines, quia fide accipi-mus spiritum sanctum, ut postea iusti esse possimus impletionem legis, quam efficit spiritus sanctus. Haec imaginatio collocae iustitiam in nostra impletionem, in nostra mundicie seu perfectione, etsi fidem sequi debet haec renovatio. Sed tu reiice oculos ab ista renovatione et a lege in totum ad promissionem et Christum, et sentias, quod propter Christum iusti, hoc est accepti coram deo, simus et pacem conscientiae inveniamus, et non propter illam renovationem. Nam haec ipsa novitas non sufficit. Ideo sola fide sumus iusti, non qui sit radix, ut tu scribas, sed quia apprehendit Christum, propter quem sumus accepti, qualisqualis sit illa novitas, etsi necessario sequi debet, sed non pacificat conscientiam.*

theology apart from what had come before.²³ Now the divergence from Augustine could no longer be papered over: 'Augustine does not do justice to Paul's meaning (*Augustinus non satisfacit Pauli sententiae*), even if he does do better than the scholastics'.²⁴ Yet perhaps because of the way in which Melanchthon had appealed to Augustine throughout the *Apologia*, he felt compelled to explain his 'Augustinian rhetoric' further:

And therefore I invoke Augustine *as if he were entirely of the same mind* (*tanquam prorsus ὁμόψηφον*) because of the common opinion of him, even though he does not adequately explain the righteousness of faith. Believe me, my Brenz, the controversy about the righteousness of faith is great and obscure, yet you will still understand the matter rightly if you totally remove your eyes from the law and the fancy of Augustine concerning the fulfilment of the law and fix your mind entirely on the gracious promise. ... I tried to explain this in the *Apology*, but it was not possible to speak thus (as now I speak with you) because of the calumnies of our adversaries, even if I am saying the same thing.²⁵

This is a remarkable admission, and one that raises important questions about Melanchthon's use of his sources. At first blush, this letter would seem to indicate that the reformer was not being wholly candid in his deployment of theological authorities in public debate. This impression is reinforced by the way in which Melanchthon had subtly deployed Augustine's terms in the *Apologia*, a performance which was carefully constructed to give the impression of complete agreement between Augustine and the reformers – when by his own admission, Melanchthon knew perfectly well that this was not the case.

This conclusion needs to be tempered, to a certain extent, by two considerations. Accusing Melanchthon of duplicity in his patristic rhetoric depends in this instance on a clear distinction between public and private correspondence, one that is difficult to maintain in the context of sixteenth-century humanist epistolary conventions.²⁶ If the letter to Brenz was intended as a strictly private admonition, then it would seem that what we have here is something like the early modern equivalent of the microphone left on after the press conference

²³ T.W. Wengert, 'Melanchthon and Luther/Luther and Melanchthon', in Helmar Junghans (ed.), *Lutherjahrbuch* 66 (Göttingen, 1999), 55-88, 68.

²⁴ Philipp Melanchthon, *Texte 1151* (110, ll. 23-4): *Augustinus non satisfacit Pauli sententiae, etsi propius accredit quam scholastici*.

²⁵ Philipp Melanchthon, *Texte 1151* (110, ll. 24-9): *Et ego cito Augustinum tanquam prorsus ὁμόψηφον propter publicam de eo persuasionem, cum tamen non satis explicit fidei iusticiam. Crede mihi, mi Brenzi, magna et obscura controversia est de iusticia fidei, quam tamen ita recte intelliges, si in totum removeris oculos a lege et imaginatione Augustini de impletione legis et deflexeris animum prorsus in gratuita promissione. ... Ego conatus sum eam in apologia explicare, sed ibi propter adversariorum calumnias non sic loqui licet, ut nunc tecum loquor, etsi re ipsam idem dico*.

²⁶ As Kristeller notes, even the private correspondence of the humanists 'served a literary and rhetorical purpose, as we can see from the fact that they were often edited and collected by their authors', in Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources* (New York, 1979), 249.

had ended. But Melanchthon was no fool: he must certainly have known that he would have no control over what happened to the letter after it left Wittenberg. If, on the other hand, the letter was written with the expectation of a wider readership, it may well be that what Melanchthon was doing here was signalling a shift in the way he read Augustine.

Second, despite his reluctant admission that ‘it was not possible to speak thus’ in the *Apology*, Melanchthon still maintained that the substance of his position was consistent with his private advice to his colleague in the letter. In other words, Melanchthon was convinced that there was a deeper consistency to his line of argumentation that should be apparent to the careful reader. It would perhaps be uncharitable – though not inconsistent with the facts of the case – to conclude that Melanchthon was simply implying a falsehood in defence of what he took to be a deeper truth, but this might be to overestimate the degree to which both positions were fully worked out in Melanchthon’s own thinking at this point. Brenz’s reply – if he ever wrote a reply – is now lost to us, but we can imagine him responding with some heat: ‘if you think Augustine got it wrong, why don’t you come out and say so?’

Contra Augustinum

But this, as it happens, is precisely what we see the following year when Melanchthon published a greatly revised edition of his commentary on Romans. Here for the first time Melanchthon explicitly articulated in public what would come to be one of the central tenets of confessional Protestant soteriology, distinguishing the interior renewal brought about by God’s grace from the forensic declaration of righteousness *extra nos*.²⁷ Melanchthon was convinced that only the latter could give troubled consciences peace, and for this reason he set out to distinguish his position even more clearly than it had been in the *Apologia*:

Augustine handled this matter inadequately (*tenuiter*). He only said that we receive the Holy Spirit by faith, and that praying in faith we obtain the help of God to fulfil the law. But it is much better to remind the reader concerning the proper role of faith, the destruction of doubt, and that for the doubting conscience, it is not possible to fulfil the law.²⁸

²⁷ Timothy J. Wengert, *Law and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon’s Debate with John Agricola of Eisleben over Poenitentia* (Grand Rapids, 1997), 179.

²⁸ See Philipp Melanchthon, *Römerbriefkommentar*, ed. Robert Stupperich, *Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl [Studienausgabe]*, 7 vols. (Gütersloh, 1951-75), 5, 122: *Augustinus tenuiter tractat hanc particulam; tantum dicit, quod fide accipiamus spiritum sanctum, et quod fide orantes impetremus auxilium Deo ad legem faciendam. Sed multo magis prodest admonere lectorem de proprio fidei officio, de tollenda dubitatione, et quod dubitante conscientia lex non possit fieri. ... Et haec est propria evangelii doctrina: conscientias redder certas, quod Deus certo sit propitius*

The tone of this passage is rather less sharp than the exasperated letter to Brenz, but at the same time the negative evaluation of Augustine is even more decisive. In the earlier letter, Melanchthon had argued that Augustine's primary concern was to refute any confidence in the 'righteousness of reason', and he had attributed the notion that grace-empowered works play a significant role in justification to the 'imagination' of a later era. In other words, the problem was not entirely with Augustine himself, but with a later misconstrual of his meaning. In the 1532 commentary, however, this ambivalence had disappeared, and Melanchthon was prepared to concede without qualification that Augustine held the view the reformers were now rejecting, namely that 'praying in faith we obtain the help of God to fulfil the law', and that this fulfilment was (at least in part) constitutive of justification.

In the 1532 commentary we thus have not only Melanchthon's mature position on justification, but also his mature evaluation of Augustine, and the two emerge simultaneously. Melanchthon had much more to say about Augustine and the other church fathers in later years, but from here on out the message would be consistent: Augustine would remain 'the central patristic voice on Wittenberg's side in the struggle against the works-righteousness and "enthusiasm" of their opponents' to the right and to the left, even as his understanding of justification required correcting in light of what Melanchthon took to be the clear teaching of Scripture.²⁹

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to offer two brief observations. First, Protestant engagement with the patristic corpus was not always consistent or univocal. Melanchthon in particular developed a much more nuanced and selective appreciation of Augustine over the course of his career, and this would create tensions with other reformers, such as Brenz (not to mention Osiander, Bucer, and Oecolampadius), who continued to hold that 'the return to Scripture is identical with the return to the best teaching of the Fathers'.³⁰ In the end, both the Wittenberg movement and the Reformed churches moved beyond a program of mere patristic resourcement to stake out genuinely new positions, positions which in their view completed and corrected the best of what the fathers had written.

per misericordiam, quia lex simpliciter affert dubitationem et desperationem; non enim satisfacimus legi.

²⁹ T.W. Wengert, 'Philipp Melanchthon and Augustine of Hippo', *Lutheran Quarterly* 22 (2008), 249-67, 263.

³⁰ P. Fraenkel, *Testimonia Patrum* (1961), 34.

Second, we must exercise care in distinguishing between the ‘rhetorical’ and the ‘dialectical’ uses of patristic sources in the literature from this period. As Esther Chung-Kim points out in her own recent monograph, the *testamonia patrum* served two functions for the reformers: ‘on one level, the church fathers were tools for the purpose of persuasion; on another level, they were seen as building blocks to an emerging Protestant tradition whose foundation was based on the authority of Scripture’.³¹ In theory, these two functions ought to have worked hand-in-hand; in practice, as we have seen, this was not always the case. As Melanchthon himself explained in his *Three Books on Rhetoric* (1519): ‘Rhetoric and dialectic have a common purpose. The latter travels within the confines of the matter with its sails reefed, while the former manoeuvres more freely’.³² In the early years of the reformation, as the storms of controversy raged around them, there was urgent need to persuade prelates and princes that the Protestant evangel was in perfect keeping with the church’s ancient faith. As the polemical winds died down, however, it could become apparent that rhetorical appeals to the fathers had been blown far to windward and required a change of course.

Even with all these qualifications in place, we are still left with the question: was Melanchthon lying when he claimed that ‘Luther has Augustine on his side’ (*Lutherus habet ὁμόψηφον Augustinum*)? As the title of this essay suggests, I think there may be a more appropriate category for Melanchthon’s Augustinian rhetoric prior to 1532. In a justly famous essay, *On Bullshit*, philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt teases out a critical distinction between the liar and the purveyor of this more malodorous variety of falsehood:

It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows the truth. Producing bullshit requires no such conviction. A person who lies is thereby responding to the truth, and he is to that extent respectful of it. When an honest man speaks, he says only what he believes to be true; and for the liar, it is correspondingly indispensable that he considers his statements to be false. For the bullshitter, however, all these bets are off: he is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false. His eye is not on the facts at all, as the eyes of the honest man and of the liar are, except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away with what he says. He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.³³

It is quite possible that when Melanchthon took up his pen in defence of Luther in 1521, he was quite sincere in his belief that Augustine and Luther

³¹ Esther Chung-Kim, *Inventing Authority: The Use of the Church Fathers in the Reformation Debates over the Eucharist* (Waco, 2011), 9.

³² Melanchthon, *De rhetorica libri tres* (Wittenberg, 1519), A.2^r: *Commune argumentum est et rhetori et dialectico. Hic intra fines propositi negotii velis paulum contractioribus navigat, ille evagatur liberius.*

³³ Harry G. Frankfurt, *On Bullshit* (Princeton, 2005), 56.

were in lock-step on the question of justification. After all, it would be at least eight years before he himself would articulate a notion of forensic justification squarely at odds with the teaching of Augustine. But by 1530, when he wrote the *Confessio Augustana*, he was undoubtedly aware of the divergence, and his appeal to Augustine's authority is implicit, rather than explicit: he cites Augustine 'as if he were wholly of the same mind', but never actually says so. Here we must remember that, unlike modern scholars operating under the assumptions of the historical-critical ethos, 'getting Augustine right' was never an end in itself for Melanchthon – or, one is tempted to say, for any of the combatants in the theological conflicts of the sixteenth century. The 'truth' on which Melanchthon had his sights set was the theological truth of justification by faith alone, not the historical truth of whether or not Augustine held to that view with all the precision required to meet the demands of latter-day polemics. On this question, all bets are clearly off with Melanchthon, who simply does not care in the *Apology* whether what he says describes the reality of Augustine's position correctly. He simply picks out snippets from Augustine's corpus to suit his purpose. To his credit, Melanchthon seems to have realized before long that this sort of patristic bullshit was ill-suited to a clear and consistent articulation of Christian theology. Whether this is because he finally gave up hope of reconciling Augustine to the new Wittenberg theology, or because his Catholic critics were not so easily bullshitted, or because he simply came to the realization that his rhetoric had wandered too far from the course charted by his dialectic for conscience's sake, is not entirely clear.

What is clear, however, is how difficult it can be to assess the validity of theological appeals to patristic authority. Not often do we get the sort of 'smoking gun' evidence of Melanchthon's letter to Brenz, but historians would do well to attend to the ways in which appeals to the fathers allowed the reformers and their adversaries to 'maneuver more freely' in the choppy waters of theological dispute. The sixteenth century was a golden era of patristic scholarship, when many humanists engaged in Herculean effort to uncover the sources of early Christian faith, either as an end in itself, or as a prelude to deeper theological apprehension. But one suspects that just as often, patristic erudition was put to use in rhetorical contexts where the truth or falsity of historical claims was secondary to defending the *theologia vera* – whether that be the reformers' understanding of justification by faith or the deliverances of the papal curia.

This presents a curious difficulty. On the one hand, 'all historical writing requires historians to "go native"'. They must learn the languages, the customs, the intellectual assumptions, even the humor of the people they are studying'. This, however, is only part of the historian's task: 'Interpreters must interpret. They must explain to their readers in language and categories their readers can understand what they have learned from studying the writings and artifacts of an alien place and time. What they are not allowed to do is correct the opinions

of the past or reclothe long-dead figures in the fashions of the present'.³⁴ The sixteenth century was a golden age of patristic scholarship; ours is a golden age of bullshit.³⁵ Perhaps this makes our generation of historians uniquely well qualified to call it when we see it.

³⁴ David C. Steinmetz, 'Taking the Long View', the published version of his 2009 retirement lecture from Duke Divinity School, in *Taking the Long View: Christian Theology in Historical Perspective* (New York, 2011), 148-9.

³⁵ Bob Hoffman, 'The Golden Age of Bullshit', keynote address at the conference 'Advertising Week Europe 2014', published April 2, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EyTn_DgfcFE> (accessed on December 5, 2015).

The Early John Calvin and Augustine: Some Reconsiderations

Ueli ZAHND, Basel, Switzerland

ABSTRACT

In recent research it has been argued that in his early career John Calvin developed an autonomous and independent Augustinianism, by means of direct readings, that was detached from any medieval background. Yet, this is problematic since a critical evaluation of Calvin's first uses of Augustine reveals that he already cherished the African Father long before having read any of his works, while, in his very first writings, he appears to have been familiar with medieval Augustinian compilations. Reconsidering, therefore, the early Calvin's relation to Augustine, the article argues that Calvin was an Augustinian long before engaging with Augustine, and that Late Medieval Augustinianism is all but an unlikely background for his first predilection of the African Father.

It is well known that Augustine played an eminent role in the work and thought of John Calvin. Augustine is by far the most extensively cited Church Father in Calvin's writings, and Calvin's and Augustine's understanding of Christian doctrine are in agreement to such a degree that Calvin, with some justification, famously claimed Augustine to be *totus noster*.¹ Accordingly, based on two groundbreaking collections of Augustinian citations and allusions from all of the Reformer's works, compiled in the middle of the last century,² Calvin's relation to and use of Augustine have become a common and well-explored topic in modern research that underscores, in general, Calvin's predilection for the African Father.³ This appears to be true even in Calvin's earliest

¹ John Calvin, *De aeterna Dei praedestinatione*, ed. Wilhelm H. Neuser, *Ioannis Calvini Opera Omnia* 3.1 (Geneva, 1998), 30; see J. Marius J. Lange van Ravenswaay, *Augustinus totus noster: das Augustinverständnis bei Johannes Calvin*, *Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte* 45 (Göttingen, 1990).

² Luchsius Smits, *Saint Augustin dans l'œuvre de Jean Calvin*, 2 vols. (Assen, 1956-8), and Remko J. Mooi, *Het Kerk- en Dogmenhistorisch Element in de Werken van Johannes Calvijn* (Wageningen, 1965).

³ For a brief overview on the literature until 1997, see Johannes van Oort, 'John Calvin and the Church Fathers', in Irena Backus (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West. From the Carolingians to the Maurists* (Leiden, 1997), 661-700, 661-2. The most recent summary is Anthony N.S. Lane, 'John Calvin', in Karla Pollmann (ed.), *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine* (Oxford, 2013), II 739-43. See also Larissa Seelbach, 'Augustin und

writings that all rely on Augustine as their most important Patristic resource. Yet, a crucial problem remains. For, in contrast with Luther and Zwingli, who already read Augustine in their youth as part of their educational programs,⁴ it is unclear, with Calvin, at what point in his career he began to really absorb Augustinian theology and to study the Church Father's writings.

There are two trends in modern research regarding this question. After a series of studies that all too eagerly claimed the importance of Late Medieval Augustinianism Calvin would have imbibed while studying at Montaigu, under the influence of John Mair in particular, or during his law studies at Bourges and Orléans,⁵ a first modern trend is to completely deny any such influence. Since distinct Augustinian motifs are not clearly present in Calvin's earliest works, since he and John Mair may never have met at Montaigu, and since Calvin most probably studied civil law alone, and not canon law (where Augustine would have been prominent),⁶ Calvin is said to have developed, only after the time of his formal studies, his own Augustinianism, independent of medieval influences.⁷ Second, given the methodological difficulties in the detection of implicit intellectual dependencies, recent research has focused – as with the study of the reception of Augustine in general – on Calvin's explicit citations of the Church Father.⁸ For, while it is possible that unspecified doctrinal similarities between two positions are purely coincidental, explicit references imply

Calvin', in Michael Basse (ed.), *Calvin und seine Wirkungsgeschichte* (Berlin, 2011), 75-98, and S.J. Han, 'An Investigation into Calvin's Use of Augustine', in R.M. Britz and Victor E. d'Assonville (ed.), *Prompte et sincere: John Calvin and the Exposition of the Word of God*, Acta theologica Supplementum 10 (Bloemfontein, 2008), 70-83.

⁴ This is obvious for the Augustinian monk Luther; for Zwingli see, among other writings, his annotations to Francis of Mayronis' commentary on *De civitate Dei* and *De Trinitate*. On this see Daniel Bolliger, *Infiniti Contemplatio. Grundzüge der Scotus- und Scotismusrezeption im Werk Huldrych Zwinglis* (Leiden, 2003), 386-7.

⁵ As prominently proposed by François Wendel, *Calvin. Sources et évolution de sa pensée religieuse*, Études d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses 41 (Paris, 1950), 16, repeated by L. Smits, *Saint Augustin* (1956), I 14-5, and then elaborated by Karl Reuter, *Das Grundverständnis der Theologie Calvins*, Beiträge zur Geschichte und Lehre der Reformierten Kirche 15 (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1963), and *id.*, *Vom Scholaren bis zum jungen Reformator: Studien zum Werdegang Johannes Calvins* (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1981), as well as Alister McGrath, *The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation* (Oxford, 1987), 99-105.

⁶ The first to have brought forward these arguments was Alexandre Ganoczy, *Le jeune Calvin. Genèse et évolution de sa vocation réformatrice*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte 40 (Wiesbaden, 1966), 191-2; for a more recent account see Ueli Zahnd, *Calvin, l'âme humaine, et la philosophie classique. Influences philosophiques sur la Psychopannychia, premier écrit théologique de Calvin*, Cahiers de la Revue de théologie et de philosophie 23 (Geneva, 2009), 73-5.

⁷ Most prominently Heiko A. Oberman, 'Initia Calvini: The Matrix of Calvin's Reformation', in Wilhelm H. Neuser (ed.), *Calvinus Sacrae Scripturae Professor* (Grand Rapids, 1994), 122; but see J.M.J. Lange van Ravenswaay, *Augustinverständnis* (1990), 167 and 179-80, and S.J. Han, 'Calvin's Use' (2008), 80-1.

⁸ See, in particular, A.N.S. Lane, 'John Calvin' (2013).

a certain intentionality, and hence appear more significant for arguments concerning intellectual relationships. By means of studies of his explicit citations, modern research has placed the beginning of Calvin's independent engagement with Augustine, at the latest, to the first edition of the *Institutes* printed in 1536.⁹

Yet, things are not as clear as they might seem, and for three reasons in particular. First, the question of a possible influence of late medieval Augustinianism on Calvin cannot be reduced to the biographical problems of his relation to John Mair and of his possible studies of canon law. Even when assuming that Calvin never studied under John Mair, this does not relieve him from medieval influences during his stay at Montaigu.¹⁰ For, in that case, he must have studied with other scholastic teachers, and there is no reason to assume that they were less 'medieval' than Mair.¹¹ Concerning his studies at Orleans and Bourges, it is true that there is no hard evidence that Calvin studied both civil and canon law – undeniably, however, he appears to have been familiar, since his earliest writings, with one of the base texts of medieval canon law, namely the *Decretum Gratiani*.¹² Hence, whatever one considers as Calvin's true biography, given his education at Montaigu and his familiarity with medieval source texts, he cannot be detached from the late medieval background in which he grew up – but in this background, Augustine played an eminent role both in theology and philosophy.

Second, while the greater significance of explicit citations is undeniable, the problem remains that, taken on their own, these citations do not prove anything either. Just as with doctrinal similarities that do not demonstrate that one author has read the other,¹³ an explicit citation does not provide evidence of a direct reading, since it might stem either from hearsay or any kind of intermediary sources, be it anthologies or casual citations in other works at hand. Particular caution is advised in cases where a work is only mentioned once or twice or where a reference appears within a bulk of other citations.¹⁴ Yet, in

⁹ J.M.J. Lange van Ravenswaay, *Augustinverständnis* (1990), 66; J. van Oort, 'John Calvin' (1997), 666-7; L. Seelbach, 'Augustin und Calvin' (2011), 87. Others were more enthusiastic even for Calvin's earlier writings, see H.A. Oberman, 'Initia' (1994), 122.

¹⁰ See Wilhelm H. Neuser, *Johann Calvin: Leben und Werk in seiner Frühzeit 1509-1541*, Reformed Historical Theology 6 (Göttingen, 2009), 37-8.

¹¹ On the contrary, John Mair was rather open-minded regarding the new intellectual traditions, see the contributions in John T. Slotemaker and Jeffrey C. Witt (eds), *A Companion to the Theology of John Mair*, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 60 (Leiden, 2015).

¹² Ford L. Battles, 'The Sources of Calvin's Seneca Commentary', in Gervase Duffield (ed.), *Studies in John Calvin* (Appleford, 1966), 38-66, 56; see J.M.J. Lange van Ravenswaay, *Augustinverständnis* (1990), 165.

¹³ Regarding Calvin, this was already argued by F. Wendel, *Sources et évolution* (1950), 100-1; see also U. Zahnd, *Psychopannychia* (2009), 18-9.

¹⁴ If someone really had studied an entire work, he probably would cite it more than once, and simply concatenated citations remind one of florilegia, see below, fn. 51. For medieval

such mediated references to a source the supposed intentionality is even more significant, since it helps to identify the prejudices someone had about a source and its author not known from direct readings.¹⁵ Now, Calvin is known, in his early writings in particular, to have used intermediary sources such as the *Decretum Gratiani*,¹⁶ but in modern research only the need for a qualified evaluation of his unmediated citations has been recognized, based on which the beginning of his own Augustinianism was dated to the 1536 *Institutes*.¹⁷ This provokes all the more, however, the question of knowing how to classify the prominent, but mediated citations of Augustine in Calvin's pre-1536 writings.

This leads to a third point that has to be taken into account. Given that, since his earliest writings, Calvin particularly respected and preferred Augustine, he seems to have been – at least in a broad sense – an Augustinian from the very beginning of his literary career. This is all the more true since, in this early period, he more than once imitated Augustine, or, at least, legitimized his behavior with the example of Augustine.¹⁸ Hence, there seem to remain only two alternatives: either to maintain that Calvin developed his own and independent Augustinianism, and, as a consequence, to antedate this development to Calvin's earliest writings where his predilection first appears; or to consider the qualified status of his earliest citations and to admit that Calvin was an Augustinian before engaging with Augustine.

In what follows, this second alternative is defended. In the limits of this short account, the main focus lies on a reevaluation of some of Calvin's allusions to, and citations of, Augustine in his earliest writings, in order to confirm and even to elaborate on the qualified status of these references with regards to Calvin's actual reading of Augustine – as a matter of fact, there will be reasons to extend this qualification even to the 1536 *Institutes*. A few concluding remarks might adumbrate, then, how to re-open the debate for the adjacent question of knowing where else Calvin's Augustinianism was rooted if not in his own and independent readings.

Augustinian florilegia see the next note, for early modern see Arnoud S.Q. Visser, *Reading Augustine in the Reformation. The Flexibility of Intellectual Authorities in Europe, 1500-1620* (Oxford, 2011).

¹⁵ Regarding Augustine, see Erik L. Saak, 'The Augustinian Renaissance. Textual Scholarship and Religious Identity in the Later Middle Ages', in *The Historical Reception of Augustine* (2013), I 66: 'Understandings of Augustine's authority, various affinities with Augustine, interpretations of the authentic Augustine and his works, and created images of Augustine were not above and beyond, but preconditions for, how Augustine was cited'.

¹⁶ See F.L. Battles, 'The Sources' (1966), 56, and the respective paragraphs in F.L. Battles and André M. Hugo, 'Introduction', in *Calvin's Commentary on Seneca's De clementia* (Leiden, 1969), 1*-140*.

¹⁷ See above, fn. 9.

¹⁸ See below, p. 191, fn. 69.

1. Calvin's commentary on Seneca's *De clementia*

Calvin launched his literary career as a humanist in 1532 when he published a commentary on Seneca's *De clementia*. Undoubtedly, he wrote this commentary in response to a challenge posed by Erasmus and his (uncommented) edition of Seneca's works, since Erasmus had excused the lack of accompanying comments with the demand that someone *doctior, felicior, & ociosior* may fulfill this task.¹⁹ Flaunting himself as a second Erasmus, Calvin wrote a commentary that abounded with classical allusions and citations, but it has become apparent that most of these references stem from intermediary sources such as Erasmus' *Adagia*, Budé's *De asse et partibus eius*, or Philippe Beroalde's commentary on Cicero's *Tusculan disputations*.²⁰ Besides the overwhelming majority of references to classical authors, there are several that also refer to Patristic sources and, most prominently, to Augustine. In modern research, 18 allusions to the African Father have been identified,²¹ but only 14 of them explicitly name Augustine or one of his works, and only six provide a citation.²²

Most of these explicit references (three of those with citation, and all those without) allude to *De civitate Dei*. While this could indicate that Calvin actually had read the work, the modern editors of Calvin's commentary have shown that the passages referred to are so generally known and cited in Calvin's time that they do not demonstrate a personal reading.²³ With regards to one of the explicit citations, it even has been suggested that Calvin took it from the *Decretum Gratiani*, since Calvin alludes to it by means of the very title it was cited under in this medieval text of canon law.²⁴ This suggestion can be supported by a closer look at two other references. In the first reference, discussing the right

¹⁹ Desiderius Erasmus, 'Epistola nuncupatoria', in *Lucii Annei Senecae Opera* (Basel, 1529), fol. a3^v; see F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo, 'Introduction' (1969), 34*-5*.

²⁰ See F.L. Battles, 'The Sources' (1966), 40-7, and F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo, 'Introduction' (1969), 103*-4*.

²¹ L. Smits, *Saint Augustin* (1958), II 61; and the two complements in F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo, 'Introduction' (1969), 132* n. 5.

²² I.e., John Calvin, *On Seneca's De clementia*, ed. F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo (Leiden, 1969), 11, l.19; 33, ll. 35-6; 93, ll. 23-4; 103, ll. 40-1; 129, ll. 11-2; and 135, ll. 36-7.

²³ F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo, 'Introduction' (1969), 132* n. 5. J. van Oort, 'John Calvin' (1997), 663, suggests 'that Calvin consulted the 1522 edition of *De civitate Dei* by J.L. Vives together with the famous humanist's influential commentary', but he does not provide any proof for this.

²⁴ J. Calvin, *On Seneca's De clementia*, 103, ll. 40-104, l. 3: *Nam, ut ait Augustinus de communi vita clericorum, 'duae res sunt conscientia et fama. Conscientia necessaria est tibi, fama proximo tuo...'* This text appears in almost the same wording under the title of *De communi vita clericorum* in *Decretum Gratiani*, ed. Aemilius Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici* 1 (Leipzig, 1879), II, C.12, q.1, c.10 (680); while the Augustinian sermon it originally stems from (*Sermo* 355.1) is entitled *De moribus clericorum* and only has *conscientia tibi, fama proximo tuo* in the second sentence.

of asylum and alluding without citation to *De civitate Dei* 1,²⁵ Calvin describes the transfer of this right to Christian churches *ut legitur in multis iuris locis, vide Augustinum*.²⁶ Bringing together legal sources and Augustine, this reference is significant since in the occasional passages of civil law dealing with asylum, Augustine is completely absent,²⁷ while he is commonly used in those of canon law that are much more concerned with the topic – even if they usually do not refer to *De civitate Dei* 1.²⁸ Although this is no proof that Calvin relies here on canon law, he undeniably parallels the canonists' use of Augustine when dealing with asylum.

Much more telling is the second reference. It concerns the only explicit Augustine citation of his commentary that has not been identified so far, even if, in modern research, a few parallels in sense have been suggested from Augustine's oeuvre.²⁹ Discussing on what grounds one could have pity even with sinners, Calvin switches in *De clementia* 11.13-21 into the first person in order to present his own opinion:³⁰ reminding the reader of a shared and common human nature, he adds: *quemadmodum ait Augustinus 'persequamur in eis propriam iniquitatem, misereamur communem naturam'*.³¹ The modern editors of Calvin's commentary admitted that he might have drawn this citation 'from some intermediary source, but not from Gratian'³² – most probably since none of the so far suggested Augustinian parallels appears in the *Decretum*. The citation as provided by Calvin, however, was well known in the late Middle Ages from at least three different sources: first from the common glosses to *Galatians* 6:10 where, in a slightly different wording, it was explicitly attributed to Augustine;³³ second from a sermon *De generalitate eleemosynarum* that was sometimes ascribed to Augustine and almost conforms with Calvin's

²⁵ Besides *De civitate Dei* I 4 suggested by the editors, a possible reference is also *De civitate Dei* I 34.

²⁶ J. Calvin, *On Seneca's De clementia*, 111, l. 40-112, l. 1.

²⁷ E.g., the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, 5th ed., ed. Paul Krueger, Theodor Mommsen, Rudolf Schoell and Wilhelm Kroll, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1889), 1.12 (13) and 21.1.17 (211-2); see, in general, Harald Seims, 'Asyl in der Kirche? Wechsellagen des Kirchenasyls im Mittelalter', in Martin Dreher (ed.), *Das antike Asyl: Kultische Grundlagen, rechtliche Ausgestaltung und politische Funktion* (Cologne, 2003), 263-99.

²⁸ See the *Decretum Gratiani* II, C.17, q.4 (815-28); or Henry of Segusio, *Summa super titulis Decretalium* (Strasbourg, 1478), III 49 (357^v-62^r).

²⁹ L. Smits, *Saint Augustin* (1958), II 61; repeated by F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo, *Calvin's Commentary* (1969), 43, note to line 19.

³⁰ J. Calvin, *On Seneca's De clementia*, 11, ll. 13-4: *Ego vero causas mihi sum commentus quibus possem omnibus succurrere*. There are only seven other places in the commentary where Calvin intervenes with *ego* (*ibid.* 35.23, 43.2, 47.32, 72.19, 104.16 and 35, and 145.3).

³¹ *Ibid.* 11.19.

³² F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo, *Calvin's Commentary* (1969), 43, note to line 19.

³³ See both the *Glossa ordinaria*, vol. IV (Strasbourg, 1486), fol. 185^{rb-va} and Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in epistolas Pauli*, PL 191, 166C: *Persequamur ergo in malis propriam iniquitatem, misereamur in eisdem communem conditionem*.

formulation;³⁴ and third – and in Calvin’s exact wording – from the *Decretum Gratiani* in a canon that dealt with the precise question Calvin was considering and attributed the citation to Augustine.³⁵ Among these three, the most probable source for Calvin is thus Gratian, whence a third, namely two of the six verbatim citations explicitly attributed to Augustine in Calvin’s commentary, stem from the *Decretum* – which was also the source for at least three other Patristic references of Calvin’s commentary.³⁶

It appears, therefore, that in this first work of Calvin, the medieval use of Augustine was more important than has been admitted so far. It is true that, beside the much greater amount of classical citations, these few Patristic allusions seem to loose importance regardless of where they stem from. But when considering not only how often and from what sources, but also where and how these references were adopted, it becomes clear that they are used at pivotal points in the commentary. Even if Calvin tries to show off as an expert of classical thought and philosophy, he sometimes feels the need to qualify classical accounts with regards to ‘our religion’, and this is where Augustine appears.³⁷ This is most prominently the case in one of the places where Calvin cites Augustine according to the *Decretum*: after presenting the philosophers understanding of conscience, Calvin adds: *haec apud philosophos valeant, nobis vero longe aliud praescribit nostra religio*, and he goes on and cites Gratian-Augustine in order to tell what exactly our religion prescribes.³⁸ Augustine, as mediated by the *Decretum*, is thus representative of *nostra religio*, what has been considered enough to put Calvin ‘in the best Augustinian tradition’.³⁹

Yet, this is a role the Church Father plays in other passages as well. While it is true that Augustine is also used as a ‘neutral’ witness for historical episodes and for confirming the usage of a certain vocabulary,⁴⁰ when it comes to religious terms, he is the one to provide the true meaning of a concept against philosophers.⁴¹ Taken together with the other citation from the *Decretum* (or from

³⁴ This sermon can be found in PL 40, 1230; the last word is *conditionem* instead of *naturam*.

³⁵ *Decretum Gratiani* II, C.23, q.4, c.35 (916).

³⁶ Besides those detected by F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo – *Calvin’s Commentary* (1969), 25.4-9 (*Decretum Gratiani* I, d.45, c.10 [164-5], citing Gregory the Great); and *Calvin’s Commentary* (1969), 116.1-2; *Decretum Gratiani* II, C.7, q.1, c.41 (582) citing Jerome – see the reference to Gregory the Great in 27.9-11 and *Decretum Gratiani* I, d.41, c.6 (150).

³⁷ For an unpolemical reference to *nostra religio* see J. Calvin, *On Seneca’s De clementia*, 6, l. 34.

³⁸ J. Calvin, *On Seneca’s De clementia*, 103, l. 39-104, l. 3.

³⁹ F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo, ‘Introduction’ (1969), 61*.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 96*-9* and 122*.

⁴¹ This is the case to a lesser extent in *On Seneca’s De clementia*, 93, ll. 17-25, where Calvin *ut tamen intelligant lectores quid vere sit pietas* first cites Cicero, and only then Augustine; but it is obvious in 149, ll. 11-2 on pity, where Calvin alludes to Augustine *contra Stoicos*; on this last passage, see F.L. Battles and A.M. Hugo, ‘Introduction’ (1969), 61*. An exception is the term *religio* itself in 150, l. 21-151, l. 5.

another medieval source) where Calvin alludes to Augustine in order to present his own understanding of every human being worthy of pity, it becomes apparent that Augustine, as mediated by medieval sources, already played a prominent role in the formation of Calvin's earliest religious convictions, and was for him the main representative of *nostra religio*.⁴²

2. The *Psychopannychia*

The second work Calvin composed in his early career is the *Psychopannychia*, written and revised between 1534 and 1536.⁴³ This short treatise on the soul's immortality and its conscious survival after death marks the transition of the humanist Calvin to Calvin the theologian. His humanist enthusiasm is still evident, for, having challenged Erasmus in his first writing, Calvin now rivaled Cicero who, in face of the many dissenting opinions of philosophers about the soul's state after death had exclaimed: *quae vera sit, deus aliquis viderit*.⁴⁴ Calvin, in his *Psychopannychia*, proposed to look for precisely this true opinion and stated *id vero quam verum sit, nunc doceamus*.⁴⁵ He found it, however, in a new domain, since, given the philosopher's failure, Calvin proposed to argue on a purely biblical basis, saying farewell to human reasoning and philosophical accounts.⁴⁶ Besides innumerable biblical citations, the treatise has only five explicit references to classical authors, but bears more than forty allusions to Church Fathers in order to substantiate his interpretation of certain biblical passages.⁴⁷

It is important to note that this Patristic support was not used against doctrines put forward in medieval theology, but against what Calvin thought to have arisen *ex Anabaptistarum faece*.⁴⁸ Hence, while even some early Lutherans promoted the concept of soul sleep as a welcome response to the doctrine

⁴² For the meaning of *nostra religio* in late Medieval Augustinianism, see E.L. Saak, 'The Augustinian Renaissance' (2013), 66-7.

⁴³ Even if it was only published in 1542, there is no reason to assume that Calvin ever fundamentally revised his first version from 1534, see U. Zahnd, *Psychopannychia* (2009), 25-7.

⁴⁴ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, ed. Max Pohlenz (Leipzig, 1918), I 11.23 (229).

⁴⁵ John Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, ed. G. Baum, E. Cunitz and E. Reuss, in *Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia* 5, Corpus Reformatorum 33 (Braunschweig, 1866), 180. For these Ciceronian parallels in Calvin's *Psychopannychia* see Ueli Zahnd, 'Vom *philosophiae Romanae column* zum *ethnicus ille*. Die Cicero-Rezeption beim jungen Calvin', forthcoming in Günther Frank and Anne Eusterschulte (eds), *Cicero in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Melancthon-Schriften der Stadt Bretten 13 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt).

⁴⁶ Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 178.

⁴⁷ See R.J. Mooi, *Dogmenhistorisch Element* (1965), 365, and Jung-Uck Hwang, *Der junge Calvin und seine Psychopannychia* (Frankfurt, 1991), 297-311.

⁴⁸ Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 171-2.

of the purgatory,⁴⁹ Calvin's rebuttal of the concept was in line with the common medieval understanding of the immortal soul, its conscious state after corporeal death, and its progressive rapprochement with God – an understanding that, in Latin Christendom, was rooted, not least, in the thought of Augustine. Unsurprisingly, with sixteen references, Augustine is the most important Patristic resource in Calvin's treatise,⁵⁰ but once more this should not be overestimated. The references stem from eleven different works, some of which Calvin would never allude to again, and most of the references appear together with other Patristic allusions in concatenations of at least three citations.⁵¹ This very use of somewhat randomly concatenated and uncontextualized Patristic references, of course, was typical for the medieval *catena* approach to Scripture – and as a matter of fact, more than once Calvin used a reference to Augustine against Augustine's original intention, a fact Calvin would have known if he had read the passage in context.⁵² What is more, three of his 'Augustinian' references are to works that only the medievals thought to originate from Augustine, while, in humanist and reformed circles of Calvin's time, their inauthenticity was already known.⁵³

Calvin appears, therefore, to have been in line with the approach of standard medieval sourcebooks of biblical interpretation such as the *Glossa ordinaria*⁵⁴ or Peter Lombard's *Glosa magna in Psalterium et epistolas Pauli*.⁵⁵ A particularly interesting case is Calvin's exposition of *Luke* 16:19-31 with the story of the rich man and Lazarus. With the help of eight Patristic references, but none from Augustine, Calvin underscores that this passage should not be understood as a parable, but as a report,⁵⁶ an understanding which – with at least some of

⁴⁹ See U. Zahnd, *Psychopannychia* (2009), 34.

⁵⁰ See L. Smits, *Saint Augustin* (1956), II, 61.

⁵¹ Hence, more than 80% of the Patristic references are concentrated in only five passages, see U. Zahnd, *Psychopannychia* (2009), 72.

⁵² See J.-U. Hwang, *Der junge Calvin* (1991), 300-1; the same is true for most of Calvin's other Patristic references.

⁵³ I.e., the *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus* which is actually by Gennadius of Marseille, in Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 215, and the anonymous *De spiritu et anima* (*ibid.* 181 and 206-7). The reference to the former was exchanged, in the second edition of the *Psychopannychia* from 1545, with a reference to Bernard of Clairvaux; for the latter see also A.N.S. Lane, 'John Calvin' (2013), 742.

⁵⁴ Compare, e.g., Calvin's exposition of *Gen.* 1:26 (Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 180) with *Glossa ordinaria*, vol. 1 (1480), fol. a8^{ra}; or his understanding of the *sinus Abrahæ* (Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 188-9) with *Glossa ordinaria*, vol. 4 (1481), fol. f4^{ra}.

⁵⁵ See, e.g., the typical gloss that *fieri* in *1Cor.* 15:54 means *impleri* (Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 206) and Peter Lombard, *Glosa magna*, PL 191, 1691 – the later Calvin would not bother to explain this anymore, see his *Commentarius in epistolam Pauli ad Corinthos I*, ed. G. Baum, E. Cunitz and E. Reuss, in *Ioannis Calvini Opera Quæ Supersunt Omnia* 49, Corpus Reformationum 77 (Braunschweig, 1892), 563. The Augustinian citation in *Psychopannychia*, 202-3, explaining *1Cor.* 15:42, is already in Lombard's *Glosa magna*, 1688 on the same verse.

⁵⁶ Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 187.

the Patristic references provided by Calvin – was always underscored in medieval glosses, too, and in the *Catena aurea* of Thomas Aquinas in particular.⁵⁷ Now, Calvin continued by arguing that his opponents nevertheless could not claim Augustine's support, even if, at one point in *De Genesi ad litteram*, Augustine understood Lazarus as Christ and the rich man as the Pharisees, for, in introducing an analogical reading, Augustine rather confirmed the factual character of the passage.⁵⁸ The problem is that neither in *De Genesi ad litteram* nor elsewhere did Augustine introduce the analogy to which Calvin referred. It can be found, however, in Theophylactus' *Ennaratio in Evangelium Lucae*, and this is a passage that was also present in Thomas Aquinas' *Catena aurea* on *Luke* 16.⁵⁹ Whatever Calvin's direct source may have been, it is thus apparent that he relied not on personal reading, but profited from compilations that stood in the medieval tradition.

Once more, Calvin's use of these medieval Augustinian slivers is telling. It is true that at two places he slightly disagrees with what he thinks to be Augustine's opinion, but he does so in a very hesitant and respectful way, while he has no problem stating that Chrysostom simply erred.⁶⁰ At another place, where his opponents might have relied on Augustine, Calvin is concerned to show that the Church Father is on his side,⁶¹ and in a third passage, he recognizes that Augustine had once held the position of his opponents, but that he later corrected himself in his *Retractationes*.⁶² In a similar sense, he presents in yet another passage Augustine as *sui ipsius interpret*.⁶³ While the former allusions underscore in general his particular respect for Augustine,⁶⁴ the latter shows that Calvin – prior, it seems, to having read any of Augustine's works – already knew how to argue with Augustine and the specificities of his oeuvre on quite a sophisticated level. This is all the more significant since the use of the *Retractationes* and the principle of self-interpretation were prominent means by which the late medieval revival of Augustinianism could derive Augustine's true

⁵⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia*, ed. Angelico Guarienti (Torino, 1953), II 227; see also *Glossa ordinaria*, vol. 4 (1481), fol. f3^{vb}.

⁵⁸ Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 187: *Hoc magis ridiculum, quod errori suo praetendunt Augustini nomen, quem cavillantur in hanc opinionem consensisse: opinor, quia quodam loco dixerit: in parabola per Lazarum Christum intelligendum: per divitem Phariseos: quum nihil aliud significet quam narrationem transferri ad parabolam.*

⁵⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Catena aurea*, II 234.

⁶⁰ For Chrysostom, see Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 180–1; for Augustine, *ibid.* 181: *id cum multis, nec fortasse improbe, dicere poteram; and 191: Augustinus sic accipit, sed nimis dure.*

⁶¹ See above, fn. 58.

⁶² Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 202, see also above, fn. 55.

⁶³ Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 216; for Calvin's later adoption of this principle of self-interpretation for Augustine see J.M.J. Lange van Ravenswaay, *Augustinverständnis* (1990), 89 and 103.

⁶⁴ See also Calvin, *Psychopannychia*, 216: *Neque displicet, quod alicubi docendi causa traditum est ab eodem, si tamen sanum et modestum interpretem habeat.*

meaning.⁶⁵ Regarding the principle of self-interpretation that originally stemmed from the Homeric exegetical tradition, it is true that it was also used in the late medieval discussions about the right understanding of Thomas Aquinas,⁶⁶ and, of course, it would become an important tool of humanist philology and reformed biblical exegesis. Yet, taken together with the late medieval proximities of Calvin's approach to Scripture, and given the fact that he adopted the principle and applied it to Augustine (not the Bible) together with arguments based on the *Retractationes*, late medieval Augustinianism is, at least, not an unlikely background from which he might have been inspired in his *Psychopannychia*.⁶⁷

3. Two prefatory letters from 1535 and the first *Institutes*

The *Psychopannychia* was only the starting point of Calvin's privileged theological use of Augustine. In 1535, Calvin had the honor of writing the prominent prefatory letter to Olivétan's French translation of the Bible, and in the same year he dedicated, in a long letter, the 1536 *Institutes* to King Francis I. In both letters, Calvin underscored the importance and prominence of Augustine for the study of Christian doctrine,⁶⁸ and in both texts he paralleled his own positions with those of the Church Father: in the *Praefatio* to Olivétan's Bible, Calvin includes an appeal to ordinary people to engage with Scripture and legitimized these readings by reminding the reader of Augustine (together with Chrysostom) and of their similar exhortations that everybody read the Bible;⁶⁹ and in his dedication to the King, Calvin paralleled *causam nostram* with the struggle of Augustine against the Donatists, making the Father's words his own: *idem ergo nunc nostris adversariis respondemus, quod tunc Donatistis Augustinus*.⁷⁰ It seems that, after imitating Erasmus and Cicero, Calvin tried now to establish himself as a new Church Father, and as a second Augustine in particular.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, vol. IV, ed. A. Damasus Trapp (Göttingen, 1978), II, dd.3-5, q.1, a.3 (382); and for the use of the *Retractationes*, see E.L. Saak, 'The Augustinian Renaissance' (2013), 61.

⁶⁶ Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, 'Thomas von Aquin und der Dominikanerorden. Lehrtraditionen bei den Mendikanten des späten Mittelalters', *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), 260-85, 272.

⁶⁷ In this respect, I reconsider what I concluded in my *Psychopannychia* (2009), 76.

⁶⁸ J.M.J. Lange van Ravenswaay, *Augustinverständnis* (1990), 57-61.

⁶⁹ John Calvin, *Praefationes Bibliis*, ed. G. Baum, E. Cunitz and E. Reuss, in *Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia* 9, Corpus Reformatorum 37 (Braunschweig, 1870), 788-9; see J. van Oort, 'John Calvin' (1997), 664.

⁷⁰ John Calvin, *Francisco Francorum Regi*, ed. G. Baum, E. Cunitz and E. Reuss, in *Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia* 1, Corpus Reformatorum 29 (Braunschweig, 1863), 15-6. See also L. Seelbach, 'Augustin und Calvin' (2011), 86-7.

Unsurprisingly, in the 1536 *Institutes* Augustine remained the most important Patristic resource. Yet it needs to be noted that alongside the 27 detected allusions to Augustine's works – that outmatch by far any other Patristic author – are 25 references to the *Decretum Gratiani* and 16 references to Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, where many of his Augustinian citations can already be found.⁷¹ This undeniable presence of medieval resources has long been noted, but after what has been argued above, it is no longer possible to consider them as Calvin's first and unprejudiced contact with medieval theology, but rather as the continuation of an approach that was already present in his earliest writings.

Nevertheless, Calvin's independence from medieval approaches has been argued, first, since Calvin openly contested Peter Lombard's uses of Augustine,⁷² and second, since in one passage at least it seems that Calvin read for himself the Augustine text he quoted.⁷³ Concerning the first point, however, Calvin only intensified in the *Institutes* what generations of medieval theologians – and those in an Augustinian tradition in particular – had done when commenting on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, i.e. reviewing Lombard's accounts and challenging them when Lombard seemed to have misunderstood an authority.⁷⁴ Even if he advanced it in a very harsh tone, Calvin's critical attitude is thus anything but evidence for an independent, 'unmedieval' approach. The second point has been put forward with regards to a passage dealing with our acceptance of God's mercy. As a confirmation of his accounts, Calvin adduces *ut ait Augustinus: nostra merita obliti, Christi dona amplectimur*.⁷⁵ While it is true that this citation cannot be found in the typical medieval textbooks, thus suggesting an independent reading, it has to be noted that it cannot be found in Augustine, either. Against his own account (and the one of recent Calvin research),⁷⁶ Calvin is simply not citing the Church Father here, but only alluding to a passage he says to be taken from '*De verbis Apostoli*, chapter 11'. In one of Augustine's sermons *De verbis Apostoli*, a parallel in sense can indeed be found, yet the sermon is not organized in chapters, and it is the eighth, not

⁷¹ R.J. Mooi, *Dogmenhistorisch Element* (1965), 366 (I have added the 3 citations of pseudo-Augustinian works to the 24 authentic works).

⁷² J.M.J. Lange van Ravenswaay, *Augustinverständnis* (1990), 66.

⁷³ *Ibid.* 62-3; building on the work of Lange van Ravenswaay, see: J. van Oort, 'John Calvin' (1997), 666-7; S.J. Han, 'Calvin's Use' (2008), 79; and L. Seelbach, 'Augustin und Calvin' (2011), 87.

⁷⁴ Concerning sacramental theology in general, see, e.g., the reevaluations of Lombard's Augustinian accounts in the early fourteenth century in Ueli Zahnd, *Wirksame Zeichen? Sakramentenlehre und Semiotik in der Scholastik des ausgehenden Mittelalters, Spätmittelalter – Humanismus – Reformation* 80 (Tübingen, 2014), 192-222.

⁷⁵ John Calvin, *Christianae Religionis Institutio [1536]*, ed. G. Baum, E. Cunitz and E. Reuss, in *Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia* 1, Corpus Reformatorum 29 (Braunschweig, 1863), 48.

⁷⁶ See above, fn. 73.

the eleventh sermon from whose second paragraph the parallel stems.⁷⁷ Hence, when taking seriously Calvin's own indication – and he maintained it until the 1554 edition of the *Institutes*⁷⁸ – it seems that Calvin did not even know how the sermon of Augustine from which he 'cited' was organized. Be this as it may, the allusion is definitely not sufficient evidence for a personal reading of Augustine – rather it seems that, even for the 1536 *Institutes*, Calvin had not yet read the Church Father.

4. Concluding remarks

In this short survey, two things have become apparent. The first is that Calvin cherished, defended, and imitated Augustine ever since he appeared as a writer, but long before he demonstrably had read any of Augustine's works. Therefore, whether or not he was already in line with truly Augustinian motifs, Calvin tried to be an Augustinian before engaging with Augustine. The second is that, already in his very first writings and long before reading Augustine himself, Calvin was familiar with medieval texts and medieval approaches that were at the core of the medieval reception of Augustine.⁷⁹ It seems thus all but likely that Calvin's own Augustinianism was rooted in the late medieval tradition. This is not to say that scholars such as Reuter or McGrath were simply right. Beyond dispute they went too far in detecting doctrinal parallels and in claiming intellectual dependencies; yet the fact that they overshot the mark does not mean that they were completely wrong: late medieval Augustinianism remains a serious background for the theological development of the early Calvin.

This leads back to the biographical question: where would Calvin have encountered this Augustinianism? An answer cannot be the task of the present survey, yet one point should be stressed. The prominence of the *Decretum Gratiani* in Calvin's earliest works is certainly a promising trace, but still more promising seems to be his philosophical education at Montaigu. For, while it is manifest that theological works such as John Mair's *Sentences* commentary are not the place to look for Augustinian motifs that might have impressed Calvin, the philosophy that was taught in Montaigu is an obvious context. Contrary to what has been argued,⁸⁰ in this philosophy, theological resources

⁷⁷ This is referred to as *Sermo* 174, PL 38, 941. The parallel reads: *Quaere dona mea, obliviscere merita tua; quia si ego quaererem merita tua, non venires ad dona mea.*

⁷⁸ The footnote in *Ioannis Calvini opera* 1, 751, is an emendation; see John Calvin, *Institutio Christianae Religionis*, X 23 (Geneva, 1554), 555.

⁷⁹ For the role of *Glosses*, the *Decretum Gratiani*, or Peter Lombard's *Sentences* in this reception see E.L. Saak, 'The Augustinian Renaissance' (2013), 59.

⁸⁰ J.M.J. Lange van Ravenswaay, *Augustinverständnis* (1990), 160.

and Augustine in particular were prominently present. Even if Calvin might never have studied under him, John Mair is representative for this philosophical context, and as a philosopher, Mair regularly relied on Augustine, be it in logic,⁸¹ ethics,⁸² or physics.⁸³ It is this philosophical reception of Augustine, therefore, that needs further evaluation in order to reassess the underestimated, but obvious medieval background of Calvin's reception of Augustine.

⁸¹ See, e.g., John Mair, *Libri quos in artibus in collegio Montis acuti Parisius regentando compilavit* (Lyon, 1508), fols. 4^{rb}, 10^{va}, 49^{va}, 157^{ra}; and the many references to Robert Holcot's *Sentences* commentary in the same work. For a more general example, see Alexander Broadie, *The Circle of John Mair. Logic and Logicians in Pre-Reformation Scotland* (Oxford, 1985), 36-7.

⁸² E.g. John Mair, *Ethica Aristotelis* (Paris, 1530), fols. 63^v, 93^v, 94^v, 118^r, 128^v, 160^v, 167^r; see also the reference to the *Decretum Gratiani* concerning the *error Pelagii* (fol. 118^r).

⁸³ E.g. John Mair, *Octo libri physicorum* (Paris, 1526), fols. a3^{va}, s2^{rb}, s3^{vb}; see also the reference to the *Decretum Gratiani* (fol. t3^{ra}).